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
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


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MR. SERJEANT STEPHEN'S
NEW
COMMENTARIES
ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

(PARTLY FOUNDED ON BLACKSTONE.)

*"For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing
"of that I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from
"antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth, and the proficience of know-
"ledge."—Lord Bac. Adv. of Learning.*

The Seventh Edition,
BY
JAMES STEPHEN, ESQ., LL.D.,
JUDGE OF COUNTY COURTS,
LATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LAW AT KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON,
AND FORMERLY RECORDER OF POOLE.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

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
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TO

THE QUEEN.

MADAM,

THE eminent person upon whose Commentaries on the Laws of England this Work is partly founded, had the honour to obtain for his labours the patronage of a Queen Consort ; but the present Writer has to congratulate himself upon the yet more distinguished fortune of being permitted thus to dedicate his pages to a reigning Queen,—under whose gracious and beneficent sceptre the administration of the law has been such as to command universal

respect, and the law itself has been carried forward in a steady and temperate course of reform, nearer and nearer towards perfection.

I remain, Madam,
with profound respect,
Your Majesty's
loyal Subject and Servant,

HENRY JOHN STEPHEN,

SERJEANT AT LAW.

The above Dedication was prefixed to the first Edition of this Work; which appeared originally volume by volume, and was completed in the year 1845.

FROM THE
PREFACE TO THE ORIGINAL EDITION.

OF the plan and principle of this work on the Laws of England, and of the views on which it was undertaken, it may be right here to give some explanation. Though the celebrated Treatise of Blackstone still remains without a rival, as an introductory and popular work on the laws of England, the positions which it contains have been nevertheless so trenched upon by alterations in the law itself of modern date, that if the student were to rely upon its text, as containing an accurate account of our present system of jurisprudence, he would be led continually astray. The later editions of that work have consequently comprised a copious accompaniment of corrective and supplementary notes at the bottom of the page: but it is not in the nature of such a method (with whatever ability pursued) to give entire satisfaction, because it obliges the reader to transfer his attention, incessantly, from the text to the commentary, and augments also, to a considerable degree, the bulk and consequent expense of the volumes. These considerations led me to conceive that a work might prove acceptable,

which should be framed upon the plan of introducing the necessary alterations into the text itself; but the question then arose, whether it would be better to confine my effort to the reparation of those defects which new legislation and new decisions had occasioned, or to take a bolder course, and, discarding all solicitude about the measure of my adherence to the original work, to interweave my own composition with it, as freely as the purpose of general improvement might seem to require. It was upon the latter plan that I fixed, though with some hesitation, my choice.

It may be thought, perhaps, that the confidence which carried me thus far, might naturally have tempted me farther, and taught me to aspire to the construction of an entirely new treatise. But if I had been conscious of faculties adequate to such an enterprise, I should still have declined it, as founded, in my judgment, on a wrong principle. The unimpaired portion of Blackstone's Commentaries comprises many passages, which (free in other respects from objection) are so far valuable at least, that they bear the stamp of his authority; and many others whose merit is of the highest order, being distinguished by all the grace and spirit of diction, the justness of thought, and the affluence of various learning, to which he owes his fame. These relics, which are in considerable danger of perishing by their incorporation in a work now falling into decay,

may be lawfully converted, by any new Commentator on the Laws, to his own purposes; and it is manifestly not less his duty than his interest, to make the appropriation. He cannot reasonably hope to rival their excellence; and to attempt to displace them for original matter of his own, is consequently an injury to the public, and to the science of which he treats.

All passages, then, which appeared to me to fall under either of the descriptions above given, I have made it my principle to retain; but my deviations from the original work have, nevertheless, been frequent and extensive. Independently of certain objections to its arrangement (to which I shall presently revert), its exposition of particular subjects appeared to me to be often deficient in depth, in fulness, or in precision, and in some instances to be even chargeable with positive inaccuracy; so that, as I had prescribed to myself the rule of departing from Blackstone wherever I felt dissatisfied with his performance as well as where any change in the law had made a departure indispensable, it is seldom that I have been able to pursue the text for several pages in succession, without the introduction (more or less extensively) of matter from my own pen. Large portions, indeed, of original composition will be found frequently to occur in a continuous form; and even where the text of my predecessor is pursued with shorter interruption, yet it will be often apparent that fundamental alterations have

been made in the manner of treating the particular subject under discussion.

With respect to the general arrangement of the work, it is to be remarked that the order adopted by Blackstone is, in all its principal lineaments, derived from the Analysis of Hale; but though rendered venerable by the combined authority of names like these, I have not felt myself able to accede to it without alteration. The main division, indeed, by which the body of municipal law is severed into *Rights* and *Wrongs*, I have deemed it expedient to retain; for (though liable to the great disadvantage of precluding the entire or continuous discussion of some particular subjects, by making it necessary to recur to them under the aspect of *Wrongs*, after they have already once engaged our attention under that of *Rights*) it is founded nevertheless on a natural and just distinction, and is interwoven besides with the whole fabric of our law, and rooted in the minds of our lawyers. The division also of *Wrongs* into those of a *civil*, and those of a *criminal* nature, I have, for similar reasons, thought it clearly essential to preserve. But as to the division of *Rights*, the case is widely different. These are distributed by Blackstone into *Rights of Persons* and *Rights of Things*; an arrangement which has been justly considered contrary both to grammatical and logical propriety. For the rights of things can only be understood as signifying the rights *relating* to things—a sense

not correctly conveyed by the form of expression ; and are placed, besides, in false antithesis to the rights of persons ; by which is evidently intended the rights *belonging* to persons. The meaning would have been better expressed by a division into the rights relating to persons, and the rights relating to things. This fault, indeed, is the more remarkable, because it might have been avoided by a closer adherence to the language of Justinian's Institutes, which apparently served in this instance as the model : *Omne jus quo utimur* (according to this authority) *vel ad personas pertinet, vel ad res, vel ad actiones* (d).

The arrangement in question, however, is not open merely to this kind of criticism, but to other objections of a much weightier description. In the first place, it determines that the law relating to *persons* shall be fully discussed before that relating to *property* has been examined,—and yet the subject of property ought, in reason, to take the precedence of that part of the law of persons, at least, which treats of relative rights ; for it is in the nature of the relative rights, *viz.* those which grow out of the social relations of parent and child, husband and wife, magistrates and people, and the like, to *pre-suppose* the absolute ones of life, liberty, personal security, and property (e). With respect to absolute

(d) Instit. lib. i. tit. 2.

(e) This did not escape the discernment of Hale : “ Having done with “ the rights of persons, I now come to the rights of things. And though

rights of the three first descriptions, this is obvious, and the precedence therefore is properly assigned to them in Blackstone's work; but it is equally true with regard to property also—for property, like the rest, unquestionably constitutes one of the circumstances to which the social relations are adjusted, and to which they must be supposed to refer. To this right, therefore, the next place ought, in point of correct arrangement, to have been allotted; but the Commentator's plan of division makes this impossible, and compels him, after a short notice of property, to pass on, and to postpone its further examination, until all relative rights (whether private or public) have been exhausted. This inversion of the natural order is not only inartificial, but often embarrasses the discussion of rights of the relative kind. Thus in the chapter on Husband and Wife, every reader must perceive the disadvantage of the total omission to notice the effects of marriage in regard to the property of the parties; and yet until the subject of property in general had been examined, any disquisition on the proprietary rights

“ according to the usual method of civilians, and our antient common law tractates, this comes in the second place, after the *jura personarum*, and therefore I have herein pursued the same course, yet that must not be the method of a young student of the common law, but he must begin his study here, at the *jura rerum*; for the former part contains matter proper for the study of one that is well acquainted with those *jura rerum*.”—Hale's Anal. sect. 23. This passage had not attracted my attention until my principle of division had been fixed upon; and its subsequent discovery was of course calculated to give me increased confidence in the propriety of my choice.

attending that particular relation, would have been obviously premature.

Another, and a still more important objection to the method which considers *Rights* as consisting either of *Rights of Persons* or *Rights of Things*, is that it fails to embrace the whole compass of rights. There is a branch of law which belongs (properly speaking) to neither of these divisions, but of great and growing importance in our municipal system, that, namely, which concerns the social, as distinguished from the political, ecclesiastical, and judicial institutions of the country, and which comprises (among many other subjects) the laws relating to the poor, to highways, to public charities, and the like. For topics such as these, the analysis of Blackstone affords no proper place, and when they are of too much importance to be neglected, expedients of an awkward kind are often devised to make room for them. Thus the law of highways and turnpikes is made incidental to the office of parish surveyor, and the large and interesting subject of the poor laws is dealt with, by way of digression from the office of overseer.

Dissatisfied for these reasons with Blackstone's arrangement of rights, and conceiving that it had not, like the other portions of his general method, become so inveterate among us, as to render its retention unavoidable, I have consequently ventured

to lay it aside, and to adopt, so far as this subject is concerned, a different plan of distribution. This plan is entirely of my own conception. It might have been supposed, indeed, that in a field so highly cultivated as that of Rights, I could be at no loss for a satisfactory precedent; but my search for one, though prosecuted with some diligence, was not attended with success. No writer on English or American law, who has deserted the order of Blackstone, had any pretension to be considered as a model—the repositories of the Roman jurisprudence (which, with the exception of the Institutes, are notoriously defective or confused in their arrangement) supplied nothing to the purpose—the Institutes themselves (from which the division into the rights of persons and of things was originally taken) could of course afford no assistance;—and, with respect to the continental systems, they either conform (as in the Code Civil of France) to the Institutes, or, when they depart (as in the treatise of Domat) from the beaten track, their course is not such as an English jurist could follow with advantage.

The general plan which I have thus ventured, on my own responsibility, to lay down, will be found at the commencement of the first book. Its leading principle is—to make the distinction between *Persons* and *Things* the foundation not of a primary, but of a subordinate arrangement, and to con-

sider *Persons* as constituting, in a primary sense, the only objects of the law's regard. But the persons, whom the law is supposed thus uniformly to contemplate, are presented, first, in the light of insulated individuals,—and in that capacity their *personal* (in other words their *bodily*) rights are examined; next, in their connection with the things around them,—which introduces the consideration of their rights of *property*; next, as members of families,—which involves their *rights in private relations*; and lastly, as members of the community,—which leads to the discussion of their rights in public relations, or (as they may be termed more compendiously) *public rights*.

According to this order, the absolute right uniformly takes the precedence of the relative, and the law of property in general is investigated before the relations of men, in regard to property, arise for consideration. Upon this system, too, the division of *Public Rights* allows of a sub-division conveniently adapted to the discussion of those mixed subjects to which we have before referred, and which, having no exclusive connection either with person or property, it is the tendency of Blackstone's method to exclude. Public Rights are accordingly divided into those which concern a man in his relations to persons in authority, whether civil or ecclesiastical, and those which concern him in his relations to his fellow citizens at large—the

first of which falls under the heads of *The Civil Government*, and *The Church*; the second under that of the *Social Economy of the Realm*; and it is under this latter head that such mixed subjects, as above referred to, will find their regular and appropriate place. The entire arrangement of the work is consequently as follows:—

I. OF PERSONAL RIGHTS.

II. OF RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.

1. As to things real.
2. As to things personal.

III. OF RIGHTS IN PRIVATE RELATIONS.

1. Between master and servant.
2. Between husband and wife.
3. Between parent and child.
4. Between guardian and ward.

IV. OF PUBLIC RIGHTS.

1. As to the civil government.
2. As to the church.
3. As to the social economy of the realm.

V. OF CIVIL INJURIES.

Including the modes of redress.

VI. OF CRIMES.

Including the modes of prosecution.

In a production bearing the relation that has been described to the work of a former writer, I have deemed it indispensable to supply the reader with the means of readily and precisely distinguishing the portions due to either commentator, or, I should

rather say, of distinguishing them with *more* readiness and precision than could be done by aid of the internal evidence resulting from the style or matter. The sense of this has led to a method of notation by brackets, the nature of which is explained in a Notice subjoined to this Preface. It has considerably increased both the labour and the expense of the publication, and by no means contributed to the beauty of its page. But the eye soon learns to accommodate itself to the novelty, and it is believed that the reader will experience no embarrassment from its adoption. It has not been thought necessary, however, to extend it to the notes. Among these, there are many which are not in Blackstone's work, but the reference that they bear to the text, or other circumstances, will in general be found sufficiently to distinguish them from the annotations of Blackstone himself.

PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION.

IN publishing an Edition of this Work in the year 1868, although it was the first after the death of my father, I did not think it necessary to introduce it to the Public by any prefatory remarks, inasmuch as my own name had long been connected with the Commentaries during his lifetime, and also because, though the statutes and cases which had intervened since the previous Edition had rendered it necessary, throughout large portions of the Work, to alter almost every page, still there was no change in its general structure, nor any statute of such paramount importance as seemed to require any preliminary announcement.

On the present occasion the case is somewhat different. And, in the first place, with regard to the brackets. These I have been urged both by friends and strangers to discard altogether—it being suggested that the Public no longer care to distinguish the parts of the Work for which the two Authors are severally responsible. In this view, however, I find myself unable wholly to concur, as I believe that most Readers would prefer to know the authority for the passage they are

studying; and in my opinion, moreover, no general acknowledgment at the outset is sufficient fairly to explain the kind of aid which must be afforded to any Writer on English Law by the materials he appropriates from Blackstone's Commentaries. At the same time I do myself think that there is no longer any reason minutely to point out every place in which a sentence or two is taken from Blackstone, or in which an inaccuracy or deficiency in his exposition of the Law has been corrected, or where passages from his work have been omitted altogether as being not applicable to the present times. I have considered it sufficient that the Reader should be apprised whether the statement of the law on any particular subject is given *substantially* on the authority of Blackstone or not, and it is on this principle that the brackets have now been arranged.

The position of the Work in reference to the Judicature Act, 1873, also seems to call for some remark, as the Profession will naturally wish to know whether the changes introduced by that important measure will be found embodied in the Present Edition.

To this question I reply that the chief enactments of that Act will be found in these pages, and that I have explained their effect to the Student through-

out the Work, to the best of my ability. Neither trouble nor expense have been spared to accomplish this object,—with what success I must leave the public to decide.

It may also deserve notice that it has been thought it would be an improvement to commence the last Volume with the subject of Crimes, so as to comprise the subject of the redress of Civil Injuries within the compass of a single volume. This has accordingly been done, and the space in the Fourth Volume thus gained has, I think, been usefully filled up by the addition of a Table of Statutes.

Those who are acquainted with the nature and extent of the duties which fall to the lot of a County Court Judge, may possibly be surprised that I have had time for such an undertaking as the present. But the explanation is a simple one. It has always been my practice on the appearance of each Edition, to prepare for its successor by noting up in their proper places the Statutes and Cases as they arise, and the materials thus gradually amassed are always ready for use when the proper time arrives. And in employing my leisure hours in the close study of these materials, I have had the satisfaction to feel that I was performing a task to which I should be wise to devote myself, were it only in order to be able to deal properly with the

various points of law requiring to be determined in the exercise of my judicial functions.

I will only add, that a good deal of labour has been spared to me, particularly in the correction of the press and the compilation of the Indexes and Table of Statutes, by the industry of my son, Mr. Henry St. James Stephen, of the Middle Temple and of the Public Record Office.

JAMES STEPHEN.

January, 1874.

NOTICE TO THE READER.

THE portions of these commentaries which lie between brackets [] are taken *substantially* from Blackstone; and (where it has been found practicable) in the words of his text. To enable the reader to distinguish these portions from the rest of the work, upon merely opening the volume, and without being obliged to turn the leaves over backwards, the continuation of an extract is always marked by a new bracket at the top of the page.

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AT the outset of a work like the present, in the course of which it is proposed (though with the aid, in part, of materials derived from a former writer) to bring under examination no less a subject than the entire body of the English law, the discouragement to which the writer is naturally inclined by the magnitude of the task before him, is counteracted by the recollection of its general interest and importance. The subject is one to which no class of readers in the realm can be indifferent; [for it is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with those laws at least with which he is immediately concerned, lest he incur the censure, as well as inconvenience, of living in society without knowing the obligations which it lays him under. But it ought to have peculiar attractions for men of liberal education and respectable rank. These advantages are given them, not for the benefit of themselves only, but also of the public: and yet they cannot, in any scene of life, discharge properly their duty either to the public or themselves without some degree of knowledge in the laws. To evince this the more clearly, it may not be amiss to descend to a few particulars.

Let us therefore begin with gentlemen of independent estates and fortune, the most useful as well as consider-

[able body of men in the nation; whom even to suppose ignorant in this branch of learning is treated by Mr. Locke as a strange absurdity^(a). It is their landed property, with its long and voluminous train of descents and conveyances, settlements, entails and incumbrances, that forms the most intricate and most extensive object of legal knowledge. The thorough comprehension of these, in all their minute distinctions, is perhaps too laborious a task for any but a lawyer by profession: yet still the understanding of a few leading principles relating to estates and conveyancing, may form some check and guard upon a gentleman's inferior agents, and preserve him at least from very gross and notorious imposition.

Again, the policy of all laws has made some forms necessary in the wording of last wills and testaments, and more with regard to their attestation. An ignorance in these, must always be of dangerous consequence to such as by choice or necessity compile their own testaments without any technical assistance. Those who have attended the courts of justice are the best witnesses of the confusion and distresses that are hereby occasioned in families; and of the difficulties that arise in discerning the true meaning of the testator, or sometimes in discovering any meaning at all: so that in the end his estate may often be vested quite contrary to these his enigmatical intentions, because perhaps he has omitted one or two formal words, which are necessary to ascertain the sense with indisputable legal precision, or has executed his will in the presence of fewer witnesses than the law requires.

But to proceed from private concerns to those of a more public consideration. All gentlemen of fortune are, in consequence of their property, liable to be called upon to establish the rights, to estimate the injuries, to weigh the accusations, and sometimes to dispose of the lives of

(a) Education, Sec. 187.

[their fellow-subjects, by serving upon juries. In this situation they have frequently a right to decide, and that upon their oaths, questions of nice importance for the solution of which some legal skill is requisite; especially where the law and the fact, as it often happens, are intimately blended together. And when juries are incapable of doing this with tolerable propriety, it tends proportionably to lower their authority and to throw more power into the hands of the judges, to direct, control, and even reverse their verdicts, than perhaps the constitution intended.

But it is not as a juror only that the English gentleman is called upon to determine questions of right, and distribute justice to his fellow-subjects: it is principally with this order of men that the commission of the peace is filled. And here a very ample field is opened for a gentleman to exert his talents, by maintaining good order in his neighbourhood; by punishing the dissolute and idle; by protecting the peaceable and industrious; and, above all, by healing petty differences and preventing vexatious prosecutions. But, in order to attain these desirable ends, it is necessary that the magistrate should understand his business; and have not only the will, but the power also, (under which must be included the knowledge,) of administering legal and effectual justice. Else, when he has mistaken his authority, through passion, through ignorance, or absurdity, he will be the object of contempt from his inferiors, and of censure from those to whom he is accountable for his conduct.

Yet farther; most gentlemen of considerable property, at some period or other in their lives, are ambitious of representing their country in parliament; and those, who are ambitious of receiving so high a trust, would also do well to remember its nature and importance. They are not thus honourably distinguished from the rest of their fellow-subjects, merely that they may list under party banners; may grant or withhold supplies; may vote with or vote

[against a popular or unpopular administration; but upon considerations far more interesting and important. They are the guardians of the English constitution; the makers, repealers, and interpreters of the English laws; delegated to watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation; to propose, to adopt, and to cherish any solid and well-weighed improvement: bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to transmit that constitution and those laws to their posterity, amended if possible, at least without any derogation. And how unbecoming must it appear in a member of the legislature to vote for a new law, who is utterly ignorant of the old! what kind of interpretation can he be enabled to give, who is a stranger to the text upon which he comments!

Indeed it is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state of life, no other occupation, art, or science, in which some method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except only the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art, commercial or mechanical; a long course of reading and study must form the divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the laws: but every man of superior fortune thinks himself *born* a legislator. Yet Cicero was of a different opinion: "it is necessary," says he, "for a senator to be thoroughly acquainted with the constitution; and this," he declares, "is a knowledge of the most extensive nature; a matter of science, of diligence, of reflection; without which no senator can possibly be fit for his office" (b).

The mischiefs that have arisen to the public from inconsiderate alterations in our laws, are too obvious to be called in question; and how far they have been owing to the defective education of our senators, is a point well

(b) "*Est senatori necessarium diligentiae, memoriae est; sine quo nosse rempublicam; idque late paratus esse senator nullo pacto patet:—genus hoc omne scientiae, potest.*" De Leg. 3, 18.

[worthy the public attention. The common law of England has fared like other venerable edifices of antiquity, which rash and unexperienced workmen have ventured to new-dress and refine, with all the rage of modern improvement. Hence frequently its symmetry has been destroyed, its proportions distorted, and its majestic simplicity exchanged for specious embellishments and fantastic novelties. For, to say the truth, almost all the perplexed questions, almost all the niceties, intricacies, and delays, (which have sometimes disgraced the English, as well as other courts of justice,) owe their original, not to the common law itself, but to innovations that have been made in it by acts of parliament, “overladen (as Sir Edward Coke expresses it) with provisoes and additions, and many times on a sudden penned or corrected by men of none or very little judgment in law” (c). This great and well-experienced judge declares, that in all his time he never knew two questions made upon rights merely depending upon the common law; and warmly laments the confusion introduced by ill-judging and unlearned legislators. “But if,” he subjoins, “acts of parliament were, after the old fashion, penned by such only as perfectly knew what the common law was before the making of any act of parliament concerning that matter, as also how far former statutes had provided remedy for former mischiefs and defects discovered by experience; then should very few questions in law arise, and the learned should not so often and so much perplex their heads to make atonement and peace, by construction of law, between insensible and disagreeing words, sentences and provisoes, as they now do.” And if this inconvenience was so strongly felt in the reign of Elizabeth, it is easy to judge that the evil is greatly increased in our own times when our statutes have become so much more numerous and complicated.]

(c) 2 Rep. Pref.

Again, what is said of gentlemen in general, and the propriety of their application to the study of the laws of their country, is equally applicable to the nobility of this realm, except only in the article of serving upon juries. On the other hand, they have peculiar provinces of far greater consequence and concern; as they are not only by birth hereditary counsellors of the crown, but are also judges upon their honour of the lives of their brother-peers. Indeed, in reference to the decisions of the Scotch and Irish Courts, they are the arbiters in the last resort of the property of their fellow-subjects; and may, as such, find occasion to decide the nicest and most critical points of the law: though the appellate jurisdiction which they have for centuries exercised over the judgments of the *English* courts is now shortly about to cease (*d*).

It is true that in the exercise of their judicial province they are entitled to demand the attendance and advice of the collective body of the judges, by whose learning they are guided through the technical difficulties of the case before them; but it is obviously important that the members of the noble assembly itself, in whose name and under the sanction of whose authority, the judgment is to be ultimately pronounced, should be so far conversant with law as to be able to make a proper and intelligent use of the assistance thus afforded.

[The Roman pandects will furnish us with a piece of history not unapplicable to our present purpose. Servius Sulpicius, a gentleman of the patrician order, and a celebrated orator, had occasion to take the opinion of Quintus Mutius Scævola, the then oracle of the Roman law; but,

(*d*) This alteration in the functions of the House of Lords, as a court of appeal, has been effected by the Judicature Act, 1873; by one of the provisions of which, no error or appeal from the Supreme Court of Judicature thereby established

shall be brought to the House of Lords (saving however all pending rights of appeal) after the commencement of the Act on the 2nd November, 1874. (See 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 20.)

[for want of some knowledge in that science, could not so much as understand even the technical terms of which his friend was obliged to make use. Upon which Mutius Scævola could not forbear to upbraid him with this memorable reproof, “that it was a shame for a patrician, a nobleman, and an orator of causes, to be ignorant of that law in which he was so peculiarly concerned” (e). This reproach made so deep an impression on Sulpicius, that he immediately applied himself to the study of the law, wherein he arrived to that proficiency, that he left behind him about a hundred and four-score volumes of his own compiling upon the subject; and became, in the opinion of Cicero, a much more complete lawyer than even Mutius Scævola himself (f).

It will be idle to recommend to our English nobility and gentry to become as great lawyers as Sulpicius; though he, together with this character, sustained likewise that of an excellent orator, a firm patriot, and a wise indefatigable senator: but the inference which arises from the story is this; that ignorance of the laws of the land hath ever been esteemed dishonourable in those who are entrusted by their country to maintain, to administer, and to amend them.]

Nor will some degree of legal knowledge [be found in the least superfluous to persons of inferior rank, especially those of the learned professions. The clergy, in particular, besides the common obligations they are under in proportion to their rank and fortune, have also abundant reason, considered merely as clergymen, to be acquainted with many branches of the law, which are almost peculiar and appropriated to themselves alone. Such are the laws relating to advowsons, institutions, and inductions; to simony, and simoniacal contracts; to uniformity, residence, and pluralities; to tithes and other ecclesiastical dues; to mar-

(e) Ff. 1, 2, s. 43. “*Turpe esse jus in quo versaretur ignorare.*”
patricio, et nobili, et causas oranti, (f) Brut. 41.

[riages, and to a variety of other subjects, which are consigned to the care of their order by the provisions of particular statutes. To understand these aright, to discern what is warranted or enjoined, and what is forbidden by law, demands a sort of legal apprehension, which is no otherwise to be acquired than by use, and a familiar acquaintance with legal writers.]

To gentlemen of the faculty of physic the study of the law is attended with some importance, not only to complete their character for general and extensive knowledge, a character which their profession has always remarkably deserved, but also to enable them to give more satisfactory evidence in a variety of cases in which they are liable to be examined as witnesses. The frequent combination of medical with legal considerations, upon inquiries relative to suspected murder or doubtful sanity, and other points of the like nature, has given birth to a sort of mixed science, known by the name of *Forensic Medicine*, or *Medical Jurisprudence*, which may be considered as common ground to the practitioners both of law and physic.

[But those gentlemen who intend to profess the civil and ecclesiastical laws, in the maritime and spiritual courts of this kingdom, are of all men (next to common lawyers) the most indispensably obliged to apply themselves seriously to the study of our municipal laws. For the civil and canon laws, considered with respect to any intrinsic obligation, have no force or authority in this kingdom; they are no more binding in England than our laws are binding at Rome. But as far as these foreign laws, on account of some peculiar propriety, have in some particular cases, and in some particular courts, been introduced and allowed by our laws, so far they oblige, and no farther; their authority being wholly founded upon that permission and adoption. And, in those of our English courts wherein a reception has been thus allowed to the civil and canon laws, if either they exceed the bounds of that reception, by ex-

[tending themselves to other matters than are permitted to them, or if such courts proceed according to the decisions of those laws, in cases wherein it is controlled by the law of the land, the common law in either instance both may, and frequently does, prohibit and annul their proceedings (*g*): and it will not be a sufficient excuse for them to tell the courts at Westminster that such or such a practice is warranted by the laws of Justinian or Gregory, or is conformable to the decrees of the Rota or imperial chamber. For which reason it becomes highly necessary for every civilian and canonist, that would act with safety as a judge, or with prudence and reputation as an advocate, to know in what cases and how far the English laws have given sanction to the Roman; in what points the latter are rejected; and where they are both so intermixed and blended together as to form certain supplemental parts of the common law of England, distinguished by the titles of the maritime and the ecclesiastical law.]

The general use and necessity of some acquaintance with the common law being thus apparent, it may naturally be supposed that some provision would antiently have been made for this, as for other branches of education, in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. The reverse, however, is the fact—the study of the common law having until recent times been wholly neglected in those venerable seats of learning, and having been cultivated from the earliest period in a different region. How this has come to pass will appear from the following retrospect.

[Sir John Fortescue, in his panegyric on the laws of England, (which was written in the reign of Henry the sixth,) puts a very obvious question in the mouth of the young prince, whom he is exhorting to apply himself to that branch of learning: “Why the laws of England, being so good, so fruitful, and so commodious, are not

(*g*) Hale, Hist. C. L. 2; Selden in Fletam; 5 Rep. Caudrey's case; 2 Inst. 599.

[taught in the universities, as the civil and canon laws are?" (*h*). In answer to which he gives what seems, with due deference be it spoken, a very jejune and unsatisfactory reason; being, in short, that "as the proceedings at common law were in his time carried on in three different tongues, the English, the Latin, and the French, that science must be necessarily taught in those three several languages; but that in the universities all sciences were taught in the Latin tongue only;" and therefore he concludes, "that they could not be conveniently taught or studied in our universities" (*i*). But without attempting to examine seriously the validity of this reason, (the very shadow of which, by the effect of late constitutions, is entirely taken away,) we perhaps may find out a better, or at least a more plausible account, why the study of the municipal laws was so long banished from these seats of science, than what the learned chancellor thought it prudent to give to his royal pupil.

That antient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is called the common law, however compounded, or from whatever fountains derived, had subsisted immemorially in this kingdom; and, though somewhat altered and impaired by the violence of the times, had in great measure weathered the rude shock of the Norman conquest. This had endeared it to the people in general, as well because its decisions were universally known, as because it was found to be excellently adapted to the genius of the English nation. In the knowledge of this law consisted great part of the learning of those dark ages: it was then taught, says Mr. Selden, in the monasteries, *in the universities*, and in the families of the principal nobility (*h*). The clergy, in particular, as they then engrossed almost every other branch of learning, so (like their predecessors, the British Druids) they were pecu-

(*h*) C. 47.

(*i*) C. 48.

(*h*) In Fletam, 7, 7.

[liarly remarkable for their proficiency in the study of the law (*l*). *Nullus clericus nisi causidicus*, is the character given of them soon after the Conquest, by William of Malmsbury (*m*). The judges therefore were usually created out of the sacred order (*n*), as was likewise the case among the Normans (*o*); and all the inferior offices were supplied by the lower clergy, which has occasioned their successors to be denominated *clerks* to this day.

But the common law of England, being not committed to writing, but only handed down by tradition, use and experience, was not so heartily relished by the foreign clergy, who came over hither in shoals during the reign of the conqueror and his two sons, and were utter strangers to our constitution as well as our language.] And it was nearly brought to ruin by the new impulse given in the 12th century to the study of the system of Roman law compiled by Justinian, and its consequent reception over all the west of Europe; where, previously, it had possessed, in general, no authority, and had fallen almost into oblivion (*p*). [Hence that law now became in a particular manner the favourite of the popish clergy, who borrowed the method and many of the maxims of their canon law from this original. The study of it was introduced into several universities abroad, particularly that of Bologna, where exercises were performed, lectures read,

(*l*) Cæsar de Bello Gal. 6, 12.

(*m*) De Gest. Reg. l. 4.

(*n*) Dugdale, Orig. Jurid. c. 8.

(*o*) "*Les juges sont sages personnes et autentiques,—sicomme les archevesques, evesques, les chanoines des eglises cathedraux, et les aultres personnes qui ont dignitez en sainte eglise; les abbez, les prieurs conventuaux, et les gouverneurs des eglises, &c.*"—Grand Coustumier, ch. 9.

(*p*) Hallam's Middle Ages, 3rd vol. p. 513; 1 Bla. Com. 18; 1

Reeves, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 66. It has been said (and the opinion is adopted by Blackstone) that this revival was owing to the accidental discovery of a copy of the Pandects at the capture of Amalfi by the Pisans, about the year 1130. But there appears to be no sufficient evidence that any such discovery took place. (See Hallam, ubi sup.; and Histoire du Droit Romain au Moyen-Age, par M. De Savigny, ch. xviii. s. 35, ch. xxii. ss. 164, 167.)

[and degrees conferred in this faculty, as in other branches of science; and many nations on the continent, just then beginning to recover from the convulsions consequent upon the overthrow of the Roman empire, and settling by degrees into peaceable forms of government, also adopted the civil law as the basis of their several constitutions; blending and interweaving it among their own feudal customs, in some places with a more extensive, in others a more confined authority(*q*).

Nor was it long before the prevailing mode of the times reached England: for Theobald, a Norman abbot, being elected, in the year 1138, to the see of Canterbury, and being extremely addicted to this new study, brought over with him in his retinue many learned proficients therein; and, among the rest Roger, surnamed Vacarius, whom he placed in the university of Oxford to teach it to the people of this country(*r*). But it did not meet with the same easy reception in England, where a mild and rational system of laws had been long established, as it did upon the continent; and though the monkish clergy, devoted to the will of a foreign primate, received it with eagerness and zeal, yet the laity, who were more interested to preserve the old constitutions, and had already severely felt the effect of many Norman innovations, continued wedded to the use of the common law. King Stephen immediately published a proclamation, forbidding the study of the laws then newly imported from Italy(*s*): but this, which was treated by the monks as a piece of impiety(*t*), though it might prevent the introduction of the civil law process into our courts of justice, yet did not hinder the clergy from reading and teaching it in their own schools and monasteries.

(*q*) Domat's Treatise of Law, c. 13, § 9; Epistol. Innocent IV. in M. Paris, A.D. 1254.

(*r*) Gervas. Dorobern. Act. Pontif. Cantuar. Col. 1665.

(*s*) Rog. Bacon, citat. per Selden in Fletam, 7, 6; in Fortesc. c. 33; and 8 Rep. Pref.

(*t*) Joan. Sarisburiens. Polycrat. 8, 22.

[From this time the nation seems to have been divided into two parties; the bishops and clergy, many of them foreigners, who applied themselves wholly to the study of the civil law, and that of the Roman church (or canon law), which two systems now came to be inseparably interwoven with each other; and the nobility and laity, who adhered with equal pertinacity to the old common law: both of them reciprocally jealous of what they were unacquainted with, and neither of them, perhaps, allowing the opposite system that real merit which is abundantly to be found in each. This appears, on the one hand, from the spleen with which the monastic writers speak of our municipal laws upon all occasions (*u*); and, on the other, from the firm temper which the nobility shewed at the famous parliament of Merton, when the prelates endeavoured to procure an Act to declare all bastards legitimate in case the parents intermarried at any time afterwards: alleging this only reason, because holy church (that is, the canon law,) declared such children legitimate; but “all the earls and barons” (says the parliament-roll) “with one voice answered, that they would not change the laws of England, which had hitherto been used and approved” (*x*). And we find the same jealousy prevailing above a century afterwards, in the reign of Rich. II., when the nobility declared, with a kind of prophetic spirit, “that the realm of England hath never been unto this hour,—neither by the consent of our lord the king, and the lords of parliament, shall it ever be,—ruled or governed by the civil law” (*y*). And of this temper between the clergy and laity many more instances might be given.

While things were in this situation, the clergy, finding

(*u*) Joan. Sarisburiens. Polycrat. 5, 16; Polydor. Virgil, Hist. 1, 9.

(*x*) “*Et omnes comites et barones una voce responderunt, quod nolunt leges Angliæ mutare, quæ hucusque*

usitate sunt et approbatæ.” Stat. Merton, 20 Hen. 3, c. 9.

(*y*) Selden, Jan. Anglor. 1. 2, § 43; in Fortesc. c. 33.

[it impossible to root out the municipal law, began to withdraw themselves by degrees from the temporal courts; and to that end, very early in the reign of King Henry the third, episcopal constitutions were published, forbidding all ecclesiastics to appear as advocates *in foro sæculari* (b). Nor did they long continue to act as judges there, not caring to take the oath of office which was then found necessary to be administered, that they should, in all things determine according to the law and custom of this realm (c): though they still kept possession of the high office of chancellor, and of the court of chancery attached to it, a court then of little juridical power; and afterwards, as its business increased by degrees, they modelled the process of the court at their own discretion.

But wherever they retired, and wherever their authority extended, they carried with them the same zeal to introduce the rules of the civil, in exclusion of the municipal law. This appears in a particular manner from the spiritual courts of all denominations, as well as from the high court of chancery before mentioned; in all of which the proceedings are to this day in a course much conformed to the civil law; for which no tolerable reason can be assigned, unless that these courts were all under the immediate direction of the popish ecclesiastics, among whom it was a point of religion to exclude the municipal law; Pope Innocent the fourth having forbidden the very reading of it by the clergy, because its decisions were not founded on the imperial constitutions, but merely on the customs of the laity. And if it be considered that our universities began about that period to receive their present form of scholastic discipline; and that they were then, and continued to be till the time of the Reformation, entirely under the influence of the popish clergy; this will lead us to perceive the reason why the study of the Roman laws was in those days of bigotry pursued

(b) Wilkins, Concil. vol. i. p. 574, (c) Selden in Fletam, 9, 3.
599.

[with such alacrity in these seats of learning ; and why the common law was entirely despised, and esteemed little better than heretical.

And after the Reformation, many causes conspired to prevent its becoming a part of academical education: as, first, long usage and established custom, which, as in everything else, so especially in the forms of scholastic exercise, have justly great weight and authority. Secondly, the real intrinsic merit of the civil law, considered upon the footing of reason and not of obligation, which was well known to the instructors of our youth; and their total ignorance of the merit of the common law, though its equal at least, and perhaps an improvement on the other. But the principal reason of all that hindered the introduction of this branch of learning, is, that the study of the common law, being banished from our universities in the times of popery, fell into a quite different channel, and was wholly cultivated in another place.

For, being then entirely abandoned by the clergy, a few stragglers excepted, the study and practice of it devolved of course into the hands of laymen; who entertained upon their parts a most hearty aversion to the civil law, and made no scruple to profess their contempt, nay, even their ignorance of it, in the most public manner (*d*). But still, as the balance of learning was greatly on the side of the clergy, and as the common law was no longer *taught*, as formerly, in any part of the kingdom, it must have been subjected to many inconveniences, and perhaps would have been gradually lost and overrun by the civil,—a suspicion well justified from the frequent transcripts of Justinian to be met with in Bracton and Fleta,—had it not been for a peculiar incident, which happened at a very critical time, and contributed greatly to its support.

The incident referred to was the fixing the Court of

(*d*) Fortesc. de Laud. LL. c. 25.

[Common Pleas, the grand tribunal for disputes of property, to be held in one certain spot; so that the seat of ordinary justice might be permanent and notorious to all the nation. Formerly, this court, in conjunction with all the other superior courts, was held before the king's chief justiciary of England in the *aula regis*, or such of his palaces wherein his royal person resided; and removed, with his household, from one end of the kingdom to the other. This was found to occasion great inconvenience to the suitors; to remedy which it was (in the thirteenth century) made an article of the great charter of liberties, both that of King John and that of King Henry the third, that "Common Pleas should no longer follow the king's court, but be held in some certain place;" in consequence of which they have ever since been held (a few necessary removals in times of the plague excepted) in the palace of Westminster only. This brought together the professors of the municipal law, who before were dispersed about the kingdom, and formed them into an aggregate body; whereby a society was established of persons, who (as Spelman observes) addicted themselves wholly to the study of the laws of the land (*g*); and, no longer considering it as a mere subordinate science for the amusement of leisure hours, soon raised those laws to that pitch of perfection, which they suddenly attained under the auspices of our English Justinian, King Edward the first.

In consequence of this lucky assemblage, they naturally fell into a kind of collegiate order, and, being excluded from Oxford and Cambridge, found it necessary to establish a new university of their own. This they did by purchasing at various times certain houses (now called the inns of court and of chancery) between the city of Westminster, (the place of holding the king's courts,) and the city of London; for advantage of ready access to the one, and plenty of provisions in the other (*h*). Here exercises

(*g*) Glossar. 334.

(*h*) Fortesc. c. 48.

[were performed, lectures read, and degrees were at length conferred in the common law, as at other universities in the canon and civil (*i*). The degrees were those of barristers, at first styled apprentices (*apprenticii ad legem*), who answered to the bachelors: and those of serjeants (*servientes ad legem*), who answered to the doctors of the universities (*k*).

The crown seems to have soon taken under its protection this infant seminary of common law; and, the more effectually to foster and cherish it, King Henry the third in the nineteenth year of his reign, issued out an order, directed to the Mayor and Sheriffs of London, commanding that no regent of any law schools *within* that city should, for the future, teach law therein (*l*). The word law, or *leges*, being a general term, may create some doubt, at this distance of time, whether the teaching of the civil law, or the common, or both, is hereby restrained. But in either case, it tends to the same end. If the civil law only is prohibited,—which is Mr. Selden's opinion (*m*),—it is then a retaliation upon the clergy, who had excluded the common law from *their* seats of learning. If the municipal law be also included in the restriction, (as Sir Edward Coke understands it, and which the words seem to import,) then the intention is evidently this,—by pre-

(*i*) But no degree in the *canon* law is now conferred either at Oxford or Cambridge. (See Black. Com. by Christian, vol. 1, p. 392, *in notis*.)

(*k*) The first mention perhaps in our law books of serjeants, *eo nomine*, is in the statute of Westm. I. 3 Edw. 1, c. 29, and in Horne's Mirror, c. 1, s. 10, c. 2, s. 5, c. 3, s. 1, in the same reign. But M. Paris, in his Life of John II. Abbot of St. Alban's, which he wrote A.D. 1255, (39 Hen. III.,) speaks of advocates at the common law, or "countours," (*quos banci narratores*

vulgariter appellamus,) as of an order of men well known. It has been conjectured that the *coif* in a serjeant's wig was originally introduced to hide the tonsure of such renegade clergy as were still tempted to remain in the secular courts, in the quality of advocates or judges, notwithstanding their prohibition by canon to practise therein. (See Spelm. Gloss. 385.)

(*l*) "*Ne aliquis scholas regens de legibus in eadem civitate, de cætero ibidem leges doceat.*"

(*m*) In Flet. 8, 2.

[venting private teachers within the walls of the city, to collect all the common lawyers into the one public university which was newly instituted in the suburbs (*n*).

In this juridical university, for such it is insisted to have been by Sir Edward Coke (*o*), there were two sorts of collegiate houses; one called inns of chancery, in which the younger students of the law were usually placed, "learning and studying (says Fortescue) the originals, and, as it were, the elements of the law; who, profiting therein, as they grew to ripeness, so were they admitted into the greater inns of the same study, called the inns of court" (*p*). And in these inns of both kinds, he goes on to tell us, the knights and barons, with other grandees and noblemen of the realm, did use to place their children, though they did not desire to have them thoroughly learned in the law, or to get their living by its practice; and that in his time there were about two thousand students at these several inns, all of whom, he informs us, were *filii nobilium*, gentlemen born.

Hence, it is evident, that though under the influence of the monks our universities neglected this study, yet in the time of Henry the sixth it was thought highly necessary, and was the universal practice, for the young nobility and gentry to be admitted into the inns of court and chancery, there to be instructed in the originals and elements of the laws. But by degrees this custom has fallen into disuse; which seems principally owing to these reasons; first, because in these societies all sorts of regimen and academical superintendence, either with regard to morals or studies, have been thought impracticable, and therefore entirely neglected: secondly, because persons of birth and fortune, after having finished their usual courses at the universities, have seldom leisure or resolution sufficient to enter upon a new scheme of study at a new place of instruction.]

(*n*) See 2 Inst. proëm.

(*p*) C. 49.

(*o*) 3 Rep. pref.

At the present day the inns of chancery have accordingly sunk into insignificance, and an admission to them is no longer of any avail to the student in his progress to the bar. And even the resort to the inns of court is now very much confined to those to whom the knowledge of practice is absolutely necessary, that is, such as are intended for the profession (*q*).

The inns of court still enjoy, however, their antient and exclusive privilege of conferring the rank or degree of *barrister at law*; the possession of which constitutes an indispensable qualification for practising as an advocate or counsel in the superior courts. No other means of obtaining this degree exist but that of becoming enrolled as a student in one or the other of these inns (*r*), and applying, after a certain period, to its principal officers (or *benchers*) for a *call to the bar* (*s*). As a qualification for the call, the student must (as the general rule) have kept commons for three years (i.e. twelve terms), by dining in the hall of the society into which he has obtained admission, at least six times in each term. If he be, at the same time, a member of one of the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, London, Durham, St. Andrews, Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh, or of the Queen's university in Ireland, *three* days in each term are sufficient (*t*); and by the

(*q*) The Inns of Court are the Inner Temple, the Middle Temple, Lincoln's Inn, and Gray's Inn. The Inns of Chancery are Clifford's Inn, Clement's Inn, New Inn, Staples' Inn, and Barnard's Inn. Besides these, there were formerly Furnival's Inn, the Strand Inn, Lyon's Inn, and Thavie's Inn. There is also "Serjeants' Inn," which consists of serjeants only. As to these inns, see *Rex v. Barnard's Inn*, 5 Ad. & El. 17, 5 and the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into their constitution, which was presented to Parliament in the year 1855.

(*r*) The candidate for admission as a student, unless he shall have passed a public examination at one of the universities within the British dominions, must pass a preliminary examination testing his knowledge of the English and Latin languages, and of English history. (See Consol. Reg., M. T. 1872.)

(*s*) An appeal from the decision of the benchers as to calling to the bar or disbaring, lies to the judges of the superior courts in their capacity of *visitors*. (See *The King v. Lincoln's Inn*, 4 B. & C. 855.)

(*t*) Consol. Reg., M. T. 1872.

present educational system (as lately established) it is further provided that no student shall hereafter be called to the bar unless he shall, to the satisfaction of the Council of Legal Education, have passed a public examination, for the purpose of ascertaining his fitness to be so called, and have obtained from the said council a certificate of having satisfactorily passed such examination. And, accordingly, a public examination, for all the inns collectively, periodically takes place, extending to all students who are desirous of submitting themselves to that test of proficiency (*u*). It is further to be observed, that academical instruction in the principles of the law of England may now be obtained in other schools than those of the inns of court; for though no provision for instruction in such law was antiently made, as we have seen, at either Oxford or Cambridge, the deficiency has been long since redressed by the munificence of private donors, who at each university have founded professorships, with appropriate endowments for that purpose (*x*).

(*u*) Consol. Reg., M. T. 1872. Such examination must be also passed before a certificate can be obtained to be allowed to practise under the bar as a special pleader, conveyancer, or draughtsman in equity. (Ibid.)

For the purpose of affording to students the means of obtaining instruction and guidance in their legal studies, *Professors* are appointed (by a joint council of the Four Inns) of Jurisprudence, of Common Law, of Equity, and of the Law of Real and Personal Property,—together with as many *tutors* as shall from time to time be deemed necessary. And no student admitted after the 31st December, 1872, shall receive a certificate of fitness to be called to the bar unless he shall have passed a satisfactory examination “in the

Roman Civil Law, in the Law of Real and Personal Property, and also in Common Law and Equity.” (Ibid.)

It may be observed, further, that legal education is also, (as it has long been,) conducted in this country in private channels; it being very usual for the student to obtain admission as a pupil to the chambers of a barrister, special pleader, conveyancer, or draughtsman in equity; whereby he has opportunities of observing the course of actual practice, as well as the advantage of private tuition in the principles of law.

(*x*) There are also professorships of law founded at King’s College and University College (London), and in the Scotch and Irish Universities.

SECTION II. OF THE NATURE OF LAWS IN GENERAL.

[BY the term Laws we here intend to denote the rules of human action or conduct; that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and free-will, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.

Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct; not, indeed, in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle, therefore, has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently as man depends absolutely upon his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should, in all points, conform to his Maker's will.

This will of his Maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with free-will to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that free-will is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to

[discover the purport of those laws. Such, among others, are these principles,—that we should live reputably, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law (a).]

The constitution and frame of humanity are in this respect, as in all others, so contrived as to afford a striking proof of the benevolence of the great Creator. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connexion of justice and human felicity, we ought to consider the law of nature not as made up of a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised,—but as graciously reduced to this one paternal precept, “that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness.” [This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law; for the several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating that this or that action tends to man’s real happiness, and therefore concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man’s real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.]

But though the real basis of the law of nature is a tendency to promote human happiness, and though to a certain extent this consideration affords a practical test, whether a given course of conduct be naturally right or not, yet the fallibility of human reason, and its inability to judge of the ultimate consequences of things, will in general preclude the application of such a test to particular

(a) “*Juris præcepta sunt hæc, honeste vivere, alterum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere.*”—Inst. l. 1, 3. The word *honeste* in this pas-

sage has been rendered by Blackstone, vol. i. p. 40, *honestly*, which scarcely conveys the full meaning.

cases. It would seem not to have been the design of the all-wise disposer of the universe that man, even in his perfect state, should be left wholly to the guidance of his own understanding or conscience on the subject of moral duty; but it is at all events certain that, since the Fall, his corrupt and clouded faculties have proved unequal to the task.

[Ample light, however, is now afforded to him by the benign interposition of divine Providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection and the blindness of human reason, hath been pleased, at sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the Holy Scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason in its present corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As, then, the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moral system which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the natural law; because one is the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself, the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.

Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points

[in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty, but which are found necessary, for the benefit of society, to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance the case of murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law;] and, from these prohibitions, arises the chief unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, by which it is also interdicted, add comparatively but little to its moral guilt, or to the duty *in foro conscientie* of abstaining from its perpetration. [Nay, if any human law should allow or injoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But, with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws,—such, for instance, as the importation of particular commodities from foreign countries,—here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not so.]

But we are further to observe that [Man was formed for society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on this subject, is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it (*b*). However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great society, they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, and nations, entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called “the law of nations,” which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by any; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts,

(*b*) Puffendorf, l. 7, c. 1, compared with Barbeyrac's Commentary.

[treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities: in the construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of nature; being the only one to which all the communities are equally subject: and therefore the civil law very justly observes, that *quod naturalis ratio inter homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium* (c).

Thus much it appeared necessary to premise concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before a more full exposition was given of the principal subject of this section, municipal law; that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations, are governed. It is here called *municipal* law, in compliance with common speech; for, though strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of one single *municipium* or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws and customs.]

The true meaning and force of the term (taken in this its ordinary sense) may be more fully developed thus: it is "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state" (d).

[Let us endeavour to explain its several properties, as they arise out of this definition. And, first, it is a *rule*: not a transient sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uniform and universal (e). Therefore a particular Act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attain him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this Act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community

(c) Ff. l. 1, 9. It may be doubted whether Blackstone here had in his mind the technical force of the expression "*jus gentium*," as used by the writers on Roman law.

(d) "*Jus civile est quod quisque*

sibi populus constituit."—Inst. l. 2, 1.

(e) An order affecting certain individuals only was, by the Roman jurists, termed *privilegium*. See Austin on Jurisprudence, vol. i. p. 13.

[in general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an Act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accused shall be deemed high treason: this has permanency, uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as we see proper, and to judge upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the thing advised: whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon our approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counsel is only matter of persuasion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon the unwilling also.

It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from a *compact* or *agreement*; for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, "I will, or will not, do this;" that of a law is, "thou shalt, or shalt not, do it." It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising anything at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be "*a rule.*"

Municipal law is also "*a rule of civil conduct.*" This distinguishes municipal law from the natural, or revealed, the former of which is the rule of moral conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of faith. These regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbour, considered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards his neighbour than those of mere nature and religion: duties, which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which amount to no more than that he do contribute, on his part, to the subsistence and peace of the society.

[It is likewise “a rule *prescribed*.” Because a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can never be properly a law; it is requisite that this resolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the case of the common law of England. It may be notified *vivâ voce*, by officers appointed to proclaim the law which has been made. It may, lastly, be notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the most public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people. There is a still more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws *ex post facto*; when, after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator then, for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust. All laws should be therefore made to commence *in futuro*, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term “*prescribed*.” But when this rule is in the usual manner notified, or prescribed, it is then the subject’s business to be thoroughly acquainted therewith; for if ignorance, of what he might know, were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.

[But farther : municipal law is “ a rule of civil conduct prescribed *by the supreme power in a state.*” For legislature is the greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another. Wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of a law, that it be made by the supreme power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms ; one cannot subsist without the other.

This will naturally lead us into a short inquiry concerning the nature of society and civil government ; and the natural and inherent right that belongs to the sovereignty of a state, wherever that sovereignty be lodged, of making and enforcing laws.

The only true and natural foundations of society are the wants and the fears of individuals. Not that we can believe, with some theoretical writers, that there ever was a time when there was no such thing as society either natural or civil ; and that from the impulse of reason, and through a sense of their wants and weaknesses, individuals met together in a large plain, entered into an original contract, and chose the tallest man present to be their governor. This notion, of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is too wild to be seriously admitted : and besides it is plainly contradictory to the revealed accounts of the primitive origin of mankind, and their preservation two thousand years afterwards ; both which were effected by the means of single families. These formed the first natural society among themselves ; which, every day extending its limits, laid the first though imperfect rudiments of civil or political society ; and when it grew too large to subsist with convenience in that pastoral state, wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it necessarily subdivided itself by various migrations into more. Afterwards, as agriculture increased, which employs and can maintain a much greater number of hands, migrations became less frequent : and various tribes, which had formerly separated, reunited again ; sometimes by compulsion and conquest, sometimes by accident, and sometimes

[perhaps by compact. But though society had not its formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants and their fears; yet it is the *sense* of their weakness and imperfection that *keeps* mankind together; that demonstrates the necessity of this union; and that therefore is the solid and natural foundation, as well as the cement, of civil society. And this is what we mean by the original contract of society; which, though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed at the first institution of a state, yet in nature and reason must always be understood and implied, in the very act of associating together; namely, that the whole should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should guarantee to each individual member the enjoyment of certain liberties and advantages or (as they are generally termed) *rights*, and that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which submission of all, it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any.

For when civil society is once formed, government at the same time results of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order. Unless some superior be constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their several rights, and redress their several wrongs. But, as all the members which compose this society were naturally equal, it may be asked, in whose hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general answer is easy; but the application of it to particular cases has occasioned one half of those mischiefs, which are apt to proceed from misguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government should be reposed in such persons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which is among

[the attributes of him who is emphatically styled the Supreme Being; the three grand requisites, that is to say, of wisdom, of goodness, and of power; wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community; goodness, to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and strength or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural foundations of sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every well-constituted frame of government.

How the several forms of government we now see in the world at first actually began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite disputes. It is not intended here to enter into any of them. However they began, or by what right soever they subsist, there is and must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the *jura summi imperii*, or the rights of sovereignty, reside. And this authority is placed in those hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of such respective states, either expressly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the qualities requisite for supremacy — wisdom, goodness, and power—are the most likely to be found.

The political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the first, when the sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate assembly consisting of all the free members of a community, which is called a democracy; the second, when it is lodged in a council, composed of select members, and then it is styled an aristocracy; the last, when it is entrusted in the hands of a single person, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All other species of government, they say, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, these three.

By the sovereign power, as was before observed, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that power resides, all others must conform to and be directed by it, whatever appearance the outward form and administration of the government may put on. For it is at any

[time in the option of the legislature to alter that form and administration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the laws into whatever hands it pleases; by constituting one, or a few, or many executive magistrates: and all the other powers of the state must obey the legislative power in the discharge of their several functions, or else the constitution is at an end.

In a democracy, where the right of making laws resides in the people at large, public virtue, or goodness of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of the other qualities of government. Popular assemblies are frequently foolish in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and just, and have always a degree of patriotism or public spirit. In aristocracies there is more wisdom to be found, than in the other frames of government; being composed, or intended to be composed, of the most experienced citizens: but there is less honesty than in a republic, and less strength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the most powerful of any; for, by the entire conjunction of the legislative and executive powers, all the sinews of government are knitted together, and united in the hand of the prince: but then there is imminent danger of his employing that strength to improvident or oppressive purposes.

Thus these three species of government have, all of them, their several perfections and imperfections. Democracies are usually the best calculated to direct the end of a law; aristocracies to invent the means by which that end shall be obtained; and monarchies to carry those means into execution. And the antients, it was observed, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government but these three; for though Cicero declares himself of opinion "*esse optime constitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari, sit modice confusa*"(e); yet Tacitus treats this notion of

(e) In his fragments De Rep. l. 2.

[a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a visionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lasting or secure (*f*).

But, happily for us of this island, the British constitution has long remained (and may it long continue!) a standing exception to the truth of this observation. For as with us the executive power of the laws is lodged in a single person, they have all the advantages of strength and dispatch, that are to be found in the most absolute monarchy: and as the legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to three distinct powers, entirely independent of each other; first, the sovereign; secondly, the lords spiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratical assembly of persons selected for their piety, their birth, their wisdom, their valour, or their property; and, thirdly, the House of Commons, freely chosen by the people from among themselves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by different springs, and attentive to different interests, composes the British parliament, and has the supreme disposal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power, sufficient to repel any innovation which it shall think inexpedient or dangerous.

Here then is lodged the sovereignty of the British constitution; and lodged as beneficially as is possible for society. For in no other shape could we be so certain of finding the three great qualities of government so well and so happily united. If the supreme power were lodged in any one of the three branches separately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of either absolute monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy: and so want two of the three principal ingredients of good polity; that is, virtue, wisdom,

(*f*) "*Cunctas nationes et urbes populus, aut primores, aut singuli regunt: delecta ex his et constituta reipublicæ forma laudari*

facilius quam evenire, vel, si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest."—Ann. lib. iv. c. 33.

[and power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches—for instance, in the sovereign and House of Lords—our laws might be providently made, and well executed, but they might not always have the good of the people in view: if lodged in the sovereign and commons, we should want that circumspection and mediatory caution, which the wisdom of the peers is to afford: if the supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two houses only, and the crown had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative or perhaps to abolish the royal office, and thereby weaken (if not totally destroy) the strength of the executive power. But the constitutional government of this island is so admirably tempered and compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legislature and the rest. For if ever it should happen that the independence of any one of the three should be lost, or that it should become subservient to the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of our constitution. The legislature would be changed from that which (upon the supposition of an original contract, either actual or implied,) is presumed to have been originally set up by the general consent and fundamental act of the society: and such a change, however effected, is, according to Mr. Locke, (who perhaps carries his theory too far,) at once an entire dissolution of the bands of government; and the people are thereby reduced to a state of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative power (*g*).

Having thus cursorily considered the three usual species of government, and our own singular constitution selected and compounded from them all, we are now to remark that, as the power of making laws constitutes the supreme authority, so wherever the supreme authority in any state resides, it is the right of that authority to make laws; that

(*g*) On Government, part 2, § 212.

[is, in the words of our definition, *to prescribe the rule of civil action*. And this may be discovered from the very end and institution of states. For a state is a collective body, composed of a multitude of individuals, united for their safety and convenience, and intending to act together as one man. If it therefore is to act as one man, it ought to act by one uniform will. But, inasmuch as political communities are made up of many natural persons, each of whom has his particular will and inclination, these several wills cannot by any natural union be joined together, or tempered and disposed into a lasting harmony, so as to constitute and produce one uniform will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwise produced than by a political union; by the consent of all persons to submit their own private wills to the will of one man, or of one or more assemblies of men, to whom the supreme authority is entrusted: and this will of that one man, or assemblage of men, is in different states, according to their different constitutions, understood to be *law*.

Thus far, as to the right of the supreme power to make laws; but farther, it is its duty likewise. For since the respective members are bound to conform themselves to the will of the state, it is expedient that they receive directions from the state declaratory of that its will. But as it is impossible, in so great a multitude, to give injunctions to every particular man, relative to each particular action, it is therefore incumbent on the state to establish general rules, for the perpetual information and direction of all persons in all points, whether of positive or negative duty. And this, in order that every man may know what to look upon as his own, what as another's; what absolute and what relative duties are required at his hands; what is to be esteemed honest, dishonest, or indifferent; what degree every man retains of his natural liberty; what he has given up as the price of the benefits of society; and after what manner each person is to moderate the use and exercise of those rights which the state assigns him, in order to promote and secure the public tranquillity.

[Municipal law, in a general point of view, may be said to consist of several parts: one, *declaratory*; whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down: another *directory*; whereby the subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain from the commission of those wrongs: a third, *remedial*; whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man's private rights, or redress his private wrongs:] to which may be added—in case of a law by which any public wrong is prohibited, or public duty enjoined—a fourth, viz., the part which contains the *sanction*, that is, the provision for enforcing or promoting its observance.

[With regard to the first of these, the *declaratory* part of municipal law, this depends not so much upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine, which before was slightly touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God and nature have established, and may therefore be called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be effectually invested in every man; neither do they receive any material increase of strength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislature can justifiably abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural duties (such as, for instance, the worship of God, the maintenance of children, and the like) receive a much stronger sanction from being also declared to be duties by the law of the land. The case is the same as to crimes and misdemeanors that are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore styled *mala in se*, such as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract but little additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before observed, in subordination to the great Lawgiver, transcribing and publishing his precepts. So that, upon the whole, the declaratory part of the

[municipal law, has very little force or operation with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.

But, with regard to things in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely altered. These become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees proper for promoting the welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil life. And sometimes, where the thing itself has its rise from the law of nature, the particular circumstances and mode of doing it become right or wrong, as the laws of the land shall direct. Thus, for instance, in civil duties,—obedience to superiors is the doctrine of revealed as well as natural religion: but who those superiors shall be, and in what circumstances, or to what degrees they shall be obeyed, it is the province of human laws to determine. And so, as to injuries or crimes, it must be left to our own legislature to decide in what cases the seizing another's cattle shall amount to a trespass or a theft; and where it shall be a justifiable action, as when a landlord takes them by way of distress for rent.

Thus much for the *declaratory* part of municipal law: and the *directory* stands much upon the same footing: for this virtually includes the former, the declaration being usually collected from the direction. The law that says "thou shalt not steal," implies a declaration that stealing is a crime. And we have seen that, in things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong depends upon the direction of the laws to do or to omit them.

The *remedial* part of a law is so necessary a consequence of the former two, that laws must be very vague and imperfect without it. For in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of the law. When, for instance, the declaratory part of the law has said, that

[“ the field or inheritance, which belonged to Titius’s father, is vested by his death in Titius;” and the directory part has “ forbidden any one to enter on another’s property, without the leave of the owner:” if Gaius after this will presume to take possession of the land, the remedial part of the law will then interpose its office; will make Gaius restore the possession to Titius, and also pay him damages for the invasion.

With regard to the *sanction* of laws it is observed, that human legislators have for the most part chosen to make it rather *vindictory* than *remuneratory*, or to consist rather in punishments, than in actual particular rewards. Because, in the first place, the quiet enjoyment and protection of all our civil rights and liberties, which are the sure and general consequence of obedience to the municipal law, are in themselves the best and most valuable of all rewards; because, also, were the exercise of every virtue to be enforced by the proposal of particular rewards, it were impossible for any state to furnish stock enough for so profuse a bounty; and farther, because the dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human actions than the prospect of good (*h*). For which reasons, though a prudent bestowing of rewards is sometimes of exquisite use, yet we find that those civil laws, which enforce and enjoin our duty, do seldom, if ever, propose any privilege or gift to such as obey the law; but do constantly come armed with a penalty denounced against transgressors, either expressly defining the nature and quantity of the punishment, or else leaving it to the discretion of the judges, and those who are entrusted with the care of putting the laws in execution.

Laws attended with a vindictory sanction are said to *compel* and *oblige*: not that by any natural violence they so constrain a man, as to render it impossible for him to act otherwise than as they direct, which is the strict sense

(*h*) Locke on the Human Understanding, b. 2, c. 21.

[of obligation ; but because, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty against offenders, they bring it to pass that no man can easily choose to transgress the law ; since, by reason of the impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to disobedience. And, even where rewards are proposed as well as punishments threatened, the obligation of the law seems chiefly to consist in the penalty ; for rewards, in their nature, can only *persuade* and *allure* ; nothing is *compulsory* but punishment.]

It is, however, held by the soundest ethical writers, that there is also an obligation in point of conscience to observe the laws. It is related of Socrates that he made a promise with himself to observe the laws of his country ; and this is nothing more than what every man ought both to promise and perform ; and he ought also to promise that he will exert all his power to compel others to obey them (*i*). It was indeed the opinion of Blackstone that this principle must be understood with some restriction, and he remarks [it holds as to *rights*—and when the law has determined the field to belong to Titius, it is matter of conscience no longer to withhold or invade it. So also in regard to *natural* duties, and such offences as are *mala in se* ; here we are bound in conscience, because we are bound by superior laws, before those human laws were in being, to perform the one and abstain from the other. But in relation to those laws which enjoin only *positive* duties, and forbid only such things as are not *mala in se*, but *mala prohibita* merely, without any intermixture of moral guilt, annexing a penalty to non-compliance : here conscience is no farther concerned than by directing a submission to the penalty in case of our breach of those laws (*k*).] The distinction however will perhaps hardly bear the test of a close inquiry. To form a true judgment on the subject, it is necessary to take into consideration

(*i*) Note by Christian, to 1 Bl. Com. p. 59. (*k*) 1 Bl. Com. 58.

that the true principle both of moral and of positive laws is in effect the same, viz. utility, or the general welfare, and that disobedience to either sort of precept must be presumed to involve in it some kind of mischievous consequence. Supposing the existence of a law of the merely positive class, which happens to be considered by the public at large as useless or even detrimental to society, yet a conscientious man will feel himself bound to observe it, if for no other reason, yet for this, that his taking the contrary course might encourage others to violate laws of a more beneficial character, and lessen the general reverence for the institutions of his country.

SECTION III. OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.



[THE “municipal law of England,” or the rule of civil conduct prescribed to the inhabitants of this kingdom, may with sufficient propriety be divided into two kinds: the *lex non scripta*, the unwritten (or common) law; and the *lex scripta*, the written (or statute) law (*a*).

With regard to our “unwritten” law, it is not, however, to be understood that the whole of it is at present merely *oral*, or communicated to us from the former ages to the present solely by word of mouth. It is true indeed, that, in the profound ignorance of letters which formerly overspread the whole western world, all laws were entirely traditional; for this plain reason, because the nations among which they prevailed had but little idea of writing. Thus the British as well as the Gallic druids committed all their laws as well as learning to memory (*b*); and it is said of the primitive Saxons here, as well as their brethren on the continent, that *leges solâ memoriâ et usu retinebant* (*c*). But with us, at present, the monuments and evidences of our legal customs are contained in the records of the several courts of justice, in books of reports and judicial decisions, and in the treatises of learned sages of the profession, preserved and handed down to us from the times of highest antiquity. And these parts of our law are therefore styled *leges non scriptæ*, because their original institution and authority are not set down in

(*a*) The relation which “equity”
bears to “law” in our system of
jurisprudence, is explained, *post*,

p. 81.

(*b*) Cæs. de B. G. lib. 6, c. 13.

(*c*) Spelm. Gl. 362.

[writing, as acts of parliament are; but they receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom.

Our antient lawyers, and particularly Fortescue (*d*), insist with abundance of warmth, that these customs are as old as the primitive Britons, and continued down, through the several mutations of government and inhabitants, to the present time, unchanged and unadulterated. This may be the case as to some; but the assertion (as observed by Selden) must be understood with many grains of allowance; and ought only to signify, as the truth seems to be, that there never was any formal exchange of one system of laws for another; though doubtless the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes, and the Normans, must have insensibly introduced and incorporated many of their own customs with those that were before established; thereby, in all probability, improving the texture and wisdom of the whole by the accumulated wisdom of divers particular countries. Our laws, saith Lord Bacon, are mixed as our language (*e*); and as our language is so much the richer, the laws are the more complete.

And indeed our early historians do positively assure us, that our body of laws is of this compounded nature. For they tell us that in the time of Alfred the local customs of the several provinces of the kingdom were grown so various, that he found it expedient to compile a *Dom-boc* or *Liber Judicialis*, digesting them into one uniform code of laws for the general use of the whole kingdom: and this book is said to have been extant so late as the reign of King Edward the fourth, but to have been since lost; and probably contained the principal maxims of the common law, the penalties for misdemeanors, and the forms of judicial proceedings (*f*).

(*d*) C. 17.

(*f*) 1 Bl. Com. 65. In the

(*e*) See his proposals for a digest. opinion however of Mr. Hallam

[The irruption and establishment of the Danes in England, which followed soon after, introduced new customs, and caused this code of Alfred in many provinces to fall into disuse, or at least to be mixed and debased with other laws of a coarser alloy; so that about the beginning of the eleventh century, there were three principal systems of laws prevailing in different districts: 1. The *Mercen-Lage*, or Mercian laws, which were observed in many of the midland counties, and those bordering on the principality of Wales, the retreat of the antient Britons; and which were therefore very probably intermixed with the British or Druidical customs. 2. The *West-Saxon Lage*, or laws of the West-Saxons, which obtained in the counties to the south and west of the island, from Kent to Devonshire. These were probably much the same with the laws of Alfred above mentioned; being the municipal law of the far most considerable part of his dominions, and particularly including Berkshire, the seat of his peculiar residence. 3. The *Dane-Lage*, or Danish law, which was principally maintained in the rest of the midland counties, and also on the eastern coast, (the part most exposed to the visits of the Danes,) the very northern provinces being at that time under a distinct government (*g*).

Out of these three systems of laws, Roger Hoveden and Ranulphus Cestrensis inform us, that king Edward the Confessor extracted one uniform law, or digest of laws, to be observed throughout the whole kingdom; though the work had also been projected and begun by his grand-

(Midd. Ages, vol. ii. p. 402, 7th ed.) there is no sufficient proof that Alfred "compiled a *dom-boc*, or general code for the government of his kingdom." Turner (in his *Hist. Ang. Sax.* vol. ii. p. 149, 6th ed.) considers the *dom-boc* as the same with the laws of Alfred, in the *Leges Anglo-Sax.* published by Wilkins. A document, called

"*Alfred's Dooms*," was printed by the Record Commissioners in 1840, but Sir F. Palgrave remarks, (*Rise, &c. of the British Commonwealth*, c. 11,) that it is insufficient to support the assertions of Blackstone as to Alfred's achievements as a law compiler.

(*g*) Bl. Com. ubi sup. For this he cites Sir M. Hale, *Hist. C. L.* c. 3.

[father king Edgar. And indeed a general digest of the same nature has been constantly found expedient, and therefore put in practice by other great nations, which were formed from an assemblage of little provinces governed by peculiar customs (*h*). However, these undertakings of king Edgar and Edward the Confessor were probably no more than a new edition, or fresh promulgation of Alfred's code or Dom-boc, with such additions and improvements as the experience of a century and a half had suggested. For Alfred is generally styled by the same historians the *legum Anglicanarum conditor*, as Edward the Confessor is the *restitutor*.]

But whatever may be thought of these points of legal history or tradition, there can be no doubt that, under the first princes of the Norman line, our ancestors were engaged in a frequent struggle to maintain certain institutions known by the appellation of the "laws of Edward the Confessor," and which would seem to have been a body of laws or customs observed (though not first established) in the reign of that monarch (*i*); and it is certain that the Norman princes made frequent engagements to restore and maintain these laws as the most popular act they could do, when pressed by foreign emergencies or domestic discontents. Nor is it unreasonable to believe that these, or some other remains of the law established in this country before the Conquest, gave rise (in part at least) to that collection of maxims and customs which is now known by the name of the common law (*h*); a name

(*h*) Blackstone (vol. i. p. 66) instances the Portuguese code completed in the fifteenth century, the Spanish code entitled *Las Partidas*, collected by Alonzo the tenth, in the year 1250, and the collection of the *land's lagh* in Sweden made about the same period; and he cites Mod. Un. Hist. xx. 211; xxii. 135; xxxiii. 21, 58.

(*i*) The laws so called, contained in Lambard and Wilkins, are considered spurious. (See Hallam's Midd. Ages, vol. ii. p. 444, 7th edit.)

(*h*) That much of our common law was in force in this island before the Conquest is maintained both by Hale and Blackstone. And the historian of the Middle Ages, though inclined in general to as-

either given to it in contradistinction to other laws,—as the statute law, the civil law, the law merchant, and the like—or more probably, as a law common to all the realm.

To assign however to the common law no other original than this, would be to take an imperfect and erroneous view of the subject. Our system of tenures was chiefly constructed, if not first founded, by the Norman conqueror (*o*); our judicial forms and pleadings, while they have nothing in common with the Anglo-Saxon style, are in striking conformity with the Norman (*p*); and it has been remarked with great truth, that the general language of our jurisprudence and its terms of art are exclusively of French extraction (*q*). We cannot hesitate therefore to recognize in the antient law of Normandy another parent of the common law, and one from which it has inherited some of its most remarkable features (*r*).

[But though these are the most likely foundation of this

cribe our common law to a date not much antecedent to the publication of Glanville (temp. Hen. 2), yet admits that “some features of it “may be distinguishable in Saxon “times.” (Hallam’s Midd. Ages, vol. ii. pp. 466, 468, 7th edit.) Mr. Spence, also, in his *History of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery*, insists that the most important part of our common law was a legacy from the Romans.

(*o*) 2 Bl. Com. 48; Henry, Hist. of Eng. vol. vi. pp. 10; 18; Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. 1, p. 28, 3rd edit.; Hallam, *ubi sup.* p. 408.

(*p*) Some information on this subject may be found in the Notes to Stephen on Pleading, 6th edit., 1860.

(*q*) “*Omnia vocabula, quæ vocabula artis dicuntur, quibusque hodie in foro Angli utuntur, Gallica sunt; nihilque cum Saxonica*

lingua habent affine.” — Craig, Jus Feud. lib. i. s. 7.

(*r*) The similarity of the English and Norman Laws is strongly illustrated by a comparison of the Grand Coustumier of Normandy (compiled as late as Ric. I. and probably later), with our Glanville, who wrote in the reign of Hen. II. This subject is discussed by Hale in Hist. C. L. c. 6, who, jealous for the originality of the English law, argues from the posteriority in date of the Grand Coustumier, that, in most of the particulars where the conformity is to be traced, the merit of the first introduction presumably belongs to England, though he admits the reasonableness of assigning it in others to Normandy. It does not, however, seem very material in which of the two countries they were first established. They have at all events no resemblance to the

[collection of maxims and customs, yet the maxims and customs, so collected, are of a higher antiquity than memory or history can reach(*s*): nothing being more difficult than to ascertain the precise beginning and first spring of an antient and long established custom. Whence it is that, in our law, the goodness of a custom depends upon its having been used time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase, "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,"] a phrase which refers, however, (it is to be observed,) in our law to a fixed era, and means that the custom must appear (for anything that can be proved to the contrary) to have been in use before the commencement of the reign of Richard the first(*t*). [This it is that gives it its weight and authority; and of this nature are the maxims and customs which compose the common law, or *lex non scripta*, of this kingdom.

This unwritten or common law is properly distinguishable into three kinds: I. General customs; which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the "common law," in its stricter and more usual signification. II. Particular customs; which affect only the inhabitants of particular districts. III. Certain particular laws; which, by custom, are adopted and used by some particular courts, of pretty general and extensive jurisdiction.

I. As to general customs, or the common law, properly so called; this is that law by which proceedings and determinations in the ordinary courts of justice are principally guided and directed; this, for the most part, settles the course in which lands descend by inheritance; the manner and form of acquiring and transferring property; the solemnities and obligations of contracts; the rules of expounding wills, deeds, and acts of parliament; the re-

Anglo-Saxon institutions, and are evidently due to lawyers of the Norman School.

(*s*) Hale, Hist. C. L. c. 3.

(*t*) See the preamble to stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71; Co. Lit. 116 a; Jenkins v. Harvey, 5 Tyrw. 396.

[spective remedies of civil injuries; and an infinite number of minuter particulars, which diffuse themselves as extensively as the ordinary distribution of common justice requires(*u*). Thus, for example, that the eldest son alone is heir to his ancestor;—that a deed is of no validity unless sealed and delivered;—that wills shall be construed more favourably, and deeds more strictly;—that money lent upon bond is recoverable by action of debt;—all these, and many others which might be instanced, are doctrines that are not set down in any written statute or ordinance; but depend merely upon immemorial usage, that is, upon common law, for their support(*v*).

Some have divided the common law into two principal grounds or foundations: viz., established *customs*; and established *maxims*. But these appear to be one and the same thing. For the authority of these maxims (such, for example, as “the king can do no wrong,” “no man shall be bound to accuse himself,” and the like) rests entirely upon general reception and usage: and the only method of proving that this or that maxim is a rule of the common law, is by showing that it hath been always the custom to observe it.

But here a very natural, and very material, question arises: how are these general customs or maxims to be known, and by whom is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by the judges in the several courts of justice. They are the depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land. The knowledge of that law is derived from experience and study; from the “*viginti annorum lucubrationes*,” which Fortescue mentions(*x*); and from being

(*u*) Hale’s Hist. C. L. c. 2.

(*v*) One familiar example, viz. that “there shall be four superior courts of record, the Chancery, the Queen’s Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer,” has been now

broken in upon by the absorption of those courts into the Supreme Court of Judicature, established from the 2nd November, 1874, by the Judicature Act, 1873. (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66.)

(*x*) Cap. 8.

[long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. And indeed these judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a general custom as shall form a part of the common law. The judgment itself, and all the proceedings previous thereto, are carefully registered and preserved, under the name of *records*, in public repositories set apart for that particular purpose (*y*); and to them frequent recourse is had, when any critical question arises, in the determination of which former precedents may give light or assistance. And therefore, even so early as the Conquest, we find the "*præteritorum memoria eventorum*" reckoned up as one of the chief qualifications of those, who were held to be "*legibus patriæ optime instituti*" (*z*),] while at the same time it has been uniformly considered to be the duty of those who administer the law, to conform to the precedents thus established. [For the scale of justice is not intended to waver with every new judge's opinion (which would be productive of intolerable inconvenience), but when in any case the law has been solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one.] Yet a single determination is not sufficient to establish an inflexible rule—more particularly where it is opposed to reason or natural justice. [But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not

(*y*) As to records, see Co. Lit. 260 a, and the note by Mr. Hargrave. By stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 94, the public records of the kingdom are now in general placed under the

superintendence of the Master of the Rolls for the time being, and a public Record Office has been established.

(*z*) Seld. Review of Tith. c. 8.

[pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was *bad law*, but that it was *not law*; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined.] And here we may observe that our lawyers have been always copious in their encomiums on the reason of the common law; [their doctrine being that the law is the perfection of reason, that it always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reason is not law.] In accordance with which, a presumption always obtains in favour of an antient and established rule, the reason of which cannot at this distance of time be precisely assigned, that it is really founded on just and solid views. [And in fact it hath been an antient observation in the laws of England, that whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason perhaps could not be remembered or discerned, hath been wantonly broken in upon by statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the rule hath in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation.]

It is to be observed, however, that many specific questions are perpetually occurring, in which the rule of the common law does not happen to be fixed by any known decision, and that these are disposed of by the judges in the manner that they think most conformable to the received rule in other analogous cases; or if there be no such analogy to guide them, then according to the natural reason of the thing; though (in deference to the principle already referred to, that the opinion of the judge is not to make the law, but only to ascertain it), their determination always purports to be declaratory of what the law *is*, and not of what it *ought* to be. It is obvious that, owing to the infinite variety of combinations in human affairs, questions of this novel description must frequently arise under every system of jurisprudence, with whatever prospective sagacity it may attempt to guard against them,—

as in cases which turn on the exposition of the meaning of particular clauses in deeds or wills; and it is remarked by Sir Matthew Hale (a) that they are much better dealt with by a judge, than they could be by a merely learned or wise man not belonging to the profession of the law, who might be incompetent to understand even the technical terms employed in the instrument to be expounded, and at all events would be unable to reason from analogy to other decided cases. To which it may be added, that, even in such of those questions as depend on reason only, the habit of solving them has an obvious tendency to improve the faculty, and to give the judge a great advantage over any person possessed of the same natural abilities, but not accustomed to exercise them in the same manner.

[The decisions of the courts, being the best evidence of what the common law is, are held in the highest regard, and are not only preserved as authentic records in the treasuries of the several courts, but are handed out to public view in the numerous volumes of *Reports* which furnish the lawyer's library. These reports are histories of the several cases, with a short summary of the proceedings, (which are preserved at large in the record,) the arguments on both sides, and the reasons the court gave for its judgment; taken down in short notes by persons present at the determination. And these serve as indexes to, and also to explain, the records; which always, in matters of consequence and nicety, the judges direct to be searched. The Reports are extant in a regular series from the reign of King Edward the second to that of Henry the eighth inclusive; and were taken by the prothonotaries, or chief scribes of the court, at the expense of the crown, and published *annually*; whence they are known under the denomination of the *Year Books*.] In the reign of the latter monarch, however, this series closed; and though afterwards King James the first, at the instance of Lord

(a) Hist. C. L. c. 4.

Bacon, appointed two reporters with a handsome stipend to perform the same duty (*b*), that institution was soon neglected (*c*); and from the reign of Henry the eighth to the present time the task of communicating to the public the decisions of the courts has been executed by private hands. [Some of the most valuable of the antient reports which were thus executed are those published by Lord Chief Justice Coke (*d*); a man of infinite learning in his profession, though not a little infected with the pedantry and quaintness of the times he lived in, which appear strongly in all his works. However, his writings are so highly esteemed, that they are generally cited without the author's name (*e*).] He had been preceded as a reporter by Dyer and Plowden, both lawyers of the highest eminence: of his successors (too numerous, especially in our own days, for distinct notice,) we will only mention the more antient and distinguished names of Hobart, Croke, Yelverton, Saunders, Vaughan and Levinz (*f*).

(*b*) See Lord Bacon's proposition for amending the laws of England.

(*c*) 1 Bla. Com. p. 72. In James the second's time an order was issued to the Stationers' Company, to the effect that all books concerning the common laws of the realm were to be *licensed* by the Lord Chancellor or the judges or one of them. (See 1 Ld. Raym. 537; Burr. pref.) But the judges afterwards came to a resolution to grant licences no longer.

(*d*) The first eleven parts only were published in Coke's lifetime, at various periods between 1600 and 1615;—the twelfth and thirteenth being posthumous.

(*e*) His reports, for instance, are styled, *κατ' ἐξουχίαν*, "the Reports," and, in quoting them, we usually say, 1 or 2 Rep., not 1 or 2 Coke's Rep. as in citing other authors.

The reports of Judge Croke are also cited in a peculiar manner, by the names of those princes, in whose reigns the cases reported in his three volumes were determined; *viz.* Queen Elizabeth, King James and King Charles the first; as well as by the number of each volume. For sometimes we call them 1, 2 and 3 Cro., but more commonly Cro. Eliz., Cro. Jac. and Cro. Car.

(*f*) The reports of Saunders were edited in 1799 by Mr. Serjeant Williams, a profound lawyer, who appended to them notes (or rather legal dissertations) of a very instructive character. His edition was afterwards republished by Sir John Patteson and Sir E. V. Williams (then both at the bar) as joint editors, and still more recently by Sir E. V. Williams alone, before his elevation to the bench; and

Besides these reporters, there are also other authors, to whom great veneration and respect is paid by the students of the common law. Such are Glanville and Bracton, who in the reigns of Henry the second and Henry the third respectively wrote treatises on the Law of England; the author of *Fleta*, who composed a work on the same subject in the time of Edward the first (*g*); the author of the *Mirror*, a work generally ascribed to the reign of Edward the second (*h*); Fortescue, who wrote *De Laudibus Legum Angliæ* in the reign of Henry the sixth; St. German, who composed the treatise on the grounds of the laws of England called the *Doctor and Student*, in the reign of Henry the eighth; Staundforde, whose work on the criminal law was published about the time of Philip and Mary, and who was followed in that track by Hale and Hawkins early in the last century; the author of *Sheppard's Touchstone*, who wrote on conveyances in the reign of James the first (*i*); Fitzherbert, Brooke and Rolle, who published abridgments or digests of the different titles of the law in the reigns of Henry the eighth, Elizabeth, and Charles the second respectively, and whom

these editors added excellent annotations of their own to the former stock.

(*g*) The author is unknown; and the title of the work derived from its being written during his confinement in the Fleet prison. Reeves's *Hist. Eng. Law*, vol. ii. p. 280. The work of Reeves just referred to (a production of our own times) is itself of high character, but less read perhaps than it deserves. Though its method is somewhat dry, its research and accuracy are exemplary; and a continuation of it to the present day (if executed with equal ability) would be of great service to every student of law or constitu-

tional history.

(*h*) The authorship and even the date of this treatise, "*The Mirror of Justices*," is uncertain. Some have pronounced it older than the Conquest, but it bears internal evidence of at least having been adapted to the time of Edward the second. (See Reeves's *Hist. Eng. Law*, vol. ii. p. 358.) It is stated by Turner (*Hist. Ang. Sax. b. i. c. 3*) to have been written by Andrew Horne, temp. Edw. 2.

(*i*) The work has been attributed to Doderidge, a judge of great eminence. See Pref. to Hilliard's edition.

Viner, Comyns and Bacon have since succeeded (*h*); and Gilbert, among whose valuable works (the productions of the last century), we shall only mention the treatises on tenures and on uses and trusts (*l*). These and many other methodical writers are of high and intrinsic authority in the courts of justice: but none of the class shines so conspicuously as the learned judge before mentioned, Sir Edward Coke; who in the year 1628 [published four volumes of Institutes, as he is pleased to call them, though they have little of the institutional method to warrant such a title (*m*). The first volume is a very extensive comment upon a little excellent treatise of tenures, compiled by Judge Littleton in the reign of Edward the fourth. This comment is a rich mine of valuable common law learning, collected and heaped together from the antient reports and year books, but greatly defective in method (*n*). The second volume is a comment upon many old acts of parliament, without any systematical order; the third a more methodical treatise of the pleas of the crown; and the fourth an account of the several species of courts (*o*).

And thus much for the first ground and chief corner stone of the laws of England; which is general immemorial custom, or common law, from time to time declared in the decisions of the courts of justice: which decisions

(*h*) See Mr. Hargrave's eulogium on Viner's Abridgment, and Comyns' Digest, Co. Litt. 9 a, u. (3), 17 a, n. (1).

(*l*) Chief Baron Gilbert's treatises were all published after the author's death, and in an unfinished state; but they are of a most learned and useful character. As to his treatise on tenures, see Butler's Pref. to Co. Litt.

(*m*) Butler's Preface to Co. Litt., where the reader will find some valuable observations on the celebrated commentary on Littleton, of

which the First Institute consists, and also on the original work of Littleton.

(*n*) It is usually cited either by the name of Co. Litt. or as 1 Inst.

(*o*) These are cited as 2, 3 or 4 Inst. without any author's name; an honorary distinction, which, as we before observed, is paid to the works of no other writer; the generality of reports and other tracts being quoted in the name of the compiler, as 2 Ventris, 4 Leonard, 1 Siderfin, and the like.

[are preserved among our public records, explained in our reports, and digested for general use in the authoritative writings of the venerable sages of the law.

The Roman law, as practised in the times of its liberty, paid also a great regard to custom; but not so much as our law; it only then adopting it, when the written law was deficient, though the reasons alleged in the Digest will fully justify our practice, in making it of equal authority with, when it is not contradicted by, the written law; “for since (says Julianus) the written law binds us for no other reason but because it is approved by the judgment of the people, therefore those laws which the people have approved without writing ought also to bind every body. For where is the difference, whether the people declare their assent to a law by suffrage, or by a uniform course of acting accordingly?” (*p*)]

With us, indeed, it would seem that the statute law and the common law both flowed originally from the same fountain (*q*). A great portion at least of the latter must be referred to some positive enactment of the supreme power in the country, though not now to be found of record.

II. The second branch of the unwritten law of England are particular customs which affect only the inhabitants of particular districts (*r*): and these it is usual to designate by the word *customs* taken *per se*; which sufficiently distinguishes them from the general customs of which we spoke before.

These particular customs, or some of them, are probably the remains of a multitude of local customs, prevailing, some in one part and some in another, over the whole of England, while it was broken into distinct dominions; and

(*p*) Ff. 1, 3, 32.

C. L. c. 4.

(*q*) Per Wilmot, C. J., Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 351; Hale's Hist.

(*r*) Co. Litt. 110 b; vide sup. p. 45.

out of which, after it became a single kingdom, one common law was collected and made applicable to the realm at large; each district sacrificing some of its own special usages, in order that the whole kingdom might enjoy the benefit of one uniform and universal system of law. But, for reasons now long forgotten, particular counties, cities, towns, manors, and lordships, were indulged with the privilege of abiding by their own customs, in contradistinction to the rest of the nation at large, which privilege is confirmed to them by several acts of parliament (*s*).

[Such is the custom of *gavelkind* in Kent, and some other parts of the kingdom, which ordains, among other things, that not the eldest son only of the father succeeds to his inheritance, but all the sons alike (*t*): and that, though the ancestor be attainted and hanged, yet the heir shall succeed to his estates, without any escheat to the lord (*u*). Such is the custom that prevails in divers antient boroughs, and therefore called *borough-English*, that the youngest son shall inherit the estate, in preference to all his elder brothers. Such is the custom which is found in certain boroughs that a widow shall be entitled, for her dower, to all her husband's lands; whereas, at the common law, she shall be endowed of one third part only. Such also are the special and particular customs of each manor, of which every one has more or less, and which bind all the copyhold and customary tenants that hold of the said manor. Such, lastly, are many particular customs within the city of London, with regard to trade, apprentices, widows, orphans, and a variety of other matters. All these are contrary to the general law of the land, and are good only by special usage; though indeed the customs of London are also confirmed by act of parliament (*x*).]

(*s*) Mag. Cart. 9 Hen. 3, c. 9; 1 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 9; 14 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. 1; 2 Hen. 4, c. 1.

(*t*) Co. Litt. 140 a.

(*u*) The doctrine of escheat on

a conviction for felony is, however, now abolished. (See 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 1.)

(*x*) See the City of London's case, 8 Rep. 126; The King v.

To this head has sometimes been referred that branch of the law which comprises certain rules relative to bills of exchange, partnership, and other mercantile matters, and which is generally denominated the *custom of merchants* (*y*). As its character, however, is not local, nor its obligation confined to a particular district, it cannot with propriety be considered as a custom in the technical sense to which we now refer (*z*). It is, in truth, a part of the general law of England (*a*): and it is distinguished by a separate name, only because it applies, to the particular subjects in question, principles different from those which the common law ordinarily recognizes; and because these principles were engrafted into our municipal system by gradual adoption from the *lex mercatoria*, or general body of European usages in matters relative to commerce (*b*).

Upon the same principle we must exclude from the technical idea of a custom the mere *usages of particular trades*, when not restrained to some particular limit in point of place, as opposed to the realm at large. If there be any such usage of immemorial observance, and authenticated by judicial decision, it will form, according to our definitions, part of the general law of England; if there be any sanctioned by act of parliament, it will constitute part of the statute law; but for the rest, the want of any peculiar locality determines them to be no customs, and they are consequently no rules of law at all. Yet as matters of *fact* they often fall under the notice of our courts of justice, and are very necessary to be considered: for as the prevalence of any certain course of dealing

Bagshaw, Cro. Car. 347; see also Pulling on the Laws and Customs of London, p. 2.

(*y*) 1 Bl. Com. 75.

(*z*) Co. Litt. 115 b.

(*a*) Per Holt, C. J., *Hussey v. Jacob*, Ld. Raym. 88; per Forster, J., *Edie v. East India Company*, 2 Burr. 1226; 1 Bl. Rep. 299, S. C.;

2 Inst. 58; *Stone v. Rawlinson*, Willes, 561. See also *Benson v. Chapman*, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 967, *in notis*.

(*b*) The *lex mercatoria*, or *law merchant*, is mentioned in some of our earlier statutes. (See 27 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 8, 19, 20.)

among men leads to the presumption that in particular instances they intend to conform to it, the existence of such usages as these may often bear materially or even conclusively upon the question, whether an implied contract to a given effect was entered into between certain parties; and also upon the question in what sense their express contract in certain cases was designed to be understood (*c*).

The rules relating to particular customs regard either the proof of their existence, or their allowance as good and legal, when proved. And first we will consider the rules of *proof*.

As to the modes of descent in gavelkind, and borough-English, the law takes notice of them (*d*); and there is no occasion therefore to prove that such customs actually exist, but only that the lands in question are subject thereto. But with respect to most customs, not only must their existence be shown, but also that the thing in dispute is within the custom alleged. [The trial in both cases—both to show the existence of the custom, as, “that in the manor of Dale lands shall descend only to the heirs male, and never to the heirs female;” and also to show “that the lands in question are within that manor,”—is by a jury of twelve men, and not by the judges; unless the same custom has been before tried, determined, and recorded in the same court (*e*).

The customs of London differ from all others in point

(*c*) The law on this subject has been recently much discussed in relation to the *rules of the Stock Exchange*, and the extent to which they are grafted on the contracts there made. See *Grissell v. Bristowe*, Law Rep., 3 C. P. 112; 4 C. P. 36; *Cropper v. Cook*, ib. 3 C. P. 194; *Coles v. Bristowe*, ib. 4 Ch. App. 3; *Hawkins v. Maltby*, ib. p. 200; *Cruse v. Paine*, ib. 441; *Hodgkin-*

son v. Kelly, ib. 6 Eq. Ca. 496; *Allen v. Graves*, ib. 5 Q. B. 478; *Mollett v. Robinson*, ib. 5 C. P. 646; *Bowring v. Shepherd*, ib. 6 Q. B. 309; *Maxted v. Paine*, ib. 6 Exch. 132; *Duncan v. Hill*, ib. p. 255.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 175; 36 Hen. 6, 20, 21; see stat. 17 Edw. 2, st. 1, c. 16.

(*e*) Dr. & St. 1, 10.

[of trial ; for, if the existence of the custom be brought in question, it shall not be tried by a jury, but by a certificate from the lord mayor and aldermen by the mouth of their recorder (*f*); unless indeed it be such a custom as the corporation is itself interested in—as a right of taking toll—for then the law permits them not to certify on their own behalf (*g*).

When a custom is actually proved to exist, the next inquiry is into the *legality* of it; for if it is not a good custom it ought to be no longer used; “*Malus usus abolendus est*” is an established maxim of the law (*h*).

As to the legality of a custom, the following rules are established: 1. It must have been *used so long, that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.*] Upon this subject, however, it is material to recollect what has been before laid down, that the time of memory as regards the validity of a custom, or (as it is sometimes expressed) the time of *legal* memory, has received a peculiar technical limitation, and refers to so remote a date as the commencement of the reign of king Richard the first (*i*). So that if an usage can be shown to have first commenced at any time since that era, it is void as a custom; though in the absence of such proof its observance for a long time, and as far back as the evidence reaches, will amount to presumptive proof of its having prevailed during the whole period of legal memory (*k*). It is important also to bear in mind that this principle, by which a custom is required to be immemorial, is materially qualified in many cases by a modern statute, 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71; which, as to customary and prescriptive claims of rights

(*f*) See *Appleton v. Sloughton*, Cro. Car. 516; *Plummer v. Ben-
tham*, 1 Burr. 248; *Blacquiére v.
Hawkins*, Dougl. 378; *Westoby v.
Day*, 2 Ell. & Bl. 605; per Pollock,
C. B., in *Cox v. Mayor of London*,
1 Hurl. & Colt. p. 356.

(*g*) *Day v. Savadge*, Hob. 85.

(*h*) Litt. § 212; 4 Inst. 274.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 115 a; et vide sup.
p. 45.

(*k*) *Rex v. Joliffe*, 2 Barn. &
Cres. 54.

to be exercised over the land of other persons, (such as the rights of common, or way, or the like,) provides that they shall be considered as sufficiently established by an uninterrupted enjoyment as of right, in some cases for thirty, in others for twenty years; and shall not be defeated (where such enjoyment can be proved) by showing that they commenced within the time of legal memory (*l*).

2. A custom must have been *continued*. Any interruption would cause a temporary ceasing: the revival gives it a new beginning, which will be within time of memory, and thereupon the custom will be void. But this must be understood with regard to an interruption of the *right*;] for a temporary interruption of the *possession* only will not destroy the custom (*m*). [As if the inhabitants of a parish have a customary right of watering their cattle at a certain pool, the custom is not destroyed though they do not use it for ten years; it only becomes more difficult to prove: but if the *right* be any how discontinued, even for a day, the custom is quite at an end.

3. It must have been *peaceable*, and acquiesced in; not subject to contention and dispute (*n*).] For customs seem to derive their authority from their allowance at some remote period, by common consent: and where the practice or usage has been immemorially disputed, the evidence of this consent is wanting (*o*).

4. [Customs must be *reasonable* (*p*); or rather, taken negatively, they must not be unreasonable. Which is not always, as Sir Edward Coke says, to be understood of every unlearned man's reason, but of artificial and legal reason,

(*l*) See farther, post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XXIII. as to the subject of *prescription*.

(*m*) Co. Litt. 114.

(*n*) Ibid.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 54.

(*p*) See Year Book, 8 Edw. 4, 19; Litt. s. 212; Wilkes v. Broadbent, 1 Wils. 63; Bell v. Wardell,

Willes, 202; Marquis of Salisbury v. Gladstone, 9 H. of Lords' Cas. 692; Cox v. Mayor of London, 1 Hurls. & Colt. 338; Bryant v. Foot, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. 161; 3 Q. B. 497; Lawrence v. Hitch, ib. 521; Mills v. Colchester, Law Rep., 2 C. P. 476; Sowerby v. Coleman, ib. 2 Exch. 96.

[warranted by authority of law (*q*). Upon which account a custom may be good, though the particular reason of it cannot be assigned; for it sufficeth if no good legal reason can be assigned against it. Thus a custom in a parish, that no man shall put his beasts into the common till the third of October, would be good; and yet it would be hard to show the reason why that day in particular is fixed upon, rather than the day before or after. But a custom, that no cattle shall be put in till the lord of the manor has first put in his, is unreasonable, and therefore bad: for peradventure the lord will never put in his, and then the tenants will lose all their profits (*r*).

5. Customs ought to be *certain* (*s*). A custom, that lands shall descend to the most worthy of the owner's blood, is void; for how shall this worth be determined? but a custom to descend to the next male of the blood, exclusive of females, is certain, and therefore good (*t*). A custom to pay two-pence an acre in lieu of tithes, is good; but to pay sometimes two-pence, and sometimes three-pence, as the occupier of the land pleases, is bad for its uncertainty. Yet a custom to pay a year's improved value for a fine on a copyhold estate, is good; though the value is a thing uncertain: for the value may at any time be ascertained; and the maxim of law is, *id certum est quod certum reddi potest*.

6. Customs, though established by consent, must be (when established) *compulsory*; and not left to the option of every man, whether he will use them or no. Therefore a custom, that all the inhabitants shall be rated toward the maintenance of a bridge, will be good; but a custom, that every man is to contribute thereto at his own pleasure, is idle and absurd, and indeed no custom at all.

7. Customs must be also *consistent* with each other;

(*q*) Co. Litt. 62.

(*r*) Co. Copyh. § 33.

(*s*) 1 Roll. Abr. 565; Selby v.

Robinson, 2 T. R. 758; Steel v.

Houghton, 1 Hen. Bl. 51.

(*t*) 1 Roll. Abr. 565.

[one custom cannot be set up in opposition to another (*u*). For if both are really customs, then both are of equal antiquity, and both established by mutual consent; which to say of contradictory customs is absurd.] Therefore if a man should allege that as a fisherman he is entitled by the custom of a certain place, to dry his nets upon another's land,—which in favour of fishing and navigation is a reasonable usage,—the latter could not allege in opposition to this a right by custom to remove the nets when so placed; for these two contradictory customs cannot both be good, nor both stand together (*x*). He ought rather to deny the existence of the former custom.

[8. It is also a rule that customs, in derogation of the common law, must be construed strictly (*y*). Thus, by the custom of gavelkind, an infant of fifteen years may, by one species of conveyance, (called a deed of feoffment,) convey away his lands in fee simple, that is, for ever. Yet this custom does not empower him to use any other conveyance, for the custom must be strictly pursued.] Yet if there be a custom in a manor that a man may convey his copyhold in fee simple, this will also enable him to convey for life, or any other estate; for the less is implied in the greater; and though customs must be strictly, yet they need not in every case be literally construed (*z*).

9. Lastly, it is to be understood that no custom can prevail against an express act of parliament (*a*). Therefore, where an Act has directed that every pound throughout the kingdom shall contain sixteen ounces, a custom that every pound of butter sold in a certain market shall weigh eighteen ounces, is void (*b*). And thus much for the

(*u*) See *Aldred's case*, 9 Rep. 58 b; *Kenchin v. Knight*, 1 Wils. 253; 1 Bl. Rep. 49, S. C.; *Parkin v. Radcliffe*, 1 Bos. & Pul. 282.

(*x*) 1 Roll. Abr. 560; *Hickman v. Thorne*, 2 Mod. 104.

(*y*) *Arthur v. Bokenham*, 11 Mod. 161; *Denn v. Spray*, 1 T. R. 466.

(*z*) Co. Cop. § 33. This limitation of the rule is noticed in *Colebridge's Blackstone*, vol. i. p. 79; and see *Denn v. Spray*, 1 T. R. 466.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 113 a; *Noble v. Durell*, 3 T. R. 271.

(*b*) *Noble v. Durell*, 3 T. R. 271.

second part of the *leges non scriptæ*, or those particular customs which affect particular persons or districts only.

III. [The third branch of the unwritten or common laws are those which by custom are adopted and used only in certain peculiar courts and jurisdictions(c).] And by these we are to understand the civil and canon laws(d).

[It may seem a little improper at first view to rank these laws under the head of *leges non scriptæ*, or unwritten laws, seeing they are set forth by authority in pandects, codes, and institutions; in councils, decrees, and decretals; and are enforced by an immense number of expositions, decisions and treatises of the learned in both branches of the law. But it is not on account of their being *written* laws that either the canon law, or the civil law, have any obligation within this kingdom: neither do their force and efficacy depend upon their own intrinsic authority; which is the case of our written laws, or acts of parliament. They bind not the subjects of England, because their materials were collected from popes or emperors, were digested by Justinian, or declared to be authentic by Gregory. These considerations give them no authority here; for the legislature of England doth not, nor ever did, recognize any foreign power as superior or equal to it in this kingdom, or as having the right to give law to any, the meanest of its subjects. But all the strength that either the papal or imperial laws have obtained in this realm is only because they have been admitted and received by immemorial usage and custom in some particular cases, and some particular courts; and then they form a branch of the *leges non scriptæ*, or customary laws; or else because they are in some other cases introduced by consent of parliament; and then they owe their validity to the *leges scriptæ*, or statute law. This is expressly declared in those remarkable words of the statute

(c) Vide sup. p. 45.

(d) Hist. C. L. c. 2.

[25 Hen. VIII. c. 21, addressed to the king's royal majesty :
 "For this your grace's realm, recognizing no superior
 "under God but only your grace, hath been and is free
 "from subjection to any man's laws, but only to such as
 "have been devised, made, and ordained *within* this realm,
 "for the wealth of the same; or to such other as, by
 "sufferance of your grace and your progenitors, the people
 "of this your realm have taken at their free liberty, by
 "their own consent, to be used among them; and have
 "bound themselves by long use and custom to the ob-
 "servance of the same; not as to the observance of the
 "laws of any foreign prince, potentate, or prelate; but as to
 "the *accustomed* and antient laws of this realm, originally
 "established as laws of the same, by the said sufferance,
 "consents, and custom; and none otherwise."

By the *civil* law is generally understood the civil or municipal law of the Roman empire, as comprised in the Institutes, the Code, and the Digests of the Emperor Justinian, and the Novel Constitutions of himself and some of his successors. Of which, as there will frequently be occasion to cite them, by way of illustrating our own laws, it may not be amiss to give a short and general account (*f*).

The Roman laws—founded, first upon the regal constitutions of their antient kings, next upon the twelve tables of the *decemviri*, then upon the laws or statutes enacted by the senate or people, the edicts of the prætor, and the *responsa prudentum*, or opinions of learned lawyers, and lastly upon the imperial decrees, or constitutions of successive emperors,—had grown to so great a bulk, or, as Livy expresses it, "*tam immensus aliarum super alias*

(*f*) A more ample dissertation on this subject will be found in Kent's Com: (Lect. xxiii.), who refers the student in civil law to Vin-

nius on the Institutes, Voet on the Pandects, Perezius on the Code, and generally to the works of Bynkershoek, Heineccius, and Pothier.

[*acervatarum legum cumulus*" (*g*), that they were computed to be many camels' load, by an author who preceded Justinian (*h*). This was in part remedied by the collections of three private lawyers, Gregorius, Hermogenes, and Papirius; and then by the Emperor Theodosius the younger, by whose orders a code was compiled A.D. 438, being a methodical collection of all the imperial constitutions then in force; which Theodosian code was the only book of civil law received as authentic in the western part of Europe till many centuries after (*i*); and to this it is probable that the Franks and Goths might frequently pay some regard, in framing legal constitutions for their newly erected kingdoms: for Justinian commanded only in the eastern remains of the empire; and it was under his auspices that the present body of civil law was compiled and finished by Tribonian and other lawyers, about the year 533.

This consists of, 1. The Institutes, which contain the elements or first principles of the Roman law, in four books (*h*). 2. The Digests, or Pandects, in fifty books; containing the opinions and writings of eminent lawyers, digested in a systematical method. 3. A New Code, or collection of imperial constitutions, in twelve books; the lapse of a whole century having rendered the former code of Theodosius imperfect (*l*). 4. The Novels, or new con-

(*g*) L. 3, c. 34.

(*h*) See Taylor's Elements of Civil Law, 17.

(*i*) This is at least true of the western part of Europe generally, as the code of Justinian was not recognized there generally till the twelfth century. But that code seems to have been recognized by the Roman Church, at least, much earlier. See Hallam's Mid. Ag. vol. iii. p. 513; and "Histoire du Droit Romain au Moyen-Age, par

M. de Savigny," ch. xxii. ss. 164, 167.

(*h*) The Institutes of Justinian are chiefly founded on those of Gaius, and on the Fragments of Ulpian. The manuscript of Gaius was discovered accidentally by Niebuhr, in the year 1816, while at work in the library at Verona.

(*l*) It is called the "New Code," not in reference to the Theodosian code, but to a code which was promulgated by Justinian, but sup-

[stitutions posterior in time to the other books, and amounting to a supplement to the code; containing new decrees of successive emperors, as new questions happened to arise (*m*). These form the body of Roman law, or *corpus juris civilis*, as published about the time of Justinian;] which, however, fell soon into neglect and oblivion, until, in the twelfth century, the policy of the Roman ecclesiastics began to give new vogue and authority to the civil law, introduced it into several nations, and occasioned that mighty inundation of voluminous comments, with which this system of law, more than any other, is now loaded (*n*).

[The *canon* law is a body of Roman ecclesiastical law, relative to such matters as that church either has, or pretends to have, the proper jurisdiction over (*o*). This is compiled from the opinions of the antient Latin fathers, the decrees of general councils, and the decretal epistles and bulls of the holy see; all which lay in the same disorder and confusion as the Roman civil law, till, about the year 1151, one Gratian, an Italian monk, in imitation of Justinian's Pandects, reduced the ecclesiastical constitutions also into some method, in three books, which he entitled *Concordia Discordantium Canonum*, but which are generally known by the name of *Decretum Gratiani* (*p*). These reached as low as the time of Pope Alexander the third. The subsequent papal decrees, to the pontificate of Gregory the

pressed by him on the publication of the New Code.

(*m*) It is remarked by Lord Mackenzie in his *Studies on Roman Law* (p. 25), that Justinian himself is the author of most of the Novels, viz., of 154 out of 168.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 11.

(*o*) A disquisition on this subject, including our national canon law, will be found in Reeves's *Hist. Eng.*

Law, 4th vol. chapters xxiv., xxv.; and see Robertson's *Chas. V.* vol. i. n. 24.

(*p*) It is said by Dr. Burn, in the Preface to his "*Ecclesiastical Law*," p. xx., that the "decrees" of the canon law, having first been collected by Ivo in the year 1114, were afterwards "polished and perfected by Gratian, a monk of Bononia, in the year 1149."

[ninth, were published in much the same method, under the auspices of that pope, about the year 1230, in five books, entitled *Decretalia Gregorii Noni*. A sixth book was added by Boniface the eighth about the year 1298, which is called *Sextus Decretalium*. The Clementine constitutions, or decrees of Clement the fifth, were in like manner authenticated in 1317 by his successor John the twenty-second, who also published twenty constitutions of his own, called the *Extravagantes Joannis*; all which in some measure answer to the novels of the civil law. To these have been since added some decrees of later popes, in five books, called *Extravagantes Communes*: and all these together, Gratian's Decree, Gregory's Decretals, the Sixth Decretal, the Clementine Constitutions, and the Extravagants of John and his successors, form the *corpus juris canonici*, or body of the Roman canon law.

Besides these pontifical collections, which, during the times of popery, were received as authentic in this island, as well as in other parts of Christendom, there is also a kind of national canon law, composed of *legatine* and *provincial* constitutions, and adapted only to the exigencies of this church and kingdom(*q*). The *legatine* constitutions were ecclesiastical laws, enacted in national synods, held under the Cardinals Otho and Othobon, legates from Pope Gregory the ninth and Pope Clement the fourth, in the reign of king Henry the third, about the years 1220 and 1268(*r*). The *provincial* constitutions are principally the decrees of provincial synods, held under divers archbishops of Canterbury, from Stephen Langton, in the reign of Henry the third, to Henry Chichele, in the reign of Henry the fifth; and adopted also by the province of York in the reign of Henry the sixth(*s*). At the dawn of the Re-

(*q*) See Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. ii. p. 78.

(*r*) On these constitutions Athon is the chief commentator. See Pref. to Burn's Ecclesiastical Law, p. xxii.

(*s*) Burn's Eccl. Law, Pref., p. xxii. Lyndwode's Provinciale is the chief work of authority on the provincial constitutions. (See Reeves's Hist. Eng. Law, vol. iv. p. 117.)

[formation, it was enacted by statute 25 Hen. 8, c. 19, that a review should be had of the canon law; and, that till such review should be made, all canons, constitutions, ordinances, and synodals provincial, being then already made, and not repugnant to the law of the land or the king's prerogative, should still be used and executed (*u*).]

And, as no such review has yet been perfected (*x*), upon this enactment now depends the authority of the canon law in England, the limitations of which appear upon the whole to be as follows,—that no canon contrary to the common or statute law, or the prerogative royal, is of any validity; that, subject to this condition, the canons made anterior to the parliamentary provision above mentioned, and adopted into our system (for there are some which have had no reception among us), are binding both on clergy and laity; but that canons made since that period, as they have had no sanction from the parliament, are, as regards the laity at least, of no force (*y*).

[As for those canons in particular which were enacted by the clergy in convocation under James the first, in the year 1603, and which were never confirmed in parliament, but sanctioned by the king's charter only (*z*), it has been solemnly adjudged upon the principles of law and the con-

(*u*) See also three temporary statutes to the same effect, viz., 27 Hen. 8, c. 15; 35 Hen. 8, c. 16, and 3 & 4 Edw. 6, c. 11. The 25 Hen. 8, c. 19, was revived and confirmed by 1 Eliz. c. 1.

(*x*) See Watson's Cl. Law, ch. iii. p. 17, 3rd ed.; Burnet's Hist. Reform. vol. ii. p. 197; Adam's Relig. World, vol. i. p. 411.

(*y*) See Caudrey's case, 5 Rep. xxxii.; 12 Rep. 72; Co. Litt. 344 a; Pref. to Burn's Ecc. Law; Wolferstan v. Bishop of Lincoln, 2 Wils. 174; Middleton v. Croft, Stra. 1056; 2 Atk. 659, 669; Alston v. Atlay, 7

Ad. & El. 289.

(*z*) Middleton v. Croft, *ubi sup*. These are 141 in number, and are a collection out of the several preceding canons. They are intituled "Constitutions and Canons Ecclesiastical treated upon by the Bishop of London, President of the Convocation, &c., and agreed upon with the King's Majesty's licence, in their Synod begun at London, A.D. 1603, in the first year of King James." They constitute the present standard of the Church of England.

[stitution, that where they are not merely declaratory of the antient canon law, but are introductory of new regulations, they do not bind the laity, whatever regard the clergy may be bound to pay them (*a*).

There are three species of courts in which the civil and canon laws are permitted, under different restrictions, to be used; 1. The courts of the archbishops and bishops, and their derivative officers, usually called, in our law, courts Christian, *curiæ Christianitatis*, or the ecclesiastical courts. 2. The courts of admiralty. 3. The Chancellor's Court of the University of Cambridge (*b*). In all of these, their reception in general, and the different degrees of their reception, are grounded entirely upon custom, corroborated in the last instance by act of parliament, ratifying those charters which confirm the customary law of the university. The more minute consideration of these will fall properly under that part of these Commentaries which treats of the jurisdiction of courts. It will suffice at present to remark a few particulars relative to them all, which may serve to inculcate more strongly the doctrine laid down concerning them.

1. And first, the courts of common law have the superintendency over these courts; to keep them within their jurisdictions, to determine wherein they exceed them, to restrain and prohibit such excess; and, in case of contumacy, to punish the officer who executes, and in some cases the judge who enforces, the sentence so declared to be illegal (*c*).

(*a*) *Middleton v. Croft*, ubi sup.; *More v. More*, 2 Atk. 158; *Bishop of St. David's v. Lucy*, Carth. 485; *Rex v. Bishop of Lichfield*, 2 W. Bla. 968; *Marshall v. Bishop of Exeter*, 7 C. B., N. S. 653; *Law Rep.*, 3 App. Ca. 17.

(*b*) Blackstone (vol. i. p. 83) enumerates among the courts where the civil and canon laws are permitted to be used, the courts "of the two universities" (meaning those

of Oxford and Cambridge); but as to Oxford, see 25 & 26 Vict. c. 26, s. 12. As to the latter, see Cambridge University Commission Report, p. 5. Blackstone also adds a fourth species of courts, viz., the courts *military*. But these are now disused.

(*c*) 2 Inst. 623; see *Beaurain v. Scott*, 3 Camp. 388; *Ex parte Jenkins*, 1 Barn. & Cress. 655.

[2. The common law has reserved to itself a paramount authority in the exposition of all such acts of parliament as concern either the extent of these courts or the matters depending before them. And therefore, if these courts either refuse to allow these acts of parliament, or will expound them in any other sense than what the common law puts upon them, the superior courts at Westminster will grant prohibitions to restrain and control them (*d*).

3. An appeal lies from all these courts to the sovereign, in the last resort,] which proves that the jurisdiction exercised in them is not derived from any intrinsic authority of their own.

[From these three strong marks and ensigns of superiority, it appears beyond a doubt that the civil and canon laws, though admitted in some cases by custom in some courts, are only subordinate, and *leges sub graviore lege*; and that, thus admitted, restrained, altered, new-modelled and amended, they are by no means with us a distinct independent species of laws, but are inferior branches of the customary or unwritten laws of England.

Let us next proceed to the *leges scriptæ*, the written laws of the kingdom (*e*); which are statutes, acts, or edicts, made by the sovereign, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in parliament assembled (*f*). The oldest of these now extant, and printed in our statute books, is the famous *Magna Charta* of king John, as confirmed in parliament, A.D. 1225, in the ninth year of Henry the third (*g*); though

(*d*) Hall v. Maule, 7 Ad. & El. 721.

(*e*) Vide sup. p. 40.

(*f*) The Prince's case, 8 Rep. 20.

(*g*) The statutes from Magna Charta down to the end of Edw. 2—including also some which (because it is doubtful whether to as-

sign them to the reign of Hen. 3, of Edw. 1, or of Edw. 2) are termed *incerti temporis*,—compose what have been called the *Vetera Statuta*; those from the beginning of the reign of Edw. 3 being contradistinguished by the appellation of the *Nova Statuta*. (Dwarris on

[doubtless there were many Acts before that time, the records of which are now lost, and the determinations of them perhaps at present currently received for the maxims of the old common law.]

The manner of making these statutes will be better considered hereafter, when we examine the constitution of parliament. At present we will only take notice of the different kinds of statutes; and of the rules of law with regard to their effect and construction (*h*).

First, as to their several kinds. Statutes are either *public* or *private* (*i*). Thus—to show the distinction—

Statutes, 626.) It may be observed, that by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 64, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 101, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 125, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 59, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 116, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 63, c. 97, c. 98, and 36 & 37 Vict. c. 91, a variety of Acts not in use or in force, or now unnecessary,—are expressly repealed.

(*h*) The method of citing acts of parliament is various. Many of the antient ones are called after the name of the place where the parliament was held that made them;—as the statutes of Merton and Marleberge, of Westminster, Gloucester and Winchester. Others are named after their subject;—as the statutes of Wales and Ireland, the *articuli cleri* and the *prærogativa regis*. Some are distinguished by their initial words, as the statute of *Quia emptores*, and that of *Circumspectè agatis*. But the most usual method has been to name the year of the reigning sovereign and the chapter or particular Act, according to its numeral order;—as, 9 Geo. 2, c. 4. For all the Acts of one session of parliament taken together make properly but one sta-

tute; and, therefore, when two sessions have been held in one year, we usually mention stat. 1 or 2. Thus the Bill of Rights is cited as 1 W. & M. st. 2, c. 2. It has, of late, been a common plan to insert in an Act a name referring to its subject-matter and date by which it shall be legal to cite it without further particularity, *e. g.*, “The Public Health Act, 1872.” It may be worth remarking here that the *title* is no part of an act of parliament. (See *Att.-Gen. v. Weymouth*, Amb. 22; *Jeffries v. Alexander*, 8 H. of L. Cas. 603, n.) And the same may be said of the *marginal notes* appended to each section. (*Claydon v. Green*, Law Rep., 3 C. P. 511.) As to the *pre-ambles* of an Act, see *Rex v. Pierce*, 3 M. & S. 62; *Salkeld v. Johnson*, 1 Hare, 196. As to the *sub-headings* of particular sections, see *Hammersmith Rail. Co. v. Brand*, Law Rep., 4 Eng. & Ir. App. 171.

(*i*) As to the law of public and private Acts see Lord Cromwell's case, 4 Rep. 13 a; *Holland's case*, ib. 76 a; *Kirk v. Nowill*, 1 T. R. 125; *Samuel v. Evans*, 2 T. R. 569. Thus, too, the Roman lawyers dis-

the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, which prevents the master and fellows of any college, the dean and chapter of a cathedral, or any other person having a spiritual living, from making leases for longer terms than twenty-one years, or three lives, is a public Act (*i*); it being a rule prescribed to spiritual persons in general: but an Act to enable the Bishop of Chester to make a lease to A. B. for sixty years (which is, in general, beyond a bishop's power), concerns only the parties and the bishop's successors, and is therefore a private Act. Again, of private Acts, some are *local*, as affecting particular places only, others *personal*, as confined to particular persons (*j*). Of the first kind, an inclosure Act is an example; of the second, an Act for a change of name (*k*). With respect to the distinction between public and private statutes, it is to be observed that the courts of law are bound to take notice judicially of the former, but not of the latter; but by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, every statute made after the commencement of the then next session of parliament, is to be taken to be a public one, and judicially noticed as such, unless the contrary be therein expressly declared (*l*).

Statutes also are sometimes described as *declaratory*, or *penal*, or *remedial*, according to the different nature of their object or provisions. Declaratory statutes are where the old custom of the kingdom is almost fallen into disuse,

tinguish between the *senatus consulta*, which regarded the whole community, and the *senatus decreta*, which operated only upon particular persons and private concerns (Gravin. Orig. 1, § 24).

(*i*) Holland's case, 4 Rep. 76 a.

(*j*) In our printed statute book some Acts are described as being "public Acts of a local character." Some *private* Acts are not printed at all. (See 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 5; Barnett v. Cox, 9 Q. B. 617.)

(*k*) We find also in our books some Acts termed *general* and others *particular*; as to which it may be observed, that one of the latter class is not repealed by a general statute later in date, unless by express reference or by necessary construction. (Thorpe v. Adams, Law Rep., 1 C. P. 125.)

(*l*) As to the proper name of this Act, see Chorlton v. Lings, Law Rep., 4 C. P. 374.

or become disputable; in which case the parliament has thought proper, *in perpetuum rei testimonium*, and for avoiding all doubts and difficulties, to declare what the common law is and ever hath been. Thus, the statute of treasons, 25 Edw. III. c. 2, makes not any new species of treasons; but only, for the benefit of the subject, declares and enumerates those several kinds of offence, which before were treason at the common law. Penal acts are those which merely impose penalties or punishments for an offence committed, as in the case of the statutes relative to game. Remedial acts are such as supply some defect in the existing law, and redress some abuse or inconvenience with which it is found to be attended, without introducing any provision of a penal character;—as in the case of the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105, which introduces various improvements in the law relating to dower. But it is not every statute that falls within one or other of these divisions; for some combine more than one of these objects, and others have objects of a different description. There is also a distinction of acts of parliament, as being either *enlarging*, or *restraining*, *enabling*, or *disabling* acts. Thus the 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28, which gave bishops and other sole ecclesiastical corporations (except parsons and vicars) a more ample power of making leases than they possessed before, is called an enabling statute: the 13 Eliz. c. 10, above noticed, which afterwards imposed certain limitations as to the making of leases by ecclesiastical persons, is described as a restraining or disabling statute (*m*).

Secondly, as to their interpretation. In interpreting statutes,—as well as in declaring the rule of the common law (*n*),—the courts are governed by former adjudications (*o*); or, in the absence of these, by analogy and general reasoning (*p*). But many specific rules are also

(*m*) Co. Litt. 44 b; 1 Bl. Com. 87.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 46.

(*o*) By Lord Kenyon, *Lacon v.*

Hooper, 6 T. R. 224; and see *Rex v. Leek Wootton*, 16 East, 122.

(*p*) Hob. 346.

laid down for their guidance; and principally these which follow.

1. A statute begins to operate from the time when it receives the royal assent, unless some other time be fixed by the act itself for the purpose (*q*). The rule on this subject was formerly different; for at common law every act of parliament, which had no provision to the contrary, was considered, as soon as it passed, (that is, received the royal assent,) as having been in force retrospectively from the first day of the session of parliament in which it passed, though in fact it might not have received the royal assent, or even been introduced into parliament, until long after that day. Thus where a statute provided that every deed of annuity granted *after the passing of the act* should be enrolled within twenty days after execution, and the act received the royal assent in May, 1777, but the session had commenced in October, 1776, an annuity deed, executed in January, 1777, nearly four months before the royal assent was given, but after the commencement of the session, was adjudged to be void for non-compliance with the provision (*r*). This strange principle, however, though rigidly observed for centuries, no longer prevails; it being expressly provided by 33 Geo. III. c. 13, that, where no other direction is given, every act shall be considered as commencing from the date indorsed upon it as the date of its receiving the royal assent—a manifest improvement, it must be owned, on the former law; though it has been doubted (and with reason) whether even the new rule is placed upon the right basis, and whether some fixed and reasonable period ought not always to be interposed between the passing of an act and the time of its

(*q*) 33 Geo. 3, c. 13; *Nares v. Rowles*, 14 East, 510. But where an Act expires before a bill for continuing it, introduced in the same session, receives the royal assent, the latter Act takes effect (unless otherwise provided, and except as

to penalties,) from the expiration of the former; 48 Geo. 3, c. 106. By 35 & 36 Vict. c. 88, a variety of Acts then about to expire are continued as therein specified.

(*r*) *Latless v. Holmes*, 4 T. R. 660.

coming into operation, so as to give the subjects of the realm an opportunity of becoming acquainted with its provisions (*s*). The rule, it will be observed, is laid down with an exception of the case where the period of commencement is otherwise fixed by the statute itself; for by force of an express provision, or even by necessary construction from the nature of the enactment, the operation of a statute may be either postponed on the one hand, or have a retrospective relation on the other, so as to affect rights which had vested before it received the royal assent, or transactions which had before then taken place (*t*).

2. Statutes are to be construed not according to their mere letter, but the intent and object with which they were made (*u*). It occasionally happens therefore that the judges who expound them are obliged, in favour of the intention, to depart in some measure from the words. And this may be either by holding that a case within the words, is not within the meaning; or that a case not within the words, is within the meaning. Thus where a statute provides that all who shall commit a certain act shall be deemed felons, yet a madman who does the act shall not be deemed a felon; for that would be contrary to the presumable intention (*x*). And so, on the other hand, where an act of parliament gave the owners of inheritances a remedy by action against such tenants holding for life or *years* as should commit waste (i. e. spoil and destruction); the action was held maintainable against a tenant holding only for one year or less, for so the law-makers presumably designed (*y*). In all instances where the strict letter of the law is thus corrected by reference to its intention, the construction is said to be by *equity* (*z*), a phrase not peculiar

(*s*) See Kent's Comm. Lect. 20; Dwarris on Stats. 683.

(*t*) Upon the subject of construing a statute retrospectively, see Burn v. Carvalho, 1 Ad. & El. 338; Hitchcock v. Way, 6 Ad. & El. 943; Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22;

Wright v. Hale, 6 H. & N. 229.

(*u*) Bac. Ab. Statute (1), 5; Stradling v. Morgan, Plow. 205; Rex v. Everdon, 9 East, 101.

(*x*) Eyston v. Studd, Plow. 465.

(*y*) Ibid. 467.

(*z*) Eyston v. Studd, ubi sup.; Co.

to the law of England, but used by foreign jurists in the same sense (*a*). Thus, in the first example, the case would be said to be out of the equity of the act; in the second to be within its equity (*b*). It is to be observed, however, that this principle of equitable construction is not to be carried beyond certain bounds, and a judge is not at liberty, in favour of a supposed intention, to disregard the express letter of the statute, where, for anything that appears, the wording may correspond with the actual design of the legislature—the maxim in cases of this description being that *a verbis legis non recedendum est* (*c*). It is also important to remark, that the rule in question has been applied more freely to the antient statutes than it now is to those of more modern date, which are interpreted somewhat more strictly, and with closer adherence to the letter (*d*). For the style of framing acts of parliament has itself undergone a material change—those of a more antient era being comparatively short and general in their character, while the later acts are expanded into minute detail, and intended to reach every specific case; and, therefore, in adopting a construction not in strict conformity with the language of the legislature, there is more danger, than there once was, of going beyond, or falling short of, its real intention.

3. Another maxim (and one that may often serve for our guidance in the application of the last), is, that in the interpretation of statutes in general, the following points

Litt. 24 b; 1 Bl. Com. 62. The term is of very early occurrence in our law; see Bract. lib. 1, c. 4, p. 3 a; lib. 2, c. 7, p. 23 b.

(*a*) Grotius de *Æquitate*, s. 3; Puffendorf, *Elem. Jur. Un.* lib. 1, ss. 22, 23.

(*b*) 3 Bl. Com. 481. The latter expression is of more familiar occurrence, however, than the former.

(*c*) Edrich's case, 5 Rep. 118 b;

and see *Jones v. Smart*, 1 T. R. 52; and *R. v. Inhabitants of Great Bentley*, 10 Barn. & Cress. 520.

(*d*) Per Coleridge, J., *Rex v. Gardner*, 6 Ad. & El. 118; and see *Brandling v. Barrington*, 6 Barn. & Cress. 475; *Rex v. Inhabitants of Barham*, 8 Barn. & Cress. 104; *Notley v. Buck*, ib. 164; *Adam v. Inhabitants of Bristol*, 2 Ad. & El. 395, 399.

are to be considered,—the old law, the mischief, and the remedy; that is, how the common law stood at the making of the act, what the mischief was for which the common law did not provide, and what remedy the parliament hath provided to cure this mischief (*e*). And here an example may be found in the restraining statute of 13 Eliz. c. 10, to which we have already adverted (*f*). By the common law the master and fellows of a college, and such other corporations, might let as long leases as they thought proper; the mischief was that they let long and unreasonable leases, to the impoverishment of their successors; the remedy applied by the statute was by making void all leases made by them for longer terms than three lives, or twenty-one years. Now in the construction of this statute it is held, that leases, though for a longer term, made by the master and fellows of a college or a dean and chapter, are not void during the continuance of the master or the dean; for the act was made for the benefit and protection of the successor (*g*), and the mischief is therefore sufficiently suppressed by vacating them after the determination of the interest of the grantors; but the leases, during the continuance of the grantors, not being within the mischief, are not within the remedy (*h*).

4. It is also an established rule, that remedial statutes are to be more liberally, and penal more strictly, construed (*i*). The statute of Elizabeth just mentioned may again serve as an example; for, soon after it was made, the master and fellows of Magdalen College granted certain premises to the queen, her heirs, and successors, on condition that she should convey the same to a certain person named: and it was contended that this conveyance was not restrained by the act; for that by the general rule of law the sovereign is not bound by a statute unless

(*e*) Heydon's case, 3 Rep. 7; 1 Bl. Com. 87; 2 Inst. 110.

(*f*) Vide sup. pp. 70, 71.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 45, n. (4), by Harg.;

Bac. Ab. Leases (H.); Magdalen College case, 11 Rep. 73 a.

(*h*) 1 Bl. Com. 87.

(*i*) Ibid. 88.

specially mentioned; which the court admitted to be in many cases true. But as this was a remedial act, and made to suppress wrong, it was adjudged that it should bind the queen (*k*). As to the stricter manner in which a penal act must be interpreted, we may resort to an illustration of Lord Bacon's, that if for a certain offence it be enacted that a man shall lose his right hand, and some offender hath had his right hand before cut off in the wars; he shall not lose his left hand, but the crime shall rather pass without the punishment which the law assigned, than the letter of the law shall be extended (*l*). This distinction applies, it will be observed, not only to remedial and penal statutes properly so called, but also to those of a mixed kind, which contain both remedial and penal provisions;—the former of which will be construed with more indulgence than the latter (*m*).

5. In the construction of a statute all other such statutes ought to be taken into consideration as have been made *in pari materiâ* (*n*). Thus by the 7 Geo. II. c. 15, it was enacted, that ship-owners, carrying goods, are not to be responsible for losses to such goods, incurred (without their privity) by the misconduct of the master and mariners, to any greater extent than the value of the ship, *with all her appurtenances*, and the freight. By 26 Geo. III. c. 86, they were exempted from liability for loss incurred by robbery of any persons whatsoever, further than the value of the ship, *with all her appurtenances*, and the freight. By 53 Geo. III. c. 159, s. 1, they were not to be answerable for losses arising from any act done without their fault or privity, beyond the value *of the ship* and freight. Upon the last act a question arose, whether the owner of a vessel

(*k*) Magdalen College case, 11 Rep. 72.

(*l*) Bac. Maxims, 12.

(*m*) See *Platt v. Sheriffs of London*, Plowd. 36; *Bones v. Booth*, W. B. 1236.

(*n*) Bac. Abr. Statute (1), 2, 3; *Jones v. Smart*, 1 T. R. 53; *King, qui tam v. Smith*, 4 T. R. 419; *Duck v. Addington*, 4 T. R. 447; *Gale v. Laurie*, 5 Barn. & Cress. 156.

was answerable for the value of certain fishing stores belonging to the ship, and lost by an accidental collision at sea: and the court held him answerable; and remarked, that in subsequent sections of the same act, and also in the two preceding statutes, which were *in pari materiâ*, the words used were *ship and all her appurtenances*; so that the section in question was to be understood as if the words *with all her appurtenances* were used therein, supposing that those words would make any difference in the sense (*o*). This rule, it will be observed, applies whether the prior acts are referred to in the statute on which the question arises, or not. They are considered, indeed, as all forming one continued enactment (*p*).

6. A statute which treats of things or persons of an inferior rank, cannot by any general words be extended to those of a superior (*q*). And therefore, inasmuch as the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 10, before referred to, applied its prohibition to “masters and fellows of colleges, deans and chapters of cathedrals, masters of hospitals, parsons and vicars, or any other having any spiritual or ecclesiastical living,” a *bishop* was held not to be included within its provisions; for, though he has a spiritual living, he is of higher dignity than any of the persons enumerated (*r*).

7. Where the provision of a statute is general, every thing which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by the common law (*s*). And therefore, when anything is commanded or prohibited, though only in general terms, by an act of parliament, and no remedy is expressly given in the event of its provision being violated, yet is the party, who sustains an injury by such violation,

(*o*) *Gale v. Laurie*, 5 Barn. & Cress. 156. The substance of these earlier provisions in favour of ship-owners, were incorporated in the 9th part of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854.

(*p*) *Earl of Aylesbury v. Pattison*, 1 Doug. 30.

(*q*) 1 Bla. Com. 88.

(*r*) *Archbishop of Canterbury's case*, 2 Rep. 46 b; 2 Hawk. c. 27, s. 124.

(*s*) Bac. Abr. Statute (B).

entitled to bring an action for his private relief; and if the matter be of public concern, the offender shall besides be considered as guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to indictment accordingly (*t*). The law in this case will be the same, even though the statute, after the prohibition, proceeds by a separate clause to annex a particular pecuniary penalty to the offence if committed; for that will not take away the other remedies (*u*): but where a statute merely inflicts a pecuniary penalty for an act not previously unlawful, and contains no direct prohibitory clause, no indictment can in this case be sustained;—the only remedy is to proceed for the penalty (*x*).

8. A subsequent statute may repeal a prior one, not only by express provision to that effect, but by necessary implication; and every statute is a repeal by implication of a preceding statute, so far as it is contrary thereto, for *leges posteriores priores abrogant* (*y*); consonant to which it was laid down by a law of the twelve tables at Rome, that *quod populus postremum jussit, id jus ratum esto*. But this is to be understood only when the matter of the later statute is so clearly repugnant that it necessarily implies a negative. As if a former act says, that a juror shall have an estate of twenty pounds a year; and a new statute afterwards enacts, that he shall have twenty marks:—here the latter statute virtually repeals the former. For if twenty marks be made qualification sufficient, the former statute which requires twenty pounds is at an end (*z*). But if the enactments are such that they may

(*t*) 2 Inst. 131, 163. See the case of the Marshalsea, 10 Rep. 75 b; 2 Hale, P. C. 171; Rex v. Harris, 4 T. R. 205; Rex v. Leginham, 1 Mod. 71; Carden v. General Cemetery Company, 5 Bing. N. C. 253; R. v. Buchanan, 12 L. J. 227.

(*u*) Per Ashurst, J., Rex v. Harris, ubi supra; Beckford v. Hood,

7 T. R. 620; Rex v. Wright, 1 Burr. 543.

(*x*) See Rex v. Buck, 2 Str. 679; Rex v. Wright, ubi supra; Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 805.

(*y*) Bac. Abr. Statute (D). See Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing. N. C. 679; Daw v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, 12 C. B., N. S. 161.

(*z*) Jeuk. Cent. 2, 73.

stand together, here the latter does not repeal the former, but they shall both have a concurrent efficacy. As if by a former law an offence be indictable at the quarter sessions, and a later law makes the same offence indictable at the assizes;—here the jurisdiction of the sessions is not taken away, but both have concurrent jurisdiction, and the offender may be prosecuted at either: unless the new statute subjoins express negative words, as, that the offence shall be indictable at the assizes, *and not elsewhere* (*a*).

9. It was formerly the rule, that if a statute, repealing another, was itself repealed afterwards, the first statute was revived, without any formal words for that purpose (*b*). Thus when the statute of 5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 12, providing that the matrimony of priests should be deemed true and lawful matrimony to all purposes, was repealed by a statute 1 Mary, st. 2, c. 2, and this latter statute was afterwards repealed by the act of 1 Jac. c. 25; it was held that there needed not any express words of revival in King James's statute (though such words are in fact contained), but that the act of Edward the sixth was impliedly and virtually revived (*c*). But the rule is now different, it being enacted by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, ss. 5, 6, that where any act repealing in whole or in part any former statute is itself repealed, such last repeal shall not revive the act or provisions before repealed, unless words be added for that purpose; and that where any act shall be made repealing in whole or in part any former act, and substituting provisions instead of those repealed, such repealed provisions shall remain in force till those substituted shall come into operation by force of the last made statute.

10. [Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of

(*a*) Dr. Foster's case, 11 Rep. 63. See The Conservators of the Thames v. Ball, Law Rep., 1 C. P. 415. wood, 3 Bing. 493; Doe v. Gully, . 9 Barn. & Cress. 344; Phillips v. Hopwood, 10 Barn. & Cress. 39.

(*b*) See the Bishop's case, 12 Rep. 7; 4 Inst. 325; Tattle v. Grim- (*c*) The Bishop's case, 12 Rep. 9.

[subsequent parliaments bind not. So the statute 11 Hen. VII. c. 1, which directs that no person for assisting a king *de facto* shall be attainted of treason by act of parliament or otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecutions for high treason, but it will not restrain or clog any parliamentary attainder (*d*). Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority; it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. And upon the same principle Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with a proper contempt these restraining clauses, which endeavour to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. "When you repeal the law "itself," says he, "you at the same time repeal the prohibitory clause, which guards against such repeal" (*e*).]

These are the several grounds of the law of England in its proper and original extent. There is a species, however, of unwritten law to which no reference has yet been made, but which has long formed part of the general system, and (though here noticed in the last place) constitutes one of its principal divisions. This is *equity*; which is so termed by way of distinction from the original and proper law of England, or (as it is usually called in this case) the *common law*. For that phrase (we are to observe) is used in two senses—either to express the institutions which are not founded on any known statute, but on custom only (*f*),—or those which are distinct from equity. Indeed the term serves in both cases to indicate that which is more antient, as opposed to that which is less so: the statute law being of modern creation when compared with that which is of immemorial antiquity; and equity being of considerably later birth than some of

(*d*) 4 Inst. 43.

(*e*) "*Cum lex abrogatur, illud ipsum abrogatur, quo non eam*

abrogari oporteat."—Ep. ad Att. iii. 23.

(*f*) Vide sup. pp. 41, 44, 45.

the earlier parts of the statute law. The origin of equity may be stated as follows. The antient structure of our national jurisprudence (whatever might be its merit in other particulars) was singularly defective in compass and enlargement of view. It took no account of several subjects for which it is the duty of civilized judicature to provide; and to others, it applied maxims too strict and unbending to satisfy the notions of justice in an advanced state of society. Its judicial remedies were also in some cases of a cumbrous and inconvenient character. For these evils the progressive introduction of new remedial laws, by act of the legislature, would seem to have been the natural remedy. But the course of things was different. Owing perhaps to some peculiar averseness in the early genius of the country from change in its legal institutions, the law administered between subject and subject, in the antient courts of the realm, was allowed to remain for a long period of our history with very little alteration of a fundamental kind. But new courts were on the other hand gradually established with a collateral, and, in some sense, an usurped jurisdiction, in which cognizance was taken of those subjects which the proper law of England had overlooked or insufficiently regulated; relief given from the consequences of some of its harsher doctrines; and the defects of its judicial methods in certain cases supplied. These courts having been at the outset chiefly resorted to for one of the particular purposes above enumerated, viz., the mitigation of the severity of the common law as applied to particular cases, the whole system of rules and principles there administered obtained,—without much propriety, but in reference to the liberal principle of interpretation applied by jurists to the interpretation of positive laws (*g*),—the appellation of *equity*,—and soon began to hold that divided empire with the more antient, or common law, which it has hitherto maintained. In the

(*g*) Vide sup. p. 73; Redesdale, Plead. in Chan. p. 3.

Court of Chancery it has long been the practice to administer a very large proportion of the whole forensic business of the country, (that is, in matters of property, for beyond this it has had no jurisdiction); and the extensive subjects, in particular, of *trusts* and *partnerships*, have fallen almost exclusively under its management. It has also been the proper and regular tribunal to which recourse is had, when the object has been either to compel a man to perform his contract, or to cause him to abstain from the commission of an injury; and until a recent period it was the only court available for either of these purposes,—the common law courts interfering in general only so far as to award *damages* where the breach of contract or wrong had been already committed; though their jurisdiction in this respect was somewhat enlarged by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (*i*). But, as we shall see hereafter, the two systems of law and equity, from the commencement of the Judicature Act, 1873, in November, 1874, are to be administered in a single tribunal, constituted out of the superior courts of justice which now exist, and to be styled Her Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature (*h*); and that Act contains, moreover, a general provision that in all matters in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law, with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail (*l*).

(*i*) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125. See Benson *v.* Paull, 6 Ell. & Bl. 373; Norris *v.* Irish Land Company, 8 Ell. & Bl. 526.
 (*h*) Vide post, bk. v. c. v.
 (*l*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25 (11).

SECTION IV.

OF THE COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.



THE kingdom of England over which our municipal laws have jurisdiction, includes not, *by the common law*, either Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Berwick-upon-Tweed, or any other part of the dominions of the Crown (*a*); and yet the civil laws and local customs of the territory of England do now obtain, with more or less restrictions, in all of these places (*b*);—of each of which it will be proper first to take a review, before we consider the kingdom of England itself, the original and proper subject of these laws.

[*Wales* (*c*) had continued independent of England, unconquered and uncultivated in the primitive pastoral state which Cæsar and Tacitus ascribe to Britain in general, for many centuries: even from the time of the hostile invasions of the Saxons, when the antient and Christian inhabitants of the island retired to its natural intrenchments, for protection against their pagan visitants. But when these invaders themselves were converted to Christianity, and settled into regular and potent governments, this retreat of the antient Britons grew every day narrower; they were over-run by little and little, gradually driven from one fastness to another, and by repeated losses abridged of their wild independence. Very early in our

(*a*) 1 Bl. Com. p. 93.

(*b*) It may be here remarked that such statutes as apply to Scotland or to Ireland, exclusively of England, are not noticed in this work, which

treats only of the laws of *England*.

(*c*) As to Wales, see Vaugh. 395—420; Rex *v.* Cowle, 2 Burr. 850; 2 Inst. 195; 4 Inst. 239; Buckley *v.* Thomas, Plowd. 121, 123, 126, 129.

[history we find their princes doing homage to the crown of England; till at length in the reign of Edward the first, who may justly be styled the conqueror of Wales, the line of their antient princes was abolished (*c*), and the king of England's eldest son] was created their titular prince (*d*); [the territory of Wales being then entirely re-annexed, by a kind of feodal resumption, to the dominion of the crown of England (*e*); or, as] the statute of Wales expresses it, "*[terra Walliæ cum incolis suis, prius regi jure feodali subjecta* (of which homage was the sign), *jam in proprietatis dominium totaliter et cum integritate conversa est, et coronæ regni Angliæ tanquam pars corporis ejusdem annexa et unita*" (*f*). By this statute of Wales very material alterations were also made in divers parts of their laws, so as to reduce them nearer to the English standard, especially in the forms of their judicial proceedings; but they still retained very much of their original polity, particularly their rule of inheritance, viz., that their lands were divided equally among all the issue male, and did not descend to the eldest son alone. By other subsequent statutes their provincial immunities were still farther abridged: but the finishing stroke to their independency was given by the statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 26; which at the same time gave the utmost advancement to their civil prosperity, by admitting them to a thorough communication of laws with the subjects of England. Thus were this brave people gradually conquered into the enjoyment of true liberty, being insensibly put upon the same footing, and made fellow-citizens, with their conquerors.

It is enacted by this statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 26,—

(*c*) See Turner's Hist. Eng. p. 3, c. ii.; Hume's Hist. Eng. c. xiii.

(*d*) Blackstone says he became "their titular prince as a matter of course;" but the expression is not accurate, as the title of Prince of Wales is always conferred on the

heir apparent by special creation and investiture.

(*e*) Vaugh. 400; Rex v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 851.

(*f*) 12 Edw. 1. Blackstone refers erroneously in this place to the statute 10 Edw. 1.

[1. That the dominion of Wales shall be for ever united to the kingdom of England. 2. That all Welshmen born shall have the same liberties as other the king's subjects. 3. That lands in Wales shall be inheritable according to the English tenures and rules of descent. 4. That the laws of England, and no other, shall be used in Wales: besides many other regulations of the police of this principality.] And the statute 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 26, confirms the same, adds further regulations, and divides it into twelve shires, a division, it may be observed, exclusive of the county of Monmouth; which, though formerly part of Wales, had been made, by the 27 Hen. VIII. c. 26, just mentioned, one of the counties of the realm of England (*g*).

From this time the civil condition of the principality has differed but slightly from that of the kingdom at large: and it may be remarked, that an Act of Parliament, where England only is mentioned, includes Wales also (*h*). There were, however, until a recent period, two particulars of distinction sufficiently important to deserve notice—first, that Wales possessed within itself superior courts called Courts of Great Session, independent of the process of Westminster Hall; and was not visited by the English judges of assize (*i*): secondly, that such of its counties and towns as were represented in parliament sent each one member only, the usual number in England being two. But by the Act for the more effectual administration of justice, 1 Will. IV. c. 70, the jurisdiction of the Courts of Great Session was abolished; and it was enacted that assizes should be held in the principality, for the trial of all matters criminal and civil, in like manner and form as had been usual for the counties in England. And by the Reform Act of 1832 (2 Will. IV. c. 45), a new arrangement

(*g*) By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 11, the manner of assigning *sheriffs* of counties in Wales, is regulated and assimilated to that in England.

(*h*) See 20 Geo. 2, c. 42, s. 3.

(*i*) The proceedings in the courts of Great Sessions were partly regulated by 13 Geo. 3, c. 51.

was made as to the return of members for Wales; by the effect of which three of its counties respectively send two knights of the shire to parliament, and each of the remaining counties one.

[The kingdom of *Scotland*—notwithstanding the union of the crowns on the accession of their king James the sixth to that of England—continued an entirely separate and distinct kingdom for above a century more, though an union had been long projected;] which was judged to be the more easy to be done, as these kingdoms exhibited at the time of the project a very great resemblance, though far from identity, in their institutions. And this is remarked by Sir Edward Coke (*k*), who points out a conformity, in many things, not only in the religion and language of the two nations, but also in their antient laws (*l*). As to the latter particular, indeed, this resemblance did not exist at the time of the Norman conquest, for the Scottish institutions were then, according to the best authorities, exclusively Celtic, and those of England, Anglo-Saxon (*m*): but it had become established as soon afterwards as the twelfth century (*n*); and not only continued to prevail at the time of the Union, but is even yet in some particulars distinctly perceptible. The diversities of practice, however, in two large and independent juris-

(*k*) 4 Inst. 345.

(*l*) Blackstone says that both kingdoms "were antiently under the same government," and cites 1 Jac. 1, c. 1, as declaring that "these two mighty, famous, and antient kingdoms were formerly one." But when and how they became so, is not stated.

(*m*) See Hallam's Constitutional Hist. vol. iii. p. 404, 3rd ed.

(*n*) The most antient book of Scottish law, called *Regiam Majestatem* (the authenticity of which,

though once a subject of dispute, seems on the whole to be sufficiently established,) is so similar to the treatise of Glanvil on English law in the reign of Hen. 2, that one of them is plainly copied from the other. There seems little reason, however, to doubt that Glanvil's is the original work. As to these treatises, see 4 Inst. 345; Erskine's Instit. b. 1, t. 1, s. 32; Robertson's Chas. V. vol. i. n. (25); Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. i. p. 225.

dictions, and the acts of two distinct parliaments, have in process of time naturally tended to introduce great diversities; to which we may add, as a co-operative cause, the antient alliance and connection of Scotland with France, where the civil law chiefly prevailed. For to that law the Scottish jurisprudence ultimately became in many respects conformable; and particularly in all that regards contracts and commerce (*o*).

To recur, however, to the history of the Union: this appeared to Sir Edward Coke, and the politicians of that time, to be attended (notwithstanding the similarity of the two systems of law) with great difficulties; [but these were at length overcome, and the great work was happily effected in the year 1706, during the reign of Queen Anne (*p*); when twenty-five articles of union were agreed to by the parliaments of both nations; the purport of the most considerable being as follows;—that

1. On the first of May, 1707, and for ever after, the kingdoms of England and Scotland shall be united into one kingdom, by the name of Great Britain (*q*).

2. The succession to the monarchy of Great Britain shall be the same as was before settled with regard to that of England.

3. The united kingdom shall be represented by one parliament (*r*).

4. There shall be a communication of all rights and privileges between the subjects of both kingdoms, except where it is otherwise agreed.

9. When England raises 2,000,000*l.* by a land tax, Scotland shall raise 48,000*l.*

(*o*) See Erskine's Instit. b. 1, t. 1, s. 41. By 19 & 20 Vict. c. 60, and c. 97, the laws of England and Scotland have recently been assimilated on several miscellaneous points affecting trade and commerce.

(*p*) See the Act of Union (6 Ann. c. 11, sometimes printed 5 & 6 Ann. c. 8).

(*q*) We may here remark that by 4 & 5 Vict. c. 30, a general *survey* of Great Britain was authorized to be taken. (See 36 & 37 Vict. c. 75.)

(*r*) As to the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords over the Scotch courts, see 6 Ann. c. 53, and 48 Geo. 3, c. 151.

[16, 17. The standards of the coin, of weights, and of measures, shall be reduced to those of England, throughout the united kingdoms.

18. The laws relating to trade, customs, and the excise, shall be the same in Scotland as in England (*r*). But all the other laws of Scotland shall remain in force; though alterable by the parliament of Great Britain. Yet with this caution, that laws relating to public policy are alterable at the discretion of the parliament; laws relating to private right are not to be altered but for the evident utility of the people of Scotland.

22. Sixteen peers are to be chosen to represent the peerage of Scotland in parliament (*s*), and forty-five members to sit in the house of commons;] which number of commoners has, however, been now raised to sixty (*t*).

23. [The sixteen representative peers of Scotland shall have all privileges of parliament: and all peers of Scotland shall be peers of Great Britain, and rank next after those of the same degree at the time of the union; and shall have all privileges of peers, except sitting in the house of lords and voting on the trial of a peer (*u*).

These are the principal of the twenty-five articles of union, which are ratified and confirmed by statute 5 Anne, c. 8: in which statute there are also two acts of parliament recited; the one of Scotland (*x*), whereby the church of Scotland, and also the four universities of that kingdom, are established for ever, and all succeeding sovereigns are to take an oath inviolably to maintain the same; the other of England (*y*), whereby the Acts of Uniformity of the

(*r*) See *Maxwell v. Mayre*, 1 Bla. Rep. 271, 364.

(*s*) 6 Ann. c. 23. And see 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 63; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 87; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 35.

(*t*) See 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 65, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 48, Acts passed in the years 1832 and 1868 to amend the representation of the people in Scotland.

(*u*) See Lord Mornington's case, Fort. Rep. 165; Duke of Queensberry's case, 1 Peere Wms. 582.

(*x*) 1 W. & M. c. 5 (an Act for securing the Protestant religion and Presbyterian church government).

(*y*) 5 Ann. c. 5 (an Act for securing the church of England as by law established).

[thirteenth year of Elizabeth and the thirteenth and fourteenth years of Charles the second (except as the same had been altered by parliament at that time), and all other acts then in force for the preservation of the church of England, are declared perpetual(*z*); and it is stipulated that every subsequent king and queen shall take an oath inviolably to maintain the same within England, Ireland, Wales, and the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed. And it is enacted, that these two Acts "shall for ever be observed as fundamental and essential conditions of the union."

Upon these articles and acts of union, it is to be observed,—1. That the two kingdoms are now so inseparably united, that nothing can ever disunite them again; except the mutual consent of both, or the successful resistance of either, upon apprehending an infringement of those points which, when they were separate and independent nations, it was mutually stipulated should be "fundamental and essential conditions of the union." 2. That whatever else may be deemed "fundamental and essential conditions," the preservation of the two churches of England and Scotland in the same state that they were in at the time of the union, and the maintenance of the acts of uniformity which establish our common prayer, are expressly declared so to be. 3. That therefore any alteration in the constitution of either of those churches, or in the liturgy of the church of England, (unless with the consent of the respective churches, collectively or representatively given,) would be an infringement of these "fundamental and essential conditions." 4. That the municipal laws of Scotland are ordained to be still observed in that part of the island, unless altered by parliament; and, as the parliament has not yet thought proper, except in certain instances, to alter

(*z*) It may be noticed that some alteration in the act of uniformity was rendered necessary by "The Universities Tests Act, 1871" (34 & 35 Vict. c. 26), and also that the liturgy of the church of England (as referred to in that act) was mo-

dified in certain particulars by "The Prayer Book (Tables of Lessons) Act, 1871" (34 & 35 Vict. c. 37). See also the 22 Vict. c. 2, abolishing the church services for some particular days.

[them, they still (with regard to the particulars unaltered) continue in full force. Wherefore the municipal laws of England are, generally speaking, of no force or validity in Scotland;] nor, on the other hand, are those of Scotland of force or validity in England (*z*); [and of consequence, in the ensuing Commentaries, we shall have very little occasion to mention, any further than sometimes by way of illustration, the municipal laws of the Scottish part of the united kingdom.] It is however to be observed, that acts of parliament, passed since the union, extend in general to Scotland, though that country be not expressly mentioned. If it be intended to except Scotland, there must be an express proviso to that effect, or the intention of the legislature to except it must be otherwise sufficiently indicated (*a*).

[The town of *Berwick-upon-Tweed* was originally part of the kingdom of Scotland; and, as such, was for a time reduced by King Edward the first into the possession of the crown of England; and, during such its subjection, it received from that prince a charter, which, (after its subsequent cession by Edward Balliol to be for ever united to the crown and realm of England,) was confirmed by King Edward the third, with some additions; particularly that it should be governed by the laws and usages which it enjoyed during the time of King Alexander, that is, before its reduction by Edward the first. Its constitution was new-modelled, and put upon an English footing by a charter of King James the first: and all its liberties, franchises, and customs were confirmed in parliament by the statutes 22 Edw. IV. c. 8, and 2 Jac. I. c. 28. Though therefore it hath some local peculiarities, derived from the antient laws of Scotland, yet it is now clearly part of the

(*z*) Our courts do not even take judicial notice of the state of the law in Scotland; but (as in the case of a foreign country) if any question upon it happens to arise, it is considered as a matter of fact to be as-

certainied by evidence. (See *Woodham v. Edwardes*, 5 Ad. & El. 771; *Bradlaugh v. De Rin*, Law Rep., 5 C. P. 473.)

(*a*) *Rex v. Cowle*, 2 Burr. 853.

[realm of England,] and is accordingly duly represented by burgesses in the House of Commons (*b*). And therefore it was (perhaps superfluously) declared by statute 20 Geo. II. c. 42, s. 3, that where England only is mentioned in any act of parliament, the same notwithstanding hath and shall be “deemed to comprehend and include the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed.” Berwick, however, is no part of the county of Northumberland (*c*); but forms, in some sense, a county of itself; that is, a *county of a town corporate* (*d*): as to the effect of which, the reader is referred to the observations which we shall have occasion presently to make when we come to explain the nature of counties corporate (*e*).

As to *Ireland* (*f*), its inhabitants, at the time of the conquest of that island by Henry the second, were governed by what they called the Brehon law, so styled from the Irish name of judges, who were denominated Brehons (*g*). But on such conquest, the laws of England were received and sworn to by the Irish nation, assembled at the council of Lismore (*h*). [And afterwards King John, in the twelfth year of his reign, went into Ireland and carried over with him many able sages of the law; and there by his letters-patent, in right of the dominion of conquest, is said to have ordained and established that Ireland should be governed by the laws of England (*i*): which letters-patent Sir Edward Coke apprehends to have been there confirmed in parliament (*k*). But to this ordi-

(*b*) See Hale, Hist. C. L. c. 9; Rex v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 853; Com. Dig. Scotland (B.); Mayor of Berwick v. Shanks, 3 Bing. 459.

(*c*) See Rex v. Cowle, ubi sup.; Mayor of Berwick v. Shanks, 3 Bing. 459.

(*d*) See 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 67, ss. 61, 109; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 103, s. 6.

(*e*) Vide post, p. 129.

(*f*) As to Ireland, see 4 Inst. 349.

(*g*) 4 Inst. 358; Edm. Spenser's State of Ireland, p. 1513, edit. Hughes.

(*h*) Pryn. on 4 Inst. 249.

(*i*) See Craw v. Ramsay, Vaugh. 294; 2 Pryn. Rec. 85; Calvin's case, 7 Rep. 23; Campbell v. Hall, Cowp. 210.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 141.

[n]ance many of the Irish were averse to conform, and still stuck to their Brehon law: so that both Henry the third (*l*) and Edward the first (*m*) were obliged to renew the injunction; and at length in a parliament holden at Kilkenny, 40 Edw. III., under Lionel Duke of Clarence, the then lieutenant of Ireland, the Brehon law was formally abolished, it being unanimously declared to be indeed no law, but a lewd custom crept in of later times. And yet, even in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the wild natives still kept and preserved their Brehon law; which is described to have been “a rule of right unwritten, but “delivered by tradition from one to another, in which “oftentimes there appeared great show of equity in determining the right between party and party, but in many “things repugnant quite both to God’s law and man’s” (*n*). The latter part of this character is alone ascribed to it, by the laws before cited of Edward the first and his grandson.]

Notwithstanding this settlement of Ireland, it was only entitled the dominion or lordship of Ireland (*o*), and the king’s style was no other than *Dominus Hiberniæ*, lord of Ireland, till the thirty-third year of King Henry the eighth, when he assumed the title of king, which is recognized by act of parliament, 35 Hen. VIII. c. 3. [But as Ireland was a distinct dominion, and had parliaments of its own, it is to be observed, that though the immemorial customs (or common law) of England were made the rule of justice in Ireland also, yet no acts of the English parliament, since the twelfth of King John, extended into that kingdom; unless indeed it were specially named, or included under general words, such as, “within any of the king’s do-

(*l*) A. R. 30; 1 Rym. Fœd. 442.

(*m*) A. R. 5.—“*Pro eo quod leges quibus utuntur Hybernici Deo detestabiles existunt, et omni juri dissonant, adeo quod leges censeri non debeant, nobis et concilio nos-*

tro satis videtur expediens, eisdem utendas concedere leges Anglicanas.”—Pryn. Rec. 1218.

(*n*) See Spenser’s State of Ireland, ubi sup.

(*o*) Stat. Hiberniæ, 14 Hen. 3.

[minions." And this is particularly expressed, and the reason given, in the Year Books; where it is said, "a tax granted by the parliament of England shall not bind those of Ireland, because they are not summoned to our parliament;" and again, "Ireland hath a parliament of its own, and maketh and altereth laws; and our statutes do not bind them (*p*), because they do not send knights to our parliament; but their persons are the king's subjects, like as the inhabitants of Calais, Gascoigne, and Guienne, while they continued under the king's subjection" (*q*). The general run of laws, enacted by the superior state, are supposed to be calculated for its own internal government, and do not extend to its distant dependent countries, which, bearing no part in the legislature, are not therefore in its ordinary and daily contemplation. But when the sovereign legislative power sees it necessary to extend its care to any of its subordinate dominions, and mentions them expressly by name, or includes them under general words, there can be no doubt but then they are bound by its laws (*r*).

The original method of passing statutes in Ireland was nearly the same as in England, the chief governor holding parliaments at his pleasure, which enacted such laws as they thought proper (*s*). But an ill use being made of this liberty, particularly by Lord Gormanstown, deputy-lieutenant in the reign of Edward the fourth (*t*), a set of statutes was enacted in the tenth year of Henry the seventh (Sir Edward Poynings being then lord deputy, whence they are called Poynings' laws), one of which (*u*), in order to restrain the power as well of the deputy as of the Irish parliament, provides,—1. That, before any parliament be

(*p*) Lord Coke, citing this in Calvin's case (7 Rep. 22), inserts the following parenthesis, *viz.* ("which is to be understood *unless specially named*").

(*q*) 20 Hen. 6, 8; 2 Rich. 3, 12.

(*r*) Year Book, 1 Hen. 7, 3; Calvin's case, 7 Rep. 22.

(*s*) Irish Stat. 11 Eliz. st. 3, c. 8.

(*t*) Irish Stat. 10 Hen. 7, c. 23.

(*u*) *Ib.* cap. 4, expounded by 3 & 4 Ph. & M. c. 4.

[summoned or holden, the chief governor and council of Ireland shall certify to the king, under the great seal of Ireland, the considerations and causes thereof, and the articles of the acts proposed to be passed therein; and 2. That after the king, in his council of England, shall have considered, approved or altered the said Acts or any of them, and certified them back under the great seal of England, and shall have given licence to summon and hold a parliament, then the same shall be summoned and held; and therein the said acts so certified, and no other, shall be proposed, received, or rejected (*x*). But as this precluded any laws from being proposed but such as were pre-conceived before the parliament was in being, which occasioned many inconveniences, and made frequent dissolutions necessary, it was afterwards provided by the Irish statute of 3 & 4 Ph. & Mary, c. 4, that any new propositions might be certified to England in the usual forms, even after the summons and during the session of parliament. Still, however, there was nothing left to the parliament in Ireland, but a bare negative or power of *rejecting*, not of proposing or altering any law.] But the usage afterwards was, that bills were often framed in either house, under the denomination of “heads for a bill or bills:” and in that shape they were offered to the consideration of the lord lieutenant and privy council: who, upon such parliamentary intimation, or otherwise upon the application of private persons, received and transmitted such heads, or rejected them without any transmission to England. With regard, however, to “Poyning’s laws” in particular, none of them could be repealed or suspended unless the bill for that purpose, before it was certified to England, had been approved by both houses (*y*).

[But the Irish nation, being excluded from the benefit of the English statutes, were deprived of many good and

(*x*) 4 Inst. 353.

(*y*) Irish Stat. 11 Eliz. st. 3, c. 8.

[profitable laws, made for the improvement of the common law: and the measure of justice in both kingdoms becoming no longer uniform, it was therefore enacted by another of "Poynings' laws" (*z*), that all acts of parliament before made in England, should be of force within the realm of Ireland (*a*).] But by the same rule, that the people of Ireland were not bound by acts of the English parliament passed *before* this enactment, and not specially naming or referring to Ireland, so they were not bound by such acts of parliament passed *after* this enactment (*b*). And on the other hand it was equally clear that where Ireland *was* particularly named, or included under general words, they were bound by such acts of parliament. For this follows from the very nature and constitution of a dependent state: [dependence being very little else but an obligation to conform to the will or law of that superior person or state upon which the inferior depends. The original and true ground of this superiority, in the present case, was what we usually call, though somewhat improperly, the right of conquest; a right allowed by the law of nations, if not by that of nature; but which in reason and civil policy can mean nothing more than that, in order to put an end to hostilities, a compact is either expressly or tacitly made between the conqueror and the conquered, that, if they will acknowledge the victor for their master, he will treat them for the future as subjects, and not as enemies (*c*).

But this state of dependence being almost forgotten,

(*z*) Cap. 22.

(*a*) 4 Inst. 351.

(*b*) 12 Rep. 112. By the Act, however, of the Irish parliament, 21 & 22 Geo. 3, c. 48 (Yelverton's Act), it was enacted, that certain statutes then made in England or Great Britain, relating to the subjects therein enumerated, save so far as the same had been altered or

repealed, should be accepted, used and executed in Ireland. A previous Act of the same parliament (21 & 22 Geo. 3, c. 47, *Irish*), would seem to repeal the provisions of 10 Hen. 7, c. 4, and 3 & 4 Ph. & M. c. 4.

(*c*) Puff. Law of Nations, viii. 6, 24.

[and ready to be disputed by the Irish nation, it became necessary to declare how that matter really stood; and therefore by statute 6 Geo. I. c. 5, it was declared, that the kingdom of Ireland ought to be subordinate to, and dependent upon, the imperial crown of Great Britain, as being inseparably united thereto; and that the king's majesty, with the consent of the lords and commons of Great Britain in parliament, had power to make laws to bind the people of Ireland.]

It was not only the parliamentary constitution of Ireland that was thus placed in a state of dependence; the same kind of inferiority attached to her courts of justice, [for a writ of error (in the nature of an appeal) lay from the King's Bench in Ireland to the King's Bench in England (*d*), and an appeal from the chancery in Ireland immediately to the House of Lords here;] while the peers of Ireland had no jurisdiction to affirm or reverse any judgments or decrees whatsoever (*e*).

The time however at length arrived when Ireland, impatient of a subordinate position, was enabled to assert her rights as a free and independent state. For the statute of 6 Geo. I., above mentioned, having been first repealed by 22 Geo. II. c. 53; it was, by 23 Geo. III. c. 28, declared that the parliament and courts of Ireland had an exclusive right as to all matters of legislation and judicature in that country; and this emancipation was followed, in the year 1801, by the great measure which incorporated her (like Scotland) as an integral part of the British dominions.

Of the articles of the Union with Ireland (39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 67) the most important provisions are these (*f*):—

1. That the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland

(*d*) This was law in the time of Hen. 8; as appears by the antient book intituled *Diversity of Courts*, c. *Bank le Roy*.

(*e*) So declared by 6 Geo. 1, c. 5.

(*f*) These articles are contained in the statute mentioned in the text, and repeated in the Act of the Irish parliament, 40 Geo. 3, c. 38. The number of Irish members of the

shall, on the 1st day of January, 1801, and for ever after, be united into one kingdom, by the name of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

2. That the succession to the crown of the United Kingdom shall continue the same as the succession to the crown of Great Britain and Ireland before the union.

3. That there shall be one parliament, styled the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

4. That twenty-eight peers of Ireland, elected for life by the peers of Ireland, shall sit in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom; and that one hundred and five commoners shall sit in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom on the part of Ireland: that any peer of Ireland, not elected one of the twenty-eight, may serve in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom for any county, city or borough of Great Britain; but while so serving shall not be entitled to privilege of peerage, or to be elected one of the twenty-eight, or to vote at such election: and that all the peers of Ireland, (except those who may be members of the House of Commons of the

House of Commons under the Act of Union was 100, but by 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 88, was raised, in the year 1832, to 105. The Act of Union also contains a stipulation that "four lords spiritual of Ireland by rotation of sessions shall sit in the House of Lords," and also the following clause:—"That the churches of England and Ireland shall be united into one Protestant episcopal church, to be called the United Church of England and Ireland: that the doctrine, worship, discipline and government of such church shall be the same as that of the church of England; that the continuance and preservation of such united church, as the established church of England and Ireland,

shall be an essential and fundamental part of the union; and that the church of Scotland shall remain the same as established by the Acts of Union of England and Scotland." The Act of Parliament, however, which in the year 1870 put an end to the connection of the church of Ireland with that of England, and deprived the archbishops and bishops of the church of Ireland of the right to sit in the House of Lords, made the articles of the Act of Union which refer to this subject, of less importance. The momentous change above referred to, was carried into effect by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 42, amended by the 35 & 36 Vict. cc. 13, 90.

United Kingdom,) shall have all privilege of peerage as fully as those of Great Britain;—the right of sitting in the House of Lords (with its attendant privileges) only excepted.

5. That the subjects of Great Britain and Ireland shall all be entitled to the same privileges with regard to trade and navigation (*g*), and also in respect of all treaties with foreign powers.

6. That the future expenditure of the united kingdom shall be defrayed in such proportion as the parliament thereof shall from time to time deem just and reasonable, according to certain rules prescribed for that purpose in the Act of Union.

7. That all the laws and courts of each kingdom shall remain the same as already established, subject to such alterations and regulations as circumstances may appear to the parliament of the united kingdom to require; but that all writs of error and appeals which might, before the union, have been decided in the House of Lords of either kingdom, shall henceforth be decided by the House of Lords of the united kingdom.

Finally, it is to be observed, that since the union all acts of parliament extend to Ireland, whether that portion of the united kingdom be mentioned or not, unless it be expressly excepted, or the intention to except it be otherwise plainly shown.

[With regard to the other adjacent Islands, which are subject to the crown of Great Britain, some of them (as the Isles of Wight (*h*), Portland, Thanet, &c.) are comprised within some neighbouring county, and are therefore to be looked upon as annexed to the mother island and to be part of the kingdom of England (*i*). But there are others which require a more particular consideration.]

(*g*) See Attorney - General *v.* McKenzie, 11 Price, 284.

(*h*) The Isle of Wight, for the purpose of *parliamentary representation*, is a county of itself,

separate from Hampshire, and returns one member; (see 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 16).

(*i*) Com. Dig. Navigation, F. 5; 4 Inst. 287.

And first, the Isle of Man is a distinct territory from England, and is not, in general, governed by our laws (*j*), but by acts of its own local legislature, the *House of Keys*; neither does any Act of parliament extend thereto, unless it be specially named (*k*); nor (the writ of *habeas corpus* excepted) does process run there from the English courts (*l*). [It was formerly a subordinate feudatory kingdom, subject to the kings of Norway; then to King John and Henry the third of England; afterwards to the kings of Scotland; and then again to the crown of England; and then at length we find King Henry the fourth claiming the island by right of conquest, and disposing of it to the Earl of Northumberland; upon whose attainder it was granted (by the name of the lordship of Man) to Sir John de Stanley by letters-patent 7 Hen. IV. (*m*). In his lineal descendants it continued for eight generations, till the death of Ferdinando, Earl of Derby, A.D. 1594; when a controversy arose concerning the inheritance thereof between his daughters and William, his surviving brother; upon which, and a doubt that was started concerning the validity of the original patent (*n*), the island was seized into Queen Elizabeth's hands, and afterwards various grants were made of it by King James the first, all which being expired or surrendered, it was granted afresh in 7 Jac. I. to William Earl of Derby, and the heirs male of his body,

(*j*) See Com. Dig. Navigation, F. 2; Co. Litt. 9 a; Calvin's case, 7 Rep. 21; 4 Inst. 283.

(*k*) 4 Inst. 284; 2 And. 116. As to the *excise* in the Isle of Man, see 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, s. 3. As to *customs* there, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, ss. 9, 10, 346—355; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 96, ss. 12, 23, 24; c. 97; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 23; 30 & 31 Vict. c. 86; 33 & 34 Vict. cc. 12, 43. As to *probate commissioners* for the island, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 95, s. 30; as to its *harbours*, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 56

(amended by 27 & 28 Vict. c. 62). As to *costs in revenue proceedings* there, 25 Vict. c. 14. As to *forest claims* there, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 28. As to the "*Ecclesiastical Leasing Acts*, 1842 and 1858," not (from and after August, 1866) applying there, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 81. As to the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 45, s. 6, not applying there, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 51.

(*l*) See *Re Brown*, 33 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 193.

(*m*) Selden, Tit. Hon. 1, 3.

(*n*) Camden, Eliz. A.D. 1594.

[with remainder to his heirs general; which grant was the next year confirmed by act of parliament, with a restraint of the power of alienation by the said Earl and his issue male. On the death of James, Earl of Derby, A.D. 1735, the male line of Earl William failing, the Duke of Atholl succeeded to the island as heir general by a female branch. In the meantime, though the title of king had long been disused, the Earls of Derby, as lords of Man, had maintained a sort of royal authority therein, by assenting or dissenting to laws and exercising an appellate jurisdiction;] though an appeal lay from their decrees to the sovereign of Great Britain in council (*o*). [But the distinct jurisdiction of this little subordinate royalty being found inconvenient for the purposes of public justice, and for the revenue, (it affording a commodious asylum for debtors, outlaws and smugglers,) authority was given to the treasury by statute 12 Geo. I. c. 28, to purchase the interest of the then proprietors for the use of the crown. And this purchase was at length completed in the year 1765,—and confirmed by statutes 5 Geo. III. cc. 26 and 39,—whereby the whole island and all its dependencies so granted as aforesaid, (except the landed property and some other rights of the Atholl family,) became unalienably vested in the crown (*p*).

The islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Sark, Alderney, and their appendages, (often called the Channel Islands,) were parcel of the duchy of Normandy, and were united to the crown of England by the first princes of the Norman line (*q*). They are governed by their own laws, which are for the most part the ducal customs of Normandy, being collected in an ancient book of very great authority, in-

(*o*) *Christian v. Corren*, 1 P. 4, c. 34.
Wms. 329.

(*p*) An additional compensation for this cession was afterwards granted to the Duke of Atholl by 45 Geo. 3, c. 123. And see 6 Geo.

(*q*) As to these, see 4 Inst. 286; Calvin's case, 7 Rep. 20 b; *Martin v. McCulloch*, 1 Moore, Priv. Counc. Rep. 308.

[titled *Le Grand Coustumier* (*r*). The writ or process of the sovereign from the courts of Westminster is in ordinary cases (*s*) of no force in these islands; but his commission is (*t*). They are not bound by common Acts of the English parliament, unless particularly named. All causes are originally determined by their own officers, the bailiffs and *jurats* of the islands (*u*); but appeal lies from them to the sovereign in council in the last resort.]

From these adjacent islands we may now extend our view to the more distant possessions or dependencies of the British Crown in various quarters of the globe. Most of these are usually called *colonies*, and whenever in the course of what follows that term is used, it is to be understood as referring to them all (*x*). Colonies are no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions. In general, they are either gained from other states by conquest or treaty; or else they are acquired by right of occupancy only, that is, by finding them desert and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country.

Both the right by conquest or cession and that by occupancy are founded upon the law of nature, or at least upon that of nations. But there is a difference between the two species of colonies, with respect to the laws by which they are bound. For in conquered or ceded countries that have already laws of their own, those laws remain in force until changed by competent authority (*y*);

(*r*) See Hale, Hist. Com. Law, c. 6.

(*s*) 4 Inst. 286. It may be observed, however, that a writ of *habeas corpus ad subjiciendum* lies into the Channel islands, under the provisions of 31 Car. 2, c. 2, and 56 Geo. 3, c. 100. (See Carns Wilson's case, 7 Q. B. 984.)

(*t*) As to appointing probate commissioners there, see 21 & 22 Vict.

c. 95, s. 30.

(*u*) As to the *jurats* and the constitution of the Royal Court of Jersey, see Law Rep., 1 H. of L., P. C. 94; Williams v. Stevens, ib. 352.

(*x*) As to the term "colony," see 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63, s. 1; c. 113, s. 1; c. 116, s. 1.

(*y*) Campbell v. Hall, Cowp. 204; 2 P. Wms. 75; Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr. 2500.

and the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority there: [while, on the other hand, it hath been held, that if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws then in being—which are the birthright of every subject (*z*)—are immediately there in force (*a*). But this must be understood with very many and very great restrictions. Such colonists carry with them only so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation, and the condition of an infant colony; such for instance, as the general rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries. The artificial refinements and distinctions incident to the property of a great and commercial people, the laws of police and revenue (such especially as are enforced by penalties), the mode of maintenance for the established clergy, the jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a multitude of other provisions, are neither necessary nor convenient for them, and therefore are not in force.]

The sovereign exercises, as to colonies of every description, the right of appointing governors (*b*), and of issuing warrants for the appointment of officers, whether judicial or administrative (*c*). The right of legislation, too, is in some cases vested in the Crown; for any colony which has been acquired by conquest or cession is subject to such laws as the sovereign in council may impose (*d*), or to such as may be imposed by any legislative council established

(*z*) See Campbell *v.* Hall, *ubi sup.*

(*a*) Blankard *v.* Galdy, Salk. 411; S. C. 4 Mod. 215; see Smith *v.* Brown, Salk. 666.

(*b*) The term "governor" of a colony is defined in 26 & 27 Vict. c. 84, s. 2. As to the *retiring pensions* of colonial governors, see 28 & 29 Vict. c. 113; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 29.

(*c*) As to the colonial *church establishment*, we may observe here,

that, of late years, *bishops* have been appointed for the colonies; as to whom, see 59 Geo. 3, c. 60; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 33; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 4, s. 119; 15 & 16 Vict. cc. 52, 53, 88; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 49; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 115, s. 4. See also *Re the Bishop of Natal*, 3 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 115; and *Bishop of Natal v. Gladstone*, Law Rep., 3 Eq. Ca. 1.

(*d*) Calvin's case, 7 Rep. 17 b; Campbell *v.* Hall, Cowp. 211.

in the colony under the royal authority. This does not extend, however, to colonies acquired by occupancy; for in these the Crown possesses no such legislative right. The sovereign may, nevertheless, in any colony, however acquired, direct the governor to summon a representative assembly, from among the inhabitants themselves, for the purpose of interior legislation; and it is an established principle, that a conquered or ceded colony, to which the Crown has once thus granted a representative legislature, is no longer subject to legislation by the Crown (*e*). Such would seem, in a general point of view, to be the extent of the royal power in the colonies acquired either by conquest, cession or occupancy; but in connection with this subject, it is proper also to notice "The Foreign Jurisdiction" Act, of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 94 (*f*), by which it was declared that it shall be lawful for her majesty to exercise any power or jurisdiction that she may have within any country or place out of her dominions, in the same and in as ample a manner as if such power or jurisdiction had been obtained by cession or conquest: and that everything done in pursuance of such power or jurisdiction, in any place out of her majesty's dominions, shall within her dominions be deemed to be, to all intents and purposes, as valid as if done according to the local law then in force within such place; and further, that if in any proceedings, civil or criminal, it shall become necessary, in the opinion of the presiding judge, to produce evidence of the existence of such power or jurisdiction, questions properly framed shall be transmitted to a principal secretary of state, and his answer shall be final and conclusive evidence of the matters therein contained, and required to be ascertained thereby (*g*).

(*e*) *Campbell v. Hall*, Cowp. 211; *Att.-Gen. v. Stewart*, 2 Meriv. 158. As to powers of colonial legislatures, see 26 & 27 Vict. c. 84; 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63, s. 5. See also *Phillips v. Eyre*, Law Rep., 4 Q. B. 225;

6 Q. B. 1.

(*f*) As to this Act see 28 & 29 Vict. c. 116; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 87, and 36 & 37 Vict. c. 59.

(*g*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 94, s. 3. See 20 & 21 Vict. c. 75, to confirm an

Such being the nature of the authority of the Crown in our colonial possessions (as to which authority we may add that it is exercised through the agency of a principal secretary of state, called secretary of state for the colonies), it is almost superfluous to remark that they are all, under all circumstances and whatever may be their political constitution, subject to the legislative control of the British parliament. It was the exercise by parliament of this general right, for the particular purpose of raising a revenue by colonial taxation, that led to that famous dispute between the mother country and her North American provinces, which ultimately terminated in their independence (*h*). The existence of the right in this, as in other cases, was during the controversy asserted by an Act of the 6 Geo. III. c. 12, which declared that all his majesty's colonies or plantations in America were subordinate to, and dependent upon, the imperial crown and parliament of Great Britain, and liable to be bound by its laws and statutes, in all cases whatsoever; though by a subsequent statute (18 Geo. III. c. 12), it was thought expedient to add that no power of taxation as regarded America would for the future be exercised for the benefit of the mother country, a principle which has been since maintained with regard to all of our colonial possessions.

Though it is competent to parliament to legislate for the colonies, yet a colony is not considered as affected by Acts of Parliament passed after its acquisition, and while it is subject to other legislative authority, (whether that of the sovereign in council, or of a local council, or assembly,) unless it be referred to in the Act, by name, or by general description, such as "the colonies;" or unless

order in council concerning the exercise of jurisdiction in matters arising within the kingdom of *Siam*.

(*h*) By 22 Geo. 3, c. 46, his majesty was empowered to conclude a truce or peace with these colonies;

and by a definitive treaty signed at Paris, 3rd September, 1783, acknowledged the United States of America to be free, sovereign and independent.

the Act be, in its nature, obviously intended to affect all our possessions wherever situate. In the case of a colony acquired by occupancy, Acts of Parliament passed before its acquisition come into force immediately upon that event, as part of the general law of England,—as to all provisions at least not unsuitable to its social circumstances. But a colony won by conquest or cession, is not in general affected by statutes of the united kingdom passed before its acquisition.

Such being the general principles of law applicable to colonies, we may next advert to the actual constitution of those which at present belong to the British Crown (i).

(i) As to these, see the following Acts:—

Africa (Coast of), 6 & 7 Vict. c. 13; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 35; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 121. *Africa (South)*, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 35. *Africa (West)*, 34 Vict. c. 8. *America* (certain North Western territories of), 22 & 23 Vict. c. 26. *Australian Colonies*, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 59; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 56; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 11. *Australia (South)*, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 61; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 56; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 44. *Australia (Western)*, 10 Geo. 4, c. 22; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 35. *British Columbia*, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 26, ss. 1, 2, 4; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 67; 33 & 34 Vict. c. 66. *British Kaffraria*, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 5. *Canada*, 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 66; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 35; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 118; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 71; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 56; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 63; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 21; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 118; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 56; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 23; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 34; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 10, c. 26; 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, c. 16; 31 & 32 Vict. c. 105; 34 Vict. c. 28; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 45. *Cape of Good Hope*, 28 & 29 Vict.

c. 5. *Falkland Islands*, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 13; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 121. *Hong Kong*, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 80; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 9. *Leeward Islands*, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 107. *New Brunswick*, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 34; 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3. *Newfoundland*, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 120; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 3, c. 45; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 1, c. 44; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 21. *New South Wales (and Van Diemen's Land, now called Tasmania)*, 9 Geo. 4, c. 83; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 46; 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 42; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 50; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 70; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 62; 4 & 5 Vict. c. 44; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 76; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 74; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 22, c. 52; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 54, c. 55, s. 3, c. 56; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 44, ss. 1, 4; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 74. *New Zealand*, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 62; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 103; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 112; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 5; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 79; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 70; 14 & 15 Vict. cc. 84, 86; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 72; 20 & 21 Vict. cc. 51, 52, 53; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 52; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 48; 26 & 27 Vict. c. 23; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 104; 31 & 32 Vict. cc. 92, 93; 33 & 34 Vict. c. 40; 36 Vict. c. 15. *Norfolk Island*, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 35;

And here a great variety is observable. In every case they are subject to a local governor (the representative and deputy of the sovereign), who acts under the royal commission, and the royal instructions by which the commission is usually accompanied (*k*). In every case, too, the law is administered by local judges, deriving their authority from the crown; and an appeal is universally allowed from the decision of those judges to the sovereign in council, here in England. But in other particulars our present colonies differ widely from each other in their plan of government, some of them having received the gift of English laws, others remaining subject to the codes of

32 & 33 Vict. c. 16. *Nova Scotia*, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3. *Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca*, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 93. *Quebec*, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 53. *Queen's Land*, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 44. *Sierra Leone*, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 31. *Straits Settlements*, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 115. *Vancouver's Island*, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 48; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 67. *Van Diemen's Land*, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 13; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 95; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 57; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 56; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 52. *Victoria*, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 59; 18 & 19 Vict. cc. 55, 56; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 12. *Tobago and Trinidad*, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 22. Moreover with respect to the WEST INDIES, we may notice the following Acts: *For the relief of certain colonies and plantations therein*, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 125; 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 51; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 40; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 17; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 50; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 38; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 35: *For the sale of encumbered estates therein*, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 117 (amended and continued by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 96; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 45; 27

& 28 Vict. c. 108; 33 & 34 Vict. c. 103; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 9): *For regulating the prisons there*, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 67: *For increasing the number of bishoprics therein*, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 4 (see 31 & 32 Vict. c. 120): *For establishing courts of appeal for certain of the West India Islands*, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 15: *For enabling Her Majesty to confirm an Act passed by Antigua as to Barbuda*, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 13: *To authorize the extension of a loan by West India relief commissioners to Dominica*, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 57 (and see 30 & 31 Vict. c. 91): *As to loan to Jamaica*, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 55; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 69: *For the government of the Cayman Islands*, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 31: *To make provision for the government of Jamaica*, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 12: *To annex the Turks and Caicos Islands to the colony of Jamaica*, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 6.

(*k*) See 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63, s. 4, as to instructions to the colonial government from the mother country.

foreigners, their former masters; some remaining under the legislative power of the crown itself, and others receiving their laws from a local legislative council, or from representative assemblies, established by authority of the crown or of parliament. With respect to those possessing assemblies of this description, (which are a numerous class,) it may be said that their whole interior policy is in general closely modelled upon that of the mother country. For having a governor (the representative of royalty), and royal courts of justice, they have also a local council, forming a sort of upper house, in addition to their general assembly, corresponding with our House of Commons; who, by their united authority, make laws suited to the emergencies of the colony (*l*). This, however, is subject to such restriction as necessarily results from the subordination of these local establishments to the crown and the imperial parliament. For Acts of assembly not only require the assent of the governor as representing the crown, before they can come even into temporary operation, but are liable to be afterwards annulled by a notification from this country of their having been *disallowed* by the sovereign in council (*m*). This subject is now also partly regulated by a recent Act (28 & 29 Vict. c. 63), passed "to remove doubts as to the validity of colonial laws," it being by that statute declared that any colonial law *repugnant* in any respect to the provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to the colony (or of any order or regulation which has in such colony the force of an Act of Parliament,) shall be void and inoperative, but only to the extent of such repugnancy (*n*); while, on the other hand, no colonial law, *unless* so made void and inoperative, shall be affected by its repugnancy to the law of England (*o*). It is further provided by the same Act, that every *colonial* legislature may establish courts and regulate the adminis-

(*l*) Vide post, bk. IV. pt. I. c. v.

(*m*) Clark's Colonial Law, 41.

(*n*) 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63, s. 2.

(*o*) 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63, s. 3. See also 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, s. 190.

tration of justice in the colony, and that every *representative* legislature may make laws as to its own constitution, powers, and procedure (*p*).

Thus much as to our settlements in general (*q*). But there is a large class of them in the West Indies and elsewhere, which require our separate attention, on account of their connexion with the former system of colonial slavery. From the earliest period of their acquisition, their produce had been raised by the compulsory labour of the negro race, and notwithstanding the peculiar freedom of her own institutions, and the pure form of Christianity which she professes, the mother country, until early in the present century, had never hesitated to lend her sanction to that iniquitous method of cultivation (*r*). The conscience of

(*p*) By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63, the term "colonial legislature" is to include any authority (other than the imperial parliament or her Majesty in council) which is competent to make laws for the colony. And any colonial legislature, which shall comprise a legislative body of which one half is elected by the inhabitants of the colony, is (by the same statute) to be deemed a *representative* legislature.

(*q*) We may, also, here notice the following statutes, containing recent regulations applicable to our colonies in general. As to the *apprehension of offenders*, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 34. As to *evidence in colonial courts*, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 22. As to *letters-patent*, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 76. As to the *jurisdiction of the admiralty*, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 96; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 88. As to the *post-office*, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 66. As to the *proof of acts of state and legal proceedings*, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 49, s. 7. As to the *revenues of the crown*, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 39. As to

lighthouses, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91. As to *crown lands, and the emigration commissioners*, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 119. As to the *ascertainment of the law*, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 63; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 11. As to the *trial of criminals in certain cases out of the limits of the colony in which death occurs*, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 122. As to writs of *habeas corpus*, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 20. As to certain *Acts of colonial legislatures*, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 84. As to the *naval defence* of the colonies, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 14. As to the *validity of certain marriages*, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 64. As to *gold coins from colonial branch mints*, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 10. As to the *registration of ships in British possessions*, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 129. As to the *prevention of kidnapping*, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 19.

(*r*) Several of our statutes gave sanction to this system, as already established by the local laws of the colonies (see Forbes v. Lord Cochrane, 2 Barn. & Cress. 469); yet

the British public was, however, at length awakened to the atrocity of the traffic by which the plantations were continually supplied with new victims from the coast of Africa; and at a later period to the nature of the colonial bondage itself, which was shown to exceed even the servile system of Pagan Rome in severity, and to be without parallel in the history of human oppression. The slave trade, after a long and obstinate opposition from the parties interested, was abolished in 1807 (*s*)—and after another protracted interval, during which the duty of ameliorating the condition of the negroes in the colonies was confided (but in vain) to the local legislatures, the imperial parliament at length resolved to put an end, from 1st August, 1834, to the system of slavery itself—which was carried into effect by an Act passed in 1833 (*t*). To justify this measure, however, it was thought necessary to award to the slave proprietors the sum of twenty millions sterling, in compensation for the loss of service sustained,—and also to interpose a certain period of probation during which the slaves, instead of passing suddenly into absolute liberty, should be considered as apprentices, and held in that qualified species of subjection to their former masters. But in the result, the masters themselves found it expedient to abandon the system of apprenticeship before the prescribed time had expired; and, by acts of their own legislature throughout the different colonies, admitted their apprentices into the state of pure freedom at a period somewhat earlier than they would otherwise have been entitled to its enjoyment (*u*).

the condition of slavery has been long pronounced by our courts to be repugnant to the genius of the municipal law of England; see the case just cited, and the case of *Somerset*, 11 St. Tr. 340; *Lofft*, 1.

(*s*) 47 Geo. 3, st. 1, c. 36. The foreign slave trade, viz. the supply of foreign countries with slaves, was

abolished in 1806, by stat. 46 Geo. 3, c. 52; and the supply of our own conquered colonies had been previously forbidden by order in council in 1805.

(*t*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73.

(*u*) Besides the Acts above cited, see 5 Geo. 4, c. 113 ("The Slave Trade Act, 1829"); 9 Geo. 4, c. 84;

Our possessions in India are also entitled, from their superior extent and importance, to specific notice. In 1708 two rival associations existed in England for the purposes of East India traffic; but in that year they were consolidated into one by Act of Parliament (*y*), with an exclusive privilege of trading to the East Indies and other specified places (*z*);—a privilege afterwards renewed by many successive grants. This body was originally incorporated by the name of “The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies,” but convenience attached to them the shorter appellation of “The East India Company,” which afterwards became by express provision their proper legal style (*a*). In the progress of their well-known history, they crushed upon the Indian peninsula the power of the rival settlers from France; and though first instituted for purposes merely commercial, their policy, as administered by the governors whom they sent out, gradually led to the acquisition of immense territorial dominions, by which they became effectively (though subject to the undoubted supremacy of the British Crown) the sovereigns of India (*b*). The unexampled grandeur of this company rendered the regulation of its affairs, for a long period of our history, an object of the highest inte-

5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 45; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 5, c. 16, c. 82; 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 91; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 3, c. 19; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 57; 6 & 7 Vict. c. 98; 4 & 5 Vict. c. 18, *as to slave compensation and slavery*; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 86, *to remove doubts as to the rights of liberated Africans in Sierra Leone*; and 36 & 37 Vict. c. 88, *An Act for consolidating, with amendments, the Acts for carrying into effect treaties for the more effectual suppression of the*

slave trade, and for other purposes connected with the slave trade.

(*y*) 6 Ann. c. 17, s. 13.

(*z*) 6 Ann. c. 17, and 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 44, s. 81.

(*a*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 111. By 36 & 37 Vict. c. 17, this company is dissolved from 1st June, 1874.

(*b*) 7 Geo. 3, c. 57. See Gibson *v.* East India Company, 5 Bing. N.C. 272; Mayor of Lyons *v.* East India Company, 1 Moore, Priv. Counc. Rep. 374.

rest and importance to the British nation. In consequence of the prevalence of great abuses, its constitution was newly arranged in 1773 by an act of parliament (*c*), prescribing the manner in which its Directors should be chosen from among its members, and the qualification which should entitle a member to vote in its affairs (*d*). In 1784 its administration of the East was brought under the superintendence of the executive government at home, by the establishment of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, which operated as a check upon the Directors, and was afterwards generally called the "Board of Control" (*e*). Still, however, its commercial monopoly remained entire; but in 1813 it was provided by the Act (*f*) then passed for the temporary renewal of the company's charter, that the trade from all places except China, and in all commodities except tea, should be thrown open (under certain restrictions and limitations) to every subject of the realm. And this proved but the prelude to a still more important change, for the expediency being at length generally recognized of admitting the capital of our private merchants to a free participation in every branch of the Indian traffic, an arrangement was accordingly made with the company for that purpose in 1832. This was carried into effect by the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 85; under which such exclusive rights of trading as the company still retained were abolished, and they were debarred from engaging for the future in commercial transactions (*g*). And though the territories and other property in their possession, with the exception of St. Helena (which was by the same statute vested in the crown), were allowed to remain under the government of the company, this was declared to be "in trust" only for "his majesty, his heirs

(*c*) 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, explained 26 Geo. 3, c. 16, and 23 Geo. 3, and amended by 21 Geo. 3, c. 70. c. 52.

(*d*) 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, s. 5.

(*f*) 53 Geo. 3, c. 155, s. 7.

(*e*) 24 Geo. 3, c. 25, and see

(*g*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 3.

and successors" (*h*). As for the local government of India, it was committed to a governor-general and a board of councillors, who, under the style of "The Governor-General of India in Council" (*i*), were invested with a superintending authority over all the local governments called Presidencies, in all points relating to their civil and military administration (*h*); and with power to make laws for all persons, whether British or native, throughout the whole of the territories, and for all servants of the company within the dominions of allied states (*l*); subject however to a power in the Court of Directors to disallow any law so made (*m*); and also subject to the superintending and paramount authority of the imperial parliament (*n*). The ecclesiastical establishment of India was also remodelled by the same Act, and it made provision for founding two bishoprics—those of Madras and Bombay—in addition to the diocese of Calcutta, already established in accordance with the provisions of a former statute (*o*). The Bishop of Calcutta, however, was declared to be the metropolitan bishop in India, with such jurisdiction and functions as the sovereign by letters-patent should direct, subject nevertheless to the general superintendence and revision of the Archbishop of Canterbury (*p*). By the same statute the territories of India were to continue under the government of the East India Company until 30th April, 1854, but before the arrival of that time it was provided by another statute (16 & 17 Vict. c. 95) that even after that time these territories should so continue until parliament should otherwise provide. Such new provision, however, was in fact shortly afterwards made, and it was hastened by circum-

(*h*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, ss. 1, 2.

(*i*) Sect. 39. As to the powers of the Governor General of India in Council, see also 32 & 33 Vict. c. 98.

(*h*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 65.

(*l*) Sect. 43.

(*m*) Sect. 44.

(*n*) Sect. 81.

(*o*) 58 Geo. 3, c. 155.

(*p*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 94. See also the Acts referred to, sup. p. 102, n. (*c*). As to Indian bishops *on furlough*, see 34 & 35 Vict. c. 62.

stances of an unexpected and disastrous kind. The Sepoy soldiery in India, having been led early in 1857 to entertain the belief that government was about to compel them in the course of their military duty to bite cartridges greased with the fat of certain animals (an act abhorrent from the Hindoo superstition, and fatal to caste), broke out into open mutiny, which soon ripened into an extensive rebellion of the natives in general against the British power, in the course of which many fearful atrocities were committed by them, and which was not suppressed till the close of 1858. Under these circumstances it appeared to parliament in the course of that year that a time had now arrived at which, for the more effectual administration of affairs, it was expedient that the crown should take to itself the sole and unqualified dominion over India; and by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106 (intituled An Act for the better Government of India) it was accordingly provided that all powers and rights vested in the East India Company in trust for her Majesty should cease, and should become vested in her and be exercised in her name; and, conformably to this, the Act was soon afterwards followed by a proclamation of the Queen in council to the princes, chiefs and people of India, in which, under the description of "Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof" "in Europe, Asia, America and Australasia," she claimed their allegiance.

This Act contains—besides the establishment of its general principle (*q*), and the determination of the functions and powers theretofore vested in the Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors in relation to the government of India (*r*), and the abolition of the Board of Control (*s*), and the provision that all persons who then held offices, employments or commissions, under the company in India, should thenceforth be deemed to hold them under her

(*q*) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, s. 1.(*r*) Sect. 60.(*s*) Sect. 61.

Majesty and be paid out of the revenues of India (*t*)—a variety of enactments as to the manner in which the business to be transacted in this country, in relation to the Indian government, and the correspondence therewith, should in future be conducted (*u*). But of these our limits enable us to say no more, than that such business and correspondence are to be conducted by a principal secretary of state in council (*x*); and that such council—of which he is to be president, with a power himself to vote (*y*)—is to consist of fifteen members under the style of the “Council of India,” by way of distinction from the council of the governor-general already established in that country (*z*); and that the members of the council are to be salaried (*a*), and are to hold office during good behaviour (*b*), but are not to be capable of sitting or voting in parliament (*c*). It will be expedient, however, to specify another of the enactments of this statute, namely, that all Acts and provisions then in force, under charter or otherwise concerning India, should, subject to the provisions of the statute, continue in force; and be construed as referring to the secretary of state in council, in lieu of the company and the court of directors and court of proprietors thereof (*d*).

(*t*) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, s. 58.

(*u*) Sect. 19.

(*x*) Sects. 3, 21.

(*y*) Sect. 21.

(*z*) Sect. 7.

(*a*) Sect. 13.

(*b*) Sect. 11.

(*c*) Sect. 12.

(*d*) Sect. 64. Among the statutes relating to India which were *prior* to 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, are those referred to at foot of pp. 110—112, *supra*, and the following. As to administration of justice there, 37 Geo. 3, c. 142; 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 79; 4 Geo. 4, c. 71; 6 Geo. 4, c. 85; 7 Geo. 4, c. 37; 9

Geo. 4, c. 74; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 34. As to trade with India and China, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 93; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 56; 6 & 7 Vict. c. 80; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, ss. 327, 329; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 108. As to the directors, the presidencies, the governor-general and his council, and the age, qualifications and appointment of members of the civil or military service of the company, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 52; 16 & 17 Vict. cc. 95, 107; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 77.

The statutes relating to India and China which have passed *since* the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, comprise the following:—As to raising money

We have now noticed such parts of the dominions of the crown of Great Britain, as are not within the full and proper jurisdiction of the English laws.

[With regard to any *foreign* dominions which may happen in the course of events to belong to the person of the sovereign by hereditary descent, by purchase or other acquisition—as these do not in anywise appertain to the crown of these kingdoms, so they are entirely unconnected with the laws of England, and do not communicate with this nation in any respect whatsoever.

We come now to consider the kingdom of England in particular, the direct and immediate subject of those laws,

for the service of India, 22 Vict. c. 11. As to the “chief superintendent” in China, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 9; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 39; 23 Vict. c. 5; s. 3; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 130; 24 & 25 Vict. cc. 25, 118. As to European forces in India, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 100; 26 & 27 Vict. c. 48. As to the better government of India, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 41. As to certain Indian government securities and stamp duties, 23 Vict. c. 5. As to the senior member of council of India, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 87. As to the Admiralty jurisdiction in India, *ib.* c. 88. As to superannuation allowances as regards India, *ib.* c. 89. As to India stock, &c., *ib.* c. 102, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 7. As to the Indian civil service, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 54. As to the council of the governor-general of India, and the local government of the several presidencies and provinces, &c., and the temporary government of India, in the event of a vacancy in the office of governor-general, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 67. As to the enlistment in her Majesty’s general forces, of persons transferred from her Indian army,

ib. c. 74. As to the pensions, &c. of those who have served in her Majesty’s forces in India, *ib.* c. 89, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27. As to the high courts of judicature in India, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 104. As to site of the India office, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 32. As to the high courts in India and the territorial jurisdiction of the same, *ib.* c. 15. As to the powers of the governor-general and the territorial limits of the presidencies, *ib.* c. 17. As to certain military and other funds in India, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 18. As to the powers of the governor-general of India in council, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 98. As to raising money in the United Kingdom for the Indian service, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 106. As to making better provision for making laws and regulations in certain parts of India, 33 Vict. c. 3. As to rendering valid certain contracts informally executed in India, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 59. As to extending in certain respects the power of local legislatures in India as regards European British subjects, 34 Vict. c. 34.

[concerning which we are to treat in the ensuing Commentaries. But first let us observe that the main or high seas are, in one sense, part of the realm of England, for thereon our courts of admiralty have jurisdiction, as will be shown hereafter; but they are not subject to the common law (*e*). This main sea begins at the low-water-mark. But between the high-water-mark and the low-water-mark, where the sea ebbs and flows, the common law and the admiralty have *divisum imperium*, an alternate jurisdiction; one upon the water, when it is full sea, the other upon the land, when it is an ebb (*f*).

The territory of England is liable to two divisions; the one ecclesiastical, the other civil (*g*).

I. The ecclesiastical division is, primarily, into two provinces, those of Canterbury and York. A province is the circuit of an archbishop's jurisdiction. Each province contains divers dioceses (*h*), or sees of suffragan bishops (*i*);] the whole number of which, including the bishopric of the Isle of Man (*k*), is at present twenty-six (*l*). [Every diocese is divided into archdeaconries, each archdeaconry into

(*e*) Co. Litt. 260. See the case of the Free Fisheries of Whitstable *v.* Gann, 13 C. B., N. S. 853.

(*f*) Finch, L. 78; Constable's case, 5 Rep. 107 a.

(*g*) As to the territorial divisions of England, some valuable information will be found in the preface to the Population Abstract of 1831, vol. i. p. xiv.

(*h*) Bishoprics or dioceses are almost as antient as the introduction of Christianity. Of those now extant, all, (excepting seven,) were formed in Saxon or in British times. (Report on Religious Worship, p. xxxvii.) See 35 & 36 Vict. c. 14, an Act for the alteration of the *boundaries* of dioceses.

(*i*) Bishops are here termed "suffragan" (a word signifying *deputy*) in relation to their archbishop (Co. Litt. by Harg. 94 a, note (3)). As to "suffragan bishops" in relation to the bishop of their diocese, vide post, bk. IV. pt. II. c. I.

(*k*) The bishopric of Man or Sodor, (or Sodor and Man,) was formerly within the province of Canterbury, but was annexed to that of York, by statute 33 Hen. 8, c. 31. (See 4 Inst. p. 285.)

(*l*) Two of these bishoprics, (those of Ripon and Manchester,) have been created in modern times. (See as to Manchester, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 108; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 41; and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 69.)

[rural deaneries], and every rural deanery is divided into parishes (*m*).

[A parish is that circuit of ground which is committed to the charge of one parson, or vicar, or other minister having cure of souls therein (*n*). How antient the division of parishes is, may at present be difficult to ascertain; for it seems to be agreed on all hands, that, in the early ages of Christianity in this island, parishes were unknown, or at least signified the same that a diocese does now (*o*). There was then no appropriation of ecclesiastical dues to any particular church; but every man was at liberty to contribute his tithes to whatever priest or church he pleased, provided only that he did it to some; or if he made no special appointment or appropriation thereof, they were paid into the hands of the bishop, whose duty it was to distribute them among the clergy, and for other pious purposes, according to his own discretion (*p*).

Mr. Camden says, England was divided into parishes by Archbishop Honorius, about the year 636 (*q*). Sir Henry Hobart lays it down, that parishes were first erected by the council of Lateran, which was held A.D. 1179 (*r*). Each widely differing from the other, and both of them perhaps from the truth; which will probably be found in the medium between the two extremes. For Mr. Selden

(*m*) Co. Litt. 94. The number of parishes and population of each diocese in 1831 are given in the Population Abstract of that year, (vol. i. p. xix.)

(*n*) "*Parochia est locus in quo degit populus alicujus ecclesiæ.*"—5 Rep. 67 a, Jeffery's case. (See Sharpley v. Overseers of Mapletorpe, 3 Ell. & Bl. 906.) It is stated in the Population Abstract of 1831, (vol. i. p. xviii.) that the number of parishes and parochial chapelries at that period in England and Wales might, for any general

purpose, be safely taken at 10,700.

(*o*) See Chitty's Blackstone, vol. i. p. 106, n.; and 3 Burn, Ec. L. 60, 7th ed.; Hall. Mid. Ag. vol. ii. p. 205, 7th ed.

(*p*) Seld. of Tith. 9, 4; 2 Inst. 646; Slade v. Drake, Hob. 296. As to the modern law of tithes, see 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71, et post, bk. iv. pt. II. c. III.

(*q*) See Camden's Britannia, vol. i. p. ccxxviii.

(*r*) Slade v. Drake, ubi sup. And see Bishop of Winchester's case, 2 Rep. 44 b.

[has clearly shown (*s*) that the clergy lived in common, without any division of parishes, long after the time mentioned by Camden. And it appears from the Saxon laws, that parishes were in being long before the date of that council of Lateran to which they are ascribed by Hobart.

We find the distinction of parishes, nay even of mother-churches, so early as in the laws of King Edgar, about the year 970. Before that time the consecration of tithes was in general *arbitrary*; that is, every man paid his own, (as was before observed,) to what church or parish he pleased. But this being liable to be attended with either fraud, or at least caprice, in the persons paying; and with either jealousies or mean compliances in such as were competitors for receiving them; it was ordered by a law of King Edgar, that "*dentur omnes decimæ primariae ecclesiæ ad quam parochia pertinet*" (*t*). However, if any thane, or great lord, had a church, within his own demesnes, distinct from the mother-church, in the nature of a private chapel; then, provided such church had a cemetery or consecrated place of burial belonging to it, he might allot one-third of his tithes for the maintenance of the officiating minister: but if it had no cemetery, the thane must himself have maintained his chaplain by some other means; for in such case *all* his tithes were ordained to be paid to the *primaria ecclesia* or mother-church (*u*).

This proves that the kingdom was then generally divided into parishes, which division happened probably not all at once, but by degrees. And it seems pretty clear and certain, that the boundaries of parishes were originally ascertained by those of a manor or manors; since it very seldom happens that a manor extends itself over more parishes than one, though there are often many manors in one parish. The lords, as Christianity spread itself, began to build churches upon their own demesnes or wastes, to

(*s*) Seld. of Tithes, c. 9.

(*t*) C. 1.

(*u*) C. 2. See also the Laws of

King Canute, c. 11, about the year 1030.

[accommodate their tenants in one or two adjoining lordships; and, in order to have divine service regularly performed therein, obliged all their tenants to appropriate their tithes to the maintenance of the one officiating minister, instead of leaving them at liberty to distribute them among the clergy of the diocese in general; and this tract of land, the tithes whereof were so appropriated, formed a distinct parish,—which will well enough account for the frequent intermixture of parishes one with another. For if a lord had a parcel of land detached from the main of his estate, but not sufficient to form a parish of itself, it was natural for him to endow his newly-erected church with the tithes of those disjointed lands, especially if no church was then built in any lordship adjoining to those outlying parcels.

Thus parishes were gradually formed, and parish churches endowed with the tithes that arose within the circuit assigned. But some lands, either because they were in the hands of irreligious and careless owners, or were situate in forest and desert places, or for other now unsearchable reasons, were never united to any parish, and therefore continue to this day *extra-parochial*; and their tithes are now by immemorial custom payable to the king, instead of the bishop, in trust and confidence that he will distribute them for the general good of the Church (*x*).]

As a parish is an ecclesiastical division, so the persons who bear the chief authority in a parish, as such, viz. the rector, (or vicar, or perpetual curate,) and the churchwardens, are also of an ecclesiastical character: and the

(*x*) 2 Inst. 647; Bishop of Winchester's case, 2 Rep. 44; Wright v. Wright, Cro. Eliz. 512. In the Population Abstract of 1831 (vol. i. p. xxii.) more than two hundred extra-parochial places are mentioned, and it is stated that they are usually found to have been the site

of royal palaces, religious houses or antient castles. See 20 Vict. c. 19, an Act to provide for the relief of the poor and other purposes in extra-parochial places. And as to the repair of the highways in such places, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61, s. 32.

nature of their offices and duties is a subject that consequently belongs not to the present part of the work, but to that division in which we shall have occasion to treat of the law of the Church (*y*). It is material, however, to observe, here, both as to parishes and parochial officers, that though primarily and properly they have relation to ecclesiastical purposes, yet there are some secular aspects in which they also require to be considered. For there has been a gradual tendency, more particularly in modern times, to treat a parish as a civil, not less than an ecclesiastical division. Thus the collection of the poor-rate, or fund for the relief of the poor, and in a general point of view its application also, is *parochial*; and the case is the same with respect to several other species of local taxation (*z*). The affairs of a parish, as such, (whether civil or ecclesiastical,) are regulated in *vestry*, which is, properly speaking, an assembly of the minister, churchwardens and parishioners,—that is, of such of the parishioners as contribute to the public burden (*a*)—and which, from being commonly held in the “vestry” adjoining or belonging to the church, takes its name from thence, as the place itself does from the priest’s vestures, which are usually deposited there (*b*). The vestry is summoned, or called together, by the churchwardens, with the consent of the minister (*c*);

(*y*) Vide post, bk. IV. pt. II.

(*z*) See 23 & 24 Vict. c. 51, providing for an annual return of taxes, rates, tolls and dues levied for local purposes; in which, however, the *poor’s-rate* is not included.

(*a*) Steer’s Par. L. 253.

(*b*) By 13 & 14 Vict. c. 57, the Poor Law Board may, upon application of the churchwardens, pursuant to a resolution of vestry in any parish where the population exceeds 2000 by the then last census, make an order that no meeting shall be held in the parish church except for divine worship or some eccle-

siastical or charitable object or purpose approved by the bishop; nor in the vestry room attached to the church, except in cases of urgency and with previous approval of the Poor Law Board; but that the same shall be held in such other room as shall be provided within the parish. And by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 125, provisions are made for the purchase by the overseers with the consent of the vestry (in parishes whose population exceeds 4000) of fit offices for the transaction of parish business.

(*c*) Steer’s Par. L. 252.

who has been generally considered as entitled, when present, to preside at the meeting (*d*): and its principal rights and duties are those of investigating and controlling the expenditure of the parochial funds, and electing certain of the parochial officers, though there are various other matters in which it possesses an authority (*e*). We here speak of its original character at common law: but it is liable to modifications in particular places by force of special custom or enactment (*f*); and is regulated besides by the general Vestry Act, 58 Geo. III. c. 69 (*g*),—amended by 59 Geo. III. c. 85, and by 16 & 17 Vict. c. 65. By these statutes (*h*) a vestry is not to be summoned except on three days' notice (*i*); and when it meets, a chairman is to be appointed, unless the rector, vicar, or perpetual curate, is present; and the chairman shall have the casting-vote and sign the minutes of the proceedings. They also contain provisions as to the right of voting; which is adjusted upon a certain scale, having relation to the amount in which the voter is assessed to the relief of the poor (*k*). The constitution of vestries is moreover in some places regulated by 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 60 (*l*); which provides for the election, by the rate payers, of a certain

(*d*) *Wilson v. Math*, 3 B. & Ald. 241, n. (*b*); see *Mawley v. Barbet*, 2 Esp. 687.

(*e*) *Steer's Par. L.* 257; and see 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 60, ss. 27, 39; 58 Geo. 3, c. 69, s. 6.

(*f*) *Steer's Par. L.* 260; and see *Golding v. Fenn*, 7 Barn. & Cress. 765; *R. v. Brain*, 3 B. & Adol. 614; *R. v. St. Martin's in the Fields*, *ibid.* 907; *R. v. Clerkenwell*, 1 Ad. & Ell. 317.

(*g*) Known as "*Sturges Bourne's Act.*" (See *Reg. v. D'Oyly*, 12 A. & E. 139.)

(*h*) These Acts do not extend to London or Southwark, or to any parish created under the Church

Building Acts for ecclesiastical purposes only, and not separately maintaining its own poor. (See the *Queen v. Barrow*, Law Rep., 4 Q. B. 577.)

(*i*) By 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 45, the notice for calling a vestry is to be affixed on or near the church door, without any publication (as formerly) in the parish church.

(*k*) As to voters in arrear of rates, see 16 & 17 Vict. c. 65. As to the manner of voting, see *R. v. Rector of Birmingham*, 7 Ad. & El. 254.

(*l*) Known as "*Sir J. Hobhouse's Act.*" (See *Reg. v. Hedger*, 12 A. & E. 157.)

number of vestrymen and auditors, under whose management the parochial accounts are to be kept and audited (*m*). This statute has no application, however, to parishes not forming part of a city or town, and not having more than 800 rate payers: and the adoption of its arrangements is in no case compulsory: no parish being subject to them unless it voluntarily consents to place itself under the Act. There is a statute also of 59 Geo. III. c. 12, which empowers parishes to establish vestries of a certain description for the management of the poor; and, as far as their relief is concerned, the bodies so appointed supersede the authority of the ordinary parish officers: though they are themselves, on the other hand, by a subsequent enactment, made subject to the control of the Poor Law Board (*n*).

On the subject of parishes it only remains to be observed, that, by certain statutes lately passed for extending church accommodation, and making more effectual provision for the cure of souls (*o*),—it is provided, that by such authorities and under such circumstances, and with such consents, as therein specified, any part or parts of any parish may be constituted a separate *district* (*p*), for

(*m*) *R. v. St. Pancras Trustees*, 5 Nev. & M. 219; *R. v. Vestry of St. Mary-le-bone*, 5 Ad. & El. 268. By 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 1, the stat. 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 60, is repealed as to *the metropolis*; and vestries of a new constitution created there.

(*n*) See 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, ss. 21, 54; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 109, s. 10; *Queen v. Green and others*, 21 L. J. (M. C.) 137. See also 13 & 14 Vict. c. 57, enabling the Poor Law Board upon application of the churchwardens, pursuant to a resolution of vestry, in any parish where the population exceeds 2000 by the then last census, to make an order for the appointment of a *paid vestry*

clerk, whose duties the Act defines.

(*o*) The most important of these statutes are 58 Geo. 3, c. 45; 59 Geo. 3, c. 134; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 77; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 113; 6 & 7 Vict. c. 37; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 94; 19 & 20 Vict. cc. 55, 104. (See also as to division into separate *benefices*, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, s. 16; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 49, s. 6.) A further account of these statutes will be found post, bk. IV. pt. II. c. IV.

(*p*) See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 37, s. 10; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 56, s. 6, as to the registration of a map or plan of the boundaries of districts formed under these Acts.

spiritual purposes; and that any parish may also be divided into two or more distinct and separate parishes, for all ecclesiastical purposes whatsoever (*q*). In pursuance of which provisions many such new constitutions and divisions have, for purposes of that description, accordingly taken place (*r*). And thus much for the ecclesiastical division of this kingdom.

II. [The civil division of the territory of England is into counties, of those counties into hundreds, of those hundreds into tithings or towns. This division is of remote and undefined antiquity; and was not peculiar to England, similar distributions having been in use among several nations of the continent (*s*). As to the tithings, they were so called, from the Saxon, because *ten* freeholders with their families composed one. These all dwelt together, and were sureties or free pledges to the king, for the good behaviour of each other; and if any offence was committed in their district, they were bound to have the offender forthcoming (*t*). And therefore

(*q*) Some of the Acts also authorized the establishment within these divisions, of a species of select vestry for ecclesiastical purposes (see 59 Geo. 3, c. 134, s. 30; 3 Geo. 4, c. 72, s. 10). But the select vestries authorized by these Acts are abolished by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 97, s. 23.

(*r*) With respect to parishes, it may be proper also to notice the useful provisions of certain late statutes (see 2 & 3 Vict. c. 62, ss. 34—36; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 15, s. 28; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, s. 39; and 12 & 13 Vict. c. 83), whereby the ancient boundaries between parishes and townships may be (*prospectively*, see *R. v. Madeley*, 15 Q. B. 43) adjusted, or in other cases new

boundaries defined. There are also the stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 18, authorizing the sale of parish property and paying parish debts out of the poor rate;—the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 50, enabling parishioners, &c., to sell advowsons held by or in trust for them;—and the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 30, enabling two-thirds of the ratepayers of a parish to make rates for maintaining public walks, &c., therein.

(*s*) The division has been ascribed to Alfred, but Mr. Hallam questions his claim to the distinction, and observes that counties are mentioned in the Laws of Ina. (See Hallam's *Middle Ages*, vol. ii. pp. 389, 402.)

(*t*) *Flet.* 1, 47.

[antiently no man was suffered to abide in England, above forty days, unless he were enrolled in some tithing or decennary (*u*). One of the principal inhabitants of the tithing was annually appointed to preside over the rest, being called the tithingman, the headborough, (words which speak their own etymology,) and in some counties, the borsholder, or borough's-ealder, being supposed the discreetest man in the borough, town, or tithing (*v*).

Tithings, towns, or vills, are of the same signification in law; and are said to have had each of them originally a church and celebration of divine service, sacraments and burials: though that seems to be rather an ecclesiastical than a civil distinction (*x*). The word *town* (*y*) or *vill* is indeed, by the alteration of times and language, now become a generical term, comprehending under it several species and varieties.] Taken in this sense, towns are distinguished from each other as being either corporate or not corporate; the townsmen forming, in the first kind, a *corporation*, that is, a society, with certain legal properties and capacities, on the nature of which we shall treat at large in a subsequent division of these Commentaries; and shall at the same time consider the provisions of the Act for regulating municipal corporations (5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76), by the effect of which, all towns of this description are now placed under one uniform plan of internal government (*z*). There are also market-towns, that is, towns which are entitled to hold markets; and there are others which have not that franchise. And, lastly, towns are divided into cities, boroughs, and common towns. The cities of this kingdom are certain towns of

(*u*) *Mirr. c. 1, s. 3.*

(*v*) *Jac. Dict. v. Headborough.*

(*x*) *Co. Litt. 115 b.*

(*y*) As to the legal meaning of the word "town," see *Elliott v. South Devon Railway Company*, 2 Exch. 729; *Ex parte Incumbent*, &c. of

Brompton, 22 L. J., N. S. (Ch.) 281; *London and South Western Railway Company v. Blackmore*, Law Rep., 4 Eng. & Ir. App. Ca. 611.

(*z*) As to municipal corporations vide post, bk. IV. pt. III. c. I.

principal note and importance, all of which either are or have been sees of bishops; yet there seems to be no necessary connexion between a city and a see (*a*); [and it is certain, that though the bishopric be dissolved, as at Westminster, yet still it remaineth a city (*b*).] A borough is a city or other town that sends (or hath sent) burgesses to parliament (*c*), a privilege the nature of which we shall more fully explain hereafter, in that part of the work which relates to Parliament (*d*). According to Sir Edward Coke, there were in his time, in England and Wales, 8,803 towns, or thereabouts (*e*). [To several of them there are small appendages belonging, called hamlets; which are taken notice of in the statute of Exeter (14 Edw. I.), wherein frequent mention is made of “entire vill,” “demi-vill,” and “hamlets.” Entire vill, Sir Henry Spelman conjectures, to have consisted of ten freemen or frankpledges, demi-vill of five, and hamlets of less than five (*f*). These little collections of houses are sometimes under the same administration as the town itself, sometimes governed by separate officers; in which last case they are, to some

(*a*) See 1 Woodd. 302; Jac. Dict. *in tit.* City.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 109 b. The town of *Westminster* was by express creation made a city by Hen. VIII. when he also made it the seat of one of the new bishoprics he founded out of the revenues of the dissolved monasteries; but it was restored to the diocese of London in the reign of Edw. VI.; and Elizabeth, by authority of parliament, turned Westminster into a collegiate church, subject to a dean. See Chitty's Black. vol. i. p. 109, *n.*; 2 Burn, Ecc. Law, 542, 7th ed.; Co. Litt. by Harg. 109 b, *n.* (3).

(*c*) 1 Bl. Com. 114; Litt. s. 164; Co. Litt. 108 b, 109 a. See also the Reform Act of 1832 (2 Will. 4,

c. 45), s. 79. In the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, “borough” is used in a sense peculiar to that statute; and expresses a corporate town, whether sending representatives to parliament, or not. In 31 & 32 Vict. c. 41 (The Borough Electors Act, 1868), the term “parliamentary borough” is to mean a borough which prior to the Representation of the People Act, 1867, returned a member or members to parliament; and a “municipal borough,” a place subject to the provisions of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76.

(*d*) As to the parliament, vide post, bk. IV. pt. I. c. I.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 116 a.

(*f*) Gloss. 274.

[purposes in law, looked upon as distinct townships. These towns, as was before hinted, contained each originally but one parish and one tithing; though many of them now, by the increase of inhabitants, are divided into several parishes and tithings; and, sometimes, where there is but one parish there are two or more villis or tithings.

As ten families of freeholders made up a town or tithing, so ten tithings composed a superior division, called a hundred, as consisting of ten times ten families. The hundred is governed by a high constable or bailiff (*h*); and formerly there was regularly held in it the hundred court for the trial of causes, though now fallen into disuse (*i*). In some of the more northern counties these hundreds are called wapentakes (*k*).

An indefinite number of these hundreds make up a county or shire. Shire is a Saxon word signifying a division; but a county, *comitatus*, is plainly derived from *comes*, the count of the Franks; that is, the earl or alderman, (as the Saxons called him,) of a shire, to whom the government of it was entrusted. This he usually exercised by his deputy, still called in Latin *vice-comes*, and in English, the sheriff, shrieve, or shire-reeve, signifying the officer of the shire; upon whom, by process of time,

(*h*) As to high constables, however, see 32 & 33 Vict. c. 47. Blackstone says (vol. i. p. 115), that the division of *hundreds* obtained formerly in Denmark and in France, each hundred being subject to a *centenarius*, over a number of whom presided a *comes* or count. He adds, that in France the division was instituted by Clotharius and Childebert, with a view of obliging each district to answer for the robberies committed in its own division; and we may remark that in our own country, the *hundred* is made by statute answerable for the

riotous and tumultuous demolition of churches and certain other building and machinery, and for plunder of wreck. (See 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 31; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 477.)

(*i*) As to the hundred court, vide post, bk. v. c. iv.

(*k*) Seld. in Fortesc. c. 24. Wapentakes are so called because the people at a public meeting confirmed their union with the governor by touching his *weapon* or lance. (See Wilk. Leg. Ang. Sax. ll. Edw. c. 33; Christian's Blackstone, vol. i. p. 115, *note*; Cowell's Dict. v. Wapentake.)

[the civil administration of it is now totally devolved. In some counties there is an intermediate division, between the shire and the hundreds, as lathes in Kent, and rapes in Sussex (*l*), each of them containing about three or four hundreds a-piece (*m*). These had formerly their lathe-reeves and rape-reeves, acting in subordination to the shire-reeve. Where a county is divided into *three* of these intermediate jurisdictions, they are called trithings, which were antiently governed by a trithing-reeve (*n*). These trithings still subsist in the large county of York, where by an easy corruption they are denominated ridings; the north, the east, and the west riding. The number of counties in England and Wales have been different at different times; at present they are forty in England and twelve in Wales (*o*).]

It seems probable that the realm was originally divided into counties, with a view to the convenient administration of justice; for we find that the judicial business of the kingdom was in early times chiefly dispatched in local courts, held in each different county, before the sheriff, as its principal officer (*p*). These antient county courts

(*l*) The rapes of Sussex are said to have been military governments in the time of the Conqueror; the lathes of Kent to have been civil jurisdictions, and of earlier date.—(Population Abstract, 1831, vol. i. p. xv.)

(*m*) For some purposes connected with magisterial business, certain counties are severed into *divisions*. (See 9 Geo. 4, c. 43; 10 Geo. 4, c. 46; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 12; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 65; and 28 & 29 Vict. c. 37.) The number of places in England and Wales where petty sessions or divisional meetings are usually held, were returned in 1831 as amounting to 609.—(Population Abstract, vol. i. p. xv.)

(*n*) Wilk. Leg. Ang. Sax. Ll. Edw. c. 34.

(*o*) A particular place, parcel of one county, is sometimes detached from it, and surrounded by another. By 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61, these detached parts are annexed, for all purposes, to the counties of which they form a part, for the purpose of parliamentary representation. As to the jurisdiction of magistrates with respect to detached parts of counties, see 2 & 3 Vict. c. 82, and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 68; and as to the union of liberties with counties, see 13 & 14 Vict. c. 105.

(*p*) Hickee, Thes. Diss. Epist.; Reeves's Hist. Eng. L. vol. i. pp. 6, 7.

are still occasionally held for certain purposes, (for example, the proclamation of outlawries, the election of coroners, and the like,) but retain nothing of their former consequence; the local administration of justice being now entrusted in civil cases to courts similar in name, but of a very different character and jurisdiction (*p*). Yet the distribution into counties is to this day materially connected, (though in a different manner,) with the course of judicial proceedings. For trials of disputed facts, in actions of a local character, have been ordinarily conducted in the county where the cause of action arose (*q*); and (in the case of the investigation of crime) in the county wherein the alleged offence was committed (*r*); and such trials take place before the judges and commissioners of assize, who take periodical circuits throughout England and Wales for the trial of civil and criminal cases; or else before the justices of the peace for the county, who exercise a jurisdiction, in cases of the latter description, at their quarter sessions. Another important object connected with the distribution into counties, is that of parliamentary representation, inasmuch as every county sends to the House of Commons its own members, called knights of the shire,—who represent their respective counties, as the borough members do their respective towns; though, by a new arrangement, the larger counties are now subdivided, each portion forming a separate county (so far as this purpose is concerned), and sending its separate

(*p*) As to the County Courts, vide post, bk. v. c. iv.

(*q*) But see 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, sched. i. 28, as to actions brought in the High Court of Justice after the commencement of that Act in November, 1874.

(*r*) By 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, was established the "Central Criminal Court," for trial of offences committed in London, Middlesex, and some parts of Essex, Kent and Sur-

rey; and by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 16, persons charged with offences committed elsewhere may, nevertheless, be ordered to be tried in that court. And by 36 & 37 Vict. c. 10, s. 7, persons subject to the Mutiny Act may be tried in any place where they may be found after the commission of the offence. These provisions may be considered as by way of exception to the principle stated in the text.

representative (*s*). For the object of local taxation, too, the division into counties is of practical effect and importance; for as each parish is subject to a rate for relief of the poor, so is every county to a county rate, which is levied on the occupiers of land under the authority of various acts of parliament (*t*), and applied to many miscellaneous purposes (*u*).

[Three of these counties, Chester, Durham, and Lancaster, are called counties palatine. The two former are such by prescription or immemorial custom, or at least as old as the Norman conquest (*x*); the latter was created by King Edward the third, in favour of Henry Plantagenet, first Earl and then Duke of Lancaster (*y*); whose heiress being married to John of Gaunt, the king's son, the franchise was greatly enlarged and confirmed in parliament, to honour John of Gaunt himself (*z*); whom, on the death of his father-in-law, the king had also created Duke of Lancaster (*a*). Counties palatine are so called *a palatio*, because the owners thereof, the Earl of Chester, the Bishop of Durham, and the Duke of Lancaster, had in those counties *jura regalia* as fully as the king hath in his palace; *regalem potestatem in omnibus*, as Bracton

(*s*) 2 Will. 4, c. 45, ss. 12, 13, 14, and see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 112, ss. 1, 7.

(*t*) See 22 Hen. 8, c. 5; 12 Geo. 2, c. 29; 55 Geo. 3, c. 51. As to borrowing money on mortgage of county rate in Middlesex, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 32. As to the assessment and collection of the county rate generally, see 7 & 8 Vict. c. 33; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 81; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 33; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 78; and *East Looe v. Cornwall*, 3 Best & Smith, 20. See also 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 92; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 71, as to borough rates in the nature of county rates.

(*u*) See Report of County Rate Commissioners, 16 June, 1836

(printed by order of House of Commons), with the tables annexed to that Report, Appendix C. Among the purposes to which the rate is applied, are the maintenance of the rural police, lunatic asylums, gaols and bridges. As to borrowing money for county purposes, see 35 Vict. c. 7, and 36 & 37 Vict. c. 35.

(*x*) Seld. Tit. Hon. 2, 5, 8.

(*y*) Pat. 25 Edw. 3, p. 1, m. 18; Seld. *ibid.*; Sandford's Gen. Hist. 112; 4 Inst. 204.

(*z*) Cart. 36 Edw. 3, n. 9.

(*a*) Pat. 51 Edw. 3, m. 33; Case of Duchy of Lancaster, Plowd. 215; 7 Rym. 138.

[expresses it (*b*). They might pardon treasons, murders and felonies; they appointed all judges and justices of the peace: all writs and indictments ran in their names, as in other counties in the king's; and all offences were said to be done against their peace, and not, as in other places, *contra pacem domini regis* (*c*). And indeed by the antient law, in all peculiar jurisdictions, offences were said to be done against his peace in whose court they were tried; in a court leet, *contra pacem domini*; in the court of a corporation, *contra pacem ballivorum*; in the sheriff's court or tourn, *contra pacem vice-comitis* (*d*). These palatine privileges, so similar to the regal independent jurisdictions usurped by the great barons on the continent during the weak and infant state of the first feudal kingdoms in Europe (*e*), were in all probability originally granted to the counties of Chester and Durham, because they bordered upon inimical countries, Wales and Scotland; in order that the inhabitants, having justice administered at home, might not be obliged to go out of the county, and leave it open to the enemy's incursions; and that the owners, being encouraged by so large an authority, might be the more watchful in its defence. And upon this account also there were formerly two other counties palatine, Pembrokeshire and Hexamshire (the latter now united with Northumberland), but these were abolished by parliament; the former in the twenty-seventh year of Henry the eighth, the latter in the fourteenth year of Elizabeth. In the twenty-seventh year of Henry the eighth, likewise, the powers before mentioned of owners of counties palatine were abridged; the reason for their continuance having in a manner ceased (*f*).] And in modern times, many important alterations have taken place in regard to the administration of justice in the counties palatine, assimilating them in that point to the

(*b*) L. 3, c. 8, s. 4.

(*c*) 4 Inst. 205.

(*d*) Seld. in Heng. Magn. c. 2.

(*e*) See Robertson, Cha. V. i. 60.

(*f*) 4 Inst. 205.

rest of England. Thus by 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 70, the jurisdiction of the court of session of the county palatine of Chester was abolished, and the county subjected in all things to the jurisdiction of the superior courts at Westminster; and now, by the Judicature Act, 1873, the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster and the Court of Pleas of Durham is transferred from the commencement of that Act, on the 2nd November, 1874, to the High Court of Justice thereby established (*g*).

It is also to be remarked, that of the counties palatine none now remains in the hands of a subject. For the earldom of Chester, as Camden testifies, was united to the crown by Henry the third, and has ever since given title to the king's eldest son (*h*); and the palatine jurisdiction of Durham, which was vested until a recent period in the Bishop of Durham for the time being, is now taken from him by 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 19 (amended by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 45), and vested as a separate franchise and royalty in the crown. [As to the county palatine or duchy of Lancaster, it was the property of Henry Bolingbroke, the son of John of Gaunt, at the time when he wrested the crown from King Richard the second, and assumed the title of Henry the fourth. But he was too prudent to suffer this to be united to the crown; lest if he lost one he should lose the other also. For as Plowden (*i*) and Sir Edward Coke (*k*) observe, "he knew he had the duchy of Lancaster by sure and indefeasible title, but that his title to the crown was not so assured: for that after the decease of Richard the second the right of the crown was in the heir of Lionel Duke of Clarence, *second* son of Edward the third; John of Gaunt, father to this Henry the

(*g*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 16. As to the *chancery* court of the county palatine of Lancaster, see 13 & 14 Vict. c. 43; and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27.

(*h*) He is also (as already observed, *supra*, p. 84,) created *Prince of Wales*.

(*i*) P. 215.

(*k*) 4 Inst. 205.

[“ fourth, being but the *fourth* son.” And therefore he procured an Act of Parliament, in the first year of his reign, ordaining that the duchy of Lancaster, and all other his hereditary estates, with all their royalties and franchises, should remain to him and his heirs for ever ; and should remain, descend, be administered and governed in like manner as if he never had attained the regal dignity ; and thus they descended to his son and grandson, Henry the fifth and Henry the sixth : many new territories and privileges being annexed to the duchy by the former (*l*). Henry the sixth being attainted in the first year of Edward the fourth, this duchy was declared in parliament to have become forfeited to the crown (*m*) ; and at the same time an Act was made to incorporate the duchy of Lancaster, to continue the county palatine—which might otherwise have determined by the attainder (*n*),—and to make the same, parcel of the duchy : and, further, to vest the whole in King Edward the fourth and his heirs, *kings of England*, for ever ; but under a separate guiding and governance from the other inheritances of the crown. And in the first year of Henry the seventh, another Act was made to resume such part of the duchy lands, as had been dismembered from it in the reign of Edward the fourth ; and to vest the inheritance of the whole in the king and his heirs for ever, as amply and largely, and in like manner, form and condition, separate from the crown of England and possession of the same, as the three Henrys and Edward the fourth, or any of them, had and held the same (*o*).]

(*l*) Parl. 2 Hen. 5, n. 50 ; 3 Hen. 5, n. 15.

(*m*) Fisher *v.* Batten, 1 Ventr. 155.

(*n*) 1 Ventr. 1157.

(*o*) As to the effect of this Act see Plowd. 220, 1, 2 ; Lamb. Archeon, 233 ; 4 Inst. 206. We may notice here that by 18 & 19 Vict.

c. 58, the chancellor and council of the Duchy of Lancaster are enabled to sell and purchase land on behalf of her Majesty in right of the Duchy. And that by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 57, the county of Lancaster has, for certain purposes connected with its *parliamentary representation*, ceased to be a county palatine.

The isle of Ely was never a county palatine, though sometimes erroneously called so. It was, however, a royal franchise; the Bishop of Ely having been formerly entitled, by grant of King Henry the first, to *jura regalia* within the district, whereby he exercised a jurisdiction over all causes as well criminal as civil (*p*). But by 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 87 (amended by 1 Vict. c. 53), this secular authority of the bishop is taken away and vested in the crown.

[There are also counties *corporate*—otherwise called *counties of cities or towns*—which are certain cities and towns, some with more, some with less territory annexed to them, to which out of special grace and favour the kings of England have granted the privilege to be counties of themselves; and not to be comprised in any other county; but to be governed by their own sheriffs (*q*) and other magistrates, so that no officers of the county at large have any power to intermeddle therein (*r*).] As they constitute no part of the counties at large in which they are locally situate, so they had formerly, in general, no share in voting for the members to serve for those counties in parliament (*s*). But thirteen of the number are now expressly included within their respective counties, so far as regards the right of election for knights of the shire (*t*). To which we may add, that by 38 Geo. III. c. 52, all causes of action arising and offences committed in a county corporate may be tried in the next adjoining county at large (*u*); a regulation from which certain towns and cities indeed were at first excepted, but almost the whole of these ex-

(*p*) 4 Inst. 220; *Grant v. Bagge*, 3 East, 128.

(*q*) As to the appointment of sheriffs of counties corporate, see 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 61.

(*r*) Their names are given in Russell's Reform Act, p. 5; and in the Population Abstract, of 1831,

vol. i. p. xiv. And see 3 Geo. 1, c. 15; 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, ss. 61, 109.

(*s*) Russell's Reform Act, p. 5.

(*t*) 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 17.

(*u*) See also 14 & 15 Vict. c. 55, ss. 19, 21—24; and c. 100, s. 23.

ceptions have been since repealed by the Act for regulating municipal corporations (*x*).

Thus much of the countries subject to the laws of England; the consideration of which involves, in a general point of view, that of the *persons* also, to whom these laws are applicable. For all persons found within these territories fall under the operation of these laws, though in different degrees: British subjects (that is, persons born within any part of the dominions of the crown, and in some cases their descendants also, though born in foreign parts, and persons naturalized by Act of Parliament) being in a full and absolute sense entitled to the rights conferred by these laws, and liable to the obligations they impose (*y*); but aliens (or those who are not British subjects) in a limited sense only, as we shall have occasion more particularly to explain hereafter (*z*).

(*x*) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 109. Some farther provisions as to *counties corporate* are contained in 51 Geo. 3, c. 100; 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 4, s. 6; c. 14, s. 3; 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 25; 9 Geo. 4, c. 61; 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 113; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 72; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 35.

(*y*) British subjects are by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 9, liable for murder or manslaughter though committed at *sea* or on *land abroad*.

(*z*) See 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14, an Act passed to amend in certain points the law relating to the legal condition both of aliens and of British subjects. Of this statute we shall have occasion to speak further in our second volume, where some

notice is taken of the legal position of aliens in this country. It may be here remarked, that by the last census, taken on the 3rd April, 1871 (under 33 & 34 Vict. c. 107), the population of England and Wales (including the islands in the British seas), enumerated on that day, amounted to 22,848,538; of Scotland, at the same date, 3,358,613; and of Ireland, 5,402,759;—showing that the aggregate number of persons, then in Great Britain and Ireland, amounted to 31,609,910. This is exclusive of the army, navy, and merchant seamen *abroad* on that day; the number of whom is estimated, in the census tables, as about 207,198.

NEW COMMENTARIES
ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK I.
OF PERSONAL RIGHTS.

IN a disquisition of such extent and variety as that on which we are about to enter, it is obviously of the first importance to lay down a proper preliminary arrangement of the subject; and the plan of division which appears to be most suitable to a treatise of this description, is one founded on a consideration of the nature of municipal law in the abstract, and of the objects or purposes towards which it is directed. It will be necessary, therefore, to recur for a moment to the views taken of this subject in a preceding part of the work.

We have seen that municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state (*a*); whose authority to prescribe it has been referred to the contract implied in civil society, that its members should submit to certain restraints of their natural freedom, in order to secure to each the enjoyment of defined liberties and advantages; and these we have comprehended under the general name of rights (*b*). It results from these considerations, that in every country, the true and proper

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 25.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 29.

objects of the law consist in the establishment and maintenance of the *rights*, severally due to the different members of the community.

The idea of rights however naturally suggests the correlative one of *wrongs*; for every right is capable of being violated. A right to receive payment for goods sold (for example) implies a wrong on the part of him who owes, but withholds, the price; a right to live in personal security, a wrong on the part of him who commits personal violence. And, therefore, while in a general point of view the law is intended for the establishment and maintenance of rights, we find it on closer examination to be dealing both with rights and wrongs. It first fixes the character and definition of rights, and then, with a view to their effectual security, proceeds to define wrongs, and to devise the means by which the latter shall be prevented or redressed.

These considerations form the most convenient basis upon which to construct the principal division of the laws of England; and we shall therefore sever them (like former writers) into two portions, one of which regards *Rights*, and the other *Wrongs* (*c*).

But, again, if rights be analyzed, they will be found to consist of several kinds. For, first, they are such as regard a man's own person; secondly, such as regard his dominion over the external and sensible things by which he is surrounded; thirdly, such as regard his private relations, as a member of a family; fourthly, such as regard his social state or condition as a member of the community: the first of which classes may be designated as *personal rights*, the second, as *rights of property*, the third, as *rights in private relations*, and the fourth, as *public rights*.

In these divisions of rights, it is to be observed, that we everywhere mean to include the converse or reciprocal consideration of *duties*. For whatever is due *to* one man

(*c*) See the Preface to Hale's Analysis of the Laws of England, and Bl. Com. vol. i. p. 122.

or set of men, is necessarily due *from* another. Thus the right of one man to receive from another the price of a commodity sold, casts upon the latter the duty of paying that price; and the general right of each individual to live in personal security, implies the converse duty on the part of others not to subject him to any violence. The party too, who possesses the right, is in general himself subject to some resulting duty. Thus the people have a right to live under the form of government established by law, and are under a corresponding duty of submission to that government. In the discussion of rights, therefore, it is often necessary to speak also of duties. Indeed, it is under the aspect of duties principally, that some rights require to be considered.

To avoid, however, any misapprehension from the use of the term “duties,” we may remark that there are some duties which have no connection with rights in the sense which we have affixed to the latter expression; and of such duties our law consequently takes no cognizance. These are such as the law of God or conscience prescribes, but the violation of which by the individual is attended with no direct mischief to others. Thus public sobriety is a duty recognized by the law, having regard to the right of each citizen to be protected from disgusting or contaminating exhibitions of vice; but private sobriety is not enforced by any legal sanction; because secret intoxication, though equally opposed, with open drunkenness, to conscience and the law of God, is no violation of any human right, nor its commission, if by any means detected, a fit subject for human punishment.

Wrongs also may be subdivided; but as regards these we are necessarily led to adopt a different principle of distribution. For the leading distinction here depends not on the character of the right violated, but on the party who is supposed to sustain injury from its violation. According to the view which our law takes of this subject, the violation of a right may in some instances amount to

an injury to the particular individual only, but in others it may take the character of an injury to the public at large (*d*). When viewed in the first aspect, it is usually called a *civil injury*, when in the last, a *crime*. Thus the withholding of a debt, is a wrong to the individual; and consequently a civil injury; but it is considered as not affecting the public; and therefore it is no crime. On the other hand, to deprive a man of his money by theft or robbery, is held to be a wrong to the public, and therefore a crime; though it is also a civil injury, if considered in relation to the damage which the party individually sustains. The considerations which tend to determine whether a given species of wrong shall be treated as an injury to the individual, or to the public, or both, constitute a subject upon which it would be premature to enter in this place, and which belongs to a later portion of the treatise. It is sufficient at present to have thus stated the general nature of the distinction between civil injuries and crimes, and to remark that it is one of great practical importance; for the law deals very differently with the two kinds of wrong; the former being merely a subject for *redress*, the latter for *punishment*.

The extensive subject under consideration appearing thus naturally to resolve itself into the several divisions above indicated, we shall adopt them for the purpose of the present work; and our method, or order of discussion, will be as follows:—

Book I. Of Personal Rights.

II. Of Rights of Property.

III. Of Rights in Private Relations.

IV. Of Public Rights.

V. Of Civil Injuries; including also the modes of Redress which the law provides for them.

VI. Of Crimes; comprising also the modes of Criminal Prosecution.

(*d*) See 4 Bl. Com. pp. 5, 6.

We are now first to consider Personal Rights, or those which relate to a man's own person. As these are the most important, so are they also the most simple of all that are secured to men by the institutions of society; and the law has been much less frequently employed in fixing their definition and boundaries, than in devising redress or punishment in case of their violation. The discussion of these rights will consequently lie in a comparatively narrow compass. They consist of two principal or primary articles, the right of *Personal Security*, and the right of *Personal Liberty*.

I. [The right of Personal Security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.

1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins, in contemplation of law, as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb (*e*): indeed, an infant *en ventre sa mère* is supposed to be already born for many purposes (*f*). And if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise designedly killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, with a like design, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the antient law homicide or manslaughter (*g*).] But by the modern law, the offence is, in neither case, considered in this light; though to procure

(*e*) The rule of the civil law is the same. Ff. 1, 5, 26.

(*f*) For example, it may take an estate as legatee, or by descent, or under the limitations of a deed, and it may also have assigned to it a guardian. In case of *descent*, however, the presumptive heir may enter and receive the profits for his own use till the birth of the child.

(See Bl. Com. vol. 1, p. 180; Co. Litt. 390 a; 12 Car. 2, c. 24, s. 8; 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 16; Beale v. Beale, 1 P. Wms. 245; Doe v. Clark, 2 H. Bl. 399; Wallis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 117; Doe v. Lancashire, 5 T. R. 49; Goodtitle v. Newman, 3 Wils. 526.)

(*g*) Bracton, l. 3, c. 4.

a miscarriage is, in all cases, a heinous crime (*h*): and if means be used, with intent to kill a child in the womb, and the child is *born alive*, and afterwards dies by reason of the means so used, the case amounts to murder (*i*).

2. [A man's limbs—by which for the présent we only understand those members which may be useful to him in fight, and the destruction of which alone amounts to *mayhem* by the common law, are also the gift of the wise Creator, to enable him to protect himself from external injuries in a state of nature.] To these, therefore, as to life itself, he may be said to have a natural inherent right, which draws after it certain legal consequences to which we shall now advert.

[A man's life and limbs are held of such high value by our law that it pardons even homicide, if committed *se defendendo*, or in order to preserve them. Indeed, whatever is done by a man, to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion. Therefore, if a man through fear of death or mayhem is prevailed upon to execute a deed, or do any other legal act; these, though accompanied with all other the requisite solemnities, may be afterwards avoided, if forced upon him by a well-grounded apprehension of losing his life, or even his limbs, in case of his non-compliance (*k*). And the same is also a sufficient excuse for the commission of many misdemeanors, as will appear in the course of these Commentaries (*l*). The constraint a man is under in these circumstances, is called in law *duress*, from the Latin *durities*, of which there are two sorts; duress of imprisonment, where a man actually loses his liberty, of which we shall presently speak; and duress

(*h*) As to the existing law on this subject, see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 58, 59, et post, bk. VI. c. IV.

(*i*) 3 Inst. 50.

(*k*) 2 Inst. 483.

(*l*) Vide post, bk. VI. c. II.

[*per minas*, where the hardship is only threatened and impending, which is that we are now discoursing of. Duress *per minas* is either for fear of loss of life, or else for fear of mayhem or loss of limb. And this fear must be upon sufficient reason; that is, (as Bracton expresses it,) “*non suspicio cujuslibet vani et meticulosi hominis, sed talis qui possit cadere in virum constantem; talis enim debet esse metus, qui in se contineat vitæ periculum, aut corporis cruciatum*” (*m*). A fear of battery or being beaten, though never so well grounded, is no duress; neither is the fear of having one’s house burned, or one’s goods taken away and destroyed; because in these cases, should the threat be performed, a man may have satisfaction by recovering equivalent damages; but no suitable atonement can be made for the loss of life or limb (*n*).

The law not only regards life and member, and protects every man in the enjoyment of them, but also furnishes him with everything necessary for their support. For there is no man so indigent or wretched, but he may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor, of which in their proper places (*o*).]

These rights of life and member can only be determined by the death of the person; which is either a civil or a natural death (*p*). Civil death occurs where a man is attainted of treason or felony; for immediately upon such attainder he loses (subject indeed to some exceptions) his civil rights and capacities; and becomes, as it were, dead in law (*q*). [It also took place formerly where any

(*m*) Bract. 1. 2, c. 5; Co. Litt. 162 a, 253 b; R. v. Southerton, 6 East, 144.

(*n*) 2 Inst. 483. Blackstone remarks that the doctrine of the civil law with regard to *duress* agrees with our own, and cites Ff. 48, 21, 1.

(*o*) As to the laws relating to the poor, vide post, bk. IV. pt. III. c. II.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 132 a.

(*q*) 3 Inst. 213; 4 Bl. Com. 380. As to the doctrine of *attainder*, vide post, bk. VI. c. XXIII.

[man abjured the realm, by the process of the common law (*r*); or entered into religion, that is, went into a monastery, and became there a monk professed: in both of which cases he was absolutely dead in law, and his next heir had his estate. For such banished man was entirely cut off from society; and such a monk, upon his profession, renounced solemnly all secular concerns: and besides, as the popish clergy claimed an exemption from the duties of civil life and the commands of the temporal magistrate, the genius of the English laws would not suffer those persons to enjoy the benefits of society, who secluded themselves from it, and refused to submit to its regulations. A monk was therefore accounted *civiliter mortuus*; and when he entered into religion might, like other dying men, make his testament and executors; or, if he made none, the ordinary might grant administration to his next of kin, as if he were actually dead intestate. And such executors and administrators had the same power, and might bring the same actions for debts due *to* the religious, and were liable to the same actions for those due *from* him, as if he were naturally deceased (*s*). Nay, so far was this principle carried, that when one became bound in a bond to an abbot and his successors; and afterwards made his executors, and professed himself a monk of the same abbey, and in process of time was himself made abbot thereof: here it was held that the law gave him, in the capacity of abbot, an action of debt against his own executors to recover the money due (*t*). In short, a monk or religious was so effectually dead in law, that a lease made even to a third person, during the life (generally) of one who afterwards became a monk, determined by such his entry into religion; for which reason leases, and other conveyances for life, were usually made to have and to hold for the term of one's *natural* life (*u*). But, even in

(*r*) Co. Litt. 133 a; *Newsome v.*

Bowyer, 3 P. Wms. 37, n. (B).

(*s*) Litt. s. 200.

(*t*) Co. Litt. 133 b.

(*u*) *Archbishop of Canterbury's case*, 2 Rep. 48 b; Co. Litt. 132 a.

[the times of popery, the law of England took no cognizance of *profession* in any foreign country, because the fact could not be tried in our courts (*x*); and therefore, since the Reformation, this disability is held to be abolished (*y*);—as is also the disability of banishment consequent upon abjuration, by statute 21 Jac. I. c. 28 (*z*).

This natural life being, as was before observed, the immediate donation of the great Creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself, nor by any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority.] Yet, nevertheless, it may be lawfully taken away (as before observed) in the necessary defence of life or limb (*a*); and is also capable of being forfeited for a breach of those laws of society which are enforced by the sanction of capital punishments; of the nature, restrictions, expedience and legality of which, we may hereafter more conveniently inquire in a subsequent part of these Commentaries (*b*). At present it may suffice to observe, that it results from the very nature of the social compact, on which we have supposed all municipal law to be founded (*c*), that no privation or restraint ought in any case to be inflicted on the individual, unless it be indispensable to the protection of some public interest of adequate importance. All laws therefore savour of injustice and oppression, which authorize the destruction of life or member in order to secure a public object of comparatively trivial character; or even an object of the highest consequence to the public, but capable of being sufficiently secured by some more lenient method. We shall find accordingly, that, though the law of England in some cases affects the life of the delinquent, it is only for the prevention of crimes of the deepest dye—the severity by which our penal system was once unhappily distinguished

(*x*) Co. Litt. 132 b.

(*y*) *Rex v. Lady Portington*, 1 Salk. 162.

(*z*) 1 Hale, P. C. 605.

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 140.

(*b*) Vide post, bk. VI. c. I.

(*c*) Vide sup. p. 29.

having been progressively, and now at length effectually, softened by the milder spirit of modern legislation. To this it may be proper to add, that our form of government, or constitution, is an utter stranger to any arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without the express warrant of law. [*“Nullus liber homo,”* says the great charter, *“aliquo modo destruatur, nisi per legale iudicium parium suorum aut per legem terræ”* (d). Which words, *“aliquo modo destruatur,”* include, according to Sir Edward Coke (e), a prohibition not only of *killing* and *maiming*, but also of *torturing* (to which our laws are strangers), and of every oppression by colour of an illegal authority. And it is also enacted by a statute of 5 Edw. III. c. 9, that no man shall be forejudged of life or limb, contrary to the great charter and the law of the land: and again, by statute 28 Edw. III. c. 3, that no man shall be put to death without being brought to answer by due process of law.]

3. A man is also entitled, as to his whole body, to security from all corporal insults or injuries, whether by menaces, assaults, beating, wounding, or otherwise, though they may amount not to destruction of life or member.

4. To the preservation of his health from such practices as may prejudice or annoy it; and

5. To the security of his reputation or good name from slander.

But these three last articles, it will suffice to have barely mentioned among personal rights. It is to their infringement, rather than to the rights themselves, that the provisions of the laws have been in general directed; and a more convenient place for their further discussion, will consequently be found in that part of the work which relates to *wrongs* (f).

II. [Next to personal security, the law of England

(d) C. 29.

(e) 2 Inst. 48.

(f) As to *Wrongs*, vide post, bk. v. and bk. vi.

[regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. Concerning which we may make the same observations as upon the preceding article; that it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of England never abridge it without cogent reason; and that in this kingdom it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws. Here again the language of the Great Charter is, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land (*g*). And many subsequent old statutes expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or imprisoned by suggestion or petition to the king or his council, unless it be by legal indictment, or the process of the common law (*h*). Again, by the Petition of Right, (3 Car. I.,) no freeman shall be imprisoned or detained without cause shown, to which he may make answer according to law. So, also, by 16 Car. I. c. 10, it is enacted, that if any person be restrained of his liberty by order or decree of an illegal court, or by command of the king's majesty in person, or by warrant of the council board, or of any of the privy council; he shall, upon demand of his counsel, have a writ of *habeas corpus*, to bring his body before the court of King's Bench or Common Pleas; who shall determine whether the cause of his commitment be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain. And by 31 Car. II. c. 3, commonly called the *Habeas Corpus Act*,] amended and made more effectual by 56 Geo. III. c. 100, [the methods of obtaining this writ are so plainly pointed out and enforced, that, so long as this statute remains unimpeached, no subject of England can be long detained in prison, except in those cases in

(*g*) C. 29.

(*h*) 5 Edw. 3, c. 9; 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 4; 28 Edw. 3, c. 3.

[which the law requires and justifies such detainér. Moreover, lest the *habeas corpus* should be evaded by demanding unreasonable bail or sureties for the prisoner's appearance, it is declared by 1 W. & M. st. 2, c. 2, that excessive bail ought not to be required;] though, on the other hand, to prevent such abuses as are naturally apt to occur in the resort to a writ of this description, it is a rule with the courts that they will not grant a *habeas corpus* as of course, and without probable cause shown (*i*).

[Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty; for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest magistrate, to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, as in France was once daily practised by the crown, there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities (*k*). Indeed some have thought that unjust attacks, even upon life or property, at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, are less dangerous to the commonwealth, than such as are made upon the personal liberty of the subject. To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom: but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. And yet sometimes, when the state is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of our constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine when the danger of the state is so great, as to render this measure expedient: for it is the parliament only (or legislative power) that, whenever

(*i*) *Hobhouse's case*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 420. And see 56 Geo. 3, c. 100, by the express provisions of which there must, in the cases to which it applies, be "an affidavit showing a probable and reasonable

ground" for the complaint. For further information respecting the statutes of *habeas corpus*, vide post, vol. IV. bk. V. c. XII.

(*k*) See 1 Bl. Com. p. 135.

[it sees proper, by suspending the *Habeas Corpus Act* for a short and limited time, can enable the crown to imprison suspected persons,] without the possibility of their obtaining their discharge, during that period, by any interference of the courts of law (*l*); [as the senate of Rome was wont to have recourse to a dictator, a magistrate of absolute authority, when they judged the republic in any imminent danger. The decree of the senate, which usually preceded the nomination of this magistrate, "*dent operam consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat*," was called the *senatus consultum ultimæ necessitatis*: and in like manner this experiment ought only to be tried in cases of extreme emergency: in these, the nation parts with its liberty for a while, in order to preserve it for ever.

The confinement of the person in any wise, is an imprisonment. So that the keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in the street, is an imprisonment (*m*). And the law so much discourages unlawful confinement, that if a man is under *duress of imprisonment*,—which has been already explained to mean a compulsion by an illegal restraint of liberty,—until he seals a bond or the like;—he may allege this duress, and avoid the extorted bond. But if a man be lawfully imprisoned, and, either to procure his discharge, or on any other fair account, seals a bond or a deed, this is not by duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid it (*n*).] To make a commitment to prison lawful, it must either be by process from the courts of judicature, or by warrant from some person having authority to commit; [which warrant must be in writing, under the hand and seal of him by whom it is given, and must express the causes of the commitment, in order to be examined into, if necessary, upon a *habeas*

(*l*) Such suspension was authorized by 57 Geo. 3, cc. 3, 55; and again, (so far as regards Ireland, in reference to the recent Fenian

conspiracy there,) by 29 & 30 Vict. c. 1.

(*m*) 2 Inst. 589.

(*n*) 2 Inst. 482.

[*corpus*. If there be no cause expressed, the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner. For the law judges in this respect (saith Sir Edward Coke), like Festus the Roman governor, that it is unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to signify withal the crimes alleged against him (*o*).

A natural and regular consequence of this right of personal liberty, is, that every Englishman may claim to abide in his own country so long as he pleases, and not to be driven from it unless by the sentence of the law. The king indeed, by his royal prerogative, may issue his writ *ne exeat regno*, and prohibit any of his subjects from going into foreign parts without licence: for this may be necessary for the public service and safeguard of the commonwealth (*p*). But no power on earth, except the authority of parliament, can send any subject of England *out* of the land against his will; no, not even a criminal.] For exile was never sanctioned by the common law, except in the case of abjuration above referred to (*q*); and though in modern times persons have been conveyed to parts beyond the seas, under sentence of "transportation" (*r*), they have been so dealt with either by their own choice to escape a capital punishment, or else by the express direction of some act of parliament (*s*). [To this purpose the Great

(*o*) 2 Inst. 52, 53. See 1 Chitty, Crim. Law, 110, &c.

(*p*) F. N. B. 85. In modern times, the writ of *ne exeat regno* is only known as a process from the Court of Chancery to restrain a defendant in a suit from leaving the country. Vide post, bk. v. c. XIII.

(*q*) Co. Litt. 133 a. Vide sup. p. 143.

(*r*) Convicts are still sometimes conveyed to parts beyond the seas, under that sentence of *penal servitude* which is now substituted for that of transportation. (See 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3; 22 Vict. c. 25.)

(*s*) It is said that exile was first introduced as a punishment by the legislature in the thirty-ninth year of Eliz., when a statute enacted, that "such rogues as were dangerous to the inferior people should be banished the realm;" (39 Eliz. c. 4; see Bar. Ant. Stat. 269;) and that the first statute in which the word "transportation" is used is the 18 Car. 2, c. 3, which gives a power to the judges at their discretion either to execute, or transport to America for life, the Mossier-troopers of Cumberland and Northumberland.

[Charter declares that no freeman shall be banished, unless by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land (*t*). And by the *Habeas Corpus* Act, 31 Car. II. c. 2, (that second *Magna Charta*, and stable bulwark of our liberties,) it is enacted, that no subject of this realm, who is an inhabitant of England, Wales, or Berwick, shall be sent prisoner into Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or places beyond the seas—where they cannot have the full benefit and protection of the common law—but that all such imprisonment shall be illegal: that the person who shall dare to commit another, contrary to this law, shall be disabled from bearing any office, shall incur the penalty of a *præmunire*, and be incapable of receiving the king's pardon:] and that the party injured shall also have his private action against the person committing, and all his aiders, advisers and abettors, whereby he shall recover his costs and also damages to the extent of at least five hundred pounds (*u*).

[The law, as above explained, is so benignly and liberally construed for the benefit of the subject, that, though *within* the realm the king may command the attendance and service of all his liegemen, yet he cannot send any man *out* of the realm, even upon the public service; excepting sailors and soldiers, the nature of whose employment necessarily implies an exception.] Thus (says Coke) the sovereign cannot even constitute a man lord lieutenant of Ireland against his will, nor make him a foreign ambassador. For this might in reality, be no more than honourable exile (*x*).

What has been hitherto said on the subject of personal liberty, refers, it will be observed, chiefly to its illegal restraint by the authority of government. When imprisonment is illegally inflicted by a private subject, relief may, in the same manner, be had by *habeas corpus*: and re-

(*t*) C. 29.

(*u*) As to the writ of *habeas cor-*

pus, see further, bk. v. c. XII.

(*x*) See 2 Inst. 46.

dress may also be obtained by action, or the offender may be punished upon indictment. But the consideration of these methods, and the further discussion of the mode of proceeding upon *habeas corpus*, more properly belong to our divisions of civil injuries and of crimes. They are glanced at, in this place, only in illustration of the importance attached by the law to the right now under consideration.

In connection with the rights of personal liberty and security, is the right of the subject to carry such arms as are proper for his defence. [This is declared by the statute 1 W. & M. st. 2, c. 2; and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanction of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.] There is an antient enactment, however, against going armed under such circumstances as may tend to terrify the people, or indicate an intention of disturbing the public peace (*y*). And, by a modern statute, the training of persons, without lawful authority, to the use of arms is prohibited; while any justice of the peace is authorized to disperse such assemblies of persons as he may find engaged in that occupation, and to arrest any of the persons present (*z*).

(*y*) 2 Edw. 3, c. 3; see Hawk. Pleas of the Crown, bk. 1, c. 63, ss. 9, 10.

(*z*) 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 1. It may be remarked, that the volunteer rifle and artillery corps, being trained under lawful authority (viz.

under the provisions of the Volunteer Act, 1863, and 1869 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 65, and 32 & 33 Vict. c. 81), are not affected by the enactments mentioned in the text, any more than the militia, yeomanry or regular troops of the line.

BOOK II.

OF RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.



AS TO PROPERTY IN GENERAL.

THE rights of property consist in a man's free use, enjoyment, and disposal, according to the laws of the community, of all his acquisitions in the external things around him. It may be desirable to premise a few observations on the nature and origin of these rights, before we proceed to distribute and consider their several objects.

The rights in question, though we speak of them in the plural, in regard to the different objects over which a man may have ownership, and the different modifications of that ownership, are yet capable of being reduced, and for the purpose of abstract discussion are usually reduced, to one general head—the right of property, or the principle by which one man claims and exercises a sole and despotic dominion over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of all other individuals in the universe. However generally recognized that right may be, there are very few that will give themselves the trouble to consider its origin and foundation. [Pleased as we are with the possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; or at best we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in our favour, without examining the reason or authority upon which those laws have been built (*a*). We think it enough that our title is derived by the grant of the former proprietor, by descent from our ancestors, or

(*a*) Bl. Com. vol. ii. p. 2.

[by the last will and testament of the dying owner: not caring to reflect that (accurately and strictly speaking) there is no foundation in nature or in natural law, why a set of words upon parchment should convey the dominion of land; why the son should have a right to exclude his fellow-creatures from a determinate spot of ground, because his father had done so before him; or why the occupier of a particular field, or of a jewel, when lying on his death-bed, and no longer able to maintain possession, should be entitled to tell the rest of the world which of them should enjoy it after him. These inquiries, it must be owned, would be useless and even troublesome in common life. It is well if the mass of mankind will obey the laws when made, without scrutinizing too nicely into the reasons of making them. But, when law is to be considered not only as a matter of practice, but also as a rational science, it cannot be improper or useless to examine more deeply the rudiments and grounds of these positive constitutions of society.

In the beginning of the world, as we are informed by holy writ, the all-bountiful Creator gave to man “dominion over all the earth; and over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth” (*b*). Hence the earth, and all things therein, are the general property of all mankind, exclusive of other beings, from the immediate gift of the Creator. And while the earth continued bare of inhabitants, it is reasonable to suppose that all was in common among them, and that every one took from the public stock, to his own use, such things as his immediate necessities required.

These general notions of property were then sufficient to answer all the purposes of human life; and might perhaps still have answered them, had it been possible for mankind to have remained in a state of primeval sim-

(*b*) Genesis, i. 28.

[plicity: as may be collected from the manners of many American nations when first discovered by the Europeans; and from the antient method of living among the first Europeans themselves, if we may credit either the memorials of them preserved in the golden age of the poets, or the uniform accounts given by historians of those times, wherein "*erant omnia communia et indivisa omnibus, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset*" (c). Not that this communion of goods seems ever to have been applicable, even in the earliest ages, to aught but the *substance* of the thing; nor could it be extended to the *use* of it. For, by the law of nature and reason, he who first began to use it, acquired therein a kind of transient property, that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer; or, to speak with greater precision, the *right* of possession continued for the same time only that the *act* of possession lasted (d). Thus the ground was in common, and no part of it was the permanent property of any man in particular; yet whoever was in the occupation of any determined spot of it—for rest, for shade, or the like—acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have been unjust, and contrary to the law of nature, to have driven him by force: but the instant that he quitted the use or occupation of it, another might seize it without injustice. Thus also a vine or other tree might be said to be in common, as all men were equally entitled to its produce; and yet any private individual might gain the sole property of the fruit which he had gathered for his own repast. A doctrine well illustrated by Cicero, who compares the world to a great theatre, which is common to the public, and yet the place which any man has taken is, for the time, his own (e).

But when mankind increased in number, craft, and

(c) Justin, l. 43, c. 1.

(d) Barbeyr. Puff. l. 4, c. 4.

(e) "*Quemadmodum theatrum, cum commune sit, recte tamen dici*

potest, ejus esse cum locum quem quisque occupavit."—De Fin. l. 3, c. 20.

[ambition, it became necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion, and to appropriate to individuals not the immediate *use* only, but the very *substance* of the thing to be used. Otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the world been continually broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were striving who should get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it. As human life also grew more and more refined, abundance of conveniences were devised to render it more easy, commodious and agreeable; as habitations for shelter and safety, and raiment for warmth and decency. But no man would be at the trouble to provide either, so long as he had only an usufructuary property in them, which was to cease the instant that he quitted possession;—if, as soon as he walked out of his tent, or pulled off his garment, the next stranger who came by would have a right to inhabit the one, and to wear the other. In the case of habitations in particular, it was natural to observe, that even the brute creation, to whom every thing else was in common, maintained a kind of permanent property in their dwellings, especially, for the protection of their young; that the birds of the air had nests, and the beasts of the field had caverns, the invasion of which they esteemed a very flagrant injustice, and would sacrifice their lives to preserve them. Hence a property was soon established in every man's house and homestall; which seem to have been originally mere temporary huts or moveable cabins, suited to the design of Providence for more speedily peopling the earth, and suited to the wandering life of their owners, before any extensive property in the soil or ground was established. And there can be no doubt, but that moveables of every kind become sooner appropriated than the permanent substantial soil; partly because they were more susceptible of a long occupancy, which might be continued for months together without any sensible interruption, and at length by usage

[ripen into an established right ; but principally because few of them could be fit for use till improved and meliorated by the bodily labour of the occupant ;] which bodily labour, bestowed upon any subject which before lay in common to all men, is universally allowed to strengthen, very materially, the title that mere occupancy gives to an exclusive property therein.

[The article of food was a more immediate call, and therefore a more early consideration. Such as were not contented with the spontaneous product of the earth, sought for more solid refreshment in the flesh of beasts, which they obtained by hunting. But the frequent disappointments, incident to that method of provision, induced them to gather together such animals as were of a more tame and sequacious nature ; and to establish a permanent property in their flocks and herds, in order to sustain themselves in a less precarious manner, partly by the milk of the dams, and partly by the flesh of the young. The support of these their cattle made the article of *water* also a very important point. And therefore the Book of Genesis (the most venerable monument of antiquity, considered merely with a view to history) will furnish us with frequent instances of violent contentions concerning wells ; the exclusive property of which appears to have been established in the first digger or occupant, even in such places where the ground and herbage remained yet in common. Thus we find Abraham, who was but a sojourner, asserting his right to a well in the country of Abimelech, and exacting an oath for his security, “because he had digged that well” (*f*). And Isaac, about ninety years afterwards, reclaimed this his father’s property ; and, after much contention with the Philistines, was suffered to enjoy it in peace (*g*).

All this time the soil and pasture of the earth remained still in common as before, and open to every occupant ;

(*f*) Genesis, xxi. 30.

(*g*) Genesis, xxvi. 15, 18, &c.

[except perhaps in the neighbourhood of towns, where the necessity of a sole and exclusive property in lands (for the sake of agriculture) was earlier felt, and therefore more readily complied with. Otherwise, when the multitude of men and cattle had consumed every convenience on one spot of ground, it was deemed a natural right to seize upon and occupy such other lands as would more easily supply their necessities. This practice is still retained among the wild and uncultivated nations that have never been formed into civil states, like the Tartars and others in the east; where the climate itself, and the boundless extent of their territory, conspire to retain them still in the same savage state of vagrant liberty, which was universal in the earliest ages; and which, Tacitus informs us, continued among the Germans till the decline of the Roman Empire (*h*). We have also a striking example of the same kind in the history of Abraham and his nephew Lot (*i*). When their joint substance became so great that pasture and other conveniences grew scarce, the natural consequence was, that a strife arose between their servants; so that it was no longer practicable to dwell together. This contention Abraham thus endeavoured to compose: "Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between thee and me. Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I pray thee, from me. If thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left." This plainly implies an acknowledged right in either, to occupy whatever ground he pleased, that was not pre-occupied by other tribes. "And Lot lifted up his eyes, and beheld all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere, even as the garden of the Lord. Then Lot chose him all the plain of Jordan, and journeyed east; and Abraham dwelt in the land of Canaan."

(*h*) "*Colunt discreti et diversi; cuit.*"—De Mor. Ger. 16.
ut fons, ut campus, ut nemus, pla- (*i*) Genesis, c. xiii.

[Upon the same principle was founded the right of migration, or sending colonies to find out new habitations, when the mother country was overcharged with inhabitants, which was practised as well by the Phœnicians and Greeks, as the Germans, Scythians, and other northern people. And, so long as it was confined to the stocking and cultivation of desert uninhabited countries, it kept strictly within the limits of the law of nature. But how far the seizing on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders in language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such conduct was consonant to nature, to reason, or to Christianity, deserved well to be considered by those who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing mankind.

As the world by degrees grew more populous, it daily became more difficult to find out new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former occupants; and by constantly occupying the same individual spot, the fruits of the earth were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any provision for a future supply or succession. It therefore became necessary to pursue some regular method of providing a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced, or at least promoted and encouraged, the art of agriculture. And the art of agriculture, by a regular connection and consequence, introduced and established the idea of a more permanent property in the soil, than had hitherto been received and adopted. It was clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities without the assistance of tillage; but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labour? Had not, therefore, a separate property in lands as well as moveables been vested in some individuals, the world must have continued a forest, and men have been mere animals of prey; which,

[according to some philosophers, is the genuine state of nature. Whereas now (so graciously has Providence interwoven our duty and our happiness together) the result of this very necessity has been the ennobling of the human species, by giving it opportunities of improving its *rational* faculties, as well as of exerting its *natural*. Necessity begat property; and in order to ensure that property, recourse was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable concomitants; states, governments, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of religious duties. Thus connected together it was found that a part only of society was sufficient to provide, by their manual labour, for the necessary subsistence of all; and leisure was given to others to cultivate the human mind, to invent useful arts, and to lay the foundations of science.]

Upon the question therefore how property came to be established, or what it is that gave man an exclusive right to retain in a permanent manner that specific land, or moveable, which before belonged generally to everybody, but particularly to nobody,—it seems on the whole that property had its original foundation in *occupancy*, but that it was confirmed and strengthened by such labour as was bestowed upon the subject-matter,—as where land once discovered and taken possession of was improved by agriculture, or where vegetable or mineral productions once found were rendered more valuable by manufacturing processes. [There is, indeed, some difference among the writers on natural law, concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind, that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is from a principle

[of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title. A dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground, or such moveables, as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else (*j*).

Property, both in lands and moveables, being thus originally acquired by the first taker—which taking amounts to a declaration that he intends to appropriate the thing to his own use—it remains in him by the principles of universal law, till such times as he does some other act which shows an intention to abandon it; for then it becomes, naturally speaking, *publici juris* once more, and is liable to be again appropriated by the next occupant. So if one is possessed of a jewel, and casts it into the sea or a public highway, this is such an express dereliction, that a property will be vested in the first fortunate finder that will seize it to his own use. But if he hides it privately in the earth or other secret place, and it is discovered, the finder acquires no property therein; for the owner hath not by this act declared any intention to abandon it, but rather the contrary; and if he loses or drops it by accident, it cannot be collected from thence that he designed to quit the possession; and therefore in such a case the property still remains in the loser, who may claim it again of the finder.

In this manner, then, both lands and moveables became everywhere permanently appropriated. However, there are some few things which, notwithstanding the general introduction and continuance of property, must still un-

(*j*) In Mr. Maine's Treatise on Antient Law (p. 254), the theory, that the origin of property is the assent of mankind to the occupation

by individuals, is contrasted with the doctrine of Savigny, that property was acquired by adverse possession gradually ripened by prescription.

[avoidably remain in common, being such wherein nothing but an usufructuary property is capable of being had; and therefore they still belong to the first occupant, during the time he holds possession of them, and no longer. Such among others are the elements of light, air, and water, which a man may occupy by means of his windows, his gardens, his mills, and other conveniences; and such also are the generality of those animals which are said to be *feræ naturæ*, or of a wild and untameable disposition, which any man may seize upon and keep for his own use or pleasure. All these things, so long as they remain in possession, every man has a right to enjoy without disturbance; but if once they escape from his custody, though without his voluntary abandonment, it naturally follows that they return to the common stock, and any man else has an equal right to seize and enjoy them afterwards.

The doctrine of ownership once established, soon drew after it that of transfer. It was found, that what became inconvenient or useless to one man, was highly convenient and useful to another; who was ready to give in exchange for it some equivalent that was equally desirable to the former proprietor. Thus mutual convenience introduced commercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale, grant or conveyance; which may be considered either as a continuance of the original possession which the first occupant had; or as an abandoning of the thing by the present owner, and an immediate successive occupancy of the same by the new proprietor. The voluntary dereliction of the owner, and delivering the possession to another individual, amount to a transfer of the property; the proprietor declaring his intention no longer to occupy the thing himself, but that his own right of occupancy shall be vested in the new acquirer. Or, taken in the other light, if I agree to part with an acre of my land to Titius, the deed of conveyance is an evidence of my intending to abandon the property: and

[Titius, being the only or first man acquainted with such my intention, immediately steps in and seizes the vacant possession: thus the consent expressed by the conveyance, gives Titius a good right against me; and possession, or occupancy, confirms that right against all the world besides.

If all property ceased upon death, it would follow by the principles before established, that the next immediate occupant would acquire a right in all that the deceased possessed. But as, under civilized governments, which are calculated for the peace of mankind, such a constitution would be productive of endless disturbances, the universal law of almost every nation (which is a kind of secondary law of nature) has either given the dying person a power of continuing his property, by disposing of his possessions by will; or, in case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any disposition at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and declares who shall be the successor, representative, or heir of the deceased; that is, who alone shall have a right to enter upon this vacant possession, in order to avoid that confusion which its becoming again common would occasion (*i*). And further, in case no testament be permitted by the law, or none be made, and no heir can be found so qualified as the law requires, still, to prevent the robust title of occupancy from again taking place, the doctrine of *escheats* is adopted in almost every country; whereby the sovereign of the state, and those who claim under his authority, are the ultimate heirs, and succeed to those inheritances to which no other title can be formed (*k*).]

As to the right, however, of the children or nearest

(*i*) Thus, to prevent any vacancy of possession, the civil law considers father and son as one person; so that, upon the death of either, the inheritance does not so properly descend, as continue in the hands

of the survivor. (See Ff. 28, 2, 11.)

(*k*) The law of escheats as affected by a recent statute, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, is treated of hereafter (vide post, c. XII.)

relations of the deceased to inherit, (which was allowed much earlier than that of devising by testament,) its origin is, perhaps, to be traced to a higher source than the mere institutions of civil society. There is a general and intuitive feeling that it has nature on its side; and there seems in truth good reason to refer it to the same natural title of occupancy, on which the right of property itself is founded. No doubt its merits, as a civil institution, are such as might be sufficient in themselves to have recommended it for the adoption of a wise legislature; [for the transmission of one's possessions to posterity has an evident tendency to make a man a good citizen and a useful member of society; it sets the passions on the side of duty, and prompts a man to deserve well of the public, when he is sure that the reward of his services will not die with himself, but be transmitted to those with whom he is connected by the dearest and most tender affections. Yet, reasonable as this foundation of the right of inheritance may seem, it is probable that its immediate original arose not from speculations altogether so delicate and refined. A man's children or nearest relations are usually about him on his death-bed, and are the earliest witnesses of his decease. They become therefore generally the next immediate occupants, till at length in process of time this frequent usage ripened into general law. And therefore, also, in the earliest ages, on failure of children, a man's servants born under his roof were allowed to be his heirs, being immediately on the spot when he died. For we find the old patriarch Abraham expressly declaring, that since God had given him no seed, his steward Eliezer, one born in his house, was his heir (*m*).

While property continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown: and when it became inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible, and the children or heirs at law were incapable of exclusion by will: till at

(*m*) Gen. xv. 3.

[length it was found that so strict a rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient and headstrong, defrauded creditors of their just debts, and prevented many provident fathers from dividing or charging their estates as the exigencies of their families required. This introduced pretty generally the right of disposing of one's property, or a part of it, by *testament*; that is, by written or oral instructions properly witnessed and authenticated, according to the pleasure of the deceased, which we therefore emphatically style his *will*. This was established in some countries much later than in others.] With us in England, as the law stood in the reign of Henry the second, a man could only dispose of one-third of his *moveables* to the exclusion of his wife and children, a restriction, however, long since fallen out of use; and though *lands* were fully devisable before the Conquest, yet except by the special custom of particular places they could not be devised *after* the Conquest for any greater estate than a term of years, until the reign of Henry the eighth; and then only of a certain portion: [and it was not till after the Restoration, that the power of devising real property became so universal as at present (n).]

Wills and testaments are obviously in their nature of date posterior to the formation of civil society, and must be considered as the mere creatures of the municipal law; by which also it is clear that the particular modifications of the law of inheritance and succession are alone regulated. [Accordingly we find that every distinct country has different ceremonies and requisites to make a testament completely valid: neither does anything vary more than the right of inheritance under different national establishments. In England, particularly, this diversity is carried to such a length, as if it had been meant to point out the power of the laws in regulating the succession to property, and how

(n) This was in consequence of the conversion of tenure in chivalry into tenure in socage, by the st. 12

Car. 2, c. 24; vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. II. and c. XX.

[futile every claim must be that has not its foundation in the positive rules of the state. In general only the eldest son, in some places only the youngest, in others all the sons together, have a right to succeed to the inheritance: in real estates males are preferred to females, and the eldest male will usually exclude the rest; in the division of personal estates, the females of equal degree are admitted together with the males, and no right of primogeniture is allowed.]

Such is the origin that we are disposed to assign to property itself, and to the power of transferring or transmitting property, considered in the abstract. However, it is clear that all proprietary rights, as we now find them established in any country, rest on the municipal law as their *immediate* basis—being indeed some of those civil advantages, in exchange for which every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty; and, like those relative to life and limb, they have always been guarded by the laws of England with peculiar vigilance, and have been frequently recognized in distinct and emphatic terms by the legislature. [Thus the Great Charter has declared, that no freeman shall be disseised or divested of his freehold, or of his liberties, or free customs, save by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land (*o*). And by a variety of antient statutes it is enacted, that no man's lands or goods shall be seized into the king's hands against the Great Charter and the law of the land; and that no man shall be disinherited, nor put out of his franchise or freehold, unless he be duly brought to answer and be forejudged by course of law; and if anything be done to the contrary, it shall be redressed and holden for none (*p*).]

Even for the general good of the whole community, no unnecessary violation of the rights of property is, in any instance, allowed by our law. If a new road, for example,

(*o*) C. 29.

(*p*) See 5 Edw. 3, c. 9; 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 4; 28 Edw. 3, c. 3.

is to be made through the grounds of a private person, in a case where it would be extensively beneficial to the public, the legislature never permits itself to do this without consent of the owner of the land, or at least without securing to him a complete indemnification. In vain may it be urged that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community. The true principle applicable to all such cases is one to which we have had occasion already to refer, and which is constantly borne in view by the English law, viz. that the private interest of the individual is never to be sacrificed to a greater extent than is necessary to secure a public object of adequate importance (*q*). [The public, therefore, is considered in all such transactions as an individual treating with an individual, for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possession for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power which it indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform (*r*).]

Nor is this the only instance in which the law of the land has postponed the public interest to the sacred and inviolable rights of private property. [Thus no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent or that of his representatives in parliament. For by the statute 25 Edw. I. (cc. 5 & 6,) it is provided, that the king shall not take any aids or tasks but by the common assent of the realm. And what that common assent is, is more fully explained by 34 Edw. I. st. 4, c. 1, which enacts, that no talliage or aid shall be taken without the assent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and

(*q*) Vide sup. p. 143.

(*r*) See 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18 (called "The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845"), for consolidating into one Act the provisions usual in Acts

authorizing the taking of lands for undertakings of a public nature. The above statute is amended by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 106.

[other freemen of the land (*s*); and again by 14 Edw. III. st. 2, c. 1, the prelates, earls, barons, and commons, citizens, burgesses, and merchants, shall not be charged to make any aid, if it be not by the common assent of the great men and commons in parliament. And as this fundamental law had been shamefully evaded under many succeeding princes, by compulsory loans, and benevolences extorted without a real and voluntary consent, it was made an article in the Petition of Right, 3 Car. I., that no man shall be compelled to yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by act of parliament. And, lastly, by the statute 1 Will. & Mary, st. 2, c. 2, it is declared, that levying money for or to the use of the Crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, or for longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be so granted, is illegal.]

(*s*) See however the introduction to the Great Charter (edit. Oxon.), sub anno 1297; wherein it is shown that this statute, (called *De tallagio non concedendo*,) supposed to have been made in 34 Edw. 1, is in reality

nothing more than a sort of translation into Latin of the *Confirmatio cartarum*, 25 Edw. 1, which was originally published in the Norman language.

PART I.

OF THINGS REAL.

THE subjects of dominion or property, in the law of England, are *things*, as contradistinguished from *persons*; and things are distributed into two kinds, things *real*, and things *personal*. Things real, (otherwise called *realty*,) consist of things substantial and immoveable, and of the rights and profits annexed to or issuing out of these.

Things personal, (otherwise called *personalty*,) consist of goods, money, and all other moveables, and of such rights and profits as relate to moveables (*a*).

The First Part of the present Book will consequently relate to things Real, and the Second to things Personal.

(*a*) Blackstone says, "*things real* "are such as are permanent, fixed "and immoveable, which cannot be "carried out of their place, as lands "or tenements—*things personal* are "goods, money, and all other moveables which may attend the owner's "person wherever he thinks proper "to go." (2 Bl. Com. p. 16.) It has been thought expedient to deviate from these definitions, which, among other objections to them, appear to be too limited, as referring to things of a substantial or solid kind only, without embracing incorporeal rights. His definition of things personal, however, does not appear to

be fairly open to the objection that has been sometimes made to it, of not being extensive enough to comprise *chattels real*. For it is more correct and convenient to keep the idea of the subjects in which property may be acquired, separate from the idea of the estate or interest that may be acquired in these subjects. A chattel real is, properly speaking, not a thing personal, but rather a particular kind of estate in a thing real. It is, however, for many purposes, properly designated as *personal estate*. This is a matter that we shall have occasion to notice more fully hereafter.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE DIVISIONS OF THINGS REAL.

THINGS real are usually said to consist in lands, tenements, or hereditaments. [Land, says Sir Edward Coke, comprehendeth in its legal signification any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever; as arable, meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, marshes, furzes and heath (*a*). It legally includeth also all castles, houses, and other buildings: for they consist, saith he, of two things; *land*, which is the foundation, and *structure* thereupon; so that if I convey the land or ground, the structure or building passeth therewith. It is observable that *water* is here mentioned as a species of land, which may seem as a kind of solecism; but such is the language of the law: and therefore I cannot bring an action to recover possession of a pool or other piece of water by the name of *water* only; either by calculating its capacity, as for so many cubical yards; or by superficial measure, as for twenty acres of water; or by general description, as for a pond, a water-course, or a rivulet: but I must bring my action for the land that lies at the bottom, and must call it twenty acres of *land covered with water* (*b*).] And so if I grant a certain *water*, though the right of fishing passes, yet the soil does not (*c*). [For water is a moveable wandering thing, and must of necessity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only have a temporary, transient, usufructuary property therein:

(*a*) Co. Litt. 4 a; and see Ewer v. Hayden, Cro. Eliz. 476; Cooke v. Yates, 4 Bing. 90.

(*b*) Challoner v. Thomas, Brownl. 142.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 4 b.

[wherefore, if a body of water runs out of my pond into another man's, I have no right to reclaim it(*d*). But the land which that water covers, is permanent, fixed and immoveable: and therefore in this I may have a certain substantial property, of which the law will take notice, and not of the other. Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards. *Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad cælum*, is the maxim of the law, upwards; therefore no man may erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's land: and downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land and the centre of the earth, belongs in general to the owner of the surface. So that the word "land" includes not only the face of the earth, but every thing under it or over it(*e*). And therefore if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal and other fossils, his woods, his waters, and his houses, as well as his fields and meadows. Not but the particular names of the things are equally sufficient to pass them(*f*); but the capital distinction is this, that by the name of a messuage, toft, croft, or the like, nothing else will pass, except what falls with the utmost propriety under the term made use of; but by the name of land, which is *nomen generalissimum*, every thing terrestrial will pass(*g*).

The word *tenement* is of still greater extent, and though

(*d*) See *Race v. Ward*, 4 Ell. & Bl. 702.

(*e*) *Shep. Touch.* 90; *Raine v. Alderson*, 1 Arnold, 329.

(*f*) Blackstone here adds, "except in the instance of *water*." But it would seem that the case of water cannot properly be considered as an exception, because "*water*" is *not* the particular name, in contemplation of law, of the thing intended to be passed; vide sup. p. 168.

(*g*) *Co. Litt.* 4 a—6 b. This word

land is used in a still larger sense in certain statutes; as in 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, (for regulating the law of inheritance,) where it is provided, that, so far as the enactments of that statute are concerned, "land" shall comprise every interest, real or personal, capable of being inherited, and also money to be laid out in the purchase of land, &c.; see also c. 105, the Act for the regulation of the law of dower.

[in its vulgar acceptance it is only applied to houses and other buildings, yet in its original proper and legal sense, it signifies everything that may be *holden*,] that is, be the subject of *tenure*, of which we shall speak at large in the following chapter. In ordinary legal intendment, it includes not only *land* (which is the primary subject of tenure), but rents, commons and several other rights and interests issuing out of or concerning land (*h*).

[But an *hereditament*, says Sir Edward Coke, is by much the largest and most comprehensive expression (*i*); for it includes not only lands and tenements, but whatsoever may be *inherited*, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal or mixed. Thus an heir-loom, or implement of furniture, which by custom descends to the heir together with the house, is neither land nor tenements, but a mere moveable: yet, being inheritable, is comprised under the general word hereditament: and so a condition, the benefit of which may descend to a man from his ancestor, is also a hereditament (*k*).]

It is under the larger term of hereditaments, though it be not strictly confined to things real, that the subjects of real property have been usually arranged; and to this method it will therefore be most convenient to adhere. [Hereditaments, then, are of two kinds, *corporeal* and *incorporeal*. Corporeal consist of such as affect the senses, such as may be seen and handled by the body; incorporeal are not the object of sensation, can neither be seen nor handled, are creatures of the mind, and exist only in contemplation.] If we apply the word hereditaments to the realty only (which is its most ordinary use), “corporeal” hereditaments are in fact the same with *land*, of which enough has been said; “incorpo-

(*h*) Co. Litt. 6 a, 20 a, 78 a; and see *R. v. Dersingham*, 7 T. R. 671; Vin. Ab. Grants (T).

(*i*) Co. Litt. 6 a. As to the term *hereditaments*, see also *Moore v.*

Denn, 2 Bos. & Pul. 251; *Pocock v. Bishop of London*, 3 Brod. & Bing. 33.

(*k*) *Winchester's case*, 3 Rep. 2 b.

real" are the rights and profits annexed to or issuing out of land. It is to corporeal hereditaments, that our attention must be first directed; and whatever is said generally, hereafter, as to the law of real property, is to be understood as referring to its corporeal subjects only, until those of the incorporeal kind present themselves, in their turn, for separate consideration, in a distinct chapter (1).

(1) As to incorporeal hereditaments, vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XXIII.

CHAPTER II.

OF TENURES.

IN proceeding to treat of corporeal hereditaments, we shall consider, in the first place, the tenures by which they may be holden; secondly, the estates which may be had in them (*a*); and, lastly, the title to them, or the manner in which those estates may be acquired and lost (*b*). And, first, as to tenures.

These it will be impossible to understand with any degree of accuracy, unless we have some previous acquaintance with the nature of feuds, or the feudal law (*c*); a system established during the middle ages throughout the greater part of the European continent, and from thence derived to England, where its spirit still lives in several of her institutions. This chapter will therefore be dedicated, in the first instance, to an inquiry into the feudal system; after which we shall revert to our own municipal law, and particularly that branch of it which relates to the *Tenure* of real property, a doctrine that we shall find to be altogether founded upon feudal principles.

Feuds were introduced under the new dynasties founded by the barbarous tribes, who, during the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries, poured themselves from Germany and the neighbouring countries into the Roman empire (*d*). In

(*a*) Vide post, bk. II. pt. I. cc. III.
—IX.

(*b*) Vide post, bk. II. pt. I. cc. X.
—XXII.

(*c*) "I do marvel many times," says Spelman, "that my Lord Coke, "adorning our law with so many

"flowers of antiquity and foreign
"learning, hath not turned into this
"field, from whence so many roots
"of our law have, of old, been taken
"and transplanted."—Spel. Orig.
of Terms, c. VIII.

(*d*) See Spelman on Feuds, and

every province which they subjugated, large tracts of territory were divided by lot among the conquerors, some portion falling to the king or general of the invading tribe, and the rest to his soldiers, who received their shares as free and independent property, subject only to the condition of bearing arms, as occasion might require, in the defence of the community from hostile aggression. Of the lands assigned to the sovereign of the tribe, certain portions were afterwards usually distributed by him among his adherents, and chiefly among his courtiers or companions (*comites*); but the interest they derived under these grants was not strictly in the nature of property; it was of a beneficial or usufructuary kind only, a mere stipendiary return for services (commonly services of a military description) which they were expected to render to their master, and subject at some future period to resumption; the *proprietas*, or actual ownership of the land, being considered as still residing in the sovereign himself.

This species of interest, which we find at first described as a *benefice* (*e*), was called, about the close of the tenth century (and, as there is reason to suppose, much earlier) a *feud* (*f*), a term which signified in the German language a stipendiary estate, and stood in contradistinction to *allodium* (*g*), the phrase applied to that independent

Wright on Tenures; Co. Litt. by Harg. 64, a, n. (1), 191, a, n. by Butler.

(*e*) The portions of land thus distributed were at first revocable at the will of the lord, and were then, it is said, called *munera*. They were afterwards held for some limited time (usually one year), and called *beneficia*. In process of time they began to be granted in perpetuity, and were then called *feuda* according to Spelman, who cites Cujacius, Feud. lib. 3, p. 180. (See

Spelman on Feuds, 4, 6, 9; Cowell's Interpreter, *in verb.*)

(*f*) *Feudum* is said to be compounded of *od*, possession or estate, and *feo*, wages, pay.—Robertson's Hist. Ch. V. vol. i. n. (8), citing Wachteri, Gloss. Germ. voc. *Feodum*.

(*g*) *Allodium* is stated by Robertson (*ibid.*) to be compounded of the German particle *an* and *lot*, and to signify land obtained by lot; and he cites the same glossary, voc. *Al-lodium*. Another derivation, how-

species of property, before described, which had originally become vested by allotment in the conquerors of the country. There began thus to arise two distinct modes of holding or possessing land. The stipendiary held *of* (that is, in relation to and dependence upon) a superior; the allodialist held of no one, but enjoyed his land as free and independent property; the first of these methods applying exclusively to royal domains granted out in the manner we have described, the other to such land as had been allotted to the troops on the original conquest, or to land never appropriated by the barbarians, but left in the possession of the antient owners; for the holding of this was of the same independent character, and received the same appellation of *allodium*.

The interest of the stipendiary or beneficiary tenant did not originally extend beyond his own life, if it was not even determinable at the royal pleasure; but in course of time it gradually improved in stability, and acquired an *hereditary* character, which led by a natural progress to the practice of *subinfeudation*; for the stipendiary, (or feudatory, as he should now rather be termed,) considering himself as substantially the owner, began to imitate the example of his sovereign, by carving out portions of the benefice or feud, to be held of himself by some other person, on terms and conditions similar to those of the original grant; and a continued chain of successive dependencies was thus established, connecting each stipendiary, or *vassal* as he was termed (*h*), with his immediate superior or *lord*.

The beneficiary or feudal relation was well suited to those times of violence and insecurity, and was found by experience to be attended with great advantage both to

ever, and one perhaps more probable, is given by Blackstone, who considers it as compounded of *all* (*totum*), and *odh* (*proprietas*) in

the Northern languages.—2 Bl. Com. p. 45, n.

(*h*) From *gwas*, a Celtic word for a servant.—Hallam's Middle Ages, p. 155, 7th ed.

the lord and the vassal: to the former, as it secured to him a band of military retainers, attached by duty and by sentiment to his person; and to the latter, as it brought them into close connection with a powerful superior, under whom they found that shelter from oppression, which the law was then too weak to afford. The effect of this, as regarded the allodial species of property, was remarkable: the allodialist, though enjoying a nominal independence, found himself exposed to all the evils and dangers attendant on a state of civil confusion, and began to contemplate with envy the comparative security of the feudal vassal: he was therefore gradually induced to place himself under the same relation by changing the nature of his property from allodial to feudal; in order to effect which he gave up or surrendered his land to some powerful lord, and received it back again from him in the shape of a beneficum or feud, to be held upon some kind of service: or, instead of resorting to this formal transaction, he would in other cases merely *acknowledge* himself to hold as a vassal to some chosen lord, under specified services, as if by the effect of a former grant, which had, in truth, never taken place. In one or other of these methods, allodial lands were gradually changed into feudal, in every part of the continent where the feudal system had been introduced; and this conversion became, in some countries, almost universal; though, in others, there were many estates which always continued to be held allodially (*i*).

Such, according to the best informed and most discriminating writers on the subject, is the true history of the origin and establishment of the feudal system (*k*); by which we may perceive that it was not, according to the theory adopted by Blackstone, an invention of government applied systematically by the barbarous tribes to the management of the conquered countries, with a view to

(*i*) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 65 a, n. (1).

(*k*) See particularly Robertson's

Charles V. vol. i. n. (8); and Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 142—323, 7th edit.

security from foreign invasion or domestic insurrection (*l*), but rather a conventional arrangement of property, established by gradual usage among the new dynasties, and brought into general acceptance by its tendency to aggrandize powerful lords, and to protect persons of inferior rank from the inconveniences of civil disorder. It seems, probable, however, that the principle of the *beneficium*, or of that contract by which the temporary use of land was bestowed on the one hand, as the stipend for military service to be performed on the other, had been known to the barbarians in their native countries, and before their invasion of the Roman provinces; and some authority for the supposition seems to be supplied by the passage which Blackstone cites from Florus, relative to the demand which the Cimbri and Teutones are recorded to have made of the Roman people, about a century before the Christian era:—“*Ut martius populus aliquid sibi terræ daret, quasi stipendium; cæterum, ut vellet, manibus atque armis suis uteretur*” (*m*).

[The feud was conferred by words of gratuitous and pure donation, *dedi et concessi*, which would still be the operative words in a modern infeudation or deed of feoffment in the English law. This was perfected by the ceremony of corporal investiture, or open and notorious delivery of possession in the presence of the other vassals; which perpetuated among them the era of the new acquisition, at a time when the art of writing was very little known, and therefore the evidence of property was reposed in the memory of the neighbourhood; who, in case of a disputed title, were afterwards called upon to decide the difference, not only according to external proofs adduced by the parties litigant, but also by the internal testimony of their own private knowledge.

(*l*) 2 Bl. Com. pp. 45, 46.

(*m*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 46. Some writers have supposed that the idea of feudalism was borrowed by the

barbarous tribes from the Roman tenure of Emphyteusis. (See Maine on Antient Law, p. 302.)

[Besides an oath of *fealty*, or profession of faith to the lord, which was the parent of our oath of allegiance, the vassal or tenant, upon investiture, did usually *homage* to his lord; openly and humbly kneeling, being ungirt, uncovered, and holding up his hands both together between those of the lord, who sat before him, and there professing that “he did become his *man*, from that day forth, of life and limb and earthly honour;” and then he received a kiss from his lord (*n*). Which ceremony was denominated *homagium*, or *manhood*, by the feudists, from the stated form of words, *devenio vester homo* (*o*).]

Besides the fealty and homage, the relation of lord and vassal was ordinarily attended with the following feudal incidents (*p*):—1. *Aid*, which was originally a mere benevolence voluntarily granted by the vassal to his lord in time of difficulty and distress (*q*); but in process of time came to be considered as a matter of right. 2. *Relief*, which was a tribute paid to the lord, for taking up the estate which was lapsed or fallen in by the death of the last tenant: for while the feuds were not properly hereditary, but granted by favour of the lord only to the children of the former possessor, [the heir used generally to pay a fine or acknowledgment to the lord, in horses, arms, money or the like, for such renewal of the feud; which was called a relief, because, in the words of the feudal writers, “*incertam et caducam hereditatem relevant*.”] And this relief was afterwards, when the feuds

(*n*) Litt. s. 85.

(*o*) It was an observation of Dr. Arbuthnot that tradition is nowhere preserved so pure and incorrupt as among children, whose games and plays are delivered down invariably from one generation to another. (Warburton's notes on Pope, vi. 134, 8vo.) It will not, perhaps, be thought puerile to remark in confirmation of this observation, that in

one of our antient juvenile pastimes (*the king I am*, or *basilinda* of Julius Pollux, *Onomastic.*, l. 9, c. 7) the ceremonies and language of feudal homage are preserved with great exactness.

(*p*) Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 181, 7th ed.

(*q*) See Bract. lib. ii. tr. 1, c. 16, s. 8.

became absolutely hereditary, continued on the death of the tenant, though the original reason of it had ceased to apply. 3. *Fine on alienation*, being a sum of money paid to the lord by the tenant whenever he had occasion to make over his land to another. This depended on the nature of the feudal connection; [for, the reason of conferring the feud being the personal abilities of the feudatory to serve in war, it was not fit he should, without the lord's consent, be at liberty to transfer this gift, either from himself, or from his posterity who were presumed to inherit his valour, to others who might prove less able. And, as the feudal obligation was looked upon as reciprocal, the feudatory being entitled to the lord's protection in return for his own fealty and service, therefore the lord could no more transfer his seigniorship or protection, without consent of his vassal, than the vassal could his feud without consent of his lord (*r*); it being equally unreasonable that the lord should extend his protection to a person to whom he had exceptions, and that the vassal should owe subjection to a superior not of his own choosing.] 4. *Escheat and forfeiture*, being two different modes by which the relation between the lord and vassal might be dissolved (*s*). The first was where the tenant in possession of a feud not granted for life only, but transmissible by hereditary descent, died without leaving any heir behind him upon whom, according to the terms of the original grant, the feud could any longer descend; in which case it reverted to the lord, that is, the gift, being determined, resulted back to the giver. The second case (that of forfeiture) occurred where the tenant committed some act in violation of his duty towards his lord, such as rendered him unfit to be longer trusted as a vassal; and the effect of this was that his interest in the feud became

(*r*) Wright's Tenures, 30.

(*s*) As to *escheat*, vide post, bk.

II. pt. I. c. XII.: as to *forfeiture*,
ib. c. XIV.

forfeited, and returned to the lord, as for a breach of that condition of fidelity on which the grant was made (*t*).

Feuds, as we have seen, did not originally extend beyond the life of the first vassal; [but in process of time they were universally extended to his *sons*, or perhaps to such one of them as the lord should name; and in this case the form of the donation was strictly observed: for if a feud was given to a man and his *sons*, all his sons succeeded him in equal portions; and, as they died off, their shares reverted to the lord, and did not descend to their children, or even to their surviving brothers, as not being specified in the donation (*u*). But when such a feud was given to a man and his *heirs*, in general terms, then a more extended rule of succession took place; and when the feudatory died, his male descendants *in infinitum* were admitted to the succession. When any such descendant, who thus had succeeded, died, his male descendants were also admitted in the first place; and, in defect of them, such of his male collateral kindred as were of the blood or lineage of the first feudatory, but no others. For this was an unalterable maxim in feudal succession, that “none was capable of inheriting a feud but such as was of the blood of, that is, lineally descended from, the first feudatory” (*x*). And the descent, being thus confined to males, originally extended to all the males alike; all the sons, without any distinction of primogeniture, succeeding to equal portions of the father’s feud.] But this was found, upon many accounts, inconvenient (particularly by dividing the services, and thereby weakening the strength of the feudal union), and, moreover, *honorary* feuds, or titles of nobility, were gradually introduced, which were not of a divisible nature, but could only be inherited by the eldest son (*y*); and, at length, in imitation of these last, *military* feuds (or those we are now describing) began also in most

(*t*) Wright’s Tenures, 44.

(*u*) Ibid. 17.

(*x*) Ibid. 183.

(*y*) Feud. ii. 55.

countries to descend, according to the same rule of primogeniture, to the eldest son, in exclusion of all the rest (z).

[These were the principal and very simple qualities of the genuine or original feuds, which were all of a military nature, and in the hands of military persons; though the feudatories being under frequent incapacities of cultivating and manuring their own lands, soon found it necessary to commit part of them to inferior tenants, obliging them to such returns in service, corn, cattle or money, as might enable the chief feudatories to attend to their military duties without distraction; which returns, or *reditus*, were the original of rents. And by these means the feudal polity was greatly extended, these inferior feudatories (who held what are called in the Scots law “*rere-liefs*”) being under similar obligations of fealty, to do suit of court, to answer the stipulated renders or rent-service, and to promote the welfare of their immediate superiors or lords (a). But this at the same time demolished the antient simplicity of feuds; and an inroad being once made upon their constitution, it subjected them, in course of time, to great varieties and innovations. Feuds began to be bought and sold, and deviations were made from the old fundamental rules of tenure and succession, which were held no longer sacred, when the feuds themselves no longer continued to be purely military. Hence these tenures began now to be divided into *feoda propria et impropria*, proper and improper feuds; under the former of which divisions were comprehended such, and such only, of which we have before spoken; and under that of improper or derivative feuds were comprised all such as do not fall within the other description; such, for instance, as were originally bartered and sold to the feudatory for a price; such as were held upon base or less honourable services, or upon a rent, in lieu of military service; such as were in themselves alienable, without mutual licence;

(z) Wright's Tenures, 32.

(a) Ibid. 20.

[and such as might descend indifferently either to males or females. But where a difference was not expressed in the creation, such new-created feuds did in all respects follow the nature of an original, genuine and proper feud (*b*).

The feudal polity of which we have here presented an outline seems not to have been received in this part of our island, at least not universally, and as a part of the national constitution, till the reign of William the Norman (*c*). Not but that it is reasonable to believe, from abundant traces in our history and laws, that even in the times of the Saxons,—who were a swarm from what Sir William Temple calls the same northern hive,—something similar to this was in use, yet not so extensively, nor attended with all the rigour that was afterwards imported by the Normans: for the Saxons were firmly settled in this island at least as early as the year 600;] and it was not until the eleventh or twelfth century that feuds arrived to their full vigour and maturity, even on the continent of Europe (*d*).

[This introduction, however, of the feudal tenures into England by King William, does not seem to have been effected immediately after the Conquest, nor by the mere arbitrary will and power of the Conqueror; but to have been gradually established by the Norman barons and others, in such forfeited lands as they received from the gift of the Conqueror; and afterwards universally consented to by the great council of the nation, long after his title was established. Indeed, from the prodigious slaughter of the English nobility at the battle of Hastings, and the fruitless insurrections of those who survived, such numerous forfeitures had accrued, that he was able to reward his Norman followers with very large and extensive possessions; and their regard for the feudal law, under

(*b*) Wright's Tenures, 36.

(*c*) Spelm. Gloss. 218; Bract. l. 2, c. 16, s. 7.

(*d*) Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. i.

p. 192, 7th ed. Blackstone considers the feudal system as having reached its maturity about the year 800, and cites Craig, l. 1, t. 4.

[which they had long lived, together with the king's recommendation of this policy to the English, as the best way to put themselves on a military footing, and thereby to prevent any future attempts from the continent, were probably the reasons that prevailed to effect its establishment here by law. And, though the time of this great revolution in our landed property cannot be ascertained with exactness, yet there are some circumstances that may lead us to a probable conjecture concerning it; for we learn from the Saxon Chronicle (*e*), that in the nineteenth year of King William's reign an invasion was apprehended from Denmark; and the military constitution of the Saxons being then laid aside, and no other introduced in its stead, the kingdom was wholly defenceless; which occasioned the king to bring over a large army of Normans and Bretons, who were quartered upon every landholder, and greatly oppressed the people. This apparent weakness, together with the grievances occasioned by a foreign force, might co-operate with the king's remonstrances, and the better incline the nobility to listen to his proposals for putting themselves in a posture of defence; for, as soon as the danger was over, the king held a great council to inquire into the state of the nation (*f*); the immediate consequence of which was the compiling of the great survey called Domesday Book, which was finished in the next year; and in the latter end of that very year the king was attended by all his nobility at Sarum, where all the principal landholders submitted their lands to the yoke of military tenure, became the king's vassals, and did homage and fealty to his person (*g*). This may possibly have been

(*e*) A.D. 1085.

(*f*) "*Rex tenuit magnum concilium, et graves sermones habuit cum suis proceribus de hac terrâ; quo modo incoletetur, et a quibus hominibus.*"—Chron. Sax. ib.

(*g*) "*Omnes prædia tenentes, quotquot essent notæ melioris per*

totam Angliam, ejus homines facti sunt, et omnes se illi subdidere, ejusque facti sunt vasalli, ac ei fidelitatis juramenta præstiterunt, se contra alios quoscunque illi fidos futuros."—Chron. Sax. A.D. 1086.

[the era of formally introducing the feudal tenures by law ; and perhaps the very law, thus made at the council of Sarum, is that which is still extant, and couched in these remarkable words :—“*Statuimus, ut omnes liberi homines fœdere et sacramento affirment, quod intra et extra universum regnum Angliæ Wilhelmo regi domino suo fideles esse volunt ; terras et honores illius omni fidelitate ubique servare cum eo, et contra inimicos et alienigenas defendere*” (h). The terms of this law, as Sir Martin Wright has observed, are plainly feudal (i) ; for, first, it requires the oath of fealty, which made, in the sense of the feudists, every man that took it a tenant or vassal ; and, secondly, the tenants obliged themselves to defend their lord’s territories and titles against all enemies, foreign and domestic. But what clearly evinces the legal establishment of this system, is another law of the same collection, which exacts the performance of the military feudal services as ordained by the general council. “*Omnes comites, et barones, et milites, et servientes, et universi liberi homines totius regni nostri prædicti, habeant et teneant se semper bene in armis et in equis, ut decet et oportet : et sint semper prompti et bene parati ad servitium suum integrum nobis explendum et peragendum, cum opus fuerit ; secundum quod nobis debent de feodis et tenementis suis de jure facere, et sicut illis statuimus per commune concilium totius regni nostri prædicti*” (k).

It is probable that, by thus consenting to the introduction of feudal tenures, our English ancestors meant no more than to put the kingdom in a state of defence by establishing a military system, and to oblige themselves, in respect of their lands, to maintain the king’s title and territories with equal vigour and fealty, *as if* they had received their lands from his bounty upon these express conditions, as pure, proper, beneficiary feudatories.

(h) Wilkins’s Leg. Anglo-Sax.
LL. Guil. Con. c. 52.

(i) Tenures, 66.

(k) Wilkins’s Leg. Anglo-Sax.
LL. Guil. Con. c. 28.

[But whatever their meaning was, the Norman interpreters, skilled in all the niceties of the feudal constitutions, and well understanding the import and extent of the feudal terms, gave a very different construction to this proceeding; and thereupon took a handle to introduce not only the rigorous doctrines which prevailed in the duchy of Normandy, but also such fruits and dependencies, such hardships and services, as were never known to other nations (*l*); as if the English had, in fact as well as theory, owed everything they had, to the bounty of their sovereign lord.

Our ancestors, therefore, who were by no means beneficiaries, but had barely consented to this fiction of tenure from the crown as the basis of a military discipline, with reason looked upon these deductions as grievous impositions and arbitrary conclusions from principles that, as to them, had no foundation in truth (*m*). However, the Conqueror, and his son William Rufus, kept up with a high hand all the rigours of the feudal doctrines; but their successor, Henry the first, found it expedient, when he set up his pretensions to the crown, to promise a restitution of the laws of King Edward the Confessor, or antient Saxon system; and accordingly, in the first year of his reign, granted a charter (*n*), whereby he gave up the greater grievances, but still reserved the fiction of feudal tenure, for the same military purposes which engaged his father to introduce it. But this charter was gradually broken through, and the former grievances were revived and aggravated by himself and succeeding princes; till, in the reign of King John, they became so intolerable, that they occasioned his barons or principal feudatories to rise up in arms against him, which at length produced the famous great charter at Running-mead, which, with some alterations, was confirmed by his son Henry the third (*o*).]

(*l*) Spelm. of Feuds, c. 28.

LL. Hen. 1, c. 1.

(*m*) Wright's Tenures, 81.

(*o*) The charter granted by King

(*n*) Wilkins's Leges Anglo-Sax.

John received confirmation, with

And, though the immunities granted by King John (especially as his charter was finally altered, in its last edition, by Henry the third,) are very greatly short of those granted by Henry the first, they were justly esteemed at the time a vast acquisition of English liberty. And though, by reason of the alteration of tenures, which principally took place, as we shall presently see, in the reign of Charles the second, many of these immunities may now appear, to a common observer, of much less consequence than they really were when granted; this, properly considered, will show, not that the acquisitions under John were small, but that those under Charles were greater. [And from hence also arises another inference; that the liberties of Englishmen are not mere infringements of the king's prerogative, extorted from our princes by taking advantage of their weakness, but a restoration of that antient constitution of which our ancestors had been defrauded by the art and finesse of the Norman lawyers, rather than deprived of by the force of the Norman arms.]

This general introduction of strict feudal principles gave rise to that fundamental maxim which still prevails, that all land belonging to any subject in this realm is *holden* of some superior, and either mediately or immediately of the sovereign (*p*); for in the law of England, according to Sir E. Coke, we have not *allodium*, the name by which the feudists abroad distinguished such estates of the subject as were not holden of any superior (*q*). And as all lands in England were holden, they were consequently called *tenements*, the possessors thereof *tenants*, and the manner of their possession a *tenure* (*r*). Where

some not inconsiderable variations, in the first, second, and ninth years of Henry's reign. The last of these (the Magna Charta, consisting of thirty-seven chapters, printed at the commencement of our present Statute Book,) has never received any alterations. But Sir E. Coke reckons thirty-two instances wherein

it has been solemnly ratified. (Hallam's Mid. Ages, vol. ii. p. 452, 7th ed.)

(*p*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 93 a, 1 u, 1 b, 65 a.

(*q*) Ib. 64 a, n. (1); et vide sup. p. 173.

(*r*) Co. Litt. 1 b; 2 Bl. C. 59.

the tenure was of the sovereign immediately, it was said to be *in capite*, or in chief. This, however, was of two kinds, either *ut de honore* (where the land was held of the king as proprietor of some honour, castle, or manor), or *ut de coronâ* (where it was held of him in right of the crown itself); and it is to the latter kind that the term of tenure *in capite* was more especially applied (*s*). But the holding might also be mediate, that is, in the way of subinfeudation (*t*). [For such tenants as held under the king immediately, when they granted out portions of their lands to inferior persons, became also lords with respect to those inferior persons, as they were still tenants with respect to the king: and, thus partaking of a middle nature, were called *mesne*, or middle lords. So that if the king granted a manor to A., and he granted a portion of the land to B., now B. was said to hold of A., and A. of the king; or in other words, B. held his lands immediately of A., but mediately of the king. The king therefore was styled lord *paramount*; A. was both tenant and lord, or was a *mesne* lord; and B. was called tenant *paravail*, or the lowest tenant (*u*).]

This distinction of mediate or immediate tenancy ran through all the different sorts of tenure, which we shall here proceed severally to consider.

[There seem to have subsisted among our ancestors four principal species of lay tenures, to which all others may be reduced: the grand criteria of which were the natures of the several services or renders that were due to the lords from their tenants. The services, in respect of their quality, were either *free* or *base* services; in respect of their quantity and the time of exacting them,

(*s*) It seems that when tenure *in capite* was mentioned generally, it was understood to apply to a tenure *ut de coronâ* and not *ut de honore*; (Co. Litt. 108 a; 2 Inst. 64; Mag. Char. c. 31; 1 Edw. 3, c. 13, st. 2; 1 Edw. 6, c. 4; F. N. B. 175; Bro.

Alien. 11; Wright's Ten. 163.) See however the remarks which are made on this subject in Co. Litt. by Harg. 108 a, n. (3).

(*t*) Vide sup. p. 174.

(*u*) 2 Inst. 296.

were either *certain* or *uncertain*. *Free* services were such as were not unbecoming the character of a soldier, or a freeman, to perform; as to serve under his lord in the wars, to pay a sum of money, and the like. *Base* services were such as were fit only for peasants, or persons of a servile rank; as to plough the lord's land, to make his hedges, to carry out his dung, or other mean employments. The *certain* services, whether free or base, were such as were stinted in quantity, and could not be exceeded on any pretence; as, to pay a stated annual rent, or to plough such a field for three days. The *uncertain* depended upon unknown contingencies; as to do military service in person, or pay an assessment in lieu of it, when called upon; or to wind a horn whenever the Scots invaded the realm; which are free services: or to do whatever the lord should command; which is base, or villein service.]

The various combinations of these services gave rise to the various kinds of lay tenure. Of these Bracton (who wrote under Henry the third) seems to give the clearest and most compendious account of any author antient or modern; and of this, the following is the outline or abstract. "Tenements are of two kinds, frank-tenement and villenage. And of frank-tenements some are held "freely, in consideration of homage and *knight-service*; "others in *free-socage* with the service of fealty only, or "with fealty and homage, according to some authorities" (x). And again "Of villenages some are pure, "others privileged. *Pure villenage* is where a man holds "upon terms of doing whatsoever is commanded of him, "nor knows in the evening what is to be done in the "morning, and is always bound to an uncertain service. "There is also another kind of villenage holden of the "king, from the time of the Conquest, which is called "*villein-socage*, and which is villenage, but of a privi-

(x) Bract. l. 4, c. 28, § 1.

“leged sort. Such tenants of the king’s demesnes have “the privilege that they cannot be removed from the “land while they do the service due; and these villein-“socmen are properly called *glebæ ascriptitii*. They perform villein services, but such as are certain and determined” (y). This account, illustrated as it is by other authorities, proves that there antiently existed (as before remarked) four principal kinds of lay tenure: and that they were as follows—*servitium militare*, that is knight-service, or in law-French, *chivalry* or *service de chivaler*, answering to the *fief d’haubert* of the Normans (z),—where the service was free, but uncertain: *liberum socagium* (free socage), where it was not only free, but certain: *purum villenagium* (pure villenage), where it was base in its nature, and uncertain; and lastly, *villenagium privilegiatum* (or villein socage), where it was base but certain; which seems principally to have prevailed among those who are above described as “tenants of the king’s demesnes.”

The four kinds of tenure above enumerated, however, in process of time were described as only three, viz. knight-service, free socage, and copyhold; which last comprises both the species of villenage to which Bracton refers. These three subsisted in England till the middle of the seventeenth century, and the two last subsist to this day.

1. [The first, most universal, and esteemed the most honourable species of tenure, was that by *knight-service*, and it differed in very few points, as we shall presently see, from a pure and proper feud, being entirely military, in its character.] To make a tenure by knight-service, it was necessary that the tenement in point of quantity should amount to twelve ploughlands (a); which was called a knight’s fee, *feodum militare* (b); [and the value

(y) Bract. l. 4, c. 28, § 5.

(z) Spelm. Gloss. 219. Tenure by “knight service,” is expressly called “*fief d’haubert*” in the Mirror (c. 2, § 27).

(a) 2 Inst. 596. A ploughland, *carucata terræ*, was as much as one plough could plough in a year; (Co. Litt. 69 a.)

(b) 3 Inst. 596.

[of which is stated in 1 Edw. II. at £20 per annum (*c*). And he who held this proportion of land (or a whole fee) by knight-service, was bound to attend his lord to the wars for forty days in every year, if called upon (*d*); which attendance was his *reditus* or return, his rent or service, for the land he claimed to hold. If he held only half a knight's fee, he was only bound to attend twenty days, and so in proportion (*e*). And there is reason to apprehend, that this service was the whole that our ancestors meant to subject themselves to; the other fruits and consequences of this tenure being fraudulently superinduced, as the regular (though unforeseen) appendages of the feudal system.

This tenure of knight-service had all the marks of a strict and regular feud: it was granted by words of a pure donation, *dedi et concessi* (*f*); was transferred by investiture or delivering corporal possession of the land, usually called "livery of seisin;" and was perfected by homage and fealty (*g*).] It also drew after it the following consequences, some of which, as we have seen, were ordinary feudal incidents, and therefore in general observance, not in England only, but throughout a large portion of the continent (*h*).

1. In tenure by chivalry the land on the death of the

(*c*) 2 Inst. 596; Co. Litt. 69 a.

(*d*) Mr. Selden contends that a knight's fee did not consist of land of a fixed extent or value, but was as much as the king was pleased to grant, upon the condition of having the service of one knight. (Tit. of Hon. p. 2, c. 5, ss. 17 and 26.)

(*e*) Litt. § 95.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 9.

(*g*) As to homage and fealty, vide sup. p. 177; Co. Litt. 64 a, 67 b. Foreign jurists frequently blend homage and fealty together, but in England they were distinct. Co.

Litt. by Harg. 68 a, n. (1).

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 177. The local extent of the feudal law is pointed out in Hallam's Mid. Ages, vol. i. pp. 200—203, (7th edit.,) where its regular machinery and systematic establishment are considered as chiefly applying "to the dominions of Charlemagne and to those countries which afterwards derived it from thence." Denmark, Sweden, Bohemia, and Hungary are particularly mentioned as countries not influenced by the feudal system.

tenant passed by *descent* to his heir, for the practice of granting feuds *jure hæreditario* has been in use amongst us ever since the Norman conquest⁽ⁱ⁾; and in this descent sons succeeded before daughters, an elder son before a younger^(k).

2. If the heir in chivalry was under the age of twenty-one, being a male, or fourteen, being a female, the lord was entitled to the *wardship* of the heir, and was called the guardian in chivalry^(l). This wardship consisted in having the custody of the body and lands of such heir, without any account of the profits, till the age of twenty-one in males, and fourteen in females. For the law supposed the heir-male unable to perform knight-service till twenty-one: but as for the female, Sir E. Coke remarks, that she might at fourteen govern an household, and marry a husband, who might do knight's service. The lord therefore had no wardship, if at the death of the ancestor the heir-male was of the full age of twenty-one, or the heir-female of fourteen; yet, if she was then under fourteen, the lord might not only keep her in ward till she attained that age, but if she remained unmarried, he might keep her land in his custody two years longer by virtue of the statute of Westm. I., 3 Edw. I. c. 22^(m).

[This wardship, so far as it related to land, though it was not, nor could be, part of the law of feuds, so long as they were arbitrary, temporary, or for life only; yet, when they became hereditary, and did consequently often descend upon infants, who by reason of their age could neither perform nor stipulate for the services of the feud, does not seem upon feudal principles to have been unreasonable. For the wardship of the land, or custody of the

(i) Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. i. p. 36.

(k) Hale's Hist. C. L. c. 11.

(l) *Wardship and Marriage* were not ordinary feudal incidents, but nearly peculiar to England and Normandy.—Hallam, Mid. Ages, vol. ii.

pp. 429, 215; vol. i. p. 190, (7th edit.)

(m) Litt. s. 103; 2 Inst. 204; Blackstone states the guardianship of females to have lasted till sixteen. But see Coleridge's Blackstone, vol. ii. p. 67.

[feud, was retained by the lord, that he might out of the profits thereof provide a fit person to supply the infant's services, till he should be of age to perform them himself: and, if we consider the feud in its original import, as a stipend, fee or reward for actual service, it could not be thought hard that the lord should withhold the stipend, so long as the service was suspended: though undoubtedly to our English ancestors, where such a stipendiary donation was a mere supposition or figment, it carried abundance of hardship; and accordingly it was relieved by the charter of Henry the first, before mentioned, which took this custody from the lord, and ordained that the custody, both of the land and the children, should belong to the widow or next of kin. But this noble immunity did not continue many years.

The wardship of the body was a consequence of the wardship of the land; for he who enjoyed the infant's estate was the properest person to educate and maintain him in his infancy: and also in a political view, the lord was most concerned to give his tenant suitable education, in order to qualify him the better to perform those services which in his maturity he was bound to render.

When the male heir arrived to the age of twenty-one, or the heir female to that of sixteen, they might sue out their livery or *ousterlemain*; that is, the delivery of their lands out of their guardian's hands(*n*). For this they were obliged to pay a fine, namely, half a year's profits of the land; though this seems expressly contrary to *Magna Charta* (*o*).] However, in consideration of their lands having been so long in ward, they were excused all the reliefs; and the king's tenants all the primer seisins, also to be hereafter mentioned (*p*). [In order to ascertain the profits that arose to the crown by these first fruits of tenure, and to grant the heir his livery, the itinerant justices, or justices in eyre, had it formerly in charge to

(*n*) Co. Litt. 77 a.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 77 a.

(*o*) 9 Hen. 3, c. 3.

[make inquisition concerning them by a jury of the county, commonly called an *inquisitio post mortem* (*q*); which was instituted to inquire (at the death of any man of fortune) the value of his estate, the tenure by which it was holden, and who, and of what age, his heir was; thereby to ascertain the relief and value of the primer seisin, or the wardship and livery accruing to the king thereupon. A manner of proceeding that came in process of time to be greatly abused, and at length an intolerable grievance; it being one of the principal accusations against Empson and Dudley, the wicked engines of Henry the seventh, that by colour of false inquisitions they compelled many persons to sue out livery from the crown, who by no means were tenants thereunto (*r*). And afterwards a court of wards and liveries was erected, for conducting the same inquiries in a more solemn and legal manner (*s*).

When the heir thus came of full age he was to receive the order of knighthood, and was compellable to take it upon him, or else pay a fine (*t*). For, in these heroical times, no person was qualified for deeds of arms and chivalry who had not received this order, which was conferred with much preparation and solemnity. We may plainly discover the footsteps of a similar custom, in what Tacitus relates of the Germans, who, in order to qualify their young men to bear arms, presented them in a full assembly with a shield and lance; which ceremony is supposed to have been the original of the feudal knighthood (*u*). This

(*q*) Hoveden, sub Rich. 1.

(*r*) 4 Inst. 198.

(*s*) St. 32 Hen. 8, c. 46; 33 Hen. 8, c. 22.

(*t*) Blackstone adds here (vol. 2, p. 69), "provided he held a knight's fee *in capite* under the crown;" but Mr. Christian observes, that Lord Coke does not make that distinction in his Commentary on the Stat. de Milit. (2 Inst. 593), and that the power of the Commissioners, in the

commissions issued by Edward the sixth and Queen Elizabeth, was not limited to the king's tenants. And see 16 Car. 1, c. 20.

(*u*) "*In ipso concilio vel principum aliquis, vel pater, vel propinquus, scuto framedque juvenem ornant. Hæc apud illos toga, hic primus juventutis honos: ante hoc domus pars videntur; mox rei-publicæ.*"—De Mor. Germ. c. 13.

[prerogative of compelling the vassals to be knighted, or to pay a fine—as expressly recognized in parliament by the statute *de Militibus*, 1 Edw. II.—was exerted as an expedient for raising money by many of our best princes, particularly by Edward the sixth and Queen Elizabeth; but yet was the occasion of heavy murmurs when exerted by Charles the first: among whose many misfortunes it was, that neither himself nor his people seemed able to distinguish between the arbitrary stretch and the legal exertion of prerogative. However, among the other concessions made by that unhappy prince, before the fatal recourse to arms, he agreed to divest himself of this flower of the crown, and it was accordingly abolished by statute 16 Car. I. c. 20.]

3. But there still remained a species of authority which the guardian was at liberty to exercise over an infant ward; viz. the right of *marriage*, which signifies the power of disposing of the ward in matrimony (*x*). For he might tender to his infant tenant, when of the age of fourteen, a suitable match without *disparagement*, or inequality; and this the infant, if a male, could not refuse and marry elsewhere, without forfeiting *double* the value which the lord might have obtained for the alliance, *duplicem valorem maritagii*; nor could a female ward refuse, without entitling her guardian to hold her lands by way of penalty, till she attained the age of twenty-one. And even without tender of a match, the lord was entitled in every case, on the ward's coming of age, to the single value which he might have obtained for his or her marriage (*y*). [This seems to have been one of the greatest hardships of our antient tenures. There were indeed substantial reasons why the lord should have the *restraint* and *control* of the ward's marriage, especially of his female ward; because of their tender years, and the danger of such

(*x*) See Co. Litt. 88, n. (11), by Harg.; Hist. of Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. i. p. 116.

(*y*) Lord Darcy's case, 6 Rep. 70 b; Palmer's case, 5 Rep. 126 b; Co. Litt. 82 a.

[female wards intermarrying with the lord's enemy (*z*): but no tolerable pretence could be assigned why the lord should have the *sale* or *value* of the marriage. Nor indeed is this claim of strictly feudal original; the most probable account of it seeming to be this: that by the custom of Normandy the lord's consent was necessary to the marriage of his *female* wards; a custom which was introduced into England, together with the rest of the Norman doctrine of feuds (*a*). And it is likely that the lords usually took money for such their consent, since, in the before-cited charter of Henry the first, the king engages for the future to take nothing for *his* consent; which also he promises in general to give, provided such female ward were not married to his enemy. But this among other beneficial parts of that charter being disregarded, and guardians still continuing to dispose of their wards in a very arbitrary unequal manner, it was provided by King John's great charter, that heirs should be married without disparagement, the next of kin having previous notice of the contract (*b*); or, as it was expressed in the first draught of that charter, "*ita maritentur ne disparagentur, et per consilium propinquorum de consanguinitate suâ*" (*c*). But these provisions in behalf of the relations were omitted in the charter of Henry the third: wherein the clause stands merely thus—" *hæredes maritentur absque disparagatione*" (*d*): meaning certainly, by *hæredes*, heirs female, as there are no traces before this to be found of the lords claiming the marriage of heirs male (*e*); and as Glanvil expressly confines it to heirs female (*f*). But the king and his great lords thenceforward took a handle (from the ambiguity of this expression) to claim them both, *sive sit masculus sive fœmina*,

(*z*) Bract. l. 2, c. 37, s. 6.

(*a*) Gr. Cust. 95.

(*b*) Cap. 6, edit. Oxon.

(*c*) Cap. 3, ib.

(*d*) Cap. 6.

(*e*) The words *maritare* and *maritagium* seem *ex vi termini* to denote the providing of a *husband*.

(*f*) L. 7, c. 9 and 12, and l. 9, c. 4.

[as Bracton more than once expresses it (*g*): and also, as nothing but disparagement was restrained by *Magna Charta*, they thought themselves at liberty to make all other advantages that they could (*h*). And afterwards this right of selling the ward in marriage, or else receiving the price or value of it, was expressly declared by the statute of Merton (*i*); which is the first direct mention of it perhaps to be met with, in our own or any other law.

4. The tenant in chivalry was also liable to *aids*. These in England were principally three: first, to ransom the lord's person, if taken prisoner; a necessary consequence of the feudal attachment and fidelity; insomuch that the neglect of doing it, whenever it was in the vassal's power, was, by the strict rigour of the feudal law, an absolute forfeiture of his estate (*k*). Secondly, to make the lord's eldest son a knight: a matter that was formerly attended with great ceremony, pomp and expense. This aid could not be demanded till the lord's heir was fifteen years old, or capable of bearing arms (*l*); the intention of it being to breed up the eldest son and heir apparent of the seignior to deeds of arms and chivalry, for the better defence of the nation. Thirdly, to marry the lord's eldest daughter, by giving her a suitable portion; for daughters' portions were in those days extremely slender, few lords being able to save much out of their income for this purpose: nor could they acquire money by other means, being wholly conversant in matters of arms; nor, by the nature of their tenure, could they charge their lands with this, or any other incumbrances. From bearing their proportion to these aids, no rank or profession was exempted: and therefore even the monasteries, till the time of their dissolution, contributed to the knighting of their founder's male heir (of whom their lands were holden) and the marriage of his female descendants (*m*). And one cannot

(*g*) L. 2, c. 38, s. 1.

(*h*) Wright's Tenures, 97.

(*i*) 20 Hen. 3, c. 6.

(*k*) Feud. l. 2, t. 24.

(*l*) 2 Inst. 233.

(*m*) Philip's Life of Pole, l. 223.

[but observe, in this particular, the great resemblance which the lord and vassal of the feudal law, bore to the patron and client of the Roman republic(*n*); between whom also there subsisted a mutual fealty, or engagement of defence and protection. For, with regard to the matter of aids, there were three which were usually raised by the client; viz. to marry the patron's daughter; to pay his debts; and to redeem his person from captivity(*o*).

But in addition to these antient feudal aids, the tyranny of lords by degrees exacted more and more; as, aids to pay the lord's debts (probably in imitation of the Romans), and aids to enable him to pay aids or reliefs to his superior lord; though, from these last, the king's tenants *in capite* were, from the nature of their tenure, excused, as they held immediately of the king, who had no superior. To prevent this abuse, King John's *Magna Charta* ordained, that no aids be taken by the king of his tenants *in capite* without consent of parliament, nor in any wise by inferior lords, save only the three antient ones above mentioned(*p*). But this provision was omitted in Henry the third's charter, and the same oppressions were continued till the twenty-fifth year of Edward the first, when the statute called *Confirmatio Chartarum* was enacted; which in this respect revived King John's charter, by ordaining that none but the antient aids should be taken.] These ordinances, however, related to the species of aids only; the quantity of each aid was provided for by other statutes. King John's charter indeed ordered, that all aids taken by inferior lords should be reasonable(*q*); as well as that the aids taken by the king of his tenants *in capite* should be

(*n*) See Maine's Antient Law, p. 313.

(*o*) "*Erat autem hæc inter utrosque officiorum vicissitudo—ut clientes ad collocandas senatorum filias de suo conferrent; in æris alieni dissolutionem gratuitam pe-*

cuniam erogarent; et ab hostibus in bello captos redimerent."—Paul. Manutius de Senatu Romano, c. 1.

(*p*) Cap. 12, 15.

(*q*) Ibid. 15.

settled by parliament(*r*). But aids were never completely adjusted till the statute Westm. I. (3 Edw. I. c. 36), and 25 Edw. III. (stat. 5), c. 11, the former of which fixed the aid of a mesne (or inferior) lord, for making his eldest son a knight, or marrying his eldest daughter, at twenty shillings, that is to say, the supposed twentieth part of the annual value of every knight's fee: and the latter statute did the same with regard to the king's tenants *in capite*. The other aid, for ransom of the lord's person, being not in its nature capable of any certainty, was therefore never ascertained.

[5. The tenant in chivalry was liable besides to *relief*. This was looked upon, very justly, as one of the greatest grievances of tenure; especially when, at the first, it was merely arbitrary and at the will of the lord; so that, if he pleased to demand an exorbitant relief, it was in effect to disinherit the heir(*s*). The English ill brooked this consequence of their new-adopted policy; and therefore William the Conqueror by his laws *ascertained* the relief, by directing, in imitation of the Danish heriots, that a certain quantity of arms and habiliments of war should be paid by the earls, barons, and vavasours respectively; and if the latter had no arms, they should pay 100*s*.(*t*). William Rufus broke through this composition, and again demanded arbitrary uncertain reliefs, as due by the feudal laws; thereby in effect obliging every heir to new purchase or *redeem* his land(*u*): but his brother, Henry the first, by the charter before mentioned, restored his father's law; and ordained that the relief to be paid should be according to the law so established, and not an arbitrary redemption(*x*). But afterwards, when, by an ordinance in the twenty-seventh year of Henry the second, called

(*r*) Cap. 14.

(*s*) Wright's Tenures, 99.

(*t*) Wilkins's Leges Anglo-Sax.

LL. Guil. Con. cc. 22, 23, 24.

(*u*) 2 Roll. Abr. 514.

(*x*) "*Hæres non redimet terram suam sicut faciebat tempore fratris mei, sed legitima et justa relevatione relevabit eam.*" — Text. Roffens. cap. 34.

[the “assize of arms,” it was provided that every man’s armour should descend to his heir, for defence of the realm; and it thereby became impracticable to pay these acknowledgments in arms, according to the laws of the Conqueror; the composition was universally accepted of 100s. for every knight’s fee, as we find it ever after established (*c*). But it must be remembered, that this relief was only then payable, if the heir at the death of his ancestor had attained his full age of one and twenty years (*d*).

6. The tenant in chivalry was also liable to the payment of *primer seisin*, which was, however, a burthen only incident to the king’s tenants *in capite*, and not to those who held of inferior or mesne lords (*e*). It was a right which the king had, when any of his tenants *in capite* died seised of a knight’s fee, to receive of the heir, (provided he were of full age,) one whole year’s profits of the lands, if they were in immediate possession; and half a year’s profits, if the lands were in reversion expectant on an estate for life (*f*). This seems to be little more than an additional relief, but grounded upon this feudal reason; that, by the antient law of feuds, immediately upon the death of a vassal the superior was entitled to enter and take seisin or possession of the land, by way of protection against intruders till the heir appeared to claim it and received investiture, during which interval the lord was entitled to take the profits; and unless the heir claimed within a year and a day, it was by the strict law a forfeiture (*g*). This practice, however, seems, in England, not to have long obtained, if ever, with regard to tenure under inferior lords; but as to tenure *in capite*, the *prima seisin* was expressly declared, under

(*c*) As to what was a “knight’s fee,” vide sup. p. 188.

(*d*) Glanv. l. 9, c. 4; Litt. § 112.

(*e*) *Primer seisin* seems not to have been an ordinary feudal incident, though in France the lord

might enter on the lands and possess them for a year if the heir could not pay the relief.—Hallam, *Med. Ages*, vol. i. p. 183 (7th edit.)

(*f*) Co. Litt. 77 a.

(*g*) Feud. l. 2, t. 24.

[Henry the third and Edward the second, to belong to the king by prerogative, in contradistinction to other lords (*h*). The king was entitled to enter and receive the whole profits of the land, till livery was sued, which suit being commonly made within a year and a day next after the death of the tenant, in pursuance of the strict feudal rule, therefore the king used to take, as an average, the *first fruits*, that is to say, one year's profits of the land (*i*). And this afterwards gave a handle to the Popes—who claimed to be feudal lords of the Church—to claim, in like manner, from every clergyman in England the first year's profits of his benefice, by way of *primitiæ* or first fruits.]

7. The tenant in chivalry, on arriving at the full age of twenty-one, had the power of *aliening* his land; but only so that it should be held of the same lord of whom he had himself held it previously (*j*); and the tenant had no power of aliening it by a testamentary disposition.

8. The tenant in chivalry, exercising the power of alienation above mentioned, was liable, if he held *in capite*, to a *fine on alienation*; but these fines only seem to have been exacted from the king's tenants *in capite*, for these were never able to alien without a licence: and if they did, it became a question whether they did not incur an absolute forfeiture of the land (*k*). [But this severity was mitigated by the statute 1 Edward III. c. 12, which ordained, that in such case the lands should not be forfeited, but a reasonable fine be paid to the king. Upon which statute it was settled, that one-third of the yearly value should be paid for a licence of alienation;

(*h*) Stat. Marl. c. 16; 17 Edw. 2, c. 3.

(*i*) Staundf. Prerog. 12.

(*j*) This was by the statute of *Quia emptores*, (18 Edw. 1, c. 1). This statute applied both to tenants in chivalry and those in socage: (2 Inst. 501.) Even anterior to its

provisions the tenant might aliene, but only by way of sub-infeudation; that is, to hold as of himself; and in general only a part of his lands. See Wright's Tenures, p. 154; Co. Litt. by Harg. 43 a, n. (2); 2 Bl. Com. p. 161.

(*k*) 2 Inst. 66.

[but if such tenant presumed to aliene without a licence, a full year's value should be paid (*l*).]

9. The estate of the tenant in chivalry was liable to the incidents of *escheat and forfeiture*. These were feudal incidents attaching in full force to the tenure in chivalry, and were attended beside with a severity which seems to have been peculiar to England (*m*), namely, that by *attainder* (as it was termed) of treason or felony the tenant not only forfeited his land, but his blood was held to be corrupted or stained; whereby every inheritable quality was entirely blotted out and abolished, so that no land could thereafter be transmitted from him or through him in a course of descent (*n*).

These were the principal qualities, fruits, and consequences of the tenure by knight-service: a tenure by which a great part of the lands in this kingdom was held, till the middle of the seventeenth century; and which was created, as Sir Edward Coke expressly testifies, for a military purpose (*o*): viz. for defence of the realm by the king's own principal subjects; which was judged to be much better than to trust to hirelings or foreigners. The description here given is that of knight-service proper; which was to attend the king in his wars. But there were also some other species of knight-service; so called (though improperly), because the service or render was of a free and honourable nature, and equally uncertain as to the time of rendering as that of knight-service proper, and also because they were attended with similar fruits and consequences. [Such was the tenure by *grand serjeanty, per magnum servitium*, whereby the tenant was bound, instead of serving the king *generally* in his wars, to do some special honorary service to the king in person; as to carry his banner, his sword, or the like (*p*); or to be his butler, champion, or

(*l*) 2 Inst. 67.

(*m*) Hallam, Mid. Ages, vol. i. p. 188, 7th ed.; 2 Bla. Com. 254.

(*n*) The subject of *attainder* is

considered post, bk. VI. cap. XXIII.

(*o*) 4 Inst. 192.

(*p*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 108 a, n. (1).

[other officer, at his coronation (*g*). This tenure was in most other respects like knight-service (*r*); only the tenant was not bound to pay aid (*s*), or escuage (*t*); and, while tenant by knight-service paid five pounds for a relief on every knight's fee, "tenant by grand serjeanty" paid one year's value of his land, were it much or little (*u*). Moreover none could hold by grand serjeanty, save of the king only. As to tenure by *cornage*,—to wind a horn when the Scots or other enemies entered the land, in order to warn the king's subjects,—this, like other services of the same nature, when the tenure was immediately of the king (*v*), was a species of grand serjeanty (*x*).

These services, both of chivalry and grand serjeanty, were all personal and uncertain as to their quantity or duration. But the personal attendance in knight-service growing troublesome and inconvenient in many respects; the tenants found means of compounding for it; first, by sending others in their stead, and in process of time by making a pecuniary satisfaction to the lords in lieu of it. This pecuniary satisfaction at last came to be levied by assessments, at so much for every knight's fee; and therefore this kind of tenure was called *scutagium* in Latin, or *servitium scuti*; *scutum* being then a well known denomination for money: and in like manner it was called, in our Norman French, *escuage*: being indeed a pecuniary, instead of a military service (*y*). The first time this appears to have been taken, was in the fifth year of Henry the second, on account of his expedition to Toulouse; but it soon came to be so universal, that personal attendance fell quite into disuse. Hence we find in our antient histories, that from this period, when our kings

(*g*) Litt. s. 153.

(*r*) Id. s. 158.

(*s*) 2 Inst. 233.

(*t*) Litt. s. 158.

(*u*) Id. s. 154.

(*v*) Co. Litt. 107 a.

(*x*) Litt. s. 156.

(*y*) Littleton, Coke, and Bracton, render it the "service of the shield," *i. e.* of arms, being a compensation for actual service; see Co. Litt. by Harg. 68 b, 73 a, n. (2), 74 a, n. (1).

[went to war, they levied scutages on their tenants, that is, on all the landholders of the kingdom, to defray their expenses, and to hire troops: and these assessments, in the time of Henry the second, seem to have been made arbitrarily and at the king's pleasure. Which prerogative being greatly abused by his successors, it became matter of national clamour; and King John was obliged to consent, by his *Magna Charta*, that no scutage should be imposed without consent of parliament (*z*). But this clause was omitted in his son Henry the third's charter (*a*); where we only find that scutages or escuage should be taken as they were used to be taken in the time of Henry the second: that is, in a reasonable and moderate manner. Yet afterwards, by statute 25 Edward I. (cc. 5 and 6), and many subsequent statutes (*b*), it was again provided, that the king should take no aids or tasks but by the common assent of the realm; hence it was held in our old books, that escuage or scutage could not be levied but by consent of parliament (*c*); such scutages being indeed the groundwork of all succeeding subsidies, and the land-tax of later times.

By the degenerating of knight-service, or personal military duty, into escuage or pecuniary assessments, all the advantages (either promised or real) of the feudal constitution were destroyed, and nothing but the hardships remained: instead of forming a national militia, composed of barons, knights and gentlemen, bound by their interest, their honour and their oaths, to defend their king and country, the whole of this system of tenures now tending to nothing else but a wretched means of raising money to pay an army of occasional mercenaries. In the mean time the families of all our nobility and gentry groaned under the intolerable burdens, which (in consequence of the fiction adopted after the Conquest) were

(*z*) "*Nullum scutagium ponatur in regno nostro, nisi per commune consilium regni nostri.*"—Cap. 12.

(*a*) Cap. 37.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 165.

(*c*) Old Ten. tit. Escuage.

[introduced and laid upon them by the subtlety and finesse of the Norman lawyers. For, besides the scutages to which they were liable in defect of personal attendance—which however were assessed by themselves in parliament—they might be called upon by the king or lord paramount for *aids*, whenever his eldest son was to be knighted, or his eldest daughter married, not to forget the ransom of his own person. The heir, on the death of his ancestor, if of full age, was plundered of the first emoluments arising from his inheritance, by way of *relief* and *primer seisin*; and, if under age, of the whole of his estate during infancy. And then, as Sir Thomas Smith (*d*) very feelingly complains, “when he came to his own, after he was out “of *wardship*, his woods decayed, houses fallen down, “stock wasted and gone, lands let forth and ploughed to “be barren,” to reduce him still further, he was yet to pay half a year’s profits as a fine for suing out *livery*; and also the price or value of his *marriage*; or twice that value if he refused such wife as his lord and guardian tendered him without disparagement, and married elsewhere. Add to this, the untimely and expensive honour of *knighthood*, to make his poverty more completely splendid; and when by these deductions his fortune was so shattered and ruined, that perhaps he was obliged to sell his patrimony, he had not even that poor privilege allowed him, without paying an exorbitant fine for a *licence of alienation*.

A slavery so complicated, and so extensive as this, called aloud for remedy, in a nation that boasted of its freedom. Palliatives were from time to time applied by successive acts of parliament, which assuaged some temporary grievances, till at length the humanity of King James the first consented, in consideration of a proper equivalent, to abolish them all (*e*); though the plan proceeded not to effect,—in like manner as he had formed a

(*d*) Commonw. l. 3, c. 5.

(*e*) 4 Inst. 202.

[scheme, and began to put it in execution, for removing the feudal grievance of heritable jurisdictions in Scotland; which was afterwards pursued and effected by the statute 20 George II. c. 43 (*g*). King James's plan for exchanging our military tenures seems to have been nearly the same as that which was afterwards pursued; only with this difference, that by way of compensation for the loss which the crown and other lords would sustain, an annual fee-farm rent was to have been settled and inseparably annexed to the crown, and assured to the inferior lords, payable out of every knight's fee, within their respective seigniories: an expedient seemingly much better than the hereditary excise, which was afterwards made the principal equivalent for these concessions. For at length the military tenures, with all their heavy appendages, (having during the Usurpation been discontinued,) were destroyed at one blow by the statute 12 Car. II. c. 24; which enacts, that the court of wards and liveries, and all wardships, liveries, primer seisins, and ousterlemains, values and forfeitures of marriage, by reason of any tenure of the king or others, be totally taken away:—that all fines for alienations, tenures by homage, knight-service, and escuage, and also aids for marrying the daughter or knighting the son, and all tenures of the king *in capite*, be likewise taken away (*h*):—and that all sorts of tenures, held of the king or others, be turned into free and common socage, save only tenures in frankalmoign, copyholds and the honorary services (without the

(*g*) Dalrymp. of Feuds, 292. By another statute of the same year (20 Geo. 2, c. 50), the tenure of *wardholding* (equivalent to the knight-service of England) was abolished in Scotland.

(*h*) Mr. Hargrave holds this mention of tenures *in capite* to have been a mistake in the framers of the Act; (see Co. Litt. by Harg. 108,

n. (5)). There may be some doubt, however, as to the sense in which the term is used, as there were two kinds of tenure *in capite*; vide sup. p. 186. It is at all events certain that the enactment was not intended to prohibit persons from holding immediately under the crown. Indeed, it is in this manner that land in fee is now most usually held.

[slavish part) of grand serjeanty. A statute, which was a greater acquisition to the civil property of this kingdom than even *Magna Charta* itself; since that only pruned the luxuriances that had grown out of the military tenures, and thereby preserved them in vigour; but the statute of King Charles extirpated the whole, and demolished both root and branches.

II. The second kind of tenure which we had to consider (*i*), and into which, by the statute just mentioned, all tenures by knight-service are now converted, is *Free Socage*. Socage, in its most general and extensive signification, seems to denote a tenure by any certain and determinate service. And in this sense it is by our antient writers constantly put in opposition to chivalry, or knight-service, where the render was precarious and uncertain. Thus Bracton: “if a man holds by rent in money, without any escuage or serjeanty, *id tenementum dici potest socagium*; but if you add thereto any royal service, or escuage, to any the smallest amount, *illud dici poterit feodum militare*” (*j*). So too the author of Fleta: “*ex donationibus, servitia militaria vel magnæ serjantiæ non continentibus, oritur nobis quoddam nomen generale, quod est socagium*” (*k*). Littleton also defines it to be, where the tenant holds his tenement of the lord by any *certain* service, in lieu of all other services; so that they be not services of chivalry, or knight-service (*l*). The service must therefore be certain, in order to denominate it socage: as to hold by fealty and 20s. rent; or by homage, fealty and 20s. rent; or, by homage and fealty without rent; or, by fealty and certain corporal service, as ploughing the lord’s land for three days; or by fealty only, without any other service: for all these are tenures in socage (*m*).

(*i*) Vide sup. p. 188.

(*j*) L. 2, c. 16, s. 9.

(*k*) L. 3, c. 14, s. 9.

(*l*) S. 117.

(*m*) Litt. ss. 117, 118, 119. As to the etymology of the term *socage*, it is derived by Littleton, Lord Coke, and others, from the French word

[But, as formerly shown on the authority of Bracton (*n*), socage is of two sorts: *free-socage*, where the services are not only certain but honourable; and *villein-socage*, where the services, though certain, are of a baser nature. Such as hold by the former tenure are called in Glanvil and other subsequent authors, by the name of *liberi sokemanni*, or tenants in free socage (*o*). Of this tenure we are now to speak; and this, both in the nature of its service, and the fruits and consequences appertaining thereto, was always by much the most free and independent species of any.] It is of a strongly feudal character indeed; being created by words of pure donation and livery of seisin, and invariably attended with the obligation of fealty at the least, (even where no other service was rendered,) and with all the incidents attaching to feuds in general. Yet

soc, a ploughshare; its services being supposed to have consisted formerly of those of husbandry only, though changed in process of time to a pecuniary rent; (see Co. Litt. by Harg. 86 a, n.; Wright's Ten. 144.) On the other hand this term is considered by Somner and Blackstone as originating in the Saxon *soc*, which signified any franchise or privilege, (though more especially one of jurisdiction); *socage* being distinguished from other tenures by the great privilege of fixed and ascertained services; (see 2 Bl. Com. p. 80.) The opinion of Bracton, as one of the earliest authorities on the subject, would be entitled to great weight were it more decidedly expressed. "*Dici poterit socagium a socco, et inde tenentes socmanni, eo quod deputati sunt, ut videtur, tantummodo ad culturam, et quorum custodia et maritagia ad propinquiores parentes jure sanguinis pertinebant.*" — Bract. c. 35. This leans, though somewhat doubtfully,

towards the derivation from the *plough*; but in another part of his work he speaks of the tenure called *socagium villanum* in a way that rather tends to assign to *socagium* the meaning of *privileged* tenure. "*Est etiam genus villenagii, &c. quod dicitur socagium villanum, et quod est villenagium sed tamen privilegiatum.*" (See the passage more fully cited sup. p. 187.) As to *socmanni*, it may be remarked that they are frequently mentioned in Domesday Book; and in Hallam's Mid. Ages (vol. ii. pp. 386, 481, 7th edit.) they are supposed to have been derived from the superior class of Anglo-Saxon *ceorls*. It is stated, however, that they were perfectly exempt from all marks of villenage, both as to persons and estates; and they are considered as "the root of a noble plant, the free socage tenants, or English yeomanry."

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 188.

(*o*) Glanv. l. 7, c. 3.

it falls far short, upon the whole, of the severity of the tenure in chivalry; and this not only as being certain in its services, but also as being comparatively mild in some of its fruits and consequences. This will manifestly appear by the following enumeration of them.

1. The law of inheritance is the same in socage tenure as in tenure by knight-service (*p*).

2. [Wardship is also incident to tenure in socage; but of a nature very different from that incident to knight-service. For if the inheritance descend to an infant under fourteen, the wardship of him does not, nor ever did, belong to the lord of the fee; because, in this tenure, no military or other personal service being required, there was never any occasion for the lord to take the profits, in order to provide a proper substitute for his infant tenant; but his nearest relation, not being one to whom the inheritance can descend, was to be his guardian in socage, and have the custody of his land and body till he arrives at the age of fourteen (*q*). At fourteen this wardship in socage ceases: and the heir may oust the guardian, and call him to account for the rents and profits; for at this age the law supposes him capable of choosing a guardian for himself (*r*). It was in this particular of wardship, as in also that of marriage, and in the certainty of the render or service, that the socage tenures had so much the advantage of the military ones. But as the wardship ceased at fourteen, there was this disadvantage attending it: that young heirs, being left at so tender an age to choose their own guardians till twenty-one, might make an improvident choice. Therefore, when almost all the lands in the kingdom were turned into socage tenures, the same statute, 12 Car. II. c. 24, enacted that it should be in the power of any father by will to appoint a guardian,

(*p*) There was antiently however a time when socage lands descended to *all* the sons; (Glanv. l. 7, c. 3; Hale, C. L. c. 11.)

(*q*) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 88 b. n. (6).

(*r*) Litt. s. 123; Co. Litt. 89 a.

[till his child should attain the age of twenty-one (*s*). And if no such appointment be made, the Court of Chancery will frequently interpose, and name a guardian, to prevent an infant heir from improvidently exposing himself to ruin (*t*).

3. "Marriage," or the *valor maritagii*, was not in socage tenure any perquisite or advantage to the guardian, but rather the reverse. For if the guardian married his ward under the age of fourteen, he was bound to account to him for the value of the marriage, even though he took nothing for it (*u*). For the law made guardians account, not only for what they *did*, but also for what they *might*, receive on the infant's behalf; lest by some collusion the guardian should have received the value, and not brought it to account: but the statute of Charles having destroyed all values of marriages, this doctrine of, course hath ceased with them. At fourteen years of age the ward (till the Act for preventing clandestine marriages) might have disposed of himself in marriage, without any consent of his guardian (*x*).

4. The tenure in socage was subject, of common right, to aids for knighting the son and marrying the eldest daughter (*y*): and these were fixed by the statute of Westm. 1 (cap. 36) at 20*s*. for every 20*l*. per annum so held; as in knight-service. These aids, as in tenure by chivalry, were originally mere benevolences, though afterwards claimed as matter of right; but they were all abolished by the statute 12 Car. II. (*z*).

5. Relief is due upon socage tenure, as well as upon tenure in chivalry: but the manner of taking it is very different. The relief on a knight's fee was 5*l*., or one quarter of the supposed value of the land; but a socage

(*s*) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 88 b, n. (15).

(*t*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 88 b, n. (16). As to the law of guardian and ward, vide post, bk. III. c. IV.

(*u*) Litt. s. 123.

(*x*) 26 Geo. 2, c. 33. This act

was repealed by 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, (one of the present Marriage Acts,) which substitutes new provisions to prevent clandestine marriages.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 91 a.

(*z*) Vide sup. p. 201.

[relief is one year's rent or render, payable by the tenant to the lord, be the same either great or small (*a*); and therefore Bracton will not allow this to be properly a relief, but "*quædam præstatio loco relievii in recognitionem domini*" (*b*). So too the statute 28 Edw. I. c. 1, declares that a free sokeman shall give *no relief*, but shall double his rent after the death of his ancestor, according to that which he hath used to pay his lord, and shall not be grieved above measure. Reliefs in knight-service were only payable if the heir at the death of his ancestor was of full age; but in socage they are due even though the heir be under age, because the lord has no wardship over him (*c*). The statute of Charles the second reserves the reliefs incident to socage tenures; and therefore, wherever lands in fee-simple are holden by a rent, relief is still due of common right upon the death of a tenant (*d*).

6. Primer seisin was incident to the king's socage tenants *in capite*, as well as to those by knight-service (*e*). But primer seisins are, among the other feudal burthens, entirely abolished by the statute of Charles the second.]

7. The tenant in socage enjoyed the same right of aliening his lands as the tenant by knight-service (*f*).

8. Fines for alienation were, apparently, due for lands held *in capite* by socage tenure, as well as in case of tenure by knight-service; for the statutes that relate to this point, and Sir Edward Coke's comment on them, speak generally of all tenants *in capite*, without making any distinction (*g*); but now all fines for alienation of lands held *in capite* are taken away by the statute of Charles the second.

(*a*) Litt. s. 126.

(*b*) L. 2, c. 37, s. 8.

(*c*) Litt. s. 127.

(*d*) *Freeman v. Booth*, 3 Lev. 145; see Co. Litt. by Harg. 93 a, n. (2).

(*e*) Co. Litt. 77 a.

(*f*) Vide sup. p. 199. But the

tenant in socage might, by the custom of some particular places, also aliene by way of *testamentary disposition*. Co. Litt. by Harg. 111 b, n. (1).

(*g*) Co. Litt. 43 a; 2 Inst. 65, 66, 67.

9. Escheat and forfeiture are equally incident to tenure in socage, as they were to tenure by knight-service. But by modern statutes, which we shall have occasion to notice more particularly hereafter, the antient law of escheat for *felony* has been swept away in respect of every description of tenure (*h*).

Such was the tenure in free socage; being that under which the bulk of real property is held at the present day; and which is now better known by its modern denomination of *freehold* (*i*). But this tenure, which we have hitherto discussed only in its proper and ordinary shape, also comprises some particular varieties, viz. *petit serjeanty*, *tenure in burgage*, and *gavelkind*.

It has been said that *grand serjeanty* was a variety of the tenure in chivalry, involving honorary services to the king's person, such as carrying his sword or banner; and that these services were reserved by the statute 12 Car. II. c. 24, though the tenure, in other respects, was, by that Act, converted into free socage (*h*). [Now *petit serjeanty* bears a great resemblance to grand serjeanty; for as the one is a personal service, so the other is a rent or render, tending to some purpose relative to the king's person (*l*). And, accordingly, *petit serjeanty* is said by Littleton to consist in holding lands of the king by the service of rendering to him annually some small implement of war, as a bow, a sword, a lance, an arrow, or the like (*m*). The services of this tenure being free

(*h*) See 54 Geo. 3, c. 145; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 10; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 23; 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23; et vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XII.

(*i*) It may be worth while to remark, that the term *freehold* was formerly inadequate to express the particular kind of tenure; as it was indifferently applicable both to knight-service and to free socage, and accordingly we find from Lord

Coke that it was only used to express that the holding was not base; (Co. Litt. 94 a;) but, as by the abolition of knight-service free socage has become the only free lay tenure, freehold is now taken as equivalent with free socage.

(*h*) Vide sup. pp. 200, 204.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 107 a, 108 b.

(*m*) Litt. Ten. s. 159.

[and certain, it is in all respects free socage (*n*); though, being held of the king, it is by way of eminence dignified with the title of *parvum servitium regis*, or petit serjeanty. And *Magna Charta* respected it in this light, when it enacted that no wardship of the lands or body should be claimed by the king, in virtue of a tenure by petit serjeanty (*o*).

Tenure in *burgage* is described by Glanvil (*p*), and is expressly said by Littleton (*q*), to be but tenure in socage: and it is where the king or other person is lord of an antient borough, in which the tenements are held by a rent certain (*r*). It is indeed only a kind of town socage, as common socage, by which other lands are holden, is usually of a rural nature. Many of these tenements so held in antient burgage are subject to a great variety of customs: the principal and most remarkable of which is that called *Borough-English*, so named in contradistinction (as it were), to the Norman customs, and which is taken notice of by Glanvil (*s*), and by Littleton (*t*); viz. that the youngest son, and not the eldest, succeeds to the burgage tenement on the death of his father (*u*) For which Littleton (*x*) gives this reason; because the younger son, by reason of his tender age, is not so capable as the

(*n*) Wright's Tenures, 160.

(*o*) Cap. 27.

(*p*) Lib. 7, c. 3.

(*q*) S. 162.

(*r*) Litt. ss. 162, 163.

(*s*) Lib. 7, c. 3.

(*t*) S. 165.

(*u*) "The custom of Borough-English prevails in several cities and antient boroughs, and districts of smaller or larger extent adjoining to them, in different parts of the kingdom. The land is held in socage, but according to the custom it descends to the youngest son, in exclusion of all the other children of the person

"dying seised. In some places, this peculiar rule of descent is confined to the case of children, in others, the custom extends to brothers and other male collaterals.".... "The custom of Borough-English governs the descent of copyhold land in various manors."—(Third Real Property Report, p. 8.) And see as to Borough-English, Year-Book, 36 Hen. 6, 20; Co. Litt. by Harg. 10 a, n. (3), n. (4). See also the case of *Muggleton v. Barnett*, 2 H. & N. 653.

(*x*) S. 211; and see 8 Edw. 4, c. 18.

[rest of his brethren to help himself. Other authors have indeed given a much stranger reason for this custom, as if the lord of the fee had antiently a right of concubinage with his tenant's wife on her wedding night, and that therefore the tenement descended not to the eldest, but the youngest son; who was more certainly the offspring of the tenant(*y*). But it is not known that ever this custom prevailed in England, though it certainly did in Scotland (under the name of *mercheta* or *marcheta*), till abolished by Malcolm the third(*z*). And perhaps a more rational account than either may be fetched (though at a sufficient distance) from the practice of the Tartars; among whom, according to Father Duhalde, this custom of descent to the youngest son also prevails. That nation is composed totally of shepherds and herdsmen; and the elder sons, as soon as they are capable of leading a pastoral life, migrate from their father with a certain allotment of cattle, and go to seek a new habitation. The youngest son, therefore, who continues latest with the father, is naturally the heir of his house, the rest being already provided for. And thus we find that, among many other northern nations, it was the custom for all the sons but one to migrate from the father, which one became his heir(*a*). So possibly this custom, wherever it prevails, may be the remnant of that pastoral state of our British and German ancestors, which Cæsar and Tacitus describe. Other special customs there are, in different burgage tenures: as that in some the wife shall be endowed of *all* her husband's tenements(*b*), and not of the third part only, as at the common law;] and that in others, a man might (as in the Saxon times) dispose of his lands and tenements by will(*c*),—a mode of disposition which, though partially

(*y*) See 3 Mod. Rep. in pref.

(*z*) Sel. Tit. of Hon. 2, 1, 47;
Reg. Mag. l. 4, c. 31.

(*a*) "*Pater cunctos filios adultos
a se pellebat, præter unum, quem*

hæredem sui juris relinquebat."—
Walsing. Upodigm. Neust. c. 1.

(*b*) Litt. s. 166.

(*c*) S. 167.

permitted in the time of Henry the eighth, did not receive its full development till after the Restoration (*d*).

Gavelkind occurs as of common right in the county of Kent, almost the whole of which is subject to this tenure (*e*). To account for this it should be recollected, that the Kentish men obtained concessions from the Conqueror, by the effect of which they were permitted to retain their antient liberties. [And as it is principally here that we meet with the custom of gavelkind, though it was and is to be found in some other parts of the kingdom (*f*), we may fairly conclude that this custom of descent was a part of those liberties. The distinguishing properties of this tenure are various: and some of the principal are these: 1. The tenant is of age sufficient to aliene his estate by feoffment at the age of fifteen (*g*). 2. The estate does not escheat in case of an attainder for felony; the maxim being “the father to the bough, the son to the plough” (*h*). 3. In most places where the tenure is gavelkind the tenant always enjoyed the power of disposing of his land and tenements by will (*i*). 4. The lands descend, not to the eldest, youngest, or any one son only, but to all the sons together (*k*); which was indeed antiently the most usual course of descent all over England (*l*). These, among other properties, distinguish this tenure in a most remarkable manner: and yet it is said to be only a species of socage tenure, modified by the custom of the country; the lands being holden by suit of court and fealty, which is a service in its nature certain (*m*). Ac-

(*d*) Wright's Tenures, 172; vide sup. p. 163.

(*e*) As to gavelkind, see Year-Book, 36 Hen. 6, st. 20; 17 Edw. 2, st. 1, c. 16; 32 Hen. 8, c. 29; Co. Litt. 140 a.

(*f*) Stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 29; Kitch. of Courts. 200; Co. Litt. 140 a. See acc. Third Real Property Report, p. 8.

(*g*) Lamb. Peramb. 614. As to a

feoffment, vide post, c. XVII.

(*h*) Ibid. 634. As to the doctrine of escheat, as affected by recent legislation and particularly by 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, vide post, c. XII.

(*i*) F. N. B. 198; Launder v. Brooks, Cro. Car. 561.

(*k*) Litt. s. 210.

(*l*) Glanvil, l. 7, c. 3; Hale, C. L. c. 11; Analect. l. 2, c. 7.

(*m*) Wright's Tenures, 211.

[cordingly by a charter of King John, Hubert, Archbishop of Canterbury, was authorized to *exchange* the gavelkind tenures holden of the see of Canterbury into tenures by knight-service (*n*); and by statute 31 Hen. VIII. c. 3, for disgavelling the lands of divers lords and gentlemen in the county of Kent, such lands are directed to be descendible for the future *like other lands which were never holden by service of socage*.]

III. From the tenure of villenage, as described in its different branches by Bracton, sprang our present *copyhold* tenure (*o*); in order to obtain a clear idea of which, it will be previously necessary to take a short view of the original and nature of *manors*.

[Manors are in substance as antient as the Saxon constitution, though perhaps differing a little, in some immaterial circumstances, from those that exist at this day (*p*): just as we observed of feuds, that they were partly known to our ancestors, even before the Norman conquest.] It is from the Normans, however, that we derive the particular form of manors with which we are conversant at present (*q*); and among this people, a manor, *manerium* (*r*), seems to have been originally a district of ground held by a lord or great personage, who kept to himself such parts of it as were necessary for his own use, which were called *terræ dominicales*, or *demesne* lands (being those of the *dominus manerii*), and distributed the rest to freehold tenants, to be held of him in perpetuity (*s*). Of the demesne lands, again, part was retained in the actual

(*n*) Spelm. Cod. Vet. Leg. 355; vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XVII.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 187.

(*p*) Co. Cop. ss. 2, 10.

(*q*) Ibid. s. 10.

(*r*) Lord Coke (Cop. s. 31) suggests two derivations of this term: *a manendo*, because the owner of the manor usually resided there; and

from *mesner*, in French, (to guide); the tenants being under the lord's guidance and direction. He gives the preference to the latter etymology.

(*s*) See Co. Cop. s. 31; and see by Lord Kenyon, *Glover v. Lane*, 3 T. R. 447; and Attorney-General *v. Parsons*, 2 Tyrw. 223.

occupation of the lord, for the purposes of his family; other portions were held in villenage (*t*), of which we shall presently speak more at large; [and there was besides these, a portion which, being uncultivated, was termed the lord's waste, and served for public roads and for common of pasture to the lord and his tenants. Manors were formerly also called baronies, as they still are lordships; and each baron or lord was empowered to hold a domestic court, called the court baron, for redressing misdemeanors and nuisances within the manor, and for settling disputes of property among the tenants.] If several of these manors were held, as was frequently the case, under one great baron or lord paramount, his seigniorship over them was termed an *honor* (*u*).

[The villenage to which we have referred was a species of tenure neither strictly feudal, Norman, or Saxon, but mixed and compounded of them all (*x*). Under the Saxon government, there were, as Sir William Temple speaks (*y*), a sort of people in a condition of downright servitude, used and employed in the most servile works, and belonging, both they, their children and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the cattle or stock upon it. These seem to have been those who held what was called the *folkland*, from which they were removeable at the lord's pleasure. On the arrival of the Normans here,

(*t*) "*Dominicum dicitur quod quis habet ad mensam suam—dicitur etiam dominicum, villenagium quod traditur villanis,*" &c.—Bracton, as cited Co. Cop. s. 12. "*Est autem dominicum propriè terra ad mensam assignata, et villenagium quod traditur villanis ad excolendum.*"—Fleta, as cited, ib. And Lord Coke expresses his assent to this doctrine, that in strictness the demesne comprised the lands held in villenage, though popularly it signified only what the lord kept

in his own hands, whether waste or cultivated.—Co. Cop. s. 14; and see Attorney-General *v.* Parsons, 2 Tyrw. 223.

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 91; see Co. Litt. by Harg. 108 a, n. (4). It is said that there are eighty honors in England; see Com. Dig. *in tit.* Honor, where they are enumerated.

(*x*) Wright's Tenures, 215. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 92) adds that the tenure may also have "somewhat Danish in its composition."

(*y*) Intro. Hist. Eng. 59.

[it seems not improbable that they, who were strangers to any other than a feudal state, might give some sparks of enfranchisement to such wretched persons as fell to their share, by admitting them as well as others, to the oath of fealty; which conferred a right of protection, and raised the tenant to a kind of estate superior to downright slavery, but inferior to every other condition (*z*). This they called villenage, and the tenants villeins, either from the word *vilis*, or else (as Sir Edward Coke tells us) à *villâ*, because they lived chiefly in villages, and were employed in rustic works of the most sordid kind (*a*); resembling the Spartan *helotes*, to whom alone the culture of the lands was consigned; their rugged masters, like our northern ancestors, esteeming war the only honourable employment of mankind.

These villeins, belonging principally to lords of manors, were either villeins *regardant*, that is, annexed to the manor or land; or else they were *in gross*, or at large, that is, annexed to the person of the lord, and transferable by deed from one owner to another (*b*). They could not leave their lord without his permission; and if they ran away, or were purloined from him, might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or other chattels. They held, indeed, small portions of land, by way of sustaining themselves and families; but it was at the mere will of the lord, who might dispossess them whenever he pleased; and it was upon villein services, that is, to carry out dung, to hedge and ditch the lord's demesnes and any other the meanest offices (*c*); and their services were not only base, but uncertain both as to their time and quantity (*d*). A villein could acquire no property, either in lands or goods; but if he purchased either, the lord might enter upon them, oust the villein, and seize them to his own use,

(*z*) Wright's Tenures, 217.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 116 a.

(*b*) Litt. s. 181.

(*c*) Ibid. s. 172.

(*d*) Bracton, l. 4, tr. 1, c. 28.

[unless he contrived to dispose of them again before the lord had seized them; for the lord had then lost his opportunity (*e*).

In many places, also a fine was payable to the lord, if the villein presumed to marry his daughter to any one without leave from the lord (*f*); and, by the common law, the lord might also bring an action against the husband, for damages in thus purloining his property (*g*). For the children of villeins were also in the same state of bondage with their parents; whence they were called in Latin *nativi*, which gave rise to the female appellation of a villein, who was called a *neife* (*h*). In case of a marriage between a freeman and a neife, or a villein and a free-woman, the issue followed the condition of the father, being free if he was free, and villein if he was villein; contrary herein to the maxim of the civil law, *partus sequitur ventrem*. But no bastard could be born a villein, because, by another maxim of our law, he is *nullius filius*; and as he could *gain* nothing by inheritance, it were hard that he should *lose* his natural freedom by it (*i*). The law, however, protected the persons of villeins, as the king's subjects, against atrocious injuries of the lord; for he might not kill or maim them, without being subject to indictment at the king's suit (*k*).

Villeins might be enfranchised by manumission, which is either express or implied: express, as where a man granted to the villein a deed of manumission (*l*); implied, as where a man bound himself in a bond to his villein for a sum of money, granted him an annuity by deed, or gave him an estate in fee, for life or years (*m*); for this was dealing with his villein on the footing of a freeman: giving him an action against his lord, and vesting in him an

(*e*) Litt. s. 177.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 140 a.

(*g*) Litt. s. 202.

(*h*) Ibid. s. 187.

(*i*) Ibid. ss. 187, 188.

(*k*) Litt. ss. 189, 194; Co. Litt. 120 b.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 204.

(*m*) S. 204—6.

[ownership entirely inconsistent with his former state of bondage. So, also, if the lord brought an action against his villein, this enfranchised him (*n*); for as the lord might have a short remedy against him, by seizing his goods (which was more than equivalent to any damages he could recover), the law, which is always ready to catch at anything in favour of liberty, presumed that by bringing this action he meant to set his villein on the same footing with himself, and therefore held it an implied manumission. But, in case the lord indicted him for felony, it was otherwise; for the lord could not inflict a capital punishment on his villein, without calling in the assistance of the law.

Villeins, by these and many other means, in process of time gained considerable ground on their lords; and in particular strengthened the tenure of their estates to that degree, that they came to have in them an interest in many places full as good, in others better, than their lords. For the goodnature and benevolence of many lords of manors having, time out of mind, permitted their villeins and their children to enjoy their possessions without interruption, in a regular course of descent, the common law, of which custom is the life, now gave them title to prescribe against their lords; and, on performance of the same services, to hold their lands in spite of any determination of the lord's will. For, though in general they were still said to hold their estates at the will of their lord, yet it is such a will as is agreeable to the custom of the manor; which customs were preserved and evidenced by the rolls of the several manor courts in which they are entered, or kept on foot by the constant immemorial usage of the several manors in which the lands lie. And as such tenants had nothing to show for their estates but these customs, and admissions in pursuance of them entered on those rolls, or the copies of such entries wit-

[nessed by the steward, they now began to be called *tenants by copy of court-roll*, and their tenure itself a copyhold (*o*).

Thus copyhold tenures (as Coke observes), although very meanly descended, yet come of an antient house (*p*); for, from what has been premised, it appears that copyholders are in truth no other but villeins (*q*); who, by a long series of immemorial encroachments on the lord, at last established a customary right to those estates which before were held absolutely at the lord's will.] By the gradual progress of manumission also (either voluntary or constructive), the *personal* condition of villenage was at length everywhere commuted into freedom. And at the period of the reformation in religion, this change had already become almost complete. [For Sir Thomas Smith testifies, that in all his time (and he was secretary to Edward the sixth), he never knew any villein in gross throughout the realm; and the few villeins regardant that were then remaining were such only as had belonged to bishops, monasteries, or other ecclesiastical corporations, in the preceding times of popery: for, he tells us, that “the holy fathers, monks and friars had in their confessions and specially in their extreme and deadly sickness, convinced the laity how dangerous a practice it was for one Christian man to hold another in bondage, so that temporal men by little and little, by reason of that terror in their consciences, were glad to manumit all their villeins. But the said holy fathers, with the abbots and priors, did not in like sort by theirs; for they also had a scruple in conscience to impoverish and despoil the church so much as to manumit such as were bound to their

(*o*) F. N. B. 12.

(*p*) Co. Cop. 32.

(*q*) In confirmation of this doctrine, see F. N. B. 12 C.; Wright's Tenures, 224; 3 Reeves's Hist. Eng. Law, 158, 312. In *Astle v. Grant*, Doug. 725, a doubt is expressed by

Lord Loughborough whether the opinion that copyholders sprang from villeins be well founded; but it is an opinion that rests on the highest authority, and seems too firmly settled to be shaken.

[" churches, or to the manors which the church had gotten ;
 " and so kept their villeins still" (r).]

Even these remnants of the antient slavery, however, did not long survive, and the last traces of it have been entirely obliterated among us for at least two centuries ; the last claim of villenage which we find recorded in our courts being in the fifteenth year of king James the first (s). But the abolition of the personal condition did not involve that of the copyhold tenure, to which it had given birth ; and (as before stated) this tenure is one of those expressly reserved by the statute of Charles the second (t). In most manors, therefore, we still find that species of tenants called copyholders : whose lands, though substantially their own property, are nominally part of the lord's demesnes, and are entered on the rolls of the customary court of the manor, as being held *at the will of the lord* according to the custom. And a manor (when in its proper and perfect state) also still comprises, according to its antient constitution (u), some portion of freehold tenants holding of the manor in perpetuity (x). We find, also, the court baron (already alluded to) a tribunal whereof the freeholders are the judges, and distinct from the customary court of the copyholders, though usually held at the same time and place (y).

No freehold, it is to be observed, can be now converted into copyhold ; of which the chief and most obvious reason is, that the essence of the latter tenure is immemorial custom (z). But, on the other hand, a copyhold is capable of being turned into freehold, either by the lord's convey-

(r) Commonwealth, b. 3, c. 10.

(s) *Pigg v. Caley*, Noy, 27 ; 11 Harg. St. Tr. 342.

(t) Vide sup. p. 204.

(u) Vide sup. p. 214.

(æ) *Glover v. Lane*, 3 T. R. 447 a ; *Melwiche's case*, 4 Rep. 26 b. Yet though there should be a failure of suitors to the court baron, and

consequently in strictness of law an extinction of the manor, the jurisdiction of the customary court will not be thereby affected. (Coke's Tracts, 53.)

(y) Co. Litt. 58 a ; Co. Cop. s. 31.

(z) See *Revell v. Joddrell*, 2 T. R. 424.

ing to the copyholder the freehold of the particular premises, or by his releasing to him the seignorial rights; and such transmutation is called *enfranchisement* (*a*).

Copyhold, like the other tenures to which we have adverted, involves the obligation of fealty. A copyhold tenement is *descendible* also, where the custom of the manor so permits, to the *heir*. As for the rule of descent it is the same (in the greater number of manors) with the ordinary rule in free socage tenure; though in some it is according to the method in gavelkind, and in others again, to that in borough-English (*b*). But an incident almost peculiar to copyholds,—although it is occasionally met with in freehold or customary freehold lands,—is that of *heriots* (*c*). These, which are generally supposed to be a Danish custom (*d*), are a render of the best beast or other article (as the custom may be) to the lord, on the death of the tenant. If considered as a relic of villein tenure, there was originally less hardship in it, when all the goods and chattels belonged to the lord, and he might have seized them, even in the villein's lifetime; but it is now justly considered as one of the most oppressive circumstances which attend the modern law of tenures (*e*). The *wardship* in copyhold also resembles that in socage; for the lord is not guardian (except by special custom), but the guardianship belongs to the next of kin of the infant to whom the copyhold cannot descend; and he, like the guardian in socage, is accountable to his ward for the profits (*f*). Moreover, copyhold tenure is, in some manors subject to *relief*, of the same nature with that in socage, and is

(*a*) 1 Watk. Cop. 362. It may be remarked here that if the copyholder convey to the lord, this is an *extinguishment* of the copyhold.

(*b*) Third Real Property Rep. p. 14. See *Muggleton v. Barnett*, 2 H. & N. 653.

(*c*) Third Real Property Rep. p.

16; and see 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, s. 7.

(*d*) 2 Bl. C. 97.

(*e*) As to heriots, see further, post, chap. XXII.

(*f*) 2 Watk. Cop. 101; Co. Litt. by Harg. 88 b, n. (13); see 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 65, s. 3–10.

also liable to *forfeiture* and *escheat* (*g*): though (on the other hand) a copyholder cannot *aliene* except through the medium of a surrender to the lord; and the land passes not to the alienee till the lord admits him. *Fines*, too, are in general payable to the lord on alienation, and there are other fines upon hereditary descent (*h*). [In some manors only one of these sorts of fines can be demanded, in some both, and in others neither. They are sometimes arbitrary and at the will of the lord, and sometimes fixed by custom; but, even when arbitrary, the courts of law, in favour of the liberty of the copyholders, have tied fines down to be *reasonable* in their extent; otherwise they might amount to a disherison of the estate (*i*). No fine therefore is allowed to be taken upon descents and alienations (unless in particular circumstances) of more than two years improved value of the estate (*k*). From this instance we may judge of the favourable disposition that the law of England (which is a law of liberty) hath always shown to this species of tenants; by removing as far as possible, every real badge of slavery from them, however some nominal ones may continue. Moreover custom was very early suffered to get the better of the express terms upon which the tenants held their lands, by declaring, that the will of the lord was to be interpreted by the custom of the manor; and, where no custom has been suffered to grow up to the prejudice of the lord, as in this case of arbitrary fines, the law itself interposes with an equitable moderation, and will not suffer the lord to extend his power so far as to disinherit the tenant.]

The tenure that we have been describing is “copyhold,” commonly so called, or tenure *by copy of court roll, at the will of the lord, according to the custom of the manor*;

(*g*) See *Doe d. Tarrant v. Helier*, 3 T. R. 164, 169. But see now as to forfeiture and escheat *propter delictum tenentis*, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 1.

(*h*) 1 Watk. Cop. 286.

(*i*) See acc. *Hayward v. Rew*, 6 H. & N. 308.

(*k*) *Astle v. Grant*, Doug. 724; *Lord Verulam v. Howard*, 7 Bing. 327.

and this, as we have seen, is lineally descended from the antient tenure of *pure villenage*. In the division, however, that we formerly made of lay tenures (*l*) the term *copyhold* is to be understood in a larger sense; and as importing, according to the view sanctioned by the highest authorities (*m*), every *customary* tenure, that is, every tenure depending on the particular custom of a manor, as opposed to free socage or *freehold*; which last may now, since the abolition of knight-service, be considered as the general or common law tenure of the country (*n*). And copyhold, in this wider application of the term, comprises, besides the principal and common kind that we have just been delineating, two varieties, viz., *antient demesne* and *customary freehold*.

The first of these seems to be the same tenure as described by Bracton, sometimes under the name of *privileged villenage*, and sometimes of *villein-socage*. This, he tells us, is such as has been held of the kings of England from the Conquest downwards; and the tenants wherein "*villana faciunt servitia, sed certa et determinata*" (*o*). [And from these circumstances we may collect, that what he here describes is no other than an exalted species of copyhold, subsisting at this day, viz., the tenure in *antient demesne*; to which—as partaking of the baseness of villenage in the nature of its services, and the freedom of socage in their certainty,—he has therefore given a name compounded out of both, and calls it *villanum socagium*.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 188.

(*m*) The st. 12 Car. 2, c. 24, sanctions no other lay tenures but "*free and common socage*," and "*copyhold*" (vide sup. p. 204). And Blackstone remarks that all lay tenures "are now in effect reduced "to two species, free tenure in common socage, and base tenure by "copy of court roll."—2 Bl. C. 101. And see Co. Cop. ss. 17, 32; Cal-

thorpe, 51, 54; Doe v. Huntington, 4 East, 288; Doe v. Llewellyn, 5 Tyrw. 899; 1 Gale, 193; 2 C. M. & R. 503, S. C.

(*n*) See Wright's Ten. 138, 139; Anthony Lowe's case, 9 Rep. 123. As to the term *freehold*, vide sup. p. 210, n. (*i*), et infra, p. 231, n. (*g*).

(*o*) L. 4, t. 1, c. 28, s. 5. Vide sup. p. 188.

[Antient demesne is a tenure existing in certain manors, which, though now perhaps granted out to private subjects, were in the hands of the crown at the time of Edward the Confessor, or William the Conqueror; and so appear to have been by the great survey in the Exchequer, called Domesday Book (*p*). The tenants in these crown manors were not all of the same order or degree. Some of them, as Britton testifies, continued for a long time pure and absolute villeins, dependent on the will of the lord (*q*): and such as have succeeded these in their tenures, now differ from common copyholders in only a few points (*r*). Others, again, were in a great measure enfranchised by the royal favour; being only bound, in respect of their lands, to perform some of the better sort of villein services of the determinate and certain class; as, to plough the king's lands for so many days, to supply his court with such a quantity of provisions, or other stated services; all of which are now changed into pecuniary rents: and in consideration of these services they had many immunities and privileges granted to them (*s*); as to try the right of their property in a peculiar court of their own, called a court of antient demesne (*t*), and by a peculiar process, denominated a writ of *right close* (*u*); not to pay toll or taxes (*x*); not to contribute to the expenses of knights of the shire; not to be put on juries; and the like (*y*).]

Manors of antient demesne accordingly comprise, to this day, both copyholders in the proper and common sense of the term, and also such privileged tenants as just

(*p*) F. N. B. 14, 16; Crowther v. Oldfield, Salk. 364.

(*q*) C. 66.

(*r*) F. N. B. 228.

(*s*) 4 Inst. 269. It would seem that in antient demesne, the *freehold* is always in the tenant, see 2 Inst. 325; 2 Scriven, 678, (n).

(*t*) Doe v. Roe, 2 Burr. 1046;

Alden's case, 5 Rep. 103; and see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 4, 5, 6.

(*u*) F. N. B. 11.

(*x*) This immunity, however, extends not to a *county* rate or other local tax. (The Queen v. Inhabitants of Aylesford, 2 Ell. & Ell. 538.)

(*y*) F. N. B. 14.

described (*z*), who are alone properly called tenants in antient demesne (*a*). As to these last, though their services, like those of pure villeins, were originally base, yet (as appears by the account of them just given) they were distinguished from the latter, in that their services were fixed and determinate; and that they could not be compelled (like pure villeins) to relinquish their tenements at the lord's will, or to hold them against their own; "*et ideo*," says Bracton, "*dicuntur liberi*." [Britton also, from such their freedom, calls them absolutely *sokemans*, and their tenure *sokemanries*; which he describes to be "lands and tenements, which are not held by knight-service, nor by grand serjeanty, nor by petit, but by simple services; being, as it were, lands enfranchised by the king or his predecessors from their antient demesne" (*b*). And the same name is also given them in Fleta (*c*).] Tenants in antient demesne, like common copyholders, require admittance by the lord to perfect their title; and they hold according to the custom of the manor, though not *ad voluntatem domini* (*d*).

Customary freehold (the other variety to which we referred) exists in many parts of the kingdom. The evidences of title are to be found, as in pure or common copyhold, upon the court rolls; and here, again, the entries declare the holding to be according to the custom of the manor, though it is not said to be at the will of the lord (*e*). The customs of these manors are subject to

(*z*) F. N. B. 11 M., 12 B.; Co. Cop. s. 32.

(*a*) Third Real Property Rep. p. 13.

(*b*) C. 66.

(*c*) L. 1, c. 8.

(*d*) 2 Bl. C. 101; and acc. Co. Cop. s. 32; but see Third Real Property Rep. p. 13.

(*e*) Co. Cop. s. 32; see Third Real Property Rep. p. 20; Co.

Litt. by Harg. 52 b, n. (1). There is also a kind of customary estate called *tenant right* (said to be peculiar to the north of England), which falls, under the general class of copyhold, though distinguished from the common kind by many of its incidents. (See *Graham v. Jackson*, 6 Q. B. 811; *Passingham*, app. *Pitty*, resp. 17 C. B. 313.)

great variety. But in general the incidents of customary freehold are similar to those of common copyhold (*f*).

[Mention has hitherto been made of *lay* tenures only; but there is still behind, one other species of tenure which was reserved by the statute of Charles the second, and this is of a *spiritual* nature, and called the tenure in frankalmoign.

IV. Tenure in *frankalmoign*, in *liberâ eleemosynâ*, or free alms, is that, whereby a religious corporation, aggregate or sole, holdeth lands of the donor to them and their successors for ever (*g*). The service which (prior to the Reformation) they were bound to render for these lands was not certainly defined: but only, in general, to pray for the souls of the donor and his heirs, dead or alive; and therefore they did no fealty, which is incident to all other services but this (*h*), because this divine service was of a higher and more exalted nature (*i*). This is the tenure by which almost all the antient monasteries and religious houses held their lands; and by which the parochial clergy, and very many ecclesiastical and eleemosynary foundations, hold them at this day (*k*); the

(*f*) As to the state of the law with respect to the *devise* of customary freeholds before the stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, see the Third Real Property Rep. p. 22. But by the 3rd section of that statute, the power of devising is extended to all customary freehold. There has been much controversy upon the question whether the freehold, in a customary freehold, is vested in the tenant, or (as in the case of common copyhold) in the lord; see Blackst. Law Tracts, Cons. on Copyhold; 2 Scriven, 679, 3rd edit. and the cases there cited; Third Real Property Rep. p. 20; see also *The Duke of Portland v. Hill*,

Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 765, as to the tenant's rights with regard to working *minerals*.

(*g*) Litt. s. 133.

(*h*) Ib. s. 131.

(*i*) Ib. s. 135.

(*k*) See Third Real Property Rep. p. 7. That Blackstone is correct in stating this as the tenure of the parochial clergy, is confirmed by the language of the *assisa utrum*, the antient remedy of the parson for recovering his glebe, &c. in which the point of inquiry always was "*utrum tantum terræ sit libera eleemosyna pertinenens ad ecclesiam ipsius, an laicū feudum.*" —Bract. l. 4, tr. 5, c. 1. It is true,

[nature of the service being, upon the Reformation, altered and made conformable to the purer doctrines of the Church of England. It was an old Saxon tenure, and continued under the Norman revolution, through the great respect that was shown to religion and religious men in antient times. Which is also the reason that tenants in *frankalmoign* were discharged of all secular services, except the *trinoda necessitas*, of repairing the highways, building castles, and repelling invasions (*l*): just as the Druids, among the antient Britons, had *omnium rerum immunitatem* (*m*). And, even at present, this is a tenure of a nature very distinct from all others, being not in the least feudal, but merely spiritual. For if the service be neglected, the law gives no remedy by distress or otherwise to the lord of whom the lands are holden, but merely a complaint to the ordinary or visitor to correct it (*n*). Wherein it materially differs from what was called *tenure by divine service*: in which the tenants were obliged to do some special divine services in certain; as to sing so many masses, to distribute such a sum in alms, and the like; which, being expressly defined and prescribed, could with no kind of propriety be called *free* alms; especially as for this, if unperformed, the lord might distrain, without any complaint to the visitor (*o*).] No donation in *frankalmoign* can now (since the statute

indeed, that in the case of a parson the inheritance is said to be in *abeyance*, and the parson entitled for his *life* only, and this at first sight appears inconsistent with the nature of *frankalmoign*, which always implies a gift in *perpetuity*: but the difficulty is removed by the remark of Bracton (*ibid.* c. 2), "*nihil clamare poterit nisi nomine ecclesiæ suæ, quia in ecclesiis parochialibus non fit donatio personæ sed ecclesiæ.*" The inheritance, according to this

view, resides not in himself, but in his church. (And see Litt. s. 646.) The tenure of the parochial clergy, however, will be of this kind only where the grant was originally made in the antient form, to hold *ut in liberâ eleemosynâ*. See Wats. C. L. 373; Plowd. 242; 1 Inst. 94 b.

(*l*) Seld. Jan. 1, 42.

(*m*) Cæsar de Bell. Gall. 1, 6, c. 13.

(*n*) Litt. s. 136.

(*o*) Ib. s. 137.

of *Quia emptores*) be made by a subject (*p*); but they are mentioned here because *frankalmoign* is excepted by name in the statute of Charles the second, and subsists in many instances at this day.

Having made these observations with respect to tenures in general, it may be now proper to add, that, in proceeding further to investigate the nature and properties of corporeal hereditaments, we shall for the present suppose them held by the ordinary tenure of free socage, that is, *freehold*; and the reader may dismiss the subject of copyhold from his consideration, till we arrive at a later part of the treatise, when we shall have occasion to devote a separate chapter to the more particular examination of property holden by that tenure (*q*).

(*p*) Litt. s. 140. By this statute (18 Edw. 1) no subject may grant lands in perpetuity to hold of himself; (*ibid.*) From which it follows, that none can grant in frankalmoign; for (as Littleton afterwards remarks) none may hold in frankalmoign, but of the grantor and his heirs, (s. 141,) and the estate in frankalmoign is always in perpetuity.—Co. Litt. 94 b.

(*q*) Vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c.

XXII. It may be desirable to mention here, that as regards some matters of general interest, freehold and copyhold tenures are placed by modern statutes on the same footing. These matters are *the qualification to vote at elections of members of parliament for counties*;—and *the qualification to serve on juries*. See, as to the former, 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 19; as to the latter, 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 1.

CHAPTER III.

OF FREEHOLD ESTATES OF INHERITANCE.

THE second point to be considered with regard to corporeal hereditaments is the nature of the *estates* which may be had in such of them as are of free tenure, reserving for subsequent consideration the subject of corporeal hereditaments held in base tenure (*a*). [An estate in land signifies such interest as the tenant hath therein; so that if a man grants all *his estate* in Dale to A. and his heirs, everything that he can possibly grant shall pass thereby (*b*). It is called in Latin *status*: it signifying the condition or circumstance in which the owner stands with regard to his property.]

And here it is material, in the first place, to remark that some kind of actual interest or ownership is implied in the term; for a bare *possibility*, (such, for example, as the expectation of the eldest son of succeeding, upon his father's decease, to the inheritance of his lands,) will not satisfy the legal idea of an estate (*c*). Nor will a mere *power* amount to an estate; as if a man by will orders his land to be sold by his executors: for they will in such case take neither right nor title in the land, but only a

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 187, et post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XXII.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 345 a.

(*c*) See *Jones v. Roe*, 3 T. R. 93; *Doe v. Tomkinson*, 2 Mau. & Sel. 170. There are two kinds of possibility in law:—one a *bare* possibility, such as referred to in the text; the other a possibility *coupled with an interest*—such, for ex-

ample, as the possibility of *B.*, which arises on an estate being conveyed to *A.* for life, and (living *C.* at his death) then to *B.* in fee. The latter kind may without impropriety be considered as an estate (though an estate in contingency), and may now, by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 6, be disposed of by deed.

bare authority (*d*). And the same may be said of a mere *revocable licence or permission* (in writing or otherwise) to make a certain use of land (*e*); though, on the other hand, there are various descriptions of actual interest to which the term applies. The leading distinction to which estates are subject is between such as are *legal* and such as are *equitable*; the first species being properly cognizable in the courts of common law, though noticed also in the courts of equity; and the second being properly cognizable in the latter courts, and not even noticed, generally speaking, in the former (*f*).

It is of legal estate alone (which is the original and primary idea) that we shall have occasion at present to speak; and we purpose to consider it in a threefold view: first, with regard to the *quantity of interest* which the tenant has in the tenement; secondly, with regard to the *time* at which that quantity of interest is to be enjoyed; and, thirdly, with regard to the *number and connection* of the tenants.

First, with regard to the *quantity of interest* which the tenant has in the tenement, this is measured by its duration and extent. Thus, either the ownership is to subsist in the tenant during his own life, or the life of another man; or it is vested in the tenant and his descendants after him; or it is circumscribed within a certain number of years, months, or days; or, lastly, it is infinite and unlimited, being vested in the tenant and his representatives for ever. And this occasions the primary division of estates into such as are *freehold*, and such as are *less than freehold*.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 265 b; Co. Litt. 113 a, n. (2).

(*e*) See *R. v. Mellor*, 2 East, 189; *Wood v. Leadbitter*, 13 Mee. & W. 888; *Perry v. Fitzhowe*, 8 Q. B. 757; *Hewitt v. Isham*, 7 Exch. 77; *Roffey v. Henderson*, 17

Q. B. 574; *Taplin v. Florence*, 10 C. B. 764.

(*f*) *Sanders on Uses*, 8; *Bac. Us.* 77; 2 *Fonbl.* 257. And see *Alpass v. Watkins*, 8 T. R. 516; *Hardr.* 469; *Murley v. Sherren*, 8 Ad. & El. 654.

A freehold estate—*liberum tenementum*, or frank tenement, as it was formerly called,—is an estate either of inheritance, or for life, in lands of free tenure (*g*); and it is material to our proper conception of it to remark, that at the common law, and prior to certain alterations in our system to be hereafter explained, an estate of this description in hereditaments corporeal could in general be created or transferred only by the ceremony called *livery of seisin*, attended with proper words of donation; which ceremony consisted, as its name imports, of a solemn delivery of possession; and is in fact the feudal investiture of which we spoke in the last chapter (*h*).

This method (which is still capable of being used) is called a *feoffment*; and the parties between whom it takes place are called the *feoffor* and the *feoffee*. By the common law, the donation with which the livery is accompanied might be merely oral; but, by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) some instrument in writing, under the signature of the feoffor (or of his agent by writing lawfully authorized), was made essential.

It appears by our definition, that estates of freehold may be classed as being either estates of *inheritance*, or estates *not of inheritance* (*i*); and these two kinds will each be considered in their order.

An estate of inheritance is where the tenant is not only entitled to enjoy the land for his own life, but where, after his death without having disposed of it, it is cast by the

(*g*) The tenure itself, we may recollect, is expressed by the same term of *freehold*; (vide sup. p. 210, n. (*i*).) As to the definition here given of freehold estate, it is according to Co. Litt. 43 b. Blackstone's definition of freehold is, that it is "such an estate as is conveyed by livery of seisin" (2 Bl. Com. 104); but he adds, that as estates of inheritance, or for life, and no other,

are conveyed with this solemnity, therefore no others are properly freehold. It may be observed that a freehold estate may consist either in *land* or in some "tenement" (vide sup. p. 169), other than land.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 49 a. As to the manner of making livery, see Doe v. Taylor, 5 Barn. & Ad. 575.

(*i*) Edward Seymour's case, 10 Rep. 97 b.

law upon the persons who successively represent him *in perpetuum* in right of blood, according to a certain established order of *descent*, which we shall have occasion hereafter to explain (*k*). These persons are called his *heirs*, and himself their *ancestor*.

An estate of inheritance is otherwise called a *fee* (*l*).

[The true meaning of the word *fee*, *feodum*, is the same with that of *feud* or *fief*, and in its original sense it is taken in contradistinction to *allodium* (*m*); which, as we have seen, is a man's own land, which he possesseth merely in his own right, without owing any rent or service to any superior. This is property in its highest degree, and the owner thereof hath *absolutum et directum dominium*. But *feodum*, or *fee*, is that which is held of some superior, on condition of rendering him service; in which superior, the ultimate property of the land resides. This allodial property no subject in England has, it being a received and now undeniable principle in the law, that all the lands in England are holden mediately or immediately of the crown. The sovereign therefore, only hath *absolutum et directum dominium* (*n*); but all subjects' lands are in the nature of *feodum* or *fee*, whether derived to them by descent from their ancestors, or purchased for a valuable consideration; for they cannot come to any man by either of those ways, unless accompanied with those feudal clogs which were laid upon the first feudalatory when it was originally granted.

This is the primary sense and acceptance of the word *fee*. But, as Sir Martin Wright very justly observes, the doctrine "that all lands are holden" having been for so many ages a fixed and undeniable axiom, our English

(*k*) Co. Litt. 237 b. As to the law of descent, vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XI.

(*l*) "Fee simple" and "inheritance" are used as convertible terms, Litt. s. 9; Litt. s. 1; Flet. l. 5, c. 5, s. 27.

(*m*) As to allodial property, vide sup. p. 173.

(*n*) "*Prædium domini regis est directum dominium, cujus nullus est author nisi Deus.*"—Co. Litt. 1 b.

[lawyers do very rarely (of late years especially) use the word *fee* in this its primary original sense, in contradistinction to *allodium* or absolute property, with which they have no concern; but generally use it to express the continuance or quantity of estate (*o*). A *fee*, therefore, in general, signifies an estate of inheritance (*p*), being the highest and most extensive interest that a man can have in a feud. And in no other sense than this is the king said to be seised in fee, he being the feudatory of no man (*q*).]

Estates of inheritance are either estates in *fee simple* or estates in *fee tail* (*r*).

I. An estate in fee simple (*s*) is that which a man hath to hold to him and his heirs general, that is, his heirs both lineal and collateral, male and female (*t*); and this is often called an “estate in fee,” without the addition of the word “simple” (*u*); though, as already explained, a “fee” more properly signifies any estate of inheritance. Where a man claims an estate in fee simple in possession in a corporeal hereditament (*x*), the precise technical expression is as follows: that he is “seised in his demesne

(*o*) Of Ten. 148.

(*p*) Litt. s. 1; Flet. l. 5, c. 5, s. 27.

(*q*) Co. Litt. 1 b.

(*r*) “An estate of inheritance is either fee simple or fee tail.”—Edward Seymour’s case, 10 Rep. 97 b. Et vide Litt. s. 13; Co. Litt. 1 b, 19 a, 27 b; Vaughan, 273. Blackstone divides inheritances into such as are *absolute* (which he considers as equivalent to fees simple) and such as are *limited*, of which he considers fees tail as forming a species. (2 Bl. Com. 104.) But the authorities in favour of the division in the text (which is the

more usual one) greatly preponderate.

(*s*) As to this estate, see Co. Litt. 1 a—18 b.

(*t*) Wright’s Tenures, 147; Co. Litt. 1 b. It is to be observed that we are treating at present of natural persons only. Artificial persons, or *corporations*, of whom we shall have occasion to speak hereafter, hold estates in fee simple, to them and their *successors*. Co. Litt. 8 b.

(*u*) Litt. s. 293.

(*x*) Where the subject is incorporeal, or the estate expectant on a precedent freehold, the words “in his demesne” are omitted. Com. Dig. Pleader (C. 35).

as of fee," (*in dominico suo ut de feodo*); the words *in dominico*, or "in his demesne," signifying that he is seised as owner of the land itself, and not merely of the seignioriness or services (*y*); and the words "as of fee" importing that he is seised of an estate in inheritance in fee simple, and also (in reference to the original meaning of the term *fee*) that he is not the absolute or allodial owner, but holds, feudally, of a superior lord (*z*).

The quality of being always holden of a superior lord (the nature of which was fully explained in the Chapter on Tenures) is incident to every estate in fee simple belonging to a subject; but the tenure is no longer (as formerly) of the person from whose immediate grant the fee is derived, but of the person to whose seignioriness it has of antient time belonged. This is by the effect of the statute of *Quia emptores* (18 Edw. I. c. 1), which was passed to put a stop to the practice of the subinfeudation of the fee simple (*a*). For, according to that practice (which was antiently allowed), a new relation of lord and tenant was, upon each successive alienation of the fee,

(*y*) Blackstone considers these words "in his demesne," as signifying that it is "his property, as belonging to him and his heirs for ever."—(2 Bl. Com. 105.) But this assigns no meaning to them beyond what would belong to the other words with which they are connected. Lord Coke understands the word *demesne*, when used in this particular connection, to signify *de main* or of the *hand*, because it is applied only to corporeal or tangible subjects of property. (Co. Litt. 17 a.) But the Latin term *dominicum* is opposed to this derivation; for it is evidently to be traced to *dominus*. On the other hand, there is abundant authority for holding that *dominicum* properly signifies

the land which the feudal lord retained to his own use for sustentation of his household, as distinguished from what he granted out on services; and that the true sense of seisin in demesne, is that given in the text. (See Fleta, l. 5, c. 5, s. 18, s. 26; Bract. l. 4, tr. 5, c. 2, s. 2.) As for the exclusive appropriation of the term to tangible possessions, that is referable merely to the circumstance, that what the lord applied to the use of his household naturally consisted of property of that description, and not of incorporeal and intangible subjects.

(*z*) 2 Bl. Com. 105.

(*a*) As to subinfeudation, vide sup. pp. 174, 186.

continually created between the alienor and alienee; and the latter consequently held of the former, and not of the chief lord under whom the alienor himself held. But this being found prejudicial to the interests of the chief lords, by exposing them to the frequent loss of their escheats, wardships, and marriages, the statute in question was passed for their protection (*b*); directing that, upon all sales or feoffments of land in fee simple, the feoffee shall hold the same, not of his immediate feoffor, but of the next lord paramount, of whom such feoffee himself held; and by the same services (*c*). Since this statute, therefore, the vendor of land in fee simple has no longer been able to convey it to be holden of himself (*d*), but the grantee must take it to hold of the same seignior to which the fee immediately belonged when the statute passed (*e*),—unless something should have since occurred to alter the tenure. Where, from the lapse of time, no badges of tenure under any subject can now be traced, the land will be considered as holden immediately of the crown (*f*), and by the service of mere fealty; which is the least and lowest service the law can create (*g*); and which being now never exacted, has become a merely nominal obligation (*h*). But in many instances a private lord can still be shown to be entitled to the immediate seignior; the ultimate one, as formerly remarked, being in all cases vested in the sovereign.

(*b*) 2 Inst. 66, 500.

(*c*) Ib. 505.

(*d*) It is said that the stat. *Quia emptores* did not extend to the king's own tenants *in capite*, but that the like law was afterwards declared as to them by the statute *De Prerogativa Regis*, (17 Edw. 2, c. 6,) and 34 Edw. 3, c. 15. (See 2 Bl. Com. 91.) It would seem, however, that the stat. *Quia emptores* did in effect apply to the tenants *in*

capite, where they held *ut de honore*, and not *ut de coronâ*. (Wright's Tenures, 163; Taylor v. Horde, Burr. 108.) As to the distinction between these two tenures *in capite*, vide sup. p. 186.

(*e*) Bradshaw v. Lawson, 4 T. R. 443.

(*f*) Booth, 135.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 98 a.

(*h*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 68 b, n. (5).

A fee simple is the most extensive estate of inheritance that a man can possess (*i*); it is the entire property in the land (*h*); and to it is attached—as an inseparable incident—the right of *alienation*, to the full extent of the interest which is vested in the tenant himself, or for any smaller estate (*l*). If he alienes to the full extent of his interest, or, in other words, conveys away the fee simple, it follows of course that the alienee takes an estate to himself and his *own* heirs, answerable to that which the original owner had to him and *his* heirs.

[As the general rule, the fee simple or inheritance of lands and tenements is generally vested and resides in some person or other, though divers inferior estates may be carved out of it. As if one grants a lease for twenty-one years, or for one or two lives, the fee simple remains vested in the grantor and his heirs; and after the determination of those years or lives, the land reverts to the grantor or his heirs, who shall hold it again in fee.] Yet sometimes the fee may be in *abeyance*, that is, only in remembrance, intendment, and consideration of the law; there being no person *in esse*, in whom it can vest and abide; though the law considers it as always potentially existing (*m*). [This may be exemplified in the case of a parson of a church, who hath only an estate therein for the term of his life, and the inheritance remains

(*i*) Litt. s. 11; Co. Litt. 18 a; Vaughan, 269.

(*h*) Butler's Fearn, p. 13 (note); Co. Litt. 18 a; 2 Saund. 388 b; Machell v. Clarke, Ld. Ray. 779; 2 Inst. 336; Edward Seymour's case, 10 Rep. 97 b.

(*l*) Litt. s. 360; Co. Litt. 223 a; 1 Cr. Dig. 20.

(*m*) As to the doctrine of *abeyance*, see Co. Litt. 341 a, 342 b; Litt. 646, 647; Butler's Fearn, p. 360, 9th ed.; 1 Prest. Est. 503; Camoys' Peerage Case, 5 Bing. N.

C. 763; et vide sup. 226, n. (*h*). Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 107) considers *abeyance* as also importing "*expectation*," and Co. Litt. 342 b, is to the same effect. Yet Lord Coke himself afterwards remarks that the fee simple may be in *perpetual* *abeyance* (as in the case of a parson) "without any expectation to come *in esse*." (Co. Litt. 343 a.) Littleton's exposition, therefore, which is that followed in the text, seems to be the more correct; (see Litt. s. 646.)

[in abeyance (*n*). And not only the fee, but the freehold also, may be in abeyance; as, when a parson dies, the freehold of his glebe is in abeyance, until a successor be named, and then it vests in the successor (*o*).

The word “heirs” is necessary in the grant or donation, in order to make a fee or inheritance. For if the land be given to a man for ever, or to him and his assigns for ever, this vests in him but an estate for life (*p*). This very great nicety about the insertion of the word “heirs” in all donations, in order to vest a fee, is plainly a relic of the feudal strictness, by which it was required that the form of the donation should be punctually pursued; or that, as Craig expresses it in the words of Baldus, “*donationes sint stricti juris, ne quis plus donasse præsumatur quam in donatione expresserit*” (*q*). And therefore, as the personal abilities of the donee were originally supposed to be the only inducements to the gift, the donee’s estate in the land extended only to his own person, and subsisted no longer than his life; unless the donor, by an express provision in the grant, gave it a longer continuance, and extended it also to his heirs.]

But this rule has some exceptions—and particularly has never been held to extend to dispositions *by will*; in which, as they were introduced at the time when the feudal rigour was apace wearing out, a more liberal construction has always been allowed: and therefore by a devise to a man for ever, or to one and his assigns for ever, or to one in fee simple, the devisee has always been construed to have an estate of inheritance; for the intention of the devisor was sufficiently plain from the words of perpetuity annexed, though he had omitted the legal words of inheritance (*r*). If, however, the devise were

(*n*) Litt. s. 646. Lord Coke, however, holds that a parson has for some purposes a fee simple qualified; Co. Litt. 341 a.

(*o*) Litt. s. 647; Co. Litt. 342 b.

(*p*) Litt. s. 1; Wright v. Dowley, 2 W. Bl. 1185.

(*q*) L. 1, t. 9, s. 17.

(*r*) Thus, too, (even before the new Will Act,) a devisee of an in-

simply to a man and “his assigns,” without annexing any words of perpetuity, the devisee was, at one time, held to take only an estate for life; for it did not appear that the deviser intended any more. A new rule of construction, however, is now expressly provided for all devises of real property; for by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 28, it is enacted, that where any real estate shall (after the passing of that Act) be devised *without words of limitation*, it shall be construed to pass the whole interest of which the testator had power to dispose, *unless* the contrary intention should appear by the will.

Estates in fee simple are divided into three sorts (*s*):—1, *fee simple absolute*; 2, *fee simple qualified*; 3, *fee simple conditional*—a division which relates, it is to be observed, to the *quality*, not the *quantity*, of the estate;

definite estate, if he was charged *personally* with the payment of debts or legacies, was held to take the fee. Secus, if the *estate devised to him* was so charged. See *Doe d. Sams v. Garlick*, 14 Mee. & W. 698; *Manning v. Taylor*, Law Rep., 1 Exch. 235.

(*s*) This division of fees simple is given by Lord Coke as the common one in his time (Co. Litt. 1 b); and is followed by Mr. Justice Powell, in *Idle v. Cooke*, (Lord Raym. 1148,) and by the Court of King's Bench in *Martin v. Strachan*, (reported 5 T. R. 107, *in notis*.) It is to be observed, however, that the two last classes are both referred by Lord Coke to a more general head of fees simple *determinable* (a term still in frequent use). See *Edward Seymour's case*, 10 Rep. 97 b, where estates of inheritance are distributed with great clearness and precision, as follows:—First, they are either *fee simple* or *fee tail*. Estates in

fee simple are either *absolute* (i. e. indeterminable) or *determinable*. Those which are determinable are either *derived out of an estate in fee simple absolute*, or *derived out of an estate in fee tail*. The first of these are created either by way of *condition* (as upon mortgage), or by way of *limitation* (as if A. enfeoffs B. of the manor of D. to hold to him and his heirs so long as C. has heirs of his body); the first sort being called fees simple *conditional*, the second, fees simple *limited and qualified*. The fee simple derived out of an estate tail, Lord Coke exemplifies by the case where tenant in tail bargains and sells to W. H. and his heirs; in such case W. H. takes an estate in fee simple, as long as the tenant in tail has heirs of his body, derived out of the estate tail. See also *Walsingham's case*, Plowd. 557; *Willion v. Berkley*, *ibid*. 241.

for it is laid down by Lord Coke that in the latter respect, both fees qualified and fees conditional are equivalent to fees simple absolute (*t*).

1. The fee simple absolute is free from all qualification, and requires no particular remark; the two others involve considerations of some intricacy.

2. [A qualified fee is such a one as, having a qualification subjoined thereto, must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end (*u*). As, in the case of a grant to A. and his heirs, *tenants of the manor of Dale*; here, whenever the heirs of A. cease to be tenants of that manor, the grant is entirely defeated. Thus when Henry the sixth granted to John Talbot, lord of the manor of Kingston-Lisle in Berks, that he and his heirs, lords of the said manor, should be peers of the realm, by the title of barons of Lisle;—in this instance John Talbot had a qualified fee in that dignity, and the instant he or his heirs quitted the seigniorship of this manor, the dignity was at an end (*x*).] Such an estate is a fee simple, because it is limited to the heirs general, and may by possibility endure for ever; yet, as that duration depends upon the concurrence of collateral circumstances, which qualify the donation, it is therefore not an absolute, but a qualified or (as it is also called) a *base* fee (*y*).

3. A conditional fee seems properly to comprise every fee simple granted upon condition (*z*), but the term is

(*t*) Co. Litt. 18 a.

(*u*) As to a qualified fee simple, see Lord Cardigan *v.* Armitage, 2 Barn. & Cress. 202.

(*x*) Co. Litt. 27 a.

(*y*) It is proper to observe, with respect to this term of *base* fee, that it has usually a more restricted application, viz., to that species of qualified fee which is created where tenant in tail conveys his estate by bargain and sale to another and his heirs, and which Lord Coke de-

scribes as a determinable fee derived out of an estate tail; vide sup. p. 238, note (*s*). And in the Act for Abolition of Fines and Recoveries, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, its meaning is by express provision confined (so far as that statute is concerned) to the estate created by the alienation of the tenant in tail where the issue are barred, but those in remainder or reversion are not.

(*z*) Edward Seymour's case, 10 Rep. 97 b.

usually understood to refer to that particular species called a conditional fee at the common law.

[A conditional fee at the common law, was a fee restrained in its form of donation to some particular heirs, exclusive of others: "*donatio stricta et coarctata; sicut certis hæredibus, quibusdam a successione exclusis*" (a): as to the heirs of a man's body, by which only his lineal descendants were admitted, in exclusion of collateral heirs; or, to the heirs male of his body, in exclusion both of collaterals and lineal females also (b).] We say restrained in the form of donation; because, in point of legal effect, such a gift was construed by the judges of former days, as conferring not an estate descendible to some particular heirs, but a fee simple, though a fee simple subject to condition (c). For they held that a gift to a man and the heirs of his body was a gift upon condition that it should revert to the donor, if the donee had no heirs of his body (d). They therefore called it a fee simple on condition that the donee had issue. So that, as soon as he had any issue born, his estate was supposed, by the performance in some sense of the condition, to become absolute (e); at least for these three purposes:—1. To enable the tenant to aliene the land, and thereby to bar the interest not only of his own issue, but also of the donor, in the reversion (f). 2. To subject the tenant to forfeit his estate for treason, which till issue born he was not able to do, except for the period of his own life; for otherwise the inheritance of the issue, and reversion of the donor, might have been defeated (g). 3. [To empower him to charge the land with rents, commons, and certain other incum-

(a) Flet. 1. 3, c. 3, s. 5.

(b) Blackstone remarks here, (vol. ii. p. 110,) that there are strong traces of such particular limitation in our earliest Saxon laws, and cites Ll. Ælfred. c. 37.

(c) Nevil's case, 7 Rep. 34 b.

(d) Stat. de donis (13 Edw. 1, c.

1); Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 241.

(e) It was performed, says Lord Coke, "to some intent;" (Nevil's case, ubi sup.)

(f) See Nevil's case, ubi sup.; Co. Litt. 19 a; 2 Inst. 333; and see Doe v. Clark, 5 B. & Ald. 461.

(g) Co. Litt. 19 a; 2 Inst. 334.

[brances, so as to bind his issue (*h*). And this was thought the more reasonable, because, by the birth of issue, the possibility of the donor's reversion was rendered more distant and precarious: and *his* interest seems to have been the only one which the law, as it then stood, was solicitous to protect, without much regard to the right of succession intended to be vested in the issue.] However, if the grantee survived his issue, and afterwards died without making any alienation, the land by force of the condition reverted to the donor, and therefore the performance of the condition by the birth of issue did not alter the course of descent till alienation in fact took place (*i*). [For which reason, in order to subject the lands to the ordinary course of descent, the donees of these conditional fees-simple took care to aliene as soon as they had performed the condition by having issue; and, afterwards, repurchased the lands, which gave them a fee simple absolute, that would descend to the heirs general, according to the course of the common law. And thus stood the old law with regard to conditional fees:] a subject of no great practical importance, this kind of gift having been long since construed (as we shall presently see) in a different manner. [But, as Lord Coke observes, these things, though they seem antient, are yet necessary to be known; as well for the declaring how the common law stood in such cases, as for the sake of annuities, and such-like inheritances, as are not within the statutes of entail, and therefore remain as at the common law (*h*).]

II. The subject of conditional fees leads us, by a natural introduction, to our second general division of estates of inheritance (*l*)—namely, *estates in fee-tail*, or, as they are

(*h*) Co. Litt. 19 a.

(*i*) Nevil's case, 7 Rep. 34 b; Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 247.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 19 a. As to the things capable of being entailed,

see Co. Litt. by Harg. 20 a, n. (3), n. (5); Moore v. Lord Plymouth, 7 Taunt. 614.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 233.

more concisely termed, *estates tail*. An estate tail is that which a man hath to hold to him and the heirs of his body, or to him and particular heirs of his body (*m*); being, as to the form of donation, the same kind of estate that we have just been considering under the name of fee-simple conditional (*n*); for in that light it was at first contemplated (*o*). But by force of the statute to be presently mentioned, and of the judicial construction which that statute received (*p*), another character has been long attached to an estate so limited—viz. that of an estate *tail*; the incidents or consequences of which are very different from those of a fee conditional. The history of the change is as follows:—

[It was the inconveniences which attended a limited and fettered inheritance which probably induced the judges to give way to the subtle finesse of construction (for such it undoubtedly was), by which the dispositions in question were construed as conditional estates in fee simple. But, on the other hand, the nobility (who were willing to perpetuate their possession in their own families), in order to put a stop to this construction of the limitation, procured the statute of Westminster the second (commonly called the statute *De donis conditionalibus*) to be made (*q*); which Act paid a greater regard to the private will and intentions of the donor, than to the propriety of such intentions, or any public considerations whatsoever.] This statute enacted that thenceforth the will of the donor should be observed *secundum formam in cartâ doni expressam*; and that tenements given to a man and the heirs of his body, or to the heirs male of his body, or the like, should, notwithstanding any alienation by the donee, go to his issue, if there were any; or, if issue failed, should revert to the donor or his heirs.

[Upon the construction of this act of parliament, the

(*m*) As to this estate, see Co. Litt. 18 b—28 b.

(*n*) Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 237.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 238.

(*p*) 2 Inst. 335.

(*q*) 13 Edw. 1, (stat. 1,) c. 1, made A.D. 1285.

[judges determined that, under such a limitation, the donee had no longer a conditional fee-simple; but they divided the estate given into two parts (*r*), leaving in the donee a new kind of particular estate, which they denominated a *fee-tail* (*s*); and vesting in the donor the ultimate fee-simple of the land, expectant on the failure of issue (*t*). And hence it is that Littleton tells us, that tenant in fee-tail is by virtue of the statute of Westminster the second (*u*).]

The expectant estate or reversion of the donor, by virtue of this statute, is considered as of a different nature from the right which belonged, at the common law, to the donor of a fee conditional: for his reverter was only in possibility, being dependent on the contingency of the donee's estate determining by force of the condition; but the reversion of the donor of an estate tail is the residue of a fee, and therefore a fixed or vested interest (*x*).

By the express provision of the statute *De donis*, the alienation of the tenant in tail was not to defeat the succession of the issue, or the reversion of the donor and his heirs. Such alienation was not, however, a void act,—for his leases, though liable to be defeated after his death by those claiming under the entail, were in other respects effectual; and if he conveyed his estate to another and his heirs, the alienee took a *base fee* (*y*), that is to say, a fee-simple to hold as long as the tenant in tail lived or had heirs of his body (*z*). But such fee was determinable

(*r*) 2 Inst. 335; Willion *v.* Berkeley, Plowd. 241; Butler's Fearne, 382, (n.), 9th edit.

(*s*) The expression *fee tail*, or *feodum talliatum*, was borrowed from the feudists; (see Craig, l. 1, t. 10, s. 24, 25;) among whom it signified any mutilated or truncated inheritance; being derived from the barbarous verb *taliare*, to cut; from which the French *tailler* and the Italian *tagliare* are formed.—Spelm.

Gloss. ad verb. Feodum.

(*t*) 2 Inst. 335.

(*u*) S. 13.

(*x*) 2 Inst. 335; Co. Litt. 22 a. See the remarks on this subject in Bac. Abr. tit. Remainder and Reversion.

(*y*) Vide sup. p. 239.

(*z*) Such alienation, though wrongful, did not work a *forfeiture*, but, if made by certain modes of conveyance, was a *discontinuance*,

on the death of the tenant in tail and the failure of his issue; and even on his death might be avoided by the entry of the issue (a).

[Estates-tail are either *special* or *general*. Tail-general is where lands and tenements are given to one and the *heirs of his body* begotten: and this is called tail-general, because, how often soever such donee in tail be married, his issue, by all and every such marriage, is, in successive order, capable of inheriting the estate tail *per formam doni* (b). Tenant in tail-special is where the gift is restrained to the heirs of the donee's body by a particular person; as where lands and tenements are given to a man and the *heirs of his body, on Mary his now wife* to be begotten; here no issue can inherit, but such special issue as is engendered between them two; not such as the husband may have by another wife: and therefore it is called special-tail (c). And here we may observe that the words of inheritance (to him and his *heirs*) give him an estate in fee; but they being heirs *of his body* this makes it a fee-tail; and the person being also limited on whom such heirs shall be begotten, (viz. *Mary his present wife*,) this makes it a fee-tail special.

Estates in "general" and "special" tail are further

which deprived both the issue and reversioner of their *right of entry*, and left them only a *right of action*. (See Co. Litt. 328 a; 2 Inst. 335.)

(a) Co. Litt. by Butler, 331 a, n. (1); *Machell v. Clarke*, Ld. Raym. 778; Salk. 618, S. C.; *Seymour's case*, 10 Rep. 97 b; *Walsingham's case*, Plowd. 557; *Goodright v. Shilson*, Burr. 1703.

(b) Litt. ss. 14, 15.

(c) In the particular case where an estate is given to a man on his marriage with the daughter or cousin of the donor in *frankmarriage*, such donees are tenants in

special tail. Blackstone tells us (vol. ii. p. 115) that in the case of estates *in libero maritagio* (now out of use) the word "frankmarriage" does *ex vi termini*, not only create an inheritance, but likewise limits that inheritance, supplying not only words of descent but of procreation also. He adds, that such donees are liable to no service but fealty; for a rent reserved thereon is void till the fourth degree of consanguinity be passed between the issues of the donor and donee. (See Litt. ss. 19, 20.)

[diversified by the distinction of sexes in such entails; for both of them may either be in tail *male* or tail *female*. As if lands be given to a man and his *heirs male of his body* begotten, this is an estate in tail male general; but if to a man and the heirs *female of his body on his present wife* begotten, this is an estate in tail female special. And in case of an entail male, the heirs female shall never inherit, nor any derived from them; nor *è converso*, the heirs male, in case of the gift in tail female (*d*). Thus, if the donee in tail male hath a daughter who dies leaving a son, such grandson in this case cannot inherit the estate-tail; for he cannot deduce his descent wholly by heirs male (*e*). And as the heir male must convey his descent wholly by males, so must the heir female wholly by females. And therefore if a man hath two estates-tail, the one in tail male, the other in tail female; and he hath issue a daughter, which daughter hath issue a son; this grandson can succeed to neither of the estates; for he cannot convey his descent wholly either in the male or female line (*f*).

As, in a deed, the word *heirs* is necessary to create a fee, so, in further imitation of the strictness of the feudal donation, the word *body*, or some other words of procreation (*g*), are necessary to make it a fee-tail, and ascertain to what heirs in particular the fee is limited. If therefore either the words of inheritance or words of procreation be omitted in the grant, albeit the others are inserted, this will not make an estate-tail. As if the grant be to a man and the *issue of his body*, to a man and his *seed*, to a man and his *children* or *offspring*; all these are only estates for life, for there are wanting the words of inheritance, "his heirs" (*h*). So, on the other hand, a gift to a man and his *heirs male*, or *heirs female*, is an

(*d*) Litt. ss. 21, 22.

(*e*) Ibid. s. 24; Co. Litt. 25 b.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 25 b.

(*g*) Beresford's case, 7 Rep. 40.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 20; Frogmorton v. Wharrey, 2 W. Bla. 728; 3 Will. 125, 144, S. C.

[estate in fee-simple, and not in fee-tail; for there are no words to ascertain the body out of which they shall issue;] which is indispensable to an estate of the latter description (*i*); and every estate in fee, which is not in tail, must of necessity be fee-simple (*k*), as all fees consist either of one kind or the other (*l*). Upon such a limitation, too, as last supposed, heirs both male and female shall inherit (*m*); for a descent in fee-simple is inconsistent (by our definition) with a restriction to heirs of either sex (*n*). It is to be observed, however, that in last wills and testaments a greater indulgence has always been allowed as to the manner of expounding a donation (*o*); and by these instruments therefore an estate-tail may be created by a devise to a man and his *seed*, or to a man and his *heirs male*; or by other irregular modes of expression (*p*), provided they be sufficient to indicate an intention to confer an inheritance, but to restrain it to the descendants of the devisee.

We have seen that lands cannot now be conveyed in fee-simple to be holden of the grantor; but that the holding must be of him to whose seigniority the fee belongs (*q*). It is otherwise, however, with respect to a gift in tail. For if a tenant in fee-simple grants an estate tail out of it, (the reversion remaining in the donor,) the donee in tail shall hold of the donor, by fealty and such other services as may be reserved; or if none be reserved, then by fealty and such other services as the donor himself renders to the next lord paramount (*r*).

(*i*) Litt. sect. 31; Co. Litt. 7 a; *Abraham v. Twigg*, Cro. Eliz. 478; *Earl of Oxford's case*, W. Jones, 105. A grant in such terms by the *Crown*, has been held void.—*Ibid.* Co. Litt. 27 a.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 27 b.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 233.

(*m*) Co. Litt. 27 b.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 233.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 237.

(*p*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 115; Co. Litt. 9 b, 27 a; see *Mellish v. Mellish*, 2 B. & Cr. 520; *Doe d. Jearrad v. Bannister*, 7 M. & W. 298; *Good v. Good*, 7 El. & Bl. 295.

(*q*) Vide sup. p. 235.

(*r*) Litt. s. 19; Co. Litt. 23 a, 93 a, 143 a, 68 b, n. (5), by Harg.; 2 Inst. 501, 505; *Willion v. Berkeley*, Plowd. 237; *Bingham's case*, 2 Rep. 92 b.

But the tenure thus created between the donor and the donee in tail is described as *imperfect*, whereas that which subsists between the tenant in fee and the chief lord is said to be *perfect* in its kind (*s*).

[Thus much for the nature of estates tail: the establishment of which family law, as it is properly styled by Pigott (*t*), occasioned infinite difficulties and disputes (*u*). Children grew disobedient when they knew they could not be set aside: farmers were ousted of their leases made by tenants in tail; for if such leases had been held valid, then under colour of long leases the issue might have been virtually disinherited: creditors were defrauded of their debts; for if tenant in tail could have charged his estate with their payment, he might also have defeated his issue, by mortgaging it for as much as it was worth; innumerable latent entails were produced to deprive purchasers of the lands they had fairly bought; of suits in consequence of which our antient books are full: and treasons were encouraged; as estates-tail were not liable to forfeiture longer than for the tenant's life. So that they were justly branded as the source of new contentions and mischiefs unknown to the common law, and almost universally considered as the common grievance of the realm (*x*). But as the nobility were always fond of the statute *De donis*, because it preserved their family estates from forfeiture, there was little hope of procuring a repeal by the legislature; and therefore, by the connivance of an active and politic prince, a method was devised to evade it.

Nearly two hundred years intervened between the making of the statute *De donis* and the application of *common recoveries* to this intent, in the twelfth year of Edward the fourth (*y*); but these were then openly

(*s*) Co. Cop. s. 31.

(*t*) Com. Recov. 5.

(*u*) Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 131 b.

(*x*) Co. Litt. 19 b; Hunt v. Gateley, Moor, 156; Mary Portington's case, 10 Rep. 38.

(*y*) A.D. 1472.

[declared by the judges to be a sufficient bar of an estate tail (*h*). For though the courts had, so long before as the reign of Edward the third, very frequently hinted their opinion that a bar might be effected upon these principles (*i*), yet it never was carried into execution, until Edward the fourth—observing (in the disputes between the houses of York and Lancaster) how little effect attainders had upon traitors protected by the sanctuary of entails—contrived (*k*), that Taltarum's case should be brought before the court (*l*);] wherein, in consequence of the principles then laid down, it was in effect determined, that a common recovery suffered by tenant in tail should convert his estate into a fee simple absolute; and bar all persons whatever claiming the estate tail, or any estate ulterior thereto (*m*). [What common recoveries were, both in their nature and consequences, and why they were allowed to be a bar to the estate tail, must be reserved to a subsequent inquiry. At present it may suffice to say, that they were fictitious proceedings, introduced by a kind of *pia fraus*, to elude the statute *De donis*; an Act which was found so intolerably mischievous, and which yet one branch of the legislature would not then consent to repeal; and that these recoveries, however clandestinely introduced, afterwards became by long use and acquiescence a most common assurance of lands; and were looked upon as the legal mode of conveyance, by which tenant in tail might dis-

(*h*) Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 131; Mildmay's case, 6 Rep. 40.

(*i*) Mary Portington's case, 10 Rep. 37, 38.

(*k*) Pigott, 8. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 117) says he *suffered* it to be brought, but the expression of Pigott is, that he "brought it on the stage."

(*l*) Year Book, 12 Edw. 4, 14,

19; Fitzh. Abr. tit. Faux Recov. 20; Bro. Abr. *ibid.* 30; tit. Recov. in Value, 19; tit. Taille, 36. See Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 328.

(*m*) *Martin v. Strachan*, 5 T. R. 107, (n.); Willes, 449; *Taylor v. Horde*, 1 Burr. 115; *Smith v. Clifford*, 1 T. R. 738; and see First Real Property Report, p. 22.

[pose of his lands and tenements, so that no court would suffer them to be shaken or reflected on (*n*).

This expedient having greatly abridged estates-tail with regard to their duration, others were soon invented to strip them of other privileges. The next that was attacked was their freedom from forfeiture for treason. For, notwithstanding the large advances made by recoveries, in the compass of about threescore years, towards unfettering these inheritances, and thereby subjecting the lands to forfeiture, the rapacious prince then reigning, finding them resettled in a similar manner to suit the convenience of families, had address enough to procure a statute (26 Henry VIII. c. 13), whereby all estates “of inheritance,” under which general words estates-tail were covertly included, are declared to be forfeited to the king upon any conviction of high treason.

The next attack which they suffered in order of time was by the statute 32 Henry VIII. c. 28; whereby certain *leases* made by tenants in tail, not tending to the prejudice of the issue, were allowed to bind the issue in tail, though not the remainderman or reversioner (*o*). But they received a more violent blow, in the same session of parliament, by the construction put upon the statute “of fines,” (4 Henry VII. c. 24,) by the statute 32 Henry VIII. c. 36; which declares that mode of conveyance called a *fine* (which is another species of fictitious proceeding), when duly levied by tenant in tail, to be a complete bar to him and his heirs claiming under such entail. This was evidently agreeable to the intention of Henry the seventh, whose policy it was (before common recoveries had obtained their full strength and authority) to lay the road as open as possible to the

(*n*) As to recoveries, see 11 Hen. 7, c. 20; 7 Hen. 8, c. 4; 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20; 14 Eliz. c. 8; 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16; 14 Geo. 2, c. 20; et post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XIX.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 45 b. This Act (so far as regards our present subject) is repealed by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, referred to post, p. 252.

[alienation of landed property, in order to weaken the overgrown power of his nobles: but as they, from the opposite reasons, were not easily brought to consent to such a provision, it was therefore couched in his Act under covert and obscure expressions: and the judges, though willing to construe that statute as favourably as possible for the defeating of entailed estates, yet hesitated at giving fines so extensive a power by mere implication, when the statute *De donis* had expressly declared that they should *not* be a bar to estates-tail. But the statute of Henry the eighth, when the doctrine of alienation was better received, and the will of the prince more implicitly obeyed than before, avowed and established that intention.

By an enactment of the succeeding year (33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, s. 75), all estates-tail are rendered liable to be charged for payment of debts due to the king by record or special contract; as since, by the bankrupt laws, they are also subjected to be sold for the debts contracted by a *bankrupt* (*p*). And by the construction put on the statute 43 Elizabeth, c. 4, an appointment by tenant in tail of the land entailed, *to a charitable use*, was held to be good without fine or recovery (*q*).]

But the most extensive and effectual relaxation is that introduced by the modern statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74 (usually called the Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries); for this enables the tenant in tail, by an ordinary deed of conveyance, *if duly enrolled*, within six months in the Court of Chancery, and without resort to the indirect and operose expedient of a fine or recovery (which the statute wholly abolishes), to aliene in fee-simple absolute, or for any less estate, the lands entailed; and thereby to bar himself and his issue as well as all persons having any ulterior estate therein (*r*). Yet this

(*p*) The first provision for subjecting estates tail to sale in the case of bankruptcy, was by 21 Jac. I, c. 19, s. 12.

(*q*) Attorney-General *v.* Rye, 2 Vern. 453; Chan. Prec. 16.

(*r*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 15. This provision took effect from 31st

provision is subject to an important qualification, designed for the protection of family settlements. For in these, it is usual to settle a life estate (which is a freehold interest) on the parent, prior to the estate tail limited to the children; and the nature of a *recovery*, by which alone interests ulterior to the estate tail could formerly be barred, was such as to make the concurrence of the immediate tenant of the freehold indispensable to the validity of that proceeding. In order, therefore, to continue to the parent (or other prior taker of the life estate) a control of the same general description, the Act provides that where, under the same settlement which created the estate tail, a prior estate of freehold, or for years determinable with life, shall have been conferred,—it shall not be competent for the tenant in tail to bar any estate taking effect upon the determination of the estate tail, without consent of the person to whom such prior estate was given: who receives for that reason the appellation of *protector of the settlement(s)*. But the object not being to restrain the power of the tenant in tail over the estate tail itself, (which he could have barred, before the statute, by *fine*, without any other person's concurrence,) his alienation, in the manner prescribed by the Act, is allowed to be effectual even without the consent of the protector, so far as regards the barring of such tenant in tail and his issue (*t*).

Even subsequently to the passing of this Act, however, one of the antient and justly obnoxious immunities of an estate tail still remained without disturbance; viz., its exemption from liability for ordinary debts,—not being the debts of a bankrupt. But this has been now removed by the effect of two statutes of the present reign, viz., 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112—by which

December, 1833; but some few species of estates tail are excepted from the Act. (Vide post, c. XIX., where this subject is further explained.)

(s) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 22.

The estates, however, of dowresses, bare trustees, and some others, do not qualify for the protectorship, ss. 26, 27.

(t) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 34.

any debtor's entailed estates (as also any other estates of which he may be possessed, or in which he may have any interest), are now bound(*u*) by any common law judgment, or order having the operation of a judgment or rule of court, or order or decree in equity or bankruptcy(*x*), which shall be entered up against him,—provided always (in case the entry be made after the 29th July, 1864) the land shall be actually delivered in execution(*y*).

Finally, with reference to *leases* of entailed estates, we may remark that the effect of the same statute of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, is to enable a tenant in tail in possession to make effectual leases *without* the necessity of enrolment, for terms not exceeding twenty-one years at a rack-rent, or not less than five-sixth parts of a rack-rent(*z*); and that by the Settled Estates Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120), it is further enacted(*a*), that any person entitled to the possession, or to the receipt of rents and profits under a *settlement*(*b*) made after 1st November, 1856, for an estate for life, or for a term of years determinable with his life, or for any greater estate, (which brings an estate tail within the provision,) either in his own right, or in right of his wife, may demise the same from time to time, (unless the settlement shall contain an express declaration that it shall not be lawful for such person to make such demise,) for any term not exceeding twenty-one years, in such form as is in the Act prescribed(*c*).

(*u*) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13. However, to give the judgment priority against *purchasers, mortgagees and creditors*, it must be duly registered in the Court of Common Pleas. (See 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 20; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 4; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 38, s. 2; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 5; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 4.)

(*x*) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, s. 2.

(*y*) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, s. 1.

(*z*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 15, 40, 41.

(*a*) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, ss. 32, 33. This Act has been amended by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 77, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 45.

(*b*) As to the term "*settlement*," as used in this Act, and to what it extends, see 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 1, and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 77.

(*c*) But the principal mansion house of such settled estate, and demesnes and lands usually occupied

therewith, cannot be included;—also the twenty-one years must take effect in possession;—the demise must be by deed;—and the rent must be the best that can reasonably be obtained without fine, and be incident to the immediate reversion. Moreover the demise cannot be made without impeachment of waste; and there must be a covenant for the due payment of the rent;—and a condition of re-entry on non-payment of rent for twenty-eight days, or on non-observance of any of the covenants and conditions:—and a counterpart of the lease must

be executed by the lessee. (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 32.)

It may be convenient here to notice that by certain modern statutes, facilities are given to owners of settled estates to make permanent improvements on the same (as by the erection of a suitable residence for themselves), and to charge a portion of the expense on those who come after them. See 27 & 28 Vict. c. 114 (Improvement of Lands Act, 1864); 33 & 34 Vict. c. 56 (Limited Owners' Residences Act, 1870), as amended by 34 & 35 Vict. c. 84.

CHAPTER IV.

OF FREEHOLD ESTATES NOT OF INHERITANCE.

WE are next to discourse of such estates of freehold as are not of inheritance, but *for life* only (*a*). And of these estates for life, some are *conventional*, or expressly created by the act of the parties; others merely *legal*, or created by construction and operation of law (*b*). We will first consider the former class, and then the different species of the latter.

I. [Those estates for life may be termed *conventional* which are expressly created by some deed or will; and they arise when an estate is limited to a man to hold the same for the term of his own life, or for that of any other person, or for more lives than one; in any of which cases he is styled tenant for life; only, when he holds the estate by the life of another, he is usually called tenant *pur autre vie* (*c*). These estates for life are, like inheritances, of a feudal nature; and were for some time the highest estate that any man could have in a feud, for this was not in its original hereditary. They were, accordingly, originally conferred with the same feudal solemnities, the same investiture or livery of seisin, as fees themselves were;] and as in estates of inheritance in possession, the tenant is said to be “seised in his demesne as of fee,”

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 231. It may be worth remarking, that the legal tenant for life (and not the remainderman) is, as the general rule, entitled to the custody of the title-deeds.

(Allwood v. Heywood, 1 Hurl. & C. 745).

(*b*) Wright's Tenures, 190.

(*c*) Litt. s. 56.

or “of fee-tail” (*d*), so in estates for life in possession, he is “seised in his demesne as of freehold.”

[Estates for life may be created, not only by the express words before mentioned, but also by a general grant, without defining or limiting any specific estate. As if one by deed grants to A. B. the manor of Dale, this makes him tenant for life (*e*). For though, as there are no words of inheritance, or *heirs*, mentioned in the grant, it cannot be construed to be a fee; it shall however be construed to be as large an estate as the words of the donation will bear, and therefore an estate for life. Also such a grant at large, or a grant for term of life generally, shall be construed to be an estate for the life of *the grantee*, in case the grantor hath authority to make such a grant (*f*); for an estate for a man’s own life is more beneficial and of a higher nature than for any other life: and the rule of law is, that all grants are to be taken most strongly against the grantor, unless in the case of grants by the crown (*g*).

Such estates for life will, generally speaking, endure as long as the life for which they are granted (*h*): but there are some estates for life, which may determine upon future contingencies, before the life for which they are created expires. As if an estate be granted to a woman during her widowhood, or to a man until he be promoted to a benefice; in these and similar cases, whenever the contingency happens,—when the widow marries, or when the grantee obtains a benefice, the respective estates are absolutely determined and gone (*i*). Yet, while they subsist, they are reckoned estates for life (*k*); because, the time for which they will endure being uncertain, they

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 233. -

(*e*) Co. Litt. 42 a, 183 a.

(*f*) Ibid.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 36 a, 183 a.

(*h*) If tenant for life has not been heard of for the space of *seven*

years, a presumption of his death arises, under stat. 19 Car. 2, c. 16, s. 2, and 6 Anne, c. 18.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 42 a; Boraston’s case, 3 Rep. 19 a.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 42 a.

[may by possibility last for life, if the contingencies upon which they are to determine do not sooner happen. And, moreover, in case an estate be granted to a man for his life generally, it may also determine by his *civil* death;] as if he be outlawed, whereby his estate is forfeited and he becomes dead in law; [for which reason, in conveyances, the grant is usually made “for the term of a man’s *natural* life;” which can only determine by his natural death (*m*).]

On the gift of an estate tail we may remember that the donee holds of the donor, by fealty and such other services as may be reserved between them; or if none be reserved, then by fealty, and the same services as are due from the donor to the next superior lord (*n*). In like manner, upon a lease for life, a tenure (of the imperfect kind) is thereby created between the lessor and lessee, and the latter will hold of the former, by the nominal obligation of fealty, and such other services as may be reserved; but if no other be reserved, the lessee will hold not by those due from the lessor himself, but by fealty only (*o*).

The incidents to an estate for life (whether conventional or legal) are principally the following:—

1. Every tenant for life, unless restrained by covenant or agreement, may of common right take, upon the land demised to him, reasonable *estovers* or *botes*, that is, an allowance of wood for fuel, repairs, and the like: the term *estovers* being derived from the French word *estoffer*, to furnish; and *bote*, which is of Saxon derivation, being used by us as synonymous with *estovers*. And here we may remark, that when the allowance is for fuel, it is called house-bote, and sometimes fire-bote; when for making and repairing the instruments of husbandry, plough-bote and cart-bote; when for repairing hedges

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 141.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 246.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 143 a, 23 a, 93 a,
68 b, n. (5), by Harg.; Litt. s. 132.

and fences, it is termed hay-bote or hedge-bote (*p*). However, the term *bote* and its compounds, though technically proper, have in modern times somewhat fallen out of use.

While a tenant for life has this privilege of *botes*, he is, on the other hand, answerable by law for *waste*, that is, any spoil and destruction which he does, or allows to be done, to the premises during his tenancy, to the injury of the person entitled to the inheritance (*q*). And there are two kinds of waste; that which is *voluntary* and that which is *permissive*; the first by the tenant's voluntary act, as where he pulls down a wall, or cuts down timber; the other by his default, as by suffering a wall to fall down for want of necessary repair (*r*). Estates for life are sometimes limited, however, with an express clause, that the tenant shall hold the land *without impeachment of waste*; and this has had the effect of relieving him in a court of law from this restraint (*s*), though the Court of Chancery has even in such cases prevented any manifest injury to the inheritance,—as the felling of ornamental timber, and the like (*t*).

2. A person entitled to the possession of any *settled* estate, as tenant for life, or for term of years determinable with his life,—either in his own right, or in right of his wife,—is now (in general) enabled to make an effectual *lease* of the same, for the period of twenty-one years, and also to effect permanent improvements (as by *draining*), or by erecting thereon a suitable residence for himself),

(*p*) See 2 Bl. Com. 35.

(*q*) Co. Litt. 53; 2 Bl. Com. 281; 3 Bl. Com. 223. See *Seagram v. Knight*, Law Rep., 2 Ch. App. 628.

(*r*) As to *permissive* waste, see *Yellowby v. Gower*, 11 Exch. 274; *Powys v. Blagrove*, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 448.

(*s*) See *Herlakenden's case*, 4

Rep. 63 a; *Dowman's case*, 9 Rep. 10 b; *Pyne v. Dor*, 1 T. R. 55.

(*t*) As to *equitable* waste, see *Ashton v. Ashton*, 1 Ves. sen. 254; *Burgess v. Lamb*, 16 Ves. 174; *Lushington v. Boldero*, 6 Madd. 149; *Morris v. Morris*, 15 Sim. 505; 1 Fonb. Eq. 33, n. See also 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, subs. (3).

and to charge a portion of the expense on the reversioner (*x*).

3. Tenant for life, or his representatives, shall not be prejudiced by the determination of his estate, where such determination is sudden and unforeseen. [Therefore, if a tenant for his own life sows the lands, and dies before harvest, his executors shall have the *emblements*, or profits of the crop: for the estate was determined by the act of God; and it is a maxim in the law, that *actus Dei nemini facit injuriam* (*y*). The representatives therefore of the tenant for life shall have the emblements, to compensate for the labour and expense of tilling, manuring and sowing the lands,—and also for the encouragement of husbandry, which being a public benefit attending to the increase and plenty of provisions, ought to have the utmost security and privilege that the law can give it. Wherefore, by the feudal law, if a tenant for life died between the beginning of September and the end of February, the lord, who was entitled to the reversion, was also entitled to the profits of the whole year; but if he died between the beginning of March and the end of August, the heirs of the tenant received the whole (*z*). And from hence our law of emblements seems to have been derived, but with very considerable improvements. So it is also, if a man be tenant for the life of another, and *cestui que vie*, or he on whose life the land is held, dies after the corn sown;—the tenant *pur autre vie* shall have the emblements. The same is also the rule, if a life estate be determined by the act of law.] Therefore, in a case where a lease was made to husband and wife during coverture,

(*x*) See the statutes cited sup. p. 252, n. (*c*).

(*y*) As to emblements generally, see Co. Litt. 55 a, 55 b; Graves *v.* Weld, 5 Barn. & Ad. 105; Davis *v.* Eyton, 7 Bing. 154. As to emble-

ments as between the *executor and devisee*, see Shep. Touch. by Preston, p. 472; Williams on Executors, p. 634; Cooper *v.* Woolfit, 2 H. & N. 122.

(*z*) Feud. l. 2, t. 23.

whereby they acquired a determinable estate for life, and the husband sowed the land, after which they were divorced, it was held that the husband should have the emblements; for the sentence of divorce was the act of law (*a*). [But if an estate for life be determined by the tenant's *own act*, (as by forfeiture for waste committed, or if a tenant during widowhood thinks proper to marry,) in these, and similar cases, the tenants, having thus determined the estate by their own acts, shall not be entitled to take the emblements (*b*). The doctrine of emblements extends not only to corn sown, but to roots planted, or other annual artificial profit; but it is otherwise of fruit trees, grass, and the like, which are not planted annually at the expense and labour of the tenant, but are either a permanent or natural profit of the earth (*c*). For when a man plants a tree, he cannot be presumed to plant it in contemplation of any present profit; but merely with a prospect of its being useful to himself in future, and to future successions of tenants. The advantages also of emblements are particularly extended to the parochial clergy by the statute 28 Hen. VIII. c. 11, s. 6—the reason being that all persons who are presented to any ecclesiastical benefice are considered as tenants for their own lives, unless the contrary be expressed in the form of donation.

4. A fourth incident to estates for life relates to the under-tenants or lessees. For if tenant for life under-let, the lessee, by the common law, has the same, nay greater indulgences than his lessor. The same,—for the law of estovers and emblements, with regard to the tenant for life, is also law with regard to his under-tenant, who represents him and stands in his place (*d*): and greater,—for in those cases where tenant for life shall not have the emblements, because the estate determines by his own

(*a*) Oland's case, 5 Rep. 116.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 55 a, 55 b; 1 Roll.

(*b*) Knevett v. Pool, Cro. Eliz. Abr. 728.

461; 1 Roll. Abr. 727.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 55 b.

[act, the exception shall not reach his lessee, who is a third person. Thus, too, in the case of a woman who holds *durante viduitate*: her taking husband is her own act, and therefore (as we have seen) deprives her of the emblements; but if she leases her estate to an under-tenant, who sows the land, and she then marries, this her act shall not deprive the tenant of his emblements, for he is a stranger and could not prevent her(e).] And as regards tenants at rack rent—that is, who pay full value for their lands—holding under landlords who are entitled for life or other uncertain interest, a more ample protection than was afforded by the doctrine of emblements at the common law, has been provided by statute; it being enacted by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 1(f), that where in such cases the lease or tenancy shall determine by the death or by cesser of the estate of the landlord, the tenant shall, instead of claiming emblements, continue to hold until the expiration of the then current year of his tenancy; at which time he shall (without being required to give or receive any notice) quit upon the terms of his lease or holding, in the same manner as if his tenancy were determined by effluxion of time or other lawful means during the continuance of his landlord's estate: and the succeeding owner shall be entitled to recover, (as the landlord could have done if his interest had continued,) a fair proportion of the rent for the period elapsed from the termination of the landlord's interest to the time of quitting: and the succeeding owner and tenant respectively shall be entitled, as against each other, to all the benefits, and be subject to the terms, to which the landlord and tenant respectively would have been entitled or subject in case the tenancy had determined in manner aforesaid at the expiration of such current year. This provision is in favour of the lessees of life tenants, but inasmuch as they had on the

(e) Co. Litt. 55 b.

(f) As to the tenancies to which

this enactment applies, see *Haines v. Welch*, Law Rep., 4 C. P. 91.

other hand, at the common law, a most unreasonable advantage;—as they might if they pleased, at the death of their lessors, quit the premises, and pay no rent to any body for the occupation of the land since the last quarter-day, or other day assigned for payment of rent (*g*),—the legislature has thought proper to remedy this injustice. [It was accordingly enacted by 11 Geo. II. c. 19, that the executors or administrators of tenant for life, on whose death any demise determined, might recover of the lessee a rateable proportion of rent, from the last day of payment to the death of the lessor (*h*).] Also by 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 22, that where any demise *in writing* should determine by death either of the person making the same (though he may not have been strictly tenant for life); or of the life or lives on which he held (*i*);—a proportion of the rent should in like manner be recoverable from the lessee by his executors or administrators, or by himself, as the case might be. And, finally, by the Apportionment Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 35), it has now been provided in more general terms, that all rents, annuities, dividends and other periodical payments in the nature of income, (whether reserved or made payable under an instrument of writing or otherwise,) shall, like interest on money lent, be considered *as accruing from day to day*, and shall be apportionable (in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary) in respect of time accordingly; and shall be recoverable by the representatives of the person who would have been entitled to the entire portion, had no such apportionment taken place.

II. [The next estate for life is of the legal kind, as contradistinguished from conventional: viz., that of tenant *in*

(*g*) Clun's case, 10 Rep. 127.

(*i*) See Lock v. De Burgh, 4 De

(*h*) See Jenner v. Morgan, 1 P. Wms. 392; Mills v. Trumper, Law Rep., 4 Ch. App. 320.

G. & Sm. 470; Llewellyn v. Rous, Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 27.

[*tail after the possibility of issue extinct* (*h*). This happens where one is tenant in special tail, and the person, from whose body the issue was to spring, dies without issue; or, having left issue, that issue becomes extinct: in either of these cases the surviving tenant in special tail, becomes tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct. As where one has an estate to him and his heirs on the body of his present wife to be begotten, and the wife dies without issue (*l*); in this case the man has an estate tail, which cannot possibly descend to any one; and therefore the law makes use of this long periphrasis as absolutely necessary to give an adequate idea of his estate. For if it had called him barely *tenant in fee-tail special*, that would not have distinguished him from others; and besides, he has no longer an estate of inheritance, or *fee*, for he can have no heirs capable of taking *per formam doni* (*m*). Had it called him *tenant in tail without issue*, this had only related to the present fact, and would not have excluded the possibility of future issue. Had he been styled *tenant in tail without possibility of issue*, this would exclude time past as well as present, and he might under this description never have had any possibility of issue. No definition therefore could so exactly mark him out as this of *tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct*, which, (with a precision peculiar to our own law,) not only takes in the possibility of issue in tail which he once had, but also states that this possibility is now extinguished and gone.

This estate must be created by the act of God, that is, by the death of that person out of whose body the issue was to spring; for no limitation, conveyance, or other

(*h*) As to the estate of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct, see Co. Litt. 27 b—28 b; Lewis Bowles's case, 11 Rep. 79 b; Williams v. Williams, 12 East, 209; 15

Ves. 419; Platt v. Powles, 2 Mau. & Sel. 65.

(*l*) Litt. s. 32.

(*m*) Bowles v. Berrie, 1 Roll. Rep. 184; Lewis Bowles's case, 11 Rep. 80.

[human act, can make it. For, if land be given to a man and his wife, and the heirs of their two bodies begotten, and they are divorced, they shall neither of them have this estate, but be barely tenants for life, notwithstanding the inheritance once vested in them(*n*). A possibility of issue is always supposed to exist in law, unless extinguished by the death of the parties; even though the donees be each of them an hundred years old(*n*).]

This estate is of an amphibious nature, partaking partly of an estate tail, and partly of an estate for life. For besides the name of tenant in tail, the tenant is so far in the condition of a tenant in tail properly so called, as to be dispunishable, (that is, not answerable,) for waste(*o*); and he formerly possessed some other of the privileges of a tenant in tail, connected with branches of the law which have now become extinct(*p*). But, on the other hand, his estate, in a general point of view, has always been considered as equivalent to an estate for life only(*q*); and therefore the law permits a tenant in tail of this description, and an ordinary tenant for life, to make mutual alienation of their estates, by that particular method of conveyance called an *exchange*; which can take place, as we shall see hereafter, only in the case of estates that are equal in their nature(*r*).

III. Another estate for life of the legal kind is the estate *by the curtesy of England*, that is to say, the estate which a man has, on the death of his wife, in the lands and tenements of which during the marriage she was seised in fee simple or fee tail; provided always he

(*n*) Co. Litt. 28 a.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 27 b; see *Whitfield v. Bewitt*, 2 P. Wms. 240; *Williams v. Williams*, 12 East, 209.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 27 b; *Lewis Bowles's case*, 11 Rep. 80 a.

(*q*) By 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 1,

it is expressly provided, that a tenant in tail, after possibility of issue extinct, shall be deemed a *tenant for life* for the purposes of that Act.

(*r*) As to an exchange, vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XVII.

had issue by her born alive during the marriage, and capable of inheriting her estate (*t*). If the lands, however, be in gavelkind, the rule is so far different that he shall hold no more than a moiety, and that only while he lives unmarried; and, on the other hand, his title attaches whether he had issue born or not (*u*).

This estate is said, in the *Mirroure*, to have been introduced by King Henry the first (*x*); and, notwithstanding its appellation, it is not peculiar to this realm: for it appears to have obtained also in Normandy; and to have been likewise used among the antient Germans (*y*). [And yet it is not generally apprehended to have been a consequence of feudal tenure, though some substantial feudal reasons may be given for its introduction (*z*), and some of the doctrines concerning it are of a feudal character. For if a woman seised of lands hath issue by her husband, and dies, the husband is the natural guardian of the child, and as such is in reason entitled to the profits of the lands in order to maintain it; for which

(*t*) As to an estate by the curtesy, see Co. Litt. 29 a—30 b; *Menvill's case*, 13 Rep. 23; 2 Saund. by Williams, 45, u. (5), 46, n. (q), 382, a, b; *Buckworth v. Thirkell*, 3 Bos. & Pul. 652, n.

(*u*) Robins. Gavelk. bk. ii. c. 1; and see Co. Litt. 30 a.

(*x*) Cap. 1, s. 3.

(*y*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 126, citing *Grand Coustum.* c. 119, and *Lindebrog. LL. Alman.* t. 92. It is also said by Blackstone (citing *Craig*, 1. 2, t. 19, s. 4), that it obtained in Scotland, where it was called *Curialitas*. And hence he infers that probably our word *curtesy* signified an attendance by the husband on the lord's court, (or *curia*,) in capacity of his vassal or tenant in respect of the wife's

land. Tenant by curtesy is said, however, by Littleton, to be so called, "because this is used in no "other realm but in England only." (*Litt. s. 35.*) And the manner in which the tenant is described in the old pleadings, "*Tenaunt per lei d'Engleterre*," (*Year-Book*, Trin. 1 Edw. 2,) seems to confirm that etymology. See also Co. Litt. by Harg. 33 a, n. (5), and the *Patent Roll* of Hen. 3, there cited, which speaks of this estate as the *consuetudo et lex Angliæ*. But though the term may have been derived from a notion that the estate was peculiar to the law of England, it is clear that the supposed peculiarity did not in fact exist.

(*z*) See *Wright's Ten.* 194.

[reason the heir apparent of a tenant by the curtesy, could not be in ward to the lord of the fee during the life of such tenant (*a*). As soon therefore as any child was born, and the father began to have a permanent interest in the lands, he became one of the *pares curtis*, did homage to the lord, and was called tenant by the curtesy *initiate*; and this estate being once vested in him by the birth of the child, was not suffered to determine by the subsequent death of the infant.] It may be proper to add that he was considered to hold not of the infant, but of the next lord of the fee (*b*).

[There are four requisites necessary to make a tenancy by the curtesy: marriage, seisin of the wife, issue and death of the wife (*c*):]—1. The marriage must be legal and subsisting at the death; so that if either void *ipso facto*, or avoided by a divorce, no estate by the curtesy can in either case be claimed (*d*). 2. [The seisin of the wife must be an actual seisin, that is, possession of the lands: not a bare right to possess, which is a seisin *in law*, but an actual possession, which is a seisin *in deed* (*e*);] nor may it be an estate in reversion on a freehold (*f*). On the other hand, her estate may be either legal or equitable (*g*). 3. [The issue must be born alive. Some have had a notion that it must be heard to cry, but that is a mistake. Crying, indeed, is the strongest evidence of its being born alive; but it is not the only evidence (*h*). The issue also must be born during the life of the mother; for if the mother dies in labour, and the Cæsarean opera-

(*a*) F. N. B. 143.

(*b*) 2 Inst. 301; Paine's case, 8 Rep. 36 (*a*).

(*c*) Co. Litt. 30 a. The requisite of "issue" does not exist in lands held in *gavelkind*, vide sup. p. 213.

(*d*) See Rennington v. Cole, Noy, 29.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 31 a, 29 a.

(*f*) 2 Bl. Com. 127.

(*g*) See Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Will. 108; Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603; Moore v. Webster, Law Rep., 3 Eq. Ca. 267; Appleton v. Rowley, ib. 8 Eq. Ca. 139.

(*h*) Dyer, 25; Paine's case, 8 Rep. 34.

[tion is performed, the husband in this case shall not be tenant by the curtesy; because, at the instant of the mother's death, he was clearly not entitled, as having had no issue born, but the land descended to the child while yet in the mother's womb; and the estate being once so vested, shall not afterwards be taken from it (*l*). The issue must also be such as is capable of inheriting the mother's estate (*m*). Therefore, if a woman be tenant in tail male, and hath only a daughter born, the husband is not thereby entitled to be tenant by the curtesy; because such issue female can never inherit the estate in tail male (*l*). The time when the issue was born is immaterial, provided it were during the coverture; for whether it were born before or after the wife's seisin of the lands, and whether it be living or dead at the time of the seisin, or at the time of the wife's decease, the husband shall be tenant by the curtesy (*l*). The husband by the birth of the child becomes, as was before observed, tenant by the curtesy *initiate*, and may do many acts to charge the lands (*n*); but his estate is not *consummate* till, 4. The death of the wife, which is the last requisite to make a complete tenant by the curtesy (*o*).]

To complete our view of this species of interest, it must be added that by the statute 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 32, a power (subject, however, to certain exceptions and provisions) is conferred upon tenants by the curtesy to demise for twenty-one years the lands which they hold under that title; and that such leases will consequently be good as against those in remainder (*p*).

IV. Another estate for life, is the estate *in dower*, that is to say, the estate which, by the common law, a woman, on the death of her husband, has, for the term of her natural life, in a portion of his lands and tene-

(*l*) Co. Litt. 29 b.

(*m*) Litt. s. 52.

(*n*) Co. Litt. 30 a.

(*o*) Ibid.; see Jones *v.* Davies, *per cur.*, 5 H. & N. p. 779.

(*p*) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 32.

ments (*q*). This portion amounts to the third part in value of such lands and tenements; except the lands be gavelkind, in which case she is entitled to a moiety; but subject, in this instance, to the condition of remaining chaste and unmarried (*r*).

[Dower is called in Latin by the foreign jurists *doarium*, but by Bracton and our English writers *dos*: which among the Romans signified the marriage portion which the wife brought to her husband; but with us is implied to signify this kind of estate, to which the civil law, in its original state, had nothing that bore a resemblance: nor indeed is there anything in general more different than the regulation of landed property, according to the English and Roman laws. Some have ascribed the introduction of dower to the Normans, as a branch of *their* local tenures (*s*); though we cannot expect any feudal reason for its invention, since it was not a part of the pure, primitive, simple law of feuds, but was first of all introduced into that system, (wherein it is called *triens*, *tertia*, and *dotalitium*,) by the Emperor Frederick the second, who was contemporary with our King Henry the third (*t*). It is possible, therefore, that it might be with us the relic of a Danish custom; since, according to the historians of that country, dower was introduced into Denmark by Swein, the father of our Canute the Great, out of gratitude to the Danish ladies, who sold all their jewels to ransom him when taken prisoner by the Vandals (*u*). However this be, the reason which our law gives for adopting it, is a very plain and sensible one: viz., for the

(*q*) As to dower, see Co. Litt. 30 b—41 a; Rowe v. Bower, 2 N. R. 1; Slatter v. Slatter, 1 Scott, 82; Colleton v. Gareb, 6 Simon, 19; Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 402; Ray v. Pung, 5 B. & Ald. 561; Moody v. King, 2 Bing. 447; Rex v. Northweald Bassett, 4 Dow. &

Ry. 276; Jones v. Jones, 2 Tyrw. 531.

(*r*) 2 Bl. Com. 129; Robins. Gavelk. bk. ii. c. 2.

(*s*) Wright's Ten. 192.

(*t*) Craig, l. 2, t. 22, s. 9.

(*u*) Mod. Un. Hist. xxxii. 91.

[sustenance of the wife, and the nurture and education of the younger children (*y*).

In treating of this estate, let us first consider *who* may be endowed; secondly, of *what* she may be endowed; thirdly, the manner *how* she shall be endowed; and fourthly, how dower may be *barred*, or otherwise defeated.]

1. *Who* may be endowed. She must be the actual wife of the party at the time of his decease. If there be a dissolution of the marriage (or, as it was formerly called, a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii*), she shall not be endowed; for *ubi nullum matrimonium, ibi nulla dos* (*z*). But a divorce *a mensâ et thoro* (or, as we should now say, a judicial separation) did not, by our common law, destroy the dower, not even though decreed for adultery itself (*a*). [Yet now, by the statute of Westminster the second (13 Edw. I. st. 1, c. 34), if a woman voluntarily leaves (which the law calls eloping from) her husband, and lives with an adulterer, she shall lose her dower, unless her husband be voluntarily reconciled to her (*b*). By the antient law, the wife of a person attainted could not be endowed; to the intent, says Staunforde, that if the love of a man's own life cannot restrain him from such atrocious acts, the love of his wife and children may (*c*):

(*y*) Bract. l. 2, c. 39, s. 1; Co. Litt. 30 b.

(*z*) Bract. l. 2, c. 39, s. 4. But she does not lose her dower merely because the marriage was *voidable*, if there be no actual divorce; (Co. Litt. 33 a.) Nor by reason of her having been married under the age of twelve, or to a husband under the age of fourteen; provided (says Blackstone, vol. 2, p. 131) she be above nine years old at her husband's death. In Bracton's time the age was indefinite, and dower

arose *si uxor possit dotem promereri, et virum sustinere*. (L. 2, c. 39, s. 3.)

(*a*) Co. Litt. 33 a, 33 b; Sidney v. Sidney, 3 P. Wms. 276. On the other hand, among the antient Goths, an adulteress was punished by the loss *dotalitii et trientis ex bonis mobilibus viri*. (Stiernh. l. 3, c. 2.)

(*b*) 2 Inst. 435; see Hetherington v. Graham, 6 Bing. 135, and Woodward v. Dowse, 10 C. B., N. S. 722.

(*c*) P. C. b. 3, c. 33.

[though Britton gives it another turn, viz., that it is presumed the wife was privy to her husband's crime (*d*). However, the statute 1 Edw. IV. c. 12, abated the rigour of the common law in this particular, and allowed the wife her dower. But a subsequent statute (5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 11, s. 13) revived this severity against the widows of attainted *traitors*, who are now barred of their dower, but not the widows of attainted felons (*e*).

2. We are next to inquire, of *what* a widow may be endowed. And supposing no act to have been done to defeat or abridge her rights, she is by law entitled to be endowed of all lands and tenements of which her husband was seised in fee simple or fee tail at any time during the coverture, and of which any issue, which she might have had, might by possibility have been heir (*f*). Therefore, if a man seised in fee simple hath a son by his first wife, and after marries a second wife, she shall be endowed of his lands; for her issue might by possibility have been heir, on the death of the son by the former wife. But, if there be a donee in special tail, who holds lands to him and the heirs of his body, begotten on Jane his wife; though Jane may be endowed of these lands, yet if Jane dies, and he marries a second wife, that second wife shall never be endowed of the lands entailed; for no issue that she could have, could by any possibility inherit them (*g*). A seisin in law of the husband will be as effectual as a seisin in deed, in order to render the wife dowable (*h*); for

(*d*) C. 110.

(*e*) It is said in our books that an alien woman, married without the royal licence, may not claim dower; Co. Litt. by Harg. 31 b, n. (9); but see 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14, s. 10 (1).

(*f*) Litt. ss. 36, 53. To some few possessions of the husband, however, the right to dower does

not attach — as a castle built for the defence of the realm, or a common without stint. (See Co. Litt. 316; Gerard v. Gerard, 3 Lev. 401.)

(*g*) Litt. s. 53.

(*h*) See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, s. 3.

[it is not in the wife's power to bring the husband's title to an actual seisin, as it is in the husband's power to do with regard to the wife's lands: which is one reason why he shall not be tenant by the curtesy but of such lands whereof the wife, or he himself in her right, was actually seised in deed (*i*).] She may also claim dower in an estate of inheritance in possession, of which her husband was the *equitable* owner (*j*).

3. [Next, as to the *manner* in which a woman is to be endowed. There were formerly five species of dower: 1. Dower by the common law, or that which has been already described. 2. Dower by particular custom; as that the wife should have half the husband's lands, or in some places the whole, and in some only a quarter (*k*).] 3. Dower *de la plus belle*, of which no more needs here be said than that it was a consequence of the military tenures, and that it was abolished with them (*l*). 4. [Dower *ad ostium ecclesiæ* (*m*); which was where tenant in fee simple of full age, openly at the church door, after affiance made, and (Sir Edward Coke in his translation of Littleton adds) troth plighted between them, endowed his wife with the whole, or such quantity as he pleased, of his lands, at the same time specifying and ascertaining the same (*n*); on which the wife, after her husband's death, might enter without further ceremony. And 5. Dower *ex assensu patris*, which was only a species of dower *ad ostium ecclesiæ*, made when the husband's father was alive, and the son by his consent, expressly given, endowed his wife

(*i*) Co. Litt. 31 a; vide sup. p. 265.

(*j*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, s. 2.

(*k*) Litt. s. 37. This species obtains (for example) in *gavelkind* lands, of which the dowress takes a *moiety*. (See Robins. on Gavelk. bk. ii. c. 2.)

(*l*) See as to dower *de la plus belle*, Co. Litt. 38 a; 2 Bl. Com. 132.

(*m*) Litt. s. 39.

(*n*) It would seem, however, that, at one time, the husband could not endow his wife *ad ostium* with more than one third (vide post, p. 277).

[with parcel of his father's lands (*o*).] But both the latter descriptions of dower, having been abolished by a recent act of parliament, have now disappeared from our system (*p*). We need only consider, therefore, the method of proceeding to enforce a claim of dower at *the common law*, which of the two that remain is the only usual species.

[By the old law, grounded on the feudal exactions, a woman could not be endowed without a fine paid to the lord; neither could she marry again without his licence, lest she should contract herself, and so convey part of the feud, to the lord's enemy (*q*). This licence the lords took care to be well paid for, and, as it seems, would sometimes force the dowager to a second marriage, in order to gain the fine. But to remedy these oppressions, it was provided by *Magna Charta*, that the widow shall not be distrained to marry afresh, if she chooses to live without a husband (*r*); but shall not however marry against the consent of the lord; and further, that nothing shall be taken for assignment of the widow's dower, but that she shall remain in her husband's capital mansion-house for forty days after his death, during which time her dower shall be assigned. These forty days are called the widow's *quarantine*, a term made use of in law to signify the number of forty days, whether applied to this occasion or any other (*s*). The particular lands to be held in dower must be assigned by the heir of the husband, or his guardian (*t*); not only for the sake of notoriety, but also to entitle the lord of the fee to demand his services of the heir, in respect of the lands so holden. For the heir by this entry becomes tenant thereof to the lord, and the widow is immediate tenant to the heir by a kind of subinfeudation or under-tenancy, completed by

(*o*) Litt. s. 40.

(*p*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, s. 13.

(*q*) Mir. c. 1, s. 3.

(*r*) Cap. 7.

(*s*) For example, it also signifies

the forty days which persons coming from infected countries are obliged to wait, before they are permitted to land in England.

(*t*) Co. Litt. 34 b, 35 a.

[this investiture or assignment (*u*): and such tenure may still be created notwithstanding the statute of *Quia emptores*, because the heir parts not with the fee simple, but only with an estate for life. If the heir or his guardian do not assign the widow her dower within the term of quarantine, or do assign it unfairly, she has her remedy at law by action of dower, and the sheriff is appointed to assign it (*x*). If the thing of which she is endowed be divisible, her dower must be set out by metes and bounds: but if it be indivisible, she must be endowed specially; as of the third presentation to a church, the third toll-dish of a mill, the third part of the profits of an office, the third sheaf of tithe, and the like (*y*).

4. Lastly, we are to inquire how dower may be *barred*, or otherwise defeated. A widow may be barred of her dower not only by elopement and adultery, by divorce, the treason of her husband, and other disabilities before mentioned,—but also by detaining the title-deeds or evidences of the estate from the heir, that is, until she restores them (*z*).] She may also lose the right to claim dower by an estate being settled on her at the time of marriage by way of jointure, as regulated by the stat. 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10,—a subject on which some farther explanation may here be desirable.

A *jointure* strictly signifies a joint estate limited to both husband and wife (*a*), and it is thus defined by Sir

(*u*) Gilb. Ten. 173.

(*x*) Co. Litt. 34 b, 35 a. If the heir (being under age), or his guardian, assigned more than she ought to have, this was formerly remedied by writ of *admeasurement of dower*. (See F. N. B. 148; Finch, L. 314; stat. Westm. 2, 13 Edw. 1, c. 7.) But, this writ is now abolished. Besides the remedy at law, the courts of equity also exercise a jurisdiction over dower. (See Spence's

Equitable Jurisdiction of Court of Chancery, p. 653.)

(*y*) Co. Litt. 32 a.

(*z*) Anne Bedingfield's case, 9 Rep. 15 b.

(*a*) See Dennis's case, Dy. 248 a; Vernon's case, 4 Rep. 3 b; Earl of Buckinghamshire v. Drury, 3 Bro. P. C. 492; Vernon's case, ubi sup.; Duchess of Somerset's case, Dy. 97 b.

Edward Coke (*b*):—"A competent livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands and tenements; to take effect presently, in possession or profit, after the decease of the husband; for the life of the wife at least." A description framed from the purview of the stat. 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10, before mentioned, commonly called the Statute of Uses, of which we shall speak fully hereafter. [At present it is sufficient to observe, that before the making of that statute the greatest part of the land of England was conveyed "to uses," the property or possession of the soil being vested in one man, and the *use* or profits thereof in another, whose directions, with regard to the disposition thereof, the former was in conscience obliged to follow, and might be compelled by a court of equity to observe. Now, though a husband had the profits of lands conveyed to his use, in absolute fee simple, yet the wife was not entitled to any dower therein, he not being *seised* thereof; wherefore it became usual, on marriage, to settle by express deed some special estate to the use of the husband and his wife, for their lives, in joint-tenancy or jointure; which settlement would be a provision (in lieu of dower) for the wife in case she survived her husband. But at length the Statute of Uses ordained that such as had the *use* of lands should, to all intents and purposes, be reputed and taken to be absolutely *seised* and possessed of the soil itself: and in consequence of such legal seisin, all wives would have become dowable of such lands as were held to the use of their husbands, and also entitled at the same time to any special lands that might be settled in jointure, had not the same statute provided that, upon the husband's making or procuring to be made such an estate in jointure to the wife before marriage, she should be for ever precluded from her dower (*c*). But then these four requisites must be punctually observed.—1. The jointure must be limited to take effect immediately on

(*b*) Co. Litt. 36 b; see Cresswell
v. Byron, 3 Bro. C. C. 362.

(*c*) Vernon's case, 4 Rep. 1, 2.

[the death of the husband. 2. It must be for the wife's own life at least, and not *pur autre vie*, or for any term of years, or other smaller estate. 3. It must be made to herself, and no other in trust for her. 4. It must be made, and must appear by the deed to be in satisfaction of her whole dower, and not of any particular part of it (*d*). If the jointure be made to her *after* marriage, she has her election after her husband's death, and may either accept it, or refuse it and betake herself to her dower at common law; for she was not capable of consenting to it during coverture. And if, by any fraud or accident, a jointure made before marriage, proves to be on a bad title, and the jointress is evicted, or turned out of possession, she shall then, by the provisions of the same statute, have her dower *pro tanto* at the common law (*e*).

There are some advantages attending tenants in dower that do not extend to jointresses; and so *vice versâ*, jointresses are in some respects more privileged than tenants in dower. Tenant in dower, by the old common law, is subject to no tolls or taxes; and hers is almost the only estate on which, when derived from the king's debtor, the king cannot distrain for his debt, if contracted during the coverture (*f*). But, on the other hand, a widow may enter at once, without any formal process, on her jointure land; whereas no small trouble, and a tedious method of proceeding by way of process in the courts, is necessary to compel an assignment of dower (*g*). So, though dower be forfeited by the treason of the husband, or by the wife's elopement and adultery, yet the title to lands settled in jointure remains, in either case, unimpeached (*h*).]

(*d*) See *Tinney v. Tinney*, 3 Atk. 3.

(*e*) See *Beard v. Nuthall*, 1 Vern. 428.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 31 a; F. N. B. 150.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 36 b; vide sup. p. 272, n. (*x*).

(*h*) Co. Litt. 37 a; *Sidney v. Sidney*, 2 P. Wms. 277.

Independently of the bar of dower by way of jointure, if the husband makes any provision for his wife by will or otherwise, in such manner as clearly to indicate an intention that it shall be taken in lieu of dower, she will be barred by her acceptance, after his death, of the provision so made; but she is allowed her option whether she will accept it or not (*i*).

Dower will also be barred if the husband, on acquiring his estate, took the conveyance of the land, in a form properly adapted to that purpose. Of these forms there are several, called *conveyances to uses to bar dower* (*h*); on which it is only necessary to say that they are the contrivance of conveyancers, founded on the Statute of Uses before mentioned, intended to give the husband a clear dominion over the property he purchases, free from future claim on the part of his widow: these forms being so managed as to vest in him the effective ownership, but not precisely such an estate as by the rules of law would be subject to dower.

On the other hand, if the husband neglected, on acquiring an estate subject to dower, to bar his widow's claim by taking a conveyance in the proper form, the wife's right was (up to a late period of our legal history) secure from liability to be defeated by any alienation or devise which he might think fit to make of such estate—her title always remaining paramount; and her concurrence and release of her rights by means of a *fine* (that is, a fictitious suit in the court of common pleas, as will be explained hereafter) was therefore essential to a valid conveyance (*l*). While dower retained its original importance, no just objection could be made to this principle, for though it operated as a clog on the transfer of pro-

(*i*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 36 b, n. 1; (*h*) Butler's Fearné, 346—349,
Thompson v. Nelson, 1 Cox, 447; 9th ed.
Ayres v. Willis, 1 Ves. sen. 230, (*l*) As to a fine, vide post, bk. II.
and see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, ss. 9, pt. I. c. XIX.

perty, it was evidently essential to the full protection of the widow's right. But at the period to which we refer, that right had long sunk into comparative insignificance, owing, first, to the facility with which it was capable of being barred; secondly, to the great increase in modern times of personal property, out of which the husband might make ample provision for the wife by way of testamentary disposition, and of which, if he died intestate, she became entitled to her share; and, lastly, to the effect of the Statute of Wills, which, by making real property devisable, empowered him to provide for her by will out of his real estate. Under these circumstances there appeared to be no sufficient reason for continuing the inconvenient restraint which the law of dower tended to impose on the husband's alienation; and consequently by the Dower Act, (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105,) it was provided, that all dispositions of his land (whether absolute or partial, and whether by conveyance in his lifetime or by will,) and all debts and incumbrances to which such land might be subject, should be valid and effectual, as against his widow's right to dower. The same Act also increases the facilities for barring dower; which may now be effected by a simple declaration for that purpose, introduced into the deed by which land is conveyed to a husband, or into any deed executed by him, or into his last will and testament. And it further enacts, that where the husband devises for his wife's benefit any part of his land that had been subject to her dower, she shall be thereby barred unless a contrary intention is declared by the will (*m*): though it is otherwise as to a bequest of personalty, or of land on which her claim would not attach; for, in the absence of a declaration to the contrary, such a bequest shall *not* be sufficient to exclude her title as dowress (*n*). It is to be observed,

(*m*) See *Rowland v. Cuthbertson*,
Law Rep., 8 Eq. Ca. 466.

Ves. & Bea. 244; *Dickson v. Robinson*, Jacob, 503.

(*n*) See *Chalmers v. Storil*, 2

however, that none of the provisions of this Act apply to the case of women married on or before 1st January, 1834 ; and that as to these the former law of dower consequently remains in its full force.

[It is curious to observe the several revolutions which the doctrine of dower has undergone since its introduction into England. The wife's claim seems first to have extended to a *moiety* of the husband's lands, but to have been forfeitable by incontinency or a second marriage. By the famous charter of Henry the first, this condition of widowhood and chastity, was only required in case the husband left any issue (*o*) ; and afterwards we hear no more of it. Under Henry the second, according to Glanvil, the dower *ad ostium ecclesiæ* was the most usual species of dower (*p*) ; and here, as well as in Normandy, it was binding upon the wife, if by her consented to at the time of marriage (*q*). Neither, in those days of feudal rigour, was the husband allowed to endow her *ad ostium ecclesiæ* with more than the third part of the lands whereof he then was seised, though he might endow her with less ; lest by such liberal endowments the lord should be defrauded of his wardships and other feudal profits (*r*). But if no specific dotation was made at the church porch, then she was endowed by the common law of the third part (which was called her *dos rationabilis*) of such lands and tenements as the husband was seised of at the time of the espousals, and no other ; unless he specially engaged before the priest to endow her of his future acquisitions (*s*) ; and, if the husband had no lands, an endowment in goods, chattels or money, at the time of espousals, was a bar of

(*o*) "*Si mortuo viro uxor ejus remanserit, et sine liberis fuerit, dotem suam habebit ; si vero uxor cum liberis remanserit, dotem quidem habebit, dum corpus suum legitime servaverit.*"—Cart. Hen. 1, A.D. 1101. Introd. to Great Charter,

edit. Oxon. p. iv.

(*p*) L. 6, c. 1 & 2.

(*q*) Gr. Coustum. c. 101.

(*r*) Bract. l. 2, c. 39, s. 6.

(*s*) *De questu suo* (Glanv. ibid.) ; *de terris acquisitis et acquirendis.* (Bract. ibid.)

[any dower in lands which he afterwards acquired (*t*). In King John's Magna Charta, and the first charter of Henry the third (in the year 1216), no mention is made of any alteration of the common law, in respect of the lands subject to dower; but in the charters of 1217 and 1224, it is particularly provided, that a widow shall be entitled for her dower to the third part of *all* such lands as the husband had held in his lifetime; though in case of a specific endowment of less, *ad ostium ecclesiæ*, the widow had still no power to waive it after her husband's death. And this continued to be law during the reigns of Henry the third and Edward the first (*u*). In Henry the fourth's time it was denied to be law, that a woman could be endowed of her husband's goods and chattels (*x*): and, under Edward the fourth, Littleton lays it down expressly, that a woman might be endowed *ad ostium ecclesiæ* with *more* than a third part (*y*); and should have her election, after her husband's death, to accept such dower, or refuse it and betake herself to her dower as at common law (*z*).]

(*t*) Glanv. l. 6, c. 2. When special endowments were made *ad ostium ecclesiæ*, the husband, after affiance made, and troth plighted, used to declare with what specific lands he meant to endow his wife, "*quod dotat eam de tali manerio cum pertinentiis, &c.*"—(Bract. l. 2, c. 39, s. 6); and therefore in the old York ritual, (Seld. Ux. Hebr. l. 2, c. 27,) there is at this part of the matrimonial service, the following rubric: "*sacerdos interroget dotem mulieris; et si terra ei in dotem detur, tunc dicatur psalmus iste, &c.*" When the wife was endowed generally ("*ubi quis uxorem suam dotaverit in generali, de omnibus terris et tenementis*"—Bract. *ibid.*), the husband seems to have said, "with all my lands and tenements I thee endow;" and then

they all became liable to her dower. When he endowed her with personality only, he used to say, "with all my worldly goods, (or, as the Salisbury ritual has it, *with all my worldly chattel*,) I thee endow;" which entitled the wife to her thirds, or *pars rationabilis*, of his personal estate; which is provided for by Magna Charta, c. 26. But the retaining this last expression in our modern liturgy, if of any meaning at all, can now refer only to the right of maintenance, which she acquires during coverture, out of her husband's personality.

(*u*) Bract. *ubi sup.*; Britton, c. 101, 102; Flet. l. 5, c. 23, s. 11, 12.

(*x*) P. 7 Hen. 4, 13, 14.

(*y*) Litt. s. 39; F. N. B. 150.

(*z*) Litt. s. 41.

As to the existing law, the reader will have observed, from the account above given, that the right to dower, after falling by several gradations from its original consequence, is at length, in regard to women married on or after 1st January, 1834, reduced to one of the most precarious description, which the husband may bar or defeat at his pleasure ; though if he fails to exercise that power, the widow is still in a condition to assert her title against the heir. And to this it may be added that, by the statute 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 32, a dowress has a right to demise any unsettled estate for a term not exceeding twenty-one years, and that a lease so granted will consequently be good against those in remainder, notwithstanding her death.

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CHAPTER V.

OF ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD.

HAVING now investigated, in some measure, the nature of freehold estates, we arrive at the consideration of those which are less than freehold, and to which the law consequently applies the denomination of *chattels real* (*a*). For it is to be understood that, in our law, *chattels* (or *goods and chattels*) is a term used to express any kind of property which, having regard either to the subject-matter, or the quantity of interest therein, is not *freehold* (*b*). The appellation was originally derived from the technical Latin word *catalla*, which, among the Normans, primarily signified only beasts of husbandry, or, as we still call them, *cattle*; but, in a secondary sense, was applicable to all moveables in general, and not only to these, but to whatever was not a *fief* or *feud*; to which, among the Normans, there were two requisites, a given degree of duration as to time, and immobility with regard to place (*c*). And it is in this latter more extended and negative sense that our own law adopts the term, considering as a chattel whatever amounts not to freehold; which, like the Norman *fief*, requires, as we have seen, immobility in respect of the subject-matter (*d*), and a given degree of duration, that is, a duration for a life at least, (either absolute or determinable on contingency,) as regards the quantity of interest or estate (*e*). Any

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 167, n. (*a*).(*b*) Co. Litt. 118 b.(*c*) 2 Bl. Com. 386.(*d*) Vide sup. p. 167.(*e*) Vide sup. pp. 179, 255.

estate in lands and tenements, which amounts not to freehold, is consequently a chattel; but inasmuch as it concerns, or, according to the technical expression, *savours* of the realty (*f*), it is denominated a chattel *real*, in order to distinguish it from things which have no concern with the realty, viz., mere moveables, and the rights connected with them; and such things as these are, on the other hand, often described as chattels *personal* (*g*).

Chattels of either description are inferior, it is to be observed, in the eye of the law, to freehold; and they form a subordinate class of property, the different species of which are subject, in many respects, to the same incidents; so that as distinguished from estates of inheritance or for life in things real, of whatever tenure, they receive the common denomination of *personal* estate; while these last are on the other hand described as *real* estate (*h*). As to the incidents by which chattels real and personal are allied, it may be remarked, that though “livery of seisin” was a ceremony without which an estate of inheritance or for life in corporeal hereditaments of free tenure could not in general pass at the common law, it was no more requisite in the transfer of a chattel real, than in that of a chattel personal (*i*). A chattel real belongs also, on the death of the owner, to his executor or administrator, like a chattel personal, and does not descend, like a freehold of inheritance, to his heir. So the interest in a chattel real, as in a chattel personal, may be made to commence *in futuro*, which was not in general allowed, at common law, as to the freehold in a corporeal hereditament (*j*). Moreover, the tenant of a chattel real is not said to be *seised*, like the tenant of a freehold, but to be *possessed* only, as if it were a chattel personal. And, lastly, we

(*f*) Co. Litt. 118 b.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 387.

(*h*) Ib. 386; vide sup. p. 167, n.

(*i*) This rule of the common law, is now altered by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106,

s. 2, as to which vide post, c. XVII.

(*j*) But a freehold interest may be made to commence *in futuro* by way of *remainder*; vide post, pp. 322, 323.

may observe, there can be no estate tail in a chattel real, no more than in a chattel personal, but only in a freehold (*h*).

Of estates that are less than freehold, there are three sorts: I. Estates for years; II. Estates at will; III. Estates by sufferance.

I. An estate for *years* is where a man has an interest in lands and tenements, and a possession thereof by virtue of such interest, for some fixed and determinate period of time (*l*); as in the case where lands are let for the term of a certain number of years, agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee (*m*), and the lessee enters thereon (*n*); and this amounts but to a chattel real, however long the period of time for which the lands are demised; for, in contemplation of law, no interest for a certain and determinate period of time,—even for 1000 years,—is as large as an estate for life, which, as we have seen, is the lowest description of freehold (*o*).

[Though the lease be but for half a year, or a quarter, or any less time, this lessee is respected as a tenant for years, and is styled so in some legal proceedings; a year being the shortest term of which the law in this case takes notice (*p*). And this may, not improperly, lead us into a short digression concerning the division and calculation of time by the English law.

The space of a year is a determinate and well-known period, consisting commonly of 365 days; for, though in

(*h*) 2 Bl. Com. 398.

(*l*) As to this estate, see Co. Litt. 43 b—54 b.

(*m*) We may here remark, once for all, that the termination of “—or” and “—ee” obtain, in law, the one an active, the other a passive signification: the former usually denoting the doer of an act, the latter him to whom it is done. The feoffor

is he that maketh a feoffment; the feoffee is he to whom it is made: the donor is one that giveth lands in tail; the donee is he who receiveth it: he that granteth a lease is denominated the lessor; and he to whom it is granted the lessee.—Litt. s. 57.

(*n*) Litt. 58.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 46 a.

(*p*) Litt. 67.

[bissextile or leap-years, it consists properly of 366, yet by the stat. 21 Hen. III. the increasing day in the leap-year, together with the preceding day, shall be accounted for one day only. That of a month is more ambiguous; there being, in common use, two ways of calculating months, either as *lunar*, consisting of twenty-eight days, the supposed revolution of the moon, thirteen of which make a year; or as *calendar* months of unequal lengths, according to the Julian division in our common almanacks, commencing at the calends of each month, whereof in a year there are only twelve.] By the common law, a “month” is, in matters temporal, a lunar month, or twenty-eight days; in matters ecclesiastical, a calendar month (*q*): though this is a rule of the most general description, and yields easily to exception where custom or the obvious meaning of parties in the particular transaction, or any other special consideration, makes it reasonable to depart from the usual construction of the term month (*r*). [The ordinary rule, however, applies to the case of a lease; and, consequently, a lease for “twelve months” is only for forty-eight weeks. But if it be for “*a* twelvemonth,” in the singular number, it is good for the whole year (*s*); for herein the law recedes from its usual calculation, because the ambiguity between the two methods of computation ceases, it being generally understood, that by the space of time called thus, in the singular number, a twelvemonth, is meant the whole year, consisting of one solar revolution.] In the space of a day all the twenty-four hours are usually reckoned (*t*). Therefore if I am bound

(*q*) See *Lacon v. Hooper*, 6 T. R. 226; *Blunt v. Heslop*, 3 Nev. & Per. 553; *Simpson v. Margitson*, 11 Q. B. 23.

(*r*) *Davy v. Salter*, 3 Salk. 346; *Rex v. Cussons*, 1 Sid. 186; *Hipwell v. Knight*, 1 Y. & Col. 401. A modern Act, moreover, (13 & 14 Vict. c. 21,) enacts, that in all *statutes*

“the word ‘month’ shall be deemed and taken to mean ‘calendar’ month, unless words be added showing lunar month to be intended.”

(*s*) *Catesby’s case*, 6 Rep. 62 a.

(*t*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 141; *Co. Litt.* 135 a; *Maund’s case*, 7 Rep. 28 b; *Duppa v. Mayo*, 1 Saund. 287; *Burbridge v. Manners*, 3 Camp. 194.

to pay money on any certain day, I discharge the obligation (as the general rule) if I pay it any time before twelve o'clock at night, after which the following day commences (*u*). And it is also a principle (though one from which it is often necessary, for the sake of justice, to deviate) that, with a view to convenience, the law will consider the ordinary periods of time without regard to their fractional parts (*v*). Thus half a year consists of 182 days, and a quarter of a year of 91; the remaining hours being in either case rejected (*x*). But to return to estates for years.

[These estates were originally granted to mere farmers or husbandmen, who every year rendered some equivalent in money, provisions, or other rent, to the lessors or landlords; but, in order to encourage them to manure and cultivate the ground, they had a permanent interest granted them, not determinable at the will of the lord. And yet their possession was esteemed of so little consequence, that they were rather considered as the bailiffs or servants of the lord, who were to receive and account for the profits at a settled price, than as having any property of their own (*y*). And therefore they were not allowed to have a freehold estate; but their interest, such as it was, vested after their deaths in their executors, who were to make up the accounts of their testator with the lord and the other creditors, and were entitled to the stock upon the farm. The lessee's estate might also, by the antient law, be at any time defeated by a collusive recovery, suffered by the tenant of the freehold in an action brought against him for the purpose (*z*).

While estates for years were thus precarious, it is no

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 141.

(*v*) See *Wright v. Mills*, 4 H. & N. 488.

(*x*) Co. Litt. 135 b; *Bishop of Peterborough v. Catesby*, Cro. Jac. 167; *Yelv.* 100; *Dy.* 345 a.

(*y*) *Bac. Ab. Leases.*

(*z*) Co. Litt. 46 a; 2 Inst. 321; *Flower v. Rigden*, Cro. Eliz. 284; *Pledgard v. Lake*, ib. 718; *Hist. Eng. Law*, by Reeves, vol. iv. p. 232. As to a recovery, vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XXI.

[wonder that they were usually very short, like our modern leases upon rack-rent; and indeed we are told that by the antient law no leases for more than forty years were allowable (*a*): because any longer possession, especially when given without any livery declaring the nature and duration of the estate, might tend to defeat the inheritance. Yet this law, if ever it existed, was soon antiquated; for we may observe, in Madox's collection of antient instruments, some leases for years of a pretty early date, which considerably exceed that period (*b*); and long terms—for three hundred years or a thousand—were certainly in use in the time of Edward the third (*c*), and probably of Edward the first (*d*). At all events, when by the stat. 21 Hen. VIII. c. 15, the termor (that is, he who is entitled to the term of years) was protected against fictitious recoveries, and his interest rendered secure and permanent, long terms began to be more frequent than before; and were afterwards extensively introduced, being found extremely convenient for family settlements and mortgages (*e*).

Every estate which must expire at a period certain and prefixed, by whatever words created, is an estate for years. And therefore this estate is frequently called a term, *terminus*, because its duration or continuance is bounded, limited and determined; for every such estate must have a certain beginning and certain end (*f*). But *id certum est, quod certum reddi potest*: therefore, if a man make a lease to another, for so many years as J. S. shall name, it is a good lease for years (*g*); for though it is at present uncertain, yet, when J. S. hath named the years, it is then reduced to a certainty. If no day of commencement is named in the creation of this estate, it begins from the

(*a*) Mirrour, c. 2, s. 27; Co. Litt. 45 b, 46 a.

(*b*) See Madox, *Formulare Anglican.* No. 239, fol. 140; *ib.* No. 245, fol. 146; *ib.* No. 248, fol. 148, &c.

(*c*) 32 Ass. pl. 6; Bro. Abr. t.

Mordauncestor, 42; Spoliation, 6.

(*d*) Stat. of Mortmain, 7 Edw. 1.

(*e*) See Ascongh's case, 9 Rep. 135; Brediman's case, 6 Rep. 57.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 45 b.

(*g*) Bishop of Bath's case, 6 Rep. 35 b.

[making or delivery of the lease (*h*). A lease for so many years as J. S. shall live, is void from the beginning; for it is neither certain, nor can ever be reduced to a certainty, during the continuance of the lease (*i*). And the same doctrine holds, if a parson make a lease of his glebe for so many years as he shall continue parson of Dale; for this is still more uncertain. But a lease for twenty or more years, if J. S. shall so long live, or if he shall so long continue parson of Dale, is good; for there is a certain period fixed, beyond which it cannot last; though it may determine sooner, on the death of J. S. or his ceasing to be parson there (*k*).

As already observed, the word *term*, when applied to this description of estate, signifies the estate itself which the grant confers, and not merely the period of time specified in the grant; and therefore the term may expire during the continuance of the time; as by surrender, forfeiture, and the like. For which reason, if I grant a lease to A. for the term of three years, and after the expiration of the said term to B. for six years, and A. surrenders or forfeits his lease at the end of one year, B.'s interest shall immediately take effect; but if the remainder had been to B. from and after the expiration of the said "three years," or from and after the expiration of the said "time," in this case B.'s interest will not commence till the time is fully elapsed, whatever may become of A.'s term (*l*).]

As an estate for years was not created, at common law, like a freehold, by livery of seisin, so the tenant, in proper technical language, is not said to be *seised*, but to be *possessed*. Neither for the creation of this estate is it proper to limit it to a man and his "heirs," as in the case of a freehold of inheritance. The correct limitation is to a man and to his "executors and administrators;" though it is sufficient if it be granted to himself only, without mention of his personal representatives; for in these, on

(*h*) Co. Litt. 46 b.

(*i*) Ibid. 45 b.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 45 b.

(*l*) Ibid.

his death, the law will vest it without any special words of limitation.

Again, as it required no livery of seisin, so at common law this estate, for whatever length of duration, might be constituted by mere agreement, verbal or written, if followed up by the entry of the lessee. But by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) it was enacted that no lease for more than three years, or at a lower rent than two-thirds of the improved value of the thing demised, should be effectual, unless put into writing and signed by the party demising or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized by writing (*m*). And by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, it is now further provided, that a lease required by law to be in writing, (if made after the 1st of October, 1845,) shall be void at law, unless not only reduced to writing, but also made *by deed* (*n*).

It is also to be remarked, that the bare demise does not in itself vest a complete estate for term of years, in the lessee: it only gives him a right of entry on the tenement; which right is called his "interest in the term," or *interesse termini*. But when he has actually so entered, the estate is then, and not before, completely vested in him. However, the *interesse termini* is so far in the nature of an estate, that, even before entry, the lessee may grant his interest over to another; though, on the other hand, a lessee is not in a condition to maintain an action of trespass for an injury to the land, before he has entered thereon (*o*).

[Tenant for term of years hath incident to and inseparable from his estate, unless by special agreement, the same estovers which we formerly observed that tenant for life was entitled to (*p*); that is to say, house-bote, fire-

(*m*) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 1, 2. See *Edge v. Strafford*, 1 Tyrw. 295; *Lord Bolton v. Tomlin*, 5 Ad. & El. 856.

(*n*) As to the effect of this enactment, vide post, c. XVII.

(*o*) 2 Bl. C. 144; *Plowd.* 198.

See *Doe v. Walker*, 5 Barn. & Cress. 111; *Co. Litt.* 338 a, 270 a; *Neal v. Mackenzie*, 1 Mee. & Wels. 747; *Williams v. Bosanquet*, 1 Brod. & Bing. 248; *Edge v. Strafford*, ubi sup.

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 256.

[bote, plough-bote, hay-bote (*q*), and the like; and the doctrine of *waste*, also, applies generally to tenants for years (*r*).]

With regard to emblements, that is, the profits of lands sowed, a tenant for years is entitled to them in some cases, but not in all. For where his term depends upon a certainty, as if he holds from Midsummer for ten years, and in the last year he sows a crop of corn, and it is not ripe and cut before Midsummer, the landlord shall have it, in the absence of any special contract or custom to the contrary; for the tenant knew the expiration of his term, and therefore it was his own folly to sow that of which he never could reap the profits (*s*). But where the lease for years depends upon an uncertainty, as upon the death of the lessor, being himself only tenant for life, or being a husband seised in right of his wife, or if the term of years be determinable upon a life or lives (*t*): in these and similar cases, the estate for years not being certainly to expire at a time foreknown, but by the act of God,—the tenant for years, or his executors, shall have the emblements, in the same manner that a tenant for life, or his executors, is entitled thereto (*u*). But it is otherwise if the term determine by the act of the party himself; as if he does anything that amounts to a forfeiture: in which case the emblements shall go to the lessor, and not to the lessee, who hath determined his estate by his own default (*v*). The operation of the common law right to

(*q*) Co. Litt. 41 b.

(*r*) As to waste, vide sup. p. 257, et post, bk. v. c. VIII. Some doubt has been entertained as to the liability of tenant for years (in the absence of express stipulation) for *permissive* waste; but see *Yellowly v. Gower*, 11 Exch. pp. 273, 274.

(*s*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 145; Litt. s. 68.

(*t*) But it may be remarked that a lease for years by a tenant for

life, or a husband seised in right of his wife, is not in *all cases* now subject to uncertainty. For by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 32, such persons may now, under such circumstances as therein mentioned, make effectual leases for any term not exceeding twenty-one years. Vide sup. pp. 251, 252, 257, 279.

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. ubi sup.

(*v*) Co. Litt. 55 b.

emblements, however, is now much more limited than it once was, having ceased (as we have seen), by the effect of 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, to apply to such tenants as hold farms or lands at a rack rent under a landlord entitled for life or any other uncertain interest, and whose lease or tenancy determines by the death of their landlord, or by the cesser of his estate; and a protection of a different kind, being now provided for tenants so circumstanced (*y*).

II. The second species of estates not freehold, are estates *at will* (*z*). An estate at will is where lands and tenements are let by one man to another to have and to hold at the will of the lessor, and the tenant by force of this lease obtains possession (*a*). It may be constituted by written or verbal agreement without further ceremony, if followed by entry; and may in some cases arise by mere construction of law. [Tenant at will hath no certain indefeasible estate; nothing that can be assigned by him to any other; because the lessor may determine his will, and put him out whenever he pleases. But every estate at will is at the will of both parties, landlord and tenant; so that either of them may determine his will, and quit his connexion with the other, at his own pleasure (*b*). Yet this must be understood with some restriction. For, if the tenant at will sows his land, and the landlord, before the corn is ripe or before it is reaped, puts him out; yet the tenant shall have the emblements, and free ingress, egress, and regress to cut and carry them away (*c*). And this for the same reason upon which all the cases of emblements turn, viz. the point of uncertainty; since the tenant could not possibly know when his landlord would determine his will, and therefore could make no provision against it; and having sown the land upon a reasonable presumption, the law will not suffer him to be a loser by

(*y*) Vide sup. p. 258.

(*z*) As to an estate at will, see Co. Litt. 55 a—57 b.

(*a*) Litt. s. 68.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 55 a.

(*c*) Ibid. 56 a.

[it. But it is otherwise, and upon reason equally good, where the tenant himself determines the will; for in this case the landlord shall have the profits of the land (*d*).]

The liability of a tenant at will, in regard to waste of the voluntary kind, is similar to that of tenant for years (*e*); but he is understood to be not liable for waste merely permissive (*f*).

What act does, or does not, amount to a determination of the will on either side, has formerly been matter of great debate in our courts. But it is now settled, that not only the express determination of the lessor's will (as by notice given to the lessee that he shall hold no longer), but also the exertion of any act of ownership by the lessor, without the lessee's consent, puts an end to or determines the estate at will (*g*); as, for example, the landlord's entering upon the land and cutting timber, or carrying away stone (*h*), or taking a distress for rent and impounding it on the premises (*i*). And the same consequence will follow if the lessee should commit waste (*k*), or do any act of desertion, such as assigning the estate to another, which is inconsistent with his tenure. Also, which is *instar omnium*, should either the lessor or the lessee die or be outlawed (*l*).

[The law, however, is careful that no sudden determination of the will by one party, shall tend to the manifest and unforeseen prejudice of the other. This appears in the rule as to emblements before mentioned; and, by parity of reason, the lessee, after the determination of the lessor's will, shall have reasonable ingress and egress to fetch away his goods and utensils (*m*). And, if rent be payable quarterly or half-yearly, and the lessee determines the will, the rent shall be paid to the end of the current quarter or

(*d*) Co. Litt. 55 b.

(*e*) Ibid. 57. Vide sup. pp. 257, 288.

(*f*) See Harnett v. Maitland, 16 Mee. & W. 257.

(*g*) See Co. Litt. 55 b; Henchman v. Iles, 1 Ventr. 248.

(*h*) See Co. Litt. 55 b; Turner v. Doe d. Bennett, 9 M. & W. 643.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 57 b.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 57 a.

(*l*) Oland's case, 5 Rep. 116 b; Co. Litt. 57 b, 62 b.

(*m*) Litt. s. 69.

[half-year (*n*). Moreover, upon the same principle, courts of law have of late years leaned as much as possible against construing demises, where no certain term is mentioned, to be tenancies at will (*o*); but have rather held them to be *tenancies from year to year so long as both parties please,*] and will not suffer either party to determine the tenancy, without *reasonable notice* to the other; which reasonable notice—in the case of every tenancy from year to year (*p*)—is now fixed, by general usage, at half a year at the least, ending with the current year of the tenancy (*q*); though if the tenancy commenced at one of the usual quarterly feast days, the half year may be computed from one of such feast days to another—as from Midsummer to Christmas—whether there be 182 days between them or not (*r*).

This tenancy “from year to year,” or “by the year,” has accordingly in modern times almost entirely superseded the old tenancy at will, and prevails so much that it may be proper to enlarge a little more upon its character. It belongs properly to the first species of estate which has been noticed in this chapter, viz. the estate for years; though from the degree of uncertainty to which its duration is subject, it partakes also in some measure of the nature of an estate at will. It may be created, in the first place, by the express agreement of the parties; and this

(*n*) *Leighton v. Theed*, 2 Salk. 414; *Kighly v. Bulkly*, 1 Sid. 339.

(*o*) But a demise, wherein the intention of the parties is evidently to create a tenancy by will, is still so construed by the courts. (See *Doe v. Cox*, 11 Q. B. 122.)

(*p*) So also a tenancy from *month to month*, or from *week to week*, or other recurring periods short of a year, can only be determined by “reasonable” notice; but what notice is reasonable in such cases does not appear to have been expressly

determined. (See *Jones v. Mills*, 10 C. B., N. S. 800.)

(*q*) See *Timmins v. Rawlinson*, 3 Burr. 1603; *Right v. Darby*, 1 T. R. 159; *Doe v. Smith*, 5 Ad. & El. 351; *Doe v. Stanion*, 1 Mee. & Wels. 695. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 147) remarks that this kind of lease was in use as long ago as the reign of Henry the eighth, when half a year’s notice seems to have been required to determine it.

(*r*) *Doe v. Watkins*, 7 East, 551; *Roe v. Doe*, 6 Bing. 574.

(provided the rent reserved be two-thirds at the least of the value of that which is demised) may be either verbal or in writing; but if the rent be under that amount, then it must be *by deed* (*s*). It may also be created, secondly, by construction of law (*s*). Thus, if a man demise premises to another at a yearly rent, no length of time being expressed, the law will construe this as a demise from year to year (*t*). So the law will always imply a tenancy from year to year where there is an occupation at an annual rent, and there is no evidence that the occupier's estate is of a different description (*u*). And if a man is let into possession under a demise not under seal, for a term of more than three years, though such a demise will not pass an interest in the premises for the term intended (*x*), yet the lessee will be considered as holding from year to year, and on such of the terms of the agreement as are consistent with that tenancy (*y*).

With respect to the duration of the interest, it is to be observed, that, as the half-year's notice to determine the estate (or *notice to quit* as it is called) must always be for quitting at the end of some particular year of the tenancy (*z*), a lease "from year to year" will necessarily confer an estate for one year certain, at the outset (*a*); and if in that, or any succeeding year of the tenancy, more than half a year elapse without a notice to quit being given by either of the parties, another year certain is thereby constantly added to that which is in progress. Upon the same principle, if the lease be "*for a year*, and

(*s*) Vide sup. p. 287.

(*t*) See *Doe v. Donovan*, 1 Taunt. 555; *Richardson v. Langridge*, 4 Taunt. 128; *Wilkinson v. Hall*, 3 Bing. N. C. 508.

(*u*) See *Doe d. Lord v. Crago*, 6 C. B. 90.

(*x*) Vide sup. p. 287.

(*y*) See *Lee v. Smith*, 9 Exch. 662; *Tress v. Savage*, 4 Ell. & Bl. 36, 42.

(*z*) As to the manner of proving a notice to quit, see *Doe v. Somerton*, 7 Q. B. 58; *Stapylton v. Clough*, 2 Ell. & Bl. 933. As to the sufficiency of a notice to quit, as given in particular cases, see *Doe d. Lyster v. Goldwin*, 2 Q. B. 143; *Doe d. Bailey v. Foster*, 3 C. B. 215.

(*a*) See *Doe d. Hogg v. Taylor*, 1 Jur. 960; *Doe d. Cornwall v. Matthews*, 11 C. B. 675.

so from year to year," it will enure as a demise for *two years* certain, at the outset; for at the expiration of the first, there is a continuation of the tenancy, which cannot be determined by a notice to quit at an earlier period than the expiration of the second year (*b*). But in other respects the law of duration is the same as in the case first supposed. It is further to be remarked, that the estate from year to year, when once constituted, does not determine (like an estate at will), by an assignment of the interest of either of the parties, or by their death: but the tenancy will continue to exist between one of the parties and the assigns or representatives of the other; or between the assigns or representatives of both parties, (as the case may be,) until duly determined by the usual notice to quit (*c*). To which it may be added, that though the same law with respect to waste, (either voluntary or permissive,) as above laid down in the case of a tenant at will, is also applicable in general to a tenant from year to year (*d*), yet where the demise to the latter comprises a house, he seems bound to keep it in weather-tight condition, and consequently to be answerable for such permissive waste as may arise by his neglect to do so (*e*);—a doctrine which is not understood to be applicable to a mere tenant at will.

III. An estate at *sufferance* is where one comes into possession under a lawful demise, and, after such demise is ended, wrongfully continues the possession (*f*). [As if a man takes a lease for a year, and, after the year is

(*b*) *Denn v. Cartwright*, 4 East, 32.

(*c*) See *Maddon v. White*, 2 T. R. 159; *Doe v. Porter*, 3 T. R. 13; *Buckworth v. Simpson*, 5 Tyr. 354.

(*d*) As to waste, vide sup. p. 257, et post, bk. V. c. VIII. In *Yellowly v. Gower*, 11 Exch. p. 274, it was said by the court that the degree of

repairs required from a tenant *from year to year* had been much limited by the effect of modern decisions.

(*e*) See per Lord Kenyon, *Fergusson v. —*, 2 Esp. N. C. 590; per Lord Tenterden, *Anworth v. Johnson*, 5 Car. & P. 241.

(*f*) *Co. Litt.* 57 b, 271 a; 2 Inst. 134.

[expired, continues to hold the premises, without any fresh leave from the owner of the estate. Or, if a man maketh a lease at will, and dies, the estate at will is thereby determined;² but if the tenant continueth possession, he is tenant at sufferance (*g*). But no man can be tenant at sufferance under the king, to whom no *laches*, or neglect, in not entering and ousting the tenant, is ever imputed by law; but his tenant, so holding over, is considered as an absolute intruder (*h*). And in the case of a subject, this estate may be destroyed whenever the true owner shall make an actual entry on the lands, and oust the tenant (*i*); but, before entry, he cannot maintain an action of trespass against the tenant, as he might against a stranger (*k*); and the reason is, because the tenant being once in by a lawful title, the law, (which presumes no wrong in any man,) will suppose him to continue upon a title equally lawful, unless the owner of the land, by some public and avowed act—such as entry—will declare the continuance to be tortious, or, in common language, wrongful.]

Thus stands the law, with regard to tenants by sufferance; and the landlord had formerly no remedy in such cases (other than entry) except an action of ejectment to recover the premises, in addition to which he might recover the *mesne profits*, that is, the profits of the same accruing during the period of detention. But now, by statute 4 Geo. II. c. 28, in case any tenant for life or years, (or other person claiming under or by collusion with such tenant,) shall wilfully (*l*) hold over after the determination of the term, and after demand of possession made and notice in writing given, by him to whom the remainder or reversion of the premises shall belong (*m*),—

(*g*) Co. Litt. 57 b.

(*h*) Trevellian v. Andrew, 5 Mod.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 57 b; and see n. (4),
by Harg.

384.

(*l*) See Swinfen v. Bacon, 6 H.
& N. 184, 846.

(*i*) But such entry must be *peaceable*. As to the nature of the remedy by way of entry, vide post, bk. v. c. i.

(*m*) See Blatchford, app., v. Cole, resp., 5 C. B. (N. S.) 514.

an action shall lie against him, for the time he detains the lands, whereby damages shall be recovered at the rate of *double* their yearly value. And by statute 11 Geo. II. c. 19, s. 18, any tenant, with power to determine his lease, who shall give notice of his intention to quit, and shall not deliver up possession at the time he mentions, shall pay *double* his former rent for such time as he continues thenceforth in possession (*n*).

Moreover to give landlords, as against their tenants holding over, the option (where the property is of small value) of a more cheap and speedy remedy than the formal one of an action, it is provided by 1 & 2 Vict. c. 74 (*o*), that a tenant at will, (or for a term not exceeding seven years,) without rent, or at a rent not exceeding the rate of 20*l.* per annum; who (or the person occupying under him) shall fail to deliver up possession after his interest has ended or been duly determined, may be ejected (after being served with a written notice of the intention to do so) by a summary proceeding before any two justices of the district. But where the landlord has no lawful right to the possession he will be liable for trespass, and the warrant for possession will be stayed if the tenant shall give security to bring an action to try the right, and to pay costs in the event of judgment being given against him. Relief of the same kind, to a landlord against his tenant holding over, is also afforded through the county courts, in cases where the value of the tenement is higher than 20*l. per annum*; it being enacted by 19 &

(*n*) As to these provisions, see *Wilkinson v. Colley*, 5 Burr. 2694; *Soulsby v. Neving*, 9 East, 314; *Page v. Moore*, 15 Q. B. 684. Where the tenant holds over, and an ejectment is brought, he may be compelled in some cases to find sureties for payment of the costs and damages. (See 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 213.)

(*o*) See *Jones v. Chapman*, 14 Mee. & W. 124; *Delaney v. Fox*, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 166; *Rees*, app., *Davies*, resp., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 56. As to recovering possession of premises within the *metropolitan district*, see 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 13; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 34; *Edwards v. Hodges*, 15 C. B. 477.

20 Vict. c. 108, s. 50, that if the term and interest of the tenant—where the value of the premises or rent shall not have exceeded 50*l.* per annum, and upon which no fine or premium shall have been paid—shall have expired or determined by a legal notice to quit, and the tenant (or any person holding or claiming through him) shall neglect or refuse to deliver up possession accordingly, the landlord may enter a plaint in the county court of the district (*p*), either against such tenant or such other person as afore-said; and, after judgment given in his favour, may obtain possession through the high bailiff of the court, to whom a warrant may be issued for that purpose by the registrar (*q*).

We may conclude the present chapter with this remark, that in the case of a lease for years, as well as that of a lease for life, or gift in tail, a tenure of the imperfect kind is created between the lessor and the lessee (*r*); and the latter holds of the former by the nominal obligation of fealty, and by such services as are reserved; but that it is otherwise as to a tenant at will or at sufferance, from neither of whom is any fealty due. The reason assigned as to the tenant at will, is, that “he hath not any sure estate” (*s*); and as to the tenant at sufferance, he is not considered, in strictness, as having any estate at all, but a mere “possession without privity” (*t*).

(*p*) As to the county courts, vide post, bk. v. c. iv.

(*q*) There is a former provision nearly to the same effect in 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 122, as to which see *Jones v. Owen*, 5 D. & L. 669; *Ellis v. Peachey*, ib. 675; *Banks v. Rebbeck*, 2 L., M. & P. 452; *Harrington v. Ramsay*, 8 Exch. 879; 2 Ell. & Bl. 669.

(*r*) Vide sup. p. 247.

(*s*) Co. Litt. 93 a, 93 b; 63 a, 68 b, n. (5), by Harg.; see *Denn v. Fearnside*, 1 Wils. 176. There is an exception to this, however, in the case of copyhold, which is a species of estate at will; for fealty is due from a copyholder (though *respited* as of course) on his admittance. (Co. Litt. ubi sup.)

(*t*) Co. Litt. 270 b.

CHAPTER VI.

OF ESTATES UPON CONDITION.



[BESIDES the several divisions of estates, in point of interest, which we have considered in the three preceding chapters, there is also another species still remaining, which is called an estate *upon condition* (*a*); being such whose existence depends upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain event, whereby the estate may be either originally created, or enlarged, or finally defeated (*b*). And these conditional estates have been reserved till now, because they are indeed more properly qualifications of other estates, than a distinct species of themselves; seeing that any quantity of interest—a fee, a freehold, or a term of years—may depend upon these provisional restrictions. These estates, thus understood, are of two sorts: I. Estates upon condition *implied*: II. Estates upon condition *expressed*: under which last may be included, III. Estates held *in vadio, gage, or pledge*: IV. Estates by *statute merchant* or *statute staple*: V. Estates held by *elegit*.

I. Estates upon condition *implied* in law, are where a grant of an estate has a condition annexed to it inseparably from its essence and constitution, although no condition be expressed in words. As if a grant be made to a man of an “office” generally, without adding other words, the law tacitly annexes hereto a secret condition, that the

(*a*) As to this estate, vide Co. Litt. 201 a—237 a.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 201 a; Lord Stafford’s case, 8 Rep. 73 b.

[grantee shall duly execute his office (*c*); on breach of which condition it is lawful for the grantor, or his heirs, to oust him, and grant it to another person (*d*). “Franchises” also, or regal privileges in the hands of a subject, are held to be granted on the same condition of making a proper use of them; and therefore they may be lost and forfeited, like offices, either by abuse or by neglect (*e*)

Upon the same principle proceed all the forfeitures which are given by law, of life estates and others, for any acts done by the tenant himself, that are incompatible with the estate which he holds. As if tenant for life or years enfeoff a stranger in fee simple: this, *by the common law*, as we shall see presently, was a forfeiture of their several estates; being a breach of the condition which the law annexes thereto, viz. that the tenants shall not attempt to create a greater estate than they themselves are entitled to (*f*).

II. An estate on condition *expressed* in the grant itself is of two kinds. The first is where an estate is granted—either in fee-simple or otherwise—with an expressed qualification annexed, whereby the estate granted shall either commence, be enlarged, or be defeated, upon performance or breach of such qualification or condition (*g*), which is described in the books as a condition *in deed* (*h*). These conditions are therefore either *precedent* or *subsequent*. “Precedent” are such as must happen or be performed before the estate can vest or be enlarged: “subsequent” are those, by the failure or nonperform-

(*c*) Litt. s. 378; see *Bartlett v. Downes*, 3 Barn. & Cress. 619.

(*d*) Litt. s. 317.

(*e*) *Earl of Shrewsbury's case*, 9 Rep. 50. As to franchises, vide post, c. XXIII.

(*f*) Vide post, p. 317.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 201 a. As to the commencement of estates upon con-

dition, see Co. Litt. 216 a—218 b; as to their enlargement on condition, *Lord Stafford's case*, 8 Rep. 11; *Fearne*, by Butler, 279, 9th ed.; as to their defeasance on condition, Co. Litt. 214 b, 215 a. As to estates *devised* on condition, *Sugden on Powers*, vol. i. p. 122 (7th ed.)

(*h*) Co. Litt. 201 a.

[ance of which an estate already vested may be defeated. Thus, if a man grant to his lessee for years, that upon payment of a hundred marks within the term he shall have the fee, this is a condition precedent, and the fee simple passeth not till the hundred marks be paid (*i*). But if a man grant an estate in fee simple, reserving to himself and his heirs a certain rent, and that, if such rent be not paid at the times limited, it shall be lawful for him and his heirs to re-enter and avoid the estate: in this case the grantee and his heirs have an estate upon condition subsequent; which is defeasible, if the condition be not strictly performed (*k*).] The other kind of estates on condition expressed, are those created by way of *conditional limitation* (*l*); namely, where an estate is so expressly defined and limited by the words of its creation, that it cannot endure for any longer time than till the contingency happens, upon which the estate is to fail. To this class may be referred all base fees, and fees simple conditional at the common law (*m*). [Thus an estate to a man and his heirs, *tenants of the manor of Dale*, is an estate in fee on condition that he and his heirs continue tenants of that manor. And so, if a personal annuity be granted at this day to a man and the heirs of his body; as this is no tenement within the statute of Westminster the Second, it remains, as at common law, a fee-simple on condition that the grantee has heirs of his body (*n*). Upon

(*i*) Co. Litt. 217 b; Lord Stafford's case, 8 Rep. 73 b.

(*k*) Litt. s. 325.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 234 b; see Mary Portington's case, 10 Rep. 40 b, 41 b. The term used by Lord Coke is simply "a limitation." But as "limitation" is ordinarily used to express a more general idea (viz. the definition or circumscription in any conveyance, of the interest which the grantee is intended to take), the

term "conditional limitation" better expresses the idea in the text, and is frequently adopted for that purpose (as in 1 Sand. Us. 149, 2nd ed.) It is right, however, to apprise the student that this term is used by different writers in different senses; see 1 Sand. Uses, 149, 2nd ed.; Fearne, by Butler, 10, n. (*k*), 9th ed.; Gilb. Us. by Sugd. 178.

(*m*) Vide sup. pp. 238, 239.

(*n*) As to what is a "tenement,"

[the same principle depend all the determinable estates of freehold, mentioned in the fourth chapter: as *durante viduitate*, &c.: these are estates for life upon condition that the grantees do not marry, and the like (*o*).

Between conditional limitations and estates depending on condition subsequent, (though bearing, on the whole, considerable resemblance to each other,) there is this difference—that in the former, as when land is granted to a man, *so long as* he is parson of Dale, or *while* he continues unmarried, or *until* out of the rents and profits he shall have made 500*l.* and the like; the estate determines as soon as the contingency happens, (when he ceases to be parson, marries a wife, or has received the 500*l.*,) and the next subsequent estate, which depends upon such determination, becomes immediately vested, without any act to be done by him who is next in expectancy; but, in the latter, when an estate is strictly speaking upon *condition in deed* (as if granted expressly *upon condition* to be void upon the payment of 40*l.*, by the grantor, or *so that* the grantee continues unmarried, or *provided* he goes to York, &c.), the law permits it to endure beyond the time when such contingency happens, unless the grantor or his heirs take advantage of the breach of the condition, and make an entry in order to avoid the estate (*p*).] As to the necessity of entry, however, in such case, there is a diversity (says Lord Coke) between a condition annexed to a freehold and a condition annexed to a lease for years (*q*). Thus, if a lease for years be made on condition that, if the lessee goes not to Rome before such a

vide sup. p. 169: as to the effect of the statute of 13 Edw. 1, *De donis conditionalibus*, referred to in the text, vide sup. p. 242.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 245.

(*p*) Litt. s. 347, 331; stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 34; Mary Portington's case, 10 Rep. 40 b, 41 b; Avelyn v. Ward, 1 Ves. sen. 420. As to the

party on whom lies the *onus probandi* with respect to the breach of the condition, see Brooke v. Spong, 15 Mee. & W. 153.

(*q*) As to re-entry by a lessor on breach of condition, see Roberts v. Davey, 4 Barn. & Adol. 664; Hill v. Kempshall, 7 C. B. 975.

day, the lease shall be void, the lease is *ipso facto* void upon the breach of the condition, without any entry by the lessor; but if the lease had been for life, an entry would have been necessary before it could have been defeated (*r*).

The right of entry on breach of a condition subsequent, cannot be reserved in favour of a stranger, but only of the grantor or his heirs; and the effect of entry by him or them, after breach, is to defeat altogether the estate, which had before passed to the grantee; so that the grantor or his heirs are *in* as of their former seisin (*s*). It was also the rule of the common law, that the right of entry on breach could not be assigned in any case to a stranger (*t*). So that if a man had made a lease for life, reserving a rent, with proviso for re-entry in case of non-payment, and the lessor granted over his reversionary estate to another, the latter could take no benefit from the condition (*u*). But by statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34 (*x*), the law in this respect is altered, and the grantee of the reversion, upon a lease for life or years, shall have the same benefit of a condition, in case of a subsequent breach, as the grantor himself would have had,—provided that such condition relates to the payment of rent, the restriction from waste, or other like object tending to the benefit of the reversionary interest (*y*). And with respect to *conditional limitations*, a stranger may in all cases take advantage of these, even without the aid of the statute. Thus, if a man make a lease until J. S. shall return from

(*r*) Co. Litt. 214 b. As to the nature of the entry required, see *Doe v. Pritchard*, 5 Barn. & Adol. 765.

(*s*) *Fearne*, by Butler, 381, n. (*a*), 9th ed. As to the rights of the grantor or his heirs on re-entry, in respect of the *emblems*, see *Davis v. Eyton*, 7 Bing. 154.

(*t*) Litt. s. 347.

(*u*) Co. Litt. 215 a.

(*x*) As to this statute, see *Thursby v. Plant*, 1 Saund. by Wms. 237, and the notes thereto; *Buckworth v. Simpson*, 5 Tyrw. 354; *Standen v. Christmas* and another, 10 Q. B. 135; *Wright v. Burroughes*, 3 C. B. 685.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 205 b; 1 Saund. by Wms. 287, n. (16).

Rome, and afterwards grant the reversion over to another, such grantee, on the return of J. S. from Rome, shall be entitled to enter,—the interest of the lessee being then determined by the terms of the limitation itself^(z).

[In all instances of estates upon express condition, it is to be observed, that so long as the condition remains unbroken, the grantee may have an estate of freehold, provided the estate upon which such condition is annexed be in itself of a freehold nature: as if the original grant express either an estate of inheritance or for life; or no estate at all, which is constructively an estate for life. For the breach of these conditions being contingent and uncertain, this uncertainty preserves the freehold, because the estate is capable to last for ever, or at least for the life of the tenant, supposing the condition to remain unbroken^(a). But where the estate is at the utmost a chattel interest, which must determine at a time certain, and may determine sooner (as a grant for ninety-nine years, provided A., B. and C., or the survivor of them, shall so long live), this still continues a mere chattel, and is not by reason of such its uncertainty ranked among estates of freehold.

These express conditions are void, if they be *impossible* at the time of their creation, or afterwards become impossible by the act of God or the act of the grantor himself; or if they be *contrary to law*, or *repugnant* to the nature of the estate. In any of which cases, if they be conditions *subsequent*, that is, to be performed after the estate is vested, the estate shall become absolute in the tenant. As, if a feoffment be made to a man in fee-simple, on condition that unless he goes to Rome in twenty-four hours, or unless he marries with Jane S. by such a day, (within which time the woman dies, or the feoffor marries her himself); or unless he kills another; or in case he

^(z) Co. Litt. 214 b; Mary Portington's case, 10 Rep. 42.

^(a) Co. Litt. 42 a.

[alienes in fee; that then and in any of such cases the estate shall be vacated and determined: here the condition is void, and the estate made absolute in the feoffee. For he hath by the grant the estate vested in him, which shall not be defeated afterwards by a condition either impossible, illegal or repugnant(*b*). But if the condition be *precedent* or to be performed before the estate vests, as a grant to a man that, if he kills another or goes to Rome in a day, he shall have an estate in fee; here, the void condition being precedent, the estate which depends thereon is also void, and the grantee shall take nothing by the grant; for he hath no estate until the condition be performed (*c*).]

On the other hand, even where the condition is valid and capable of being enforced, it is also capable of being waived by the grantor at his pleasure (*d*); and as the law always leans against forfeitures (*e*), it will consider him as having waived his right to enter for breach of a condition subsequent, if, after notice of the breach committed, he does any act inconsistent with an intention to avail himself of the forfeiture. Thus, if a lease be made with a proviso that, in the event of the lessee's assigning his interest, the lessor shall be at liberty to enter on the land demised, as of his former estate; he will nevertheless not be entitled to enter, if, after an assignment made, he accepts rent from the assignee (*f*). By a recent enactment however (23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 6), an actual waiver of the benefit of any covenant or condition in a lease by the lessor shall not (in the absence of any intention appearing to that effect) be assumed to extend to any breach other than that to which the waiver specially relates, nor to

(*b*) Co. Litt. 206 a; Mary Por-
tington's case, 10 Rep. 42; Doe v.
Eyre, 5 C. B. 744; Clifford v. Watts,
Law Rep., 5 C. P. 577.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 206 a. See Shrews-
bury v. Scott, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 179.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 218 a.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 206 b; Clay v. Bow-
ler, 5 Ad. & Ell. 403, n.

(*f*) See Co. Litt. 211 b; Doe *d*.
Nash v. Birch, 1 Mee. & W. 402;
Doe v. Lewis, 5 Ad. & Ell. 277;
Hartshorne v. Watson, 4 Bing. N. C.
178; Doe v. Rees, ib. 384.

operate as a general waiver of the covenant or condition in question (*g*).

III. [Another class of estates defeasible upon condition subsequent are such as are held *in vadio*, in *gage*, or pledge: such pledge being of two kinds, *vivum vadium*, or living pledge; and *mortuum vadium*, dead pledge, or *mortgage*.

Vivum vadium, or living pledge, a term rarely or never occurring in practice, is when a man borrows a sum (suppose 200*l.*) of another; and grants him an estate, as of 20*l. per annum*, to hold till the rents and profits shall repay the sum so borrowed. This is an estate conditioned to be void, as soon as such sum is raised. And in this case the land or pledge is said to be living: it subsists, and survives the debt; and immediately on the discharge of that, results back to the borrower (*h*). But *mortuum vadium*, a dead pledge, or *mortgage* (which is much more common than the other), is where a man borrows of another a specific sum (*e. g.*, 200*l.*), and grants him an estate on condition that if he, the mortgagor, shall repay the mortgagee the said sum of 200*l.*, or, as is more usual, the sum lent, with interest thereon at a fixed rate, on a certain day mentioned in the deed, that then the mortgagor may re-enter on the estate so granted in pledge; or, as is now the more usual way, that then the mortgagee shall reconvey the estate to the mortgagor; in this case, the land, which is so put in pledge, is by law, in case of non-payment at the time limited, for ever dead and gone from the mortgagor; and the mortgagee's estate in the lands is then no longer conditional, but absolute: but so long as it continues conditional, that is, between the time

(*g*) As to forfeiture for breach of covenant in a lease, relating to *not assigning* (or doing other act) *without licence*, or to the *payment of rent*, or the *insurance* of the premises, see 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s.

210; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, ss. 1—3, 4—9; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 126, ss. 1, 2.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 205 a; see Fenwick v. Reed, 1 Meriv. 119. As to mortgage of a *personal chattel*, see Flory v. Denny, 7 Exch. 581.

[of lending the money and the time allotted for payment, the mortgagee is called tenant in mortgage (*i*).]

As soon as the estate is created, the mortgagee, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, might immediately enter on the lands, but would be bound to restore them upon performance of the condition by payment of the mortgage-money at the day limited; and therefore it is usual to insert a provision that the mortgagor shall hold the land till the day assigned for payment: but in case of failure to pay at that period, the mortgagee is then entitled to enter and take peaceable possession, without any possibility of being afterwards evicted by the mortgagor by any proceeding at law (*k*). The mortgagee, however, is not in fact permitted to avail himself of the forfeiture, to any extent beyond what is necessary for the satisfaction of his reasonable claims. [For here *equity* will interpose: and though a mortgage be thus forfeited, and the estate absolutely vested in the mortgagee at *law*, and although he has obtained possession, yet the mortgagor will be allowed to recall or *redeem* his estate, on paying to the mortgagee his principal, interest and expenses; for otherwise, in strictness of law, an estate worth 1,000*l.* might be forfeited for non-payment of 100*l.* or a less sum (*l*).] It is, however, provided by a statute of

(*i*) Litt s. 332. It may be observed that a mere deposit of title-deeds without any conveyance will amount to a mortgage in contemplation of *equity*. (See Russell v. Russell, 1 Bro. C. C. 269.)

(*k*) See Doe v. Giles, 5 Bing. 421; Doe v. Cadwallader, 2 Barn. & Adol. 473; Thunder v. Belcher, 3 East, 449; Doe v. Maisey, 8 Barn. & Cress. 767; Partington v. Woodcock, 6 Ad. & El. 695. It is supposed in the text that there is no tenant in possession, under a lease

prior to the mortgage. If there be, his possession cannot of course be disturbed; but he may be compelled to pay over his rents to the mortgagee. If there be a tenant in possession under a lease granted by the mortgagor *subsequently* to the mortgage, and without the privity of the mortgagee, he may be ejected.

(*l*) If the money be not repaid by the day assigned, and the mortgagee has neither demanded, nor taken any steps to compel, pay-

limitation of modern date (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 28), that a mortgagor shall not be entitled to redeem but within *twenty years* next after the time that the mortgagee shall obtain possession: unless indeed an acknowledgment in writing shall have been given by him of the right of the mortgagor, in which case the power of redemption is limited to a period of twenty years from such acknowledgment. And, in favour of a mortgagee who has not obtained possession, it is enacted by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 28, that any person, entitled to or claiming under any mortgage of land, may make entry or bring action or suit to recover the same within twenty years next after the last payment of any part of the principal or interest secured by such mortgage;—and this he may do although more than twenty years may have elapsed since his right to enter or sue shall have first accrued (*n*).

The reasonable advantage above referred to, allowed to a mortgagor, is called the *equity of redemption* (*o*); and he may avail himself of it by taking proceedings “to redeem” (as it is called) in chancery (*p*). If the mortgagee be not in possession, this proceeding merely calls upon him for a reconveyance, on payment of principal, interest, and costs of suit (*q*): but as against a mortgagee who has obtained

ment, he is entitled to receive *six calendar months’ notice in writing* before the mortgage can be paid off. (See *Shrapnell v. Blake*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. *in tit.* Mortgage, pl. 34.)

(*n*) See *Doe d. Palmer v. Eyre*, 17 Q. B. 366.

(*o*) In certain cases of accidental or formal difficulty in obtaining a reconveyance, (as where the mortgagee has died intestate and without an heir,) the court, before which the suit is, may make an order having

the effect of a reconveyance. (See 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 19.)

(*p*) Suits for redemption or foreclosure, where the mortgage does not exceed the sum of 500*l.*, may now be brought in the county court. (28 & 29 Vict. c. 99, s. 1.) But the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is concurrent in such cases. (*Scotto v. Heritage*, Law Rep., 3 Eq. Ca. 212.)

(*q*) It may be here incidentally observed that, during the continuance of the equity of redemption, the

possession, it prays that an account may be taken of all the rents and profits on the one hand, and of the principal, interest, and costs on the other; and that, on payment of what may appear due on such account, a reconveyance may be made, and the possession of the premises restored (*r*). On the other hand, the mortgagee, where his debt remains unpaid for more than a reasonable time after the time agreed on, may (although the time for redeeming be still running), take proceedings in chancery “for foreclosure,” calling upon the mortgagor to redeem his estate presently, or in default thereof to be for ever *foreclosed* from redeeming the same; that is, to lose his equity of redemption without possibility of recall (*s*). And also, in some cases of fraudulent mortgages (*t*), such as twice mortgaging the same lands without giving notice of the mortgage already effected, the fraudulent mortgagor forfeits all equity of redemption whatsoever (*u*). The mortgagee may also bring the estate to sale in satisfaction of his debt, (paying over the surplus

mortgagor has been regarded in equity, as the owner of the estate, subject only to the mortgage debt: and hence, on the death of the mortgagor, the mortgaged estate comes to the devisee (or heir) encumbered with this debt. By “Locke King’s Act,” (17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, explained by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69,) the estate so encumbered and devised or descending is, in the absence of an expressed intention to the contrary on the part of the mortgagor, charged with such his debt. Before this Act, (as to which see Maxwell *v.* Hyslop, Law Rep., 4 Eq. Ca. 407,) in the absence of an expressed intention, the *personal* estate of the deceased mortgagor was primarily

liable.

(*r*) See Parkinson *v.* Hanbury, Law Rep., 2 H. L. 1.

(*s*) In such a suit, however, the court may direct a *sale* instead of a foreclosure (see 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 48; Newman *v.* Selfe, 33 Beav. 522).

(*t*) See stat. 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 16.

(*u*) In cases where the land is mortgaged to several persons, each ignorant of the other incumbrances, the maxim *qui prior est tempore, potior est jure*, prevails, as the general rule. (See Jones *v.* Jones, 8 Sim. 633; Wilmot *v.* Pike, 5 Hare, 14.) But preference is given, to a certain extent, to the mortgagee in possession of the legal

proceeds, if any, to the mortgagor,) even without resorting to the expedient of proceedings in equity, provided the security be taken (as is now the usual practice), in such form as to authorize that course of proceeding (*x*); and even if no power of sale be conferred by the terms of the instrument, he may still bring the estate to sale in such manner as is provided by the recent Act of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145 (*y*).

It may be here observed that it forms one of the provisions of the Judicature Act, 1873, that after the commencement thereof in November, 1874, a mortgagor entitled for the time being to the possession or receipt of the rents and profits of any land, as to which no notice of his intention to take possession or to enter into the receipts of the rents and profits thereof shall have been given by the mortgagee, may sue for such possession, or for the recovery of such rent or profits, or to prevent or recover damages in respect of any trespass or other wrong relative thereto, in his own name only, unless the cause of action arises on a lease or other contract made by him jointly with any other person (*z*).

The state of the law, as above explained, with respect to mortgages, affords the reader an example of the distinction referred to in a former place between *legal* and *equitable* estate (*a*). At law, the ownership of the land, as we have seen, is considered as absolutely vested, upon the non-payment of the money advanced, in the mortgagee. The doctrines of equity, on the other hand,

estate. (*Goddard v. Complin*, 1 Cha. Ca. 119.)

(*x*) The concurrence of the mortgagor is not required in such sale. (See *Corder v. Morgan*, 18 Ves. 344.)

(*y*) By this Act a mortgagee has now several powers as incident to his estate, though not in form conferred by the deed. These relate to

the selling, &c., the insuring against fire, and the appointment of a *receiver*, who shall receive the rents and profits as agent of the person entitled to the property subject to the charge. (23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, ss. 11—24.)

(*z*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25 (5).

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 230; 1 Sand. Us. 203, 2nd ed.

hold the mortgagor to be the true owner until a foreclosure takes place (*b*). There exists, therefore, in respect of the same subject-matter, a legal and an equitable estate; the former being vested in the mortgagee, the latter in the mortgagor.

IV. There is another species of estates defeasible on condition of which some mention is due, though in modern times they have been superseded by other remedies for the benefit of creditors—such having been the object of their original introduction. [These estates are those held by *statute merchant* and *statute staple* (*c*); and they are very nearly related to the *vivum vadium* before mentioned (*d*). For both the statute merchant and statute staple are securities for money; the one entered into before the chief magistrate of some trading town, pursuant to the statute 13 Edw. I. *De mercatoribus*, and thence called a statute merchant: the other pursuant to the statute 27 Edw. III. c. 9, before the mayor of the “staple;” that is to say, the grand mart for the principal commodities or manufactures of the kingdom, formerly held by act of parliament in certain trading towns; from whence this security is called a statute staple. They are both securities for debts acknowledged to be due, and were originally permitted only among traders, for the benefit of commerce; and, when entered into, not only the body of the debtor might be imprisoned, and his goods seized in satisfaction of the debt, but also his lands might be taken by the creditor, till out of the rents and profits of them the debt was satisfied; and, during such time as the creditor so held the lands, he was termed tenant by statute merchant or statute staple.] The benefit of this mercantile transaction was afterwards, by

(*b*) *Cashborn v. Scarfe*, 7 Vin. Ab. 156; 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 728, S. C.; and see *Amherst v. Dawling*, 2 Vern. 401.

(*c*) As to these estates, see 2 Inst.

322; 2 Saund. by Wms. 69 c, n. (3); Reeves's Hist. Eng. Law, vol. ii. pp. 161, 393.

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 304.

virtue of the statute 23 Hen. VIII. c. 6, extended to all the king's subjects, whether traders or not (*e*). But such a recognizance *in the nature* of a statute staple is directed by the Act to be acknowledged before either of the chief justices, or (out of term) before their substitutes, the mayor of the staple at Westminster and the recorder of London; and to be enrolled and certified into chancery (*f*).

V. [There is also an estate created by operation of law, for security and satisfaction of debts, called an estate of *elegit*. What an *elegit* is, and why so called, will be fully explained in a subsequent part of this work (*g*). At present it may be sufficient to mention that it is the name of a writ, founded on the statute of Westminster the second (*h*), by which, after judgment in an action has been obtained, the sheriff gives the judgment creditor possession of the lands and tenements of the opposite party, to be occupied and enjoyed until the money due on such judgment is fully paid; and during the time he so holds them, he is called tenant by *elegit*. It is easy to observe that this is also a mere conditional estate, defeasible as soon as the judgment debt is levied (*i*).] And by this writ, at one period, only one half of the lands and tenements of the judgment debtor could be seized in execution. For as the general right which a man possessed of aliening his lands by his own act did not (as is commonly supposed) extend, at the time of the passing of the statute of Westminster

(*e*) This Act was amended by 8 Geo. 1, c. 25.

(*f*) It has been remarked (see Burt. Compend. 298) that the law relative to statute staple is still so far of practical importance, that by 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, and 13 Eliz. c. 4 (see Reg. v. Ellis, 4 Exch. 652), persons indebted to the crown are to incur, in certain cases, the same liability *as if* they were bound in a statute staple.

(*g*) Vide post, bk. v. c. x.

(*h*) 13 Edw. 1, c. 18. See 2 Saund. by Wms. 68 a, n. (1); Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. ii. p. 187.

(*i*) Dighton v. Greenvil, 2 Vent. 327; Price v. Varney, 3 Barn. & Cress. 733. The estate by *elegit* will also be put an end to by the *sale* of the premises under the direction of a court of equity, on the application of the tenant under 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, s. 4.

the second, (A.D. 1285,) to the whole of his lands (*k*), that statute (*l*) permitted them to be only partially affected by the process of law for his ordinary debts; though on the other hand, by the statute *De mercatoribus*, passed in the same year (*m*), the whole of a man's lands were liable to be pledged in a statute merchant, for a debt contracted in trade. So much more readily did the feudal restraint on alienation yield to considerations of a commercial kind, than to any others. And such continued to be the state of the law as to the writ of *elegit*, until the modern statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110; which for the first time enabled the judgment creditor to seize by that writ the whole of the judgment debtor's lands and tenements (*n*).

[We shall conclude our notice of the tenants by statute merchant, statute staple, and *elegit*, with this remark, that though they are said to hold *ut liberum tenementum* until their claims are satisfied, yet are their estates no freeholds, but chattels, and pass to their *personal representatives* (*o*): which is probably owing to this: that, being a security and remedy provided for personal debts due to the deceased, to which debts the executor is entitled, the law has therefore thus directed their succession; as judging it reasonable, from a principle of natural equity, that the security and remedy should be vested in those to whom the debts, if recovered, would belong. For, upon the same principle, if lands be devised to a man's executor,

(*k*) Wright's Ten. 154. Blackstone adds, that "before the statute of *Quia emptores*, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1, "it is generally thought that the proprietor of lands was enabled to alienate no more than a moiety of them."—2 Bl. Com. p. 161.

(*l*) 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1.

(*m*) 13 Edw. 1, stat. 3.

(*n*) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 11. The same statute (s. 18), and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, s. 2, provide that decrees and orders in equity, lunacy, and

bankruptcy, and rules of the courts of law, "whereby any money shall be payable to any person," shall have the effect of judgments in the superior courts of common law; and the persons to whom money is thus payable are consequently, as judgment creditors, entitled to become tenants by *elegit*. See further as to an *elegit*, post, bk. v. c. x.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 42 a, 43 b; 2 Inst. 322.

[until out of their profits the debts due from the testator be discharged; this interest in the lands shall be a chattel interest, and on the death of such executor shall go to *his* executors (*p*): because they, being liable to pay the original testator's debts, so far as his assets will extend, are in reason entitled to possess that fund out of which he has directed them to be paid.]

(*p*) Co. Litt. 42 a.

CHAPTER VII.

OF ESTATES IN POSSESSION, REVERSION, AND
REMAINDER.

HITHERTO we have considered estates solely with regard to their duration, or the *quantity of interest* which the owners have therein. We are now to consider them in another view: with regard to the *time of their enjoyment* (*a*). When contemplated in this light, they are either in *possession* or in *expectancy*. Where a man is entitled immediately to the possession, by virtue of any of the estates or interests which we have been considering, his estate is said to be in possession (*b*); when entitled to it, not immediately, but at some future time, his estate is said to be in expectancy. Of expectancies, again, there are, at the common law, two sorts; one called a *reversion*; the other a *remainder*.

I. Of estates in *possession* not much remains to be observed. All the estates hitherto mentioned were supposed to be of this kind; for in laying down general rules we usually apply them to such estates as these. But it is material further to remark of them, that a man may have an estate in possession in land, and may nevertheless not be in actual possession of the land; for he may be *dis-*

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 230.

(*b*) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 163) defines estates in possession as "those
"whereby a present interest passes
"to and resides in the tenant, not
"depending on any subsequent cir-

"cumstance or contingency." So
it is said in 2 Cruise, Dig. 258,
"that estates in possession are those
"where the tenant is entitled to the
"actual pernanacy of the profits."

seised (*c*), that is, put out of the actual seisin, supposing his estate to be freehold; or may be deprived or ousted of the actual possession (whatever may be the nature of his estate), in some one of the wrongful ways which will hereafter be described when we treat of the various modes of civil injury (*d*); but, however ousted, he will still retain an estate in possession, according to the sense in which that term is above used. In such a case the true owner is also said to have the *right of possession* (*e*); as opposed to the mere *naked possession* of the wrongdoer: and this right of possession involves also the *right of entry* (*f*), that is, the right of entering upon and taking possession of the land withheld, if he can do so without breach of the peace: while, on the other hand, the naked possession of the wrongdoer is capable—by length of time and the neglect of the true owner to assert his right—of ripening, after a certain period (fixed, in general, at twenty years), into a lawful and indefeasible estate. Without pausing, however, upon these subjects, the further development of which belongs to a later portion of our work, we shall now proceed to examine the doctrine of estates in expectancy.

II. An estate, then, in *reversion* (*g*), to the nature of which we have already had occasion in some measure to refer, is where any estate is derived, by grant or otherwise, out of a larger one, leaving in the original owner an

(*c*) As to disseisin, see Co. Litt. 181 a; Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60; Williams v. Thomas, 12 East, 141; Doe v. Perkins, 3 Mau. & Sel. 275.

(*d*) Vide post, bk. v. c. VIII.

(*e*) 2 Bl. Com. 195; 3 Bl. Com. 177; Gilb. Ten. 21.

(*f*) The right of entry also involves that of proceeding against the wrongdoer by *ejectment*, which is the existing mode for recovering by action, land wrongfully withheld.

The antient forms of proceeding called *real actions*, by which land might also formerly be recovered, are now, with some very few exceptions, abolished by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 36 (vide post, bk. v. c. VIII.)

(*g*) Lord Coke treats of remainders before reversions, and is followed in this by Blackstone. But the order chosen in the text would seem to be the more natural and convenient.

ulterior estate immediately expectant on that which is so derived; the latter interest is called the *particular estate* (as being only a small part or *particula* of the original one), and the ulterior interest, the *reversion*(*h*). Thus, upon the creation, by the owner of the fee, of any estate in tail, for life, or for years, the residue of the fee undisposed of is described as the reversion expectant upon the particular estate in tail, for life, or years, so created. As soon as the particular estate is thus carved out of the original one (no further disposition being made), the expectant interest or reversion becomes vested in him who was before the owner of the whole, *ipso facto* and without any special reservation for the purpose(*i*). For where a smaller estate is merely taken out of a larger, the residue remains, as of course, in the original proprietor. This reversion is an actual interest or estate(*k*); but it is an estate in expectancy only, and not in possession, because the reversioner has no right to the possession until the particular estate is determined.

The tenant of a particular estate in tail, for life, or years, holds, as we have elsewhere shown, of the reversioner, by fealty and by such services as are reserved between them(*l*). Hence the usual *incidents* to reversions are said to be fealty and rent(*m*); rent being the

(*h*) Lord Coke says, "A reversion
"is where the residue of the estate
"always doth continue in him that
"made the particular estate, or where
"the particular estate is derived out
"of his estate, as in the case tenant
"in fee simple maketh gift in tail,
"&c." (Co. Litt. 22 b.) He elsewhere speaks of a reversion as a returning of the land to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over (Co. Litt. 142 b); but this is a wider sense of the term than is usually attached to it, and would include a *possibility* of *reverter*, (vide sup. p. 243,) and an *escheat*,

(vide sup. pp. 178, 200, 210.) A reversion is defined by Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 175) as "the residue of
"an estate left in the grantor, to
"commence in possession after the
"determination of some particular
"estate granted out by him."

(*i*) Litt. s. 19.

(*k*) Wiscot's case, 2 Rep. 61; see Doe v. Gatacre, 5 Bing. N. C. 619.

(*l*) Vide sup. pp. 246, 256, 296.

(*m*) "An incident," says Lord Coke, "is a thing appertaining to or following another, as more worthy
"or principal."—Co. Litt. 151 a.

usual description of service. [When no rent is reserved on the particular estate, fealty however results of course as an incident quite inseparable: and in the case where rent is reserved, it is also incident, though not inseparably so, to the reversion. The rent may be granted away, reserving the reversion; and, by special words, the reversion may be granted away, reserving the rent; but by a *general* grant of the reversion, the rent will pass with it as incident thereunto, though by the grant of the rent generally, the reversion will not pass. The incident passes by the grant of the principal, but not *è converso*; for the maxim of law is *accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principale* (n).]

Where a freehold reversion (that is, a reversion in fee, in tail, or for life) is expectant on a particular estate of freehold, the reversioner is only said to be “seised of the reversion as of fee,” (or if his estate be for life, “as of freehold”); and not to be “seised of the land in his demesne as of fee” (or “freehold”), as in the case of an estate in possession. But if a freehold reversion be expectant on a particular estate for years, it is in that case correct to describe the reversioner as “seised of the land in his demesne as of fee;” for his estate is considered (owing to the small regard once paid to chattel interests), as amounting for many purposes to a freehold estate in possession, and the possession of the termor constitutes the seisin of the freeholder (o). Of a reversion expectant on a particular estate of freehold, no dower or curtesy can (as we have seen) be claimed; but it is otherwise of a reversion expectant on a term of years (p).

By the principles of the *common law*, if the tenant of the particular estate for life or years made a conveyance by feoffment, for an estate not warranted by the nature of his own interest; as where tenant for life made a feoffment

(n) Co. Litt. 151 b, 152 a.

Finch, 4 B. & Adol. 305.

(o) Wrotesley v. Adams, Plowd. 191; Butler, Co. Litt. 330 b, n. (1); Co. Litt. 17 a; 16 East, 350; Doe v.

(p) Co. Litt. 29 b, 32 a; 2 Bl. Com. 127; Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 410; vide sup. pp. 265, 269.

in fee, or tenant for years a feoffment even for life; it destroyed the particular estate, by converting it into a new and wrongful one, and by consequence it *displaced* or *divested* the reversion in expectancy thereon. But, on the other hand, it also operated as a *forfeiture* to the person in reversion, and gave him an immediate right to enter and take possession, in defeasance of the wrongful estate so created (*q*). The law, however, on these points is now to be understood as subject to the effect of a modern statute, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, by which it is provided (sect. 4) that “a feoffment made after 1st October, 1845, shall not have any tortious operation” (*r*).

[Another doctrine, connected with the law of estates in reversion, is that of “merger.” It is a general principle of law, that where a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the same person, without any intermediate estate (*s*), the less is immediately annihilated, or, in the law phrase, is said to be *merged*, that is, sunk or drowned in the greater. Thus, if there be a tenant for years, and the reversion in fee simple descends to or is purchased by him, the term of years is merged in the inheritance, and shall never exist any more (*t*). But they

(*q*) Litt. s. 415; Co. Litt. 251 a, b; Chudleigh’s case, 1 Rep. 135 b; Archer’s case, *ibid.* 66 b; 2 Bl. Com. 153, 274; Doe v. Howell, 10 Barn. & Cress. 191. The same effects also in general followed, where the particular tenant for life made a wrongful alienation by way of *fine* or *recovery* (conveyances now abolished by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74). See Co. Litt. 356 a, 251 b; Doe v. Gatacre, 5 Bing. N. C. 609.

(*r*) We may take the opportunity here of noticing a previous Act, “To simplify the Transfer of Property,” (7 & 8 Vict. c. 76,) which, though repealed by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, was nevertheless in force, as

to the greater part of its provisions, from the 31st December, 1844, to the 1st October, 1845, and consequently still affects the title to land during that period. Of this Act it was remarked by Mr. Justice Maule (in the case of *Stratton v. Pettit*, 16 C. B. 432), “that it was “incongruous and impossible of “operation; and its absurdities “were so great that the framers “themselves had no very distinct “notion of its meaning.”

(*s*) *Duncomb v. Duncomb*, 3 Lev. 437.

(*t*) By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 9, when the reversion expectant on a lease (made either before or after the

[must come to one and the same person, in one and the same right; for if the freehold be in his own right, and he has a term in right of another (*en autre droit*), there is no merger (*u*). Therefore, if tenant for years dies, and makes him who hath the reversion in fee his executor, whereby the term of years vests also in him, the term shall not merge: for he hath the fee in his own right, and the term of years in the right of the testator, subject to his debts and legacies. So, also, if he who hath the reversion in fee marries the tenant for years, there is no merger; for he hath the inheritance in his own right, the lease in the right of his wife (*v*). An estate tail is an exception to the law of merger; for a man may have, in his own right, both an estate tail and a reversion in fee; and the estate tail, though a less estate, shall not merge in the fee (*x*). For estates tail are protected and preserved from merger by the operation and construction, though not by the express words, of the statute *De donis*; which operation and construction have probably arisen upon this consideration, that in the common cases of merger of estates for life or years, by uniting with the inheritance, the particular tenant hath the sole interest in them, and hath full power at any time to defeat, destroy, or surrender them to him that

passing of that Act), shall, after the 1st October, 1845, be surrendered or merge, "the estate which shall for the time being confer, as against the tenant under the same lease, the next vested right to the same tenements or hereditaments, shall, —to the extent and for the purpose of preserving such incidents to, and obligations on, the same reversion, as, but for the surrender or merger thereof, would have subsisted,—be deemed the reversion expectant on the same lease." This enactment was framed with

the object of securing the fermor's rights with respect to *rent* due from his lessee; for such rent, as an incident to such termor's reversion (*vide sup.* p. 316), would have perished on his acquiring the fee.

(*u*) See *Jones v. Davies*, 5 H. & N. 766.

(*v*) *Bracebridge v. Cook*, Plowd. 418; *Platt v. Sleaf*, Cro. Jac. 275; Co. Litt. 338 b. For cases in which a merger will be prevented, see also *Fearne's Cont. Rem.* 341, 9th edit.

(*x*) *Wisot's case*, 2 Rep. 61 a; *Lord Stafford's case*, 8 Rep. 74 b.

[hath the reversion ; therefore, when such an estate unites with the reversion in fee, the law considers it in the light of a virtual surrender of the inferior estate (*y*). But in an estate tail the case is otherwise ; the tenant for a long time had no power at all over it so as to bar or to destroy it, and to this day cannot bar or destroy it except in a special method : it would therefore have been strangely improvident to have permitted the tenant in tail, by purchasing the reversion in fee, to merge his particular estate and defeat the inheritance of his issue ; and hence it has become a maxim that a tenancy in tail, which cannot be surrendered, cannot be merged in the fee (*z*).] Merger, it is to be observed, is not confined to cases where one of the coinciding estates is greater than the other in point of *quantity of interest* ; for a term of years will merge in the immediate reversion, though that be a chattel interest also ; and even where the term of years in reversion is of shorter duration than the term on which it is expectant, the merger will equally take place (*a*). So a fee simple conditional will merge in the possibility of reverter (*b*).

III. An estate in *remainder* is where any estate is granted out of a larger one, an ulterior estate immediately expectant on that which is so granted being at the same time conveyed away by the original owner. The first estate so granted is called the particular estate,

(*y*) *Hughes v. Robotham*, Cro. Eliz. 302.

(*z*) Where a tenant in tail, however, acquired a base fee, and had also the immediate reversion, the base fee would formerly merge in the reversion. But by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 39, a base fee will now be *enlarged*, under such circumstances, into a fee simple absolute. It may be here noticed that after the 2nd November, 1874, "there shall not

be any merger by operation of law only, of any estate, the beneficial interest in which would not be deemed to be merged or extinguished in equity." (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, sub-s. (4).)

(*a*) See Bac. Abr. Leases, &c. (S.) 2; 3 Prest. Conv. 182; *Doe v. Walker*, 5 Barn. & Cress. 111.

(*b*) *Simpson v. Simpson*, 4 Bing. N. C. 333.

and the ulterior one the remainder(*c*). [As if a man seised in fee simple granteth lands to A. for twenty years, and, after the determination of the said term, then to B. and his heirs for ever; here A. is tenant for years, remainder to B. in fee. In the first place an estate for years is created or carved out of the fee, and given to A.; and the residue or remainder of it is given to B. But both these interests are in fact only one estate; the present term of years and the remainder afterwards, when added together, being equal only to one estate in fee(*d*). They are indeed different *parts*, but they constitute only one *whole*: they are carved out of one and the same inheritance; they are both created and may both subsist together; the one in possession, the other in expectancy. So if land be granted to A. for twenty years, and, after the determination of the said term, to B. for life; and after the determination of B.'s estate for life, it be limited to C. and his heirs for ever: this makes A. tenant for years, with remainder to B. for life, remainder over to C. in fee. Now here the estate of inheritance undergoes a division into three portions; there is first A.'s estate for years carved out of it; and after that B.'s estate for life; and then the whole that remains is limited to C. and his heirs. And here also the first estate, and both the remainders for life and in fee, are one estate only, being nothing but parts or portions of one entire inheritance; and if there were a hundred remainders, it would still be the same thing; upon a principle grounded in mathematical truth, that all the parts are equal, and no more than equal, to the whole. And hence also it is easy to

(*c*) Lord Coke defines a remainder as "a remnant of an estate in lands "or tenements, expectant upon a "particular estate created together "with the same at one time;" (Co. Litt. 143 a;) Blackstone, as "an estate limited to take effect and be

"enjoyed after another estate is determined." (2 Bl. Com. 164.) As to the definition of a remainder, see also Fearn, by Butler, p. 3, n. (*c*), 9th ed.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 143 a; Fearn, by Butler, 308, 9th ed.

[collect, that no remainder can be limited after the grant of an estate in fee simple (*e*); because a fee simple is the highest and largest estate that a subject is capable of enjoying (*f*): and he that is tenant in fee hath in him the *whole* of the estate: a remainder, therefore, which is only a portion or residuary *part* of the estate, cannot be reserved after the whole is disposed of. A particular estate, with all the remainders expectant thereon, is only one fee simple; as 40*l.* is part of 100*l.*, and 60*l.* is the remainder of it; wherefore, after a fee simple once vested, there can no more be a remainder limited thereon, than after the whole 100*l.* is appropriated there can be any residue subsisting.] But until the whole fee simple is granted away, any quantity of interest may be carved out of it, expectant on the determination of some preceding interest. Therefore, a remainder, like an estate in possession, may be either in fee, in tail, for life, or years.

From what has been premised, it appears that a reversion and a remainder are both estates in expectancy, but differ in this respect, that the former remains in the grantor, by act or construction of law, as part of his former estate, but a remainder is an estate newly created by the act of the grantor. And here it is very material to remark, that it is *only* by way of remainder that, at *common law*,—that is, independently of certain conveyances founded on statute law to be hereafter mentioned,—a man can create a new freehold estate in expectancy, in a corporeal hereditament. For it is an antient rule, which lies at the root of the learning relative to remainders, that a freehold in hereditaments corporeal cannot be created to commence *in futuro* (*g*)—that is, to take effect in possession at a distant period of time—without the interposition of a particular estate on which

(*e*) Colthirst v. Bejushin, Plowd. 29; Gardner v. Sheldon, Vaugh. 269. (*g*) Barwick's case, 5 Rep. 94 b; 2 Bl. Com. 165.

(*f*) Vide sup. p. 236.

it shall be expectant. Thus if A., seised in fee of lands, convey them to B. to hold to him and his heirs for ever, after the end of three years next ensuing;—this is, at common law, a void conveyance. This is because no freehold could in general be created at common law, in a corporeal hereditament, without livery of seisin (*h*); a ceremony in its nature incompatible with a grant of the freehold *in futuro*, inasmuch as it imports a delivery of possession, and consequently supposes that a right to the immediate possession, and not merely a future estate, is conveyed by the feoffor. And as it is the necessity for livery of seisin which constitutes the reason of the rule, so the rule itself extends not to mere chattel interests (*i*): for these, being created, as we have seen, without that ceremony, are also capable (even at common law) of being made to commence *in futuro*. Thus, though the fee could not be created to hold as from next Michaelmas, yet a lease for seven years from next Michaelmas would be good.

But while the conveyance by livery of seisin is utterly incapable (without the interposition of a particular estate) of being applied to the creation of a freehold which shall

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 231. The reason here assigned for the rule, that a freehold cannot commence *in futuro*, is that usually given in the books. See Co. Litt. 217 a; Plowd. 156; Barwick's case, 5 Rep. 94 b; 2 Bl. Com. 165; Bac. Ab. Remainder (C). And perhaps no sufficient authority can be shown for referring it to any other origin. It is held, however, by some writers to flow from the general principle of the common law, that the freehold is not to be placed (except in cases of strict necessity) in abeyance. That this principle existed there can be no doubt; and it seems clearly to have applied

both to the immediate freehold and to the ultimate fee. (See the argument of Mr. Justice Blackstone in the case of *Perrin v. Blake*, Harg. Law Tracts.) It has been considered by some as in part founded on feudal reasons, but it seems to be more satisfactorily accounted for by the inconveniences which resulted from such suspension of the fee or freehold, in reference to the system of *real actions*—the remedies antiently used for the recovery of land. As to the cases where the freehold or fee *may* be in abeyance, vide sup. p. 236, n. (*m*).

(*i*) 5 Rep. 94; 2 Bl. Com. 165.

take effect in possession at a future time, its adaptation is made easy by the interposition of such an estate, that is to say, by creating the freehold *in remainder*. For the method in this case is to make the livery of seisin to the tenant of the particular estate; which is effectual as a conveyance also to the remainder-man, since his estate and that of the particular tenant are one and the same estate in law. [Thus a man may convey to A. in tail, remainder to B. in fee, and the same livery which conveys the estate tail to A. will also pass the remainder expectant thereon to B. The whole estate passes at once from the grantor to the grantees, and the remainder-man is seised of his remainder, at the same time that the particular tenant is seised of his estate tail (*h*).] And the case is the same where the particular estate is for years only. As where one leases to A. for three years, with remainder to B. in fee, and makes livery to A. Here the livery indeed is not necessary for the lessee himself, because he has but a chattel: but it enures to the benefit of him in remainder, and the freehold is immediately created thereby and vested in B. during the continuance of A.'s term of years (*l*).

With respect to the creation of a remainder, the following rules may be laid down, which, though they amount to no more than an exposition of the different properties expressed in the very definition of this kind of estate, may yet serve to convey to the mind of the reader a more precise idea of its character:—

1. *There must necessarily be some particular estate precedent to the estate in remainder (m).* The necessity of this is sufficiently indicated by the term itself; for remainder is a *relative* expression, and implies that some part of the thing is previously disposed of. [And as no remainder can be created without such a precedent par-

(*h*) Co. Litt. 143 a.

(*l*) Ibid. 49 a, 49 b.

(*m*) Fearn, by Butler, 390, 9th edit.

tt [ticular estate, therefore the particular estate is said to *support* the remainder. But a lease at will is not held to be such a particular estate as will support a remainder over (n). For an estate at will is of a nature so slender and precarious that it is not to be looked upon as a portion of the inheritance; and a portion must first be taken out of it, in order to constitute a remainder.]

2. A second rule to be observed is this; that *the remainder must commence or pass out of the grantor, at the time of the creation of the particular estate* (o). As where it is proposed to give to A. an estate for life, with remainder to B. in fee: here B.'s remainder in fee must pass from the grantor, at the same time with A.'s life estate in possession; for if the estate, ulterior to that for life, continues in the grantor, it is a reversion, and no remainder; and B. can take only by subsequent grant of this reversion.

3. It may also be laid down, as a third rule respecting the creation of remainders, that *they must be limited to take effect in possession immediately upon the determination of the particular estate, and neither later nor earlier* (p). Thus if A. be tenant for life, remainder to B. in tail, here B.'s remainder is to take effect in possession immediately upon A.'s death; or if A. and B. be tenants for their joint lives, remainder to the survivor in fee, here, on the death of either, the remainder comes into possession instantly; and therefore both these are good remainders. But if the future estate is to take effect in possession at any period *later* than the determination of the first, as if an estate be granted to A. during his life, and upon his death and one day after, to B. and his heirs, this is no remainder (q).

(n) Lord Stafford's case, 8 Rep. 75 a.

(o) 2 Bl. Com. 167; Plowd. 25; Litt. s. 721; Bac. Ab. Remainder (C).

(p) 1 Sand. Us. 148, 2nd edit.;

Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 135 a; Boraston's case, 3 Rep. 21 a; Co. Litt. 298 a.

(q) Colthirst v. Bejushin, Plowd. 25; Fearn, by Butler, 307, 9th ed.

So the future estate will be no remainder if it is not to *await* the proper and regular determination of the first, but to take effect in defeasance or abridgment of it; as where an estate is limited to A. for life, but if B. pays him a certain sum of money, then immediately to B. and his heirs (*r*). But though a remainder cannot be limited to take effect in possession, until the particular estate regularly determines, yet eventually it may do so before that period. Thus if the particular estate determine by act of law (as by forfeiture) before its natural expiration, the remainder limited upon it, will come into immediate possession, and is not required to wait until the expiration of the period originally assigned.

A remainder, when created, is subject to many of the rules already laid down with respect to reversions. Thus, in the case of a freehold remainder, the remainder-man is seised as of fee (or as of freehold), but not “in his demesne;” unless the particular estate be a term of years, when seisin in demesne may be properly alleged. So *curtesy* or *dower* may be claimed of a remainder in fee, if expectant on an estate for years, but not if expectant on a freehold. Thus, too, the wrongful feoffment of the tenant for life or years, where the estate immediately expectant is not by way of reversion but remainder, had, at *common law*, the effect of displacing the remainder, and occasioning a forfeiture to the remainder-man, as in the other case to the reversioner (*s*). Moreover the union of an estate in remainder with the particular estate on which it is expectant, will produce a merger in the same cases (in general) and on the same principles, as if it were an estate in reversion (*t*).

(*r*) 1 Sand. Us. 143, 149; Sugd. Gilb. 152, n.; Fearn, by Butler, 261, 9th ed.

(*s*) But it is otherwise since the passing of the statute 8 & 9 Vict.

c. 106 (s. 4), as to which, vide sup. p. 317.

(*t*) As to the merger of a term of years in another term of years, where the second is in *remainder*, see Bac. Leases, &c. (S) 2.

Hitherto our remarks have related to remainders generally considered; but it is now time to turn our attention to the distinction which exists between remainders, as being either *vested* or *contingent*. *Vested* remainders or remainders *executed* are where the estate is invariably fixed to remain to a determinate person after the particular estate is spent. As if A. be tenant for twenty years, remainder to B. in fee; here B.'s is a vested remainder. *Contingent* or *executory* remainders are those limited either to an uncertain *person*, or upon an uncertain *event* (*u*): that is, to a person not *in esse* or not ascertained (*x*); or upon an event which may not happen at all, or not happen until after the particular estate is determined (*y*). The first kind, or those limited to an uncertain person, may be exemplified by a limitation to A. for life, remainder to the first son of B., who has then no son born (*z*); for here the person is not *in esse*: or to A. and B. for their joint lives, remainder to the survivor in fee; for here the person is not ascertained (*a*). The second kind, or those limited on an uncertain event, may

(*u*) Blackstone says (vol. ii. p. 169) that they are where the remainder is "limited to take effect either to a dubious and uncertain *person*, or on a dubious and uncertain *event*; so that the particular estate may chance to be determined, and the remainder never take effect." (And see *Roberts v. Roberts*, 2 Bulst. 130.) Mr. Fearne enumerates four different kinds of contingent remainders:—"1st. Where the remainder depends entirely upon a contingent determination of the preceding estate itself. 2ndly. Where the contingency on which the remainder is to take effect, is independent of the determination of the preceding estate. 3rdly. Where the condi-

tion upon which the remainder is limited is certain in event, but the determination of the particular estate may happen before it. 4thly. Where the person to whom the remainder is limited is not yet ascertained, or not yet in being." (*Fearne*, by Butler, 5, 9th ed.) But all these may be reduced to two, as in the text, with the aid of the distinctions there stated, as to the nature of the uncertainty to which the person or event may be subject.

(*x*) *Fearne*, by Butler, p. 9, 9th ed. See *Doe d. Bills v. Hopkinson*, 5 Q. B. 228.

(*y*) *Fearne*, by Butler, p. 8, 9th ed.

(*z*) *Ibid.* p. 9.

(*a*) *Ibid.*

be exemplified by a lease to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, and if B. should die before A., then the remainder to C. for life(*b*); for B.'s dying before A. is an event that may never happen, and therefore the remainder to C. is contingent: or, as another instance, by a lease to A. for life, and after the death of B. the lands to remain to another in fee(*c*); for though it is certain that B. must die, his death may not happen until after A.'s life estate shall be determined.

It is to be observed, however, that if there be no uncertainty in the person or event upon which the remainder itself is limited, the mere uncertainty whether it will ever take effect in *possession*, is not sufficient to give it the character of a contingent remainder(*d*). Thus in the case of a lease to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, the limitation of the remainder is to a person in being, and ascertained, and the event on which it is limited is certain, viz. the determination of A.'s life estate: it is therefore a vested, and not a contingent, remainder(*e*): and yet it may possibly never take effect in possession; because B. may die before A.

We may also remark, that an estate limited to an existing and ascertained person upon the determination of an estate tail, as where there is a limitation to A. in tail, remainder to B. in fee, is a vested and not a contingent remainder; for it is considered in law, that the estate tail, being a particular estate, is sure to come to an end, and that the failure of issue is consequently not a contingency, but a certain event(*f*). The case falls, therefore, within the definition of a vested remainder; the estate limited to B. being one that is invariably fixed to remain to a determinate person after the particular estate is spent.

It was laid down in a former place, that no remainder

(*b*) *Fearne*, by Butler, p. 7, 9th ed.

(*c*) *Ibid.* p. 8.

(*d*) *Ibid.* p. 216.

(*e*) *Ibid.*; see *Doe v. Scudamore*,
2 Bos. & Pul. 296.

(*f*) *Vide sup.* p. 243.

can be limited after a fee simple (*g*). A contingent remainder may, however, be limited in *substitution* for another contingent remainder in fee simple; as if land be given to A. for life, and if he have a son, then to that son in fee, and if he have no son, then to B. in fee (*h*). This has been sometimes called a *contingency with a double aspect* (*i*), and it is no violation of the rule above alluded to; for such remainders as these are *concurrent* and not *consecutive*; and though both are remainders on the particular estate, they are not remainders on each other (*k*).

It is laid down by Lord Coke, as to the nature of the contingency on which a remainder may be limited, that it must be *potentia propinqua*, which he also designates as a *common possibility*, and must not be *potentia remota*, by which he seems to mean a possibility that cannot reasonably be expected to happen (*l*); and of this doctrine Blackstone (*m*) gives the following example, which is substantially the same with one of those adduced by Lord Coke himself. [A remainder to a man's eldest son who

(*g*) Vide sup. p. 321.

(*h*) See Fearn, by Butler, 373, 9th ed.; *Lodding v. Kime*, 1 Lord Raym. 208; *Keene v. Dickson*, 3 T. R. 495; *Crump v. Norwood*, 2 Marsh. 161.

(*i*) Fearn, by Butler, 373, 9th ed.; *Lodding v. Kime*, 1 Lord Raym. 208.

(*k*) Though a contingent remainder in fee is a disposition (subject to the particular estate) of the *whole* inheritance, yet, as it is one which cannot take effect until the contingency happens, a question has been made as to what becomes of the inheritance in the meantime. According to the older authorities it is in *abeyance*, or, according to Lord Coke's allusion, *caput inter nubila*

condit. (Co. Litt. 342 b; and see 40 Edw. 3, 9). But Mr. Fearn argues (and his opinion is now generally received) that it continues to reside in the grantor. (Fearn, by Butler, 360, 9th ed.) Where the contingent remainder in fee is created by one of those conveyances which derive their operation from the statute of uses (as to which hereafter), it is clear that the fee remains in the grantor till the contingency happens; and where it is created by a will, the fee descends to the heir at law. 2 Saund. by Wms. 381 a, n. (16).

(*l*) *Cholmley's case*, 2 Rep. 51; Co. Litt. 378.

(*m*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 170.

[hath none, we have seen, is good, for by common possibility he may have one; but if it be limited in particular to his son John or Richard, it is bad if he have no son of that name, for it is too remote a possibility that he should not only have a son, but a son of the particular name.] But the rule that a remainder cannot be limited upon a *potentia remota* (sometimes called a *double possibility*, or a *possibility upon a possibility*) is no longer generally recognized (*n*); and as thus exemplified, at least, is not of a satisfactory character.

Contingent remainders are subject to the following two general rules:—

1. [*If they amount to a freehold, they cannot be limited on an estate for years, or any other particular estate less than a freehold.* Thus if land be granted to A. for ten years, with remainder in fee to the right heirs of B., this remainder is void; but if granted to A. for life, with a like remainder, it is good (*o*). For, unless the freehold passes out of the grantor at the time when the remainder is created, such freehold remainder is void (*p*): it cannot pass out of him without vesting somewhere; and in the case of a contingent remainder it must vest in the particular tenant, else it can vest nowhere: unless, therefore, the estate of such particular tenant be of a freehold nature, the freehold cannot vest in him, and consequently the remainder is void.]

2. *Every contingent remainder must become vested either during the continuance of the particular estate, or eo instanti that it determines* (*q*).

(*n*) See Fearné, by Butler, 251, n. (*o*), 9th ed.; Third Real Property Rep. p. 29; Lord St. Leonards' judgment in *Cole v. Sewell*, 4 Dru. & War. 1, 32.

(*o*) Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 130 a.

(*p*) See Fearné, by Butler, 281, 9th ed.

(*q*) Archer's case, 1 Rep. 66 b ;

Co. Litt. 298 a; Bac. Ab. Remainder (D.); 2 Saund. by Wms. 387; n. (7); Fearné, by Butler, 307, 310, 9th ed.; 2 Bl. Com. 168, in which last book the rule is laid down, as to remainders *generally*, thus: "that the remainder must vest in the grantee during the continuance of the particular estate, or *eo instanti*

It is obvious that when the contingent person comes into being or is ascertained during the continuance of the particular estate, or the contingent event takes place during that period, the remainder ceases to be a contingent, and becomes a vested one. Thus if A. be tenant for life, with remainder to B.'s eldest son, then unborn, in tail; the instant that a son is born, the remainder is no longer contingent but vested (*r*). On the other hand, if the person comes into being or is ascertained, or the event happens, not during the continuance of the particular estate, but immediately on its determination, the remainder then of course takes effect as an estate in possession; or, in other words, vests in possession, instead of vesting, as in the case first supposed, in point of interest only. Thus if land be given to A. and B. during their joint lives, remainder to the survivor in fee; this remainder, immediately on the death of either, becomes vested in possession in the survivor. The meaning of the rule, therefore, under consideration, is, that a contingent remainder must either vest as a remainder during the particular estate, or as an estate in possession at the determination thereof: and cannot remain in contingency after the latter period.

From this the important doctrine followed, that so long as a remainder was in contingency, it always required the *continuing* support of the particular freehold estate (*s*); so that if that estate came by any means to an end before the contingency happened, the remainder was altogether *defeated* (*t*); for before the happening of the contingency,

"that it determines." And this is the form in which it is often expressed. But where a remainder is not originally contingent, it is necessarily vested from the time of its creation; and cannot be said properly to vest during the continuance of the particular estate, and still less upon its determination. The rule,

therefore, has, in effect, no application except to *contingent* remainders.

(*r*) 2 Bl. Com. 169.

(*s*) Colthirst v. Bejushin, Plowd. 25; Fearn, by Butler, 307, 9th ed.

(*t*) Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Saund. 386, 387; 2 Bl. Com. 171; Fearn, by Butler, 316, 9th ed.

there was no person entitled to take, or in whom the remainder could vest; and, by the rule under consideration, it could no longer exist as a contingent remainder, because the particular estate was determined. Thus if A. were tenant for life, with remainder to B.'s eldest son, then unborn, in tail; if A. died before the contingency happened, that is, before B. had a son, the remainder was absolutely gone: for the particular estate was determined before the remainder could vest (*u*). Nay, it has been held that, by the strict rule of law, if A. were tenant for life, remainder to his own eldest son in tail, and A. died without issue born, but leaving his wife *enceinte* or big with child, and after his death a posthumous son was born, this son could not take the land by virtue of the remainder: for the particular estate determined before there was any person actually in existence in whom the remainder could vest (*x*). [This decision, however, was ultimately reversed, and the case was afterwards provided for by statute law; for it was enacted by 10 & 11 Will. III. c. 16, that posthumous children shall be capable of taking in remainder, in the same manner as if they had been born in their father's lifetime; that is, the remainder is allowed to vest in them while yet in their mother's womb (*y*).]

The same consequence was held to follow from the determination of the particular freehold estate before the

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 169.

(*x*) *Reeve v. Long*, 1 Salk. 228; 4 Mod. 282, S. C.

(*y*) It was this case of *Reeve v. Long*, (in which the House of Lords reversed the judgment of the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas,) that gave occasion to the statute mentioned in the text. The case adjudicated on by the Lords, laid down the law as to estates by *will*, and therefore the statute speaks merely of those "by marriage or

"other settlement." It may also be noticed, that where a posthumous child takes by virtue of this statute, he is entitled to the intermediate property from the death of the parent; though, where a posthumous child takes by descent, divesting the estate of the supposed heir, he takes only from the time of his birth; (see 2 Saund. by Wms. 387 a, n. (7); *Thelluson v. Woodford*, 11 Ves. 139; *Goodtitle v. Newman*, 3 Wils. 526; *Christian's Bl. Com.* vol. ii. p. 169.)

contingency happened, even though that estate determined prematurely, and were destroyed by the voluntary act of the particular tenant himself(*z*). Thus, a tenant for life, with remainder to his unborn sons successively in tail, remainder over to a stranger in fee, might, before a son was born, have destroyed the life estate by a wrongful feoffment in fee, or have surrendered it to the person in ultimate remainder, so as to merge it in the fee: and in either case the contingent remainder to the son would have been defeated(*a*). [In these cases, therefore, it was necessary to have trustees appointed to preserve the contingent remainders, in whom there was vested an estate in remainder for the life of the tenant for life, to commence when the estate determined(*b*): and then, if his estate for life determined otherwise than by his death, for example, by wrongful alienation, or by surrender, as above supposed, the estate of the trustees for the residue of his natural life would then take effect; and become a particular estate in possession, sufficient to support the remainders depending in contingency. This method is said to have been invented by Sir Orlando Bridgman, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, and another eminent counsel, who betook themselves to conveyancing during the time of the civil wars; in order thereby to secure in family settlements a provision for the future children of an intended marriage, who, before, were usually left at the mercy of the particular tenant for life; and when, after the Restoration, those gentlemen came to fill the first offices of the law, they supported this invention within reasonable and proper bounds, and introduced it into general use.]

When land was settled in the form here supposed, that is, by a limitation to the parent for life, and after his

(*z*) Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 135 b; Archer's case, *ibid.* 66 b.

(*a*) Fearn, by Butler, 317, 9th ed.; *Purefoy v. Rogers*, 2 Saund. 386, 387. As to the tortious opera-

tion of a feoffment, at common law, vide sup. pp. 316, 317.

(*b*) As to the nature of this remainder, see *Parkhurst v. Smith*, Willes, 338; 3 Atk. 138.

death to his first and other sons or children, in tail, and trustees were interposed to preserve the contingent remainders, this was called a *strict settlement*. The estate tail immediately expectant on the parent's life estate, was not only exempt from the danger of being defeated before the first son was born, but remained unalienable until he attained the age of twenty-one; at that period, however, as results from former explanations(c), he might, with concurrence of his parent, if then living, or at his own pleasure, if his parent were dead, bar both his own issue and those in remainder or reversion, and convert his estate tail into a fee simple absolute; and, even without concurrence of his parent, might in all cases bar his own issue, leaving the ulterior estates undisturbed. This state of the law as regards the position of a child to whom, before his birth, a remainder in tail has been limited, expectant on a precedent life estate limited to his parent, is still unaltered; though by the effect of a late statute, which we shall presently mention, the interposition of trustees to preserve contingent remainders is no longer necessary to his security.

To return, however, to our immediate subject, it may be further remarked, that, to support a contingent remainder, it was not, even at the common law, essential that the particular estate should be in actual possession; for, provided such an estate were in existence, it would suffice for that purpose, though it were reduced to a *right of entry* only(d). Thus, if there were an estate for life, with a contingent remainder over, and the tenant for life were disseised, that is, put out of his seisin or possession of the freehold by a stranger, there nevertheless resided an immediate right of entry in the disseisee; and that would have been sufficient to support the remainder(e).

The law was said to lean against contingent remainders, as compared with vested ones, on account of the liability of the former to be defeated; and therefore in a case of

(c) Vide sup. p. 250.

(d) Archer's case, 1 Rep. 66 b, 67 a.

(e) Ibid.

doubtful interpretation, it has been held that a remainder capable of being taken as vested, ought not to be construed as contingent (*f*). But the law relating to contingent remainders has now undergone an alteration of a very important kind, by which much of the old learning, to which we have just had occasion to refer, has been displaced. For by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 8, “a contingent remainder existing at any time after the 31st day of December, 1844, shall be,—and if created before the passing of that Act, shall be deemed to have been,—capable of taking effect, notwithstanding the determination by forfeiture, surrender or merger, of any preceding estate of freehold, in the same manner, in all respects, as if such determination had not happened” (*g*).

In connection also with the subject of contingent remainders, occurs that remarkable rule of construction so familiar in our books under the appellation of the *Rule in Shelley's case* (*h*).

This rule is propounded in Lord Coke's Reports in the following form—that wherever a man by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited either mediately or immediately to his *heirs* in fee or in tail, the word *heirs* is a word of limitation, and not of purchase (*i*). In other

(*f*) See *Ives v. Legge*, 3 T. R. 489, n.; *Driver v. Frank*, 3 Mau. & Sel. 37; *Doe d. Pilkington v. Spratt*, 5 Barn. & Adol. 731.

(*g*) In connection with this enactment it is necessary also to advert to 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, (noticed sup. p. 317,) “that a feoffment made after 1st October, 1845, shall not have any tortious operation.”

(*h*) See the elaborate dissertation on this rule by Mr. Fearne, *Fearne*, by Butler, 28—208, 9th ed.; the observations on the rule by Mr. Har-

grave, in *Harg. Law Tracts*, and the argument of Mr. Justice Blackstone, in *Perrin v. Blake*, *ibid*. The instances which call for its application are very numerous; but they occur much more frequently where the limitation is by will, than where it is by deed. *Bradley v. Cartwright*, Law Rep., 2 C. P. 511, may be consulted as a recent case in which this rule was discussed.

(*i*) *Shelley's case*, 1 Rep. 104 a. As to the terms in which the rule is expressed, see *Fearne*, by Butler, 76,

words, it is to be understood as expressing the quantity of estate which the party is to take, and not as conferring any distinct estate on the persons who may become his representatives.

This indeed is the *ordinary* force of the word *heirs*; for, as may be inferred from the former remarks on the subject of estates of inheritance, if land is given to a man and his heirs, he takes a fee simple (*h*); if to him and the heirs of his body, a fee tail (*l*); in which cases, the word plainly operates as a mere limitation of the quantity of his estate. But where land is given to A. B. for his life, and on his decease to his heirs, or to the heirs of his body; it might be supposed, from the doctrines we have been considering with respect to remainders, that this confers a separate estate on his representatives; and that he will take for his own life only, with contingent remainder to his heirs; or to the heirs of his body: according to the apparent purport of the grant. And such ulterior limitation would in fact be a contingent remainder to them, if the previous life estate had been limited not to A. himself, but to another person. By the effect, however, of the rule which we are considering, the heirs or heirs of the body of A. will not take in remainder, (in the case supposed,) nor will A. himself take a mere life estate, but a remainder also in fee or tail; and as that remainder will absorb, according to the law of merger, his life interest, the result upon the whole conveyance will be to give him an *estate in fee* (or in *tail*, as the case may be) *in possession* (*m*). And upon the same principle, if another particular estate, by way of vested remainder upon A.'s life estate (for example, a life estate to B.) be interposed before the ulterior limitation to A.'s heirs, or the heirs of his body, that ulterior

9th ed. The rule would seem still to apply, though the ancestor's estate of freehold is of a nature that may determine in his lifetime; Brook's Estates, 76; Fearn, ubi

sup. p. 29; *Curtis v. Price*, 12 Ves. 89.

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 233.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 242.

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 317.

limitation will take effect in A. himself; but as a vested remainder only in fee or tail, because the intervening estate will in that case prevent a merger. If the estate interposed, indeed, be not a vested but a contingent remainder, A. will take (as in the case first supposed) the entire fee; for while the contingency is in suspense, there is nothing to prevent the consolidation of his life estate with the ulterior limitation to his heirs; yet he takes it *sub modo* only, and in such manner that it will open and let in the intermediate estate when the contingency happens (*n*).

It is to be observed, that the interest which, by the effect of this rule, passes to the ancestor, is of a kind very different from that which would belong to him if the words were to receive their more obvious construction. According to the rule, he becomes, in the first case we have supposed, proprietor of the whole fee, which it is consequently in his power to alienate at his pleasure (subject, where the estate is in tail, to the ordinary restrictions); and in the two other cases, his interest is of the same description, except as regards the intervening estates: while, on the other hand, if he took an estate for life only (though with remainder to his heirs), he could alien for no longer period than his own life, and he would have no control over the inheritance.

With respect to the *reason* of the rule, it is involved in much obscurity (*o*). But, according to the prevalent opinion, it was established with a view to the protection of the feudal lord, who would have been defrauded, it is said, of his wardship and other perquisites, if the heir had been allowed to take by way of remainder, and not by hereditary succession. And the argument by which it is best supported seems to be in substance as follows: that where by the same conveyance land is given to a

(*n*) Fearn, by Butler, 29, 9th ed.;
Lewis Bowles's case, 11 Rep. 79 b.

(*o*) See Fearn, by Butler, 83, 9th
ed.; argument of Mr. Justice Black-

stone in the case of *Perrin v. Blake*
in Hargrave's Law Tracts; Hist.
Eng Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 8.

person for his life, and afterwards to the heirs of the same person, it is reasonable to presume that he is himself intended in both cases as the sole object of the gift; and that no benefit is designed to his heirs, except what they may derive by operation of law from his own antecedent seisin.

We shall conclude this chapter with notice of two legislative provisions,—one intended for the protection of those who are possessed of *reversionary interests*, the other to ascertain the rule which is to govern the disposal by sale of such interests, whether in real or personal estate.

1. [By 6 Anne, c. 18, in order to assist such persons as have any estate in remainder, reversion, or expectancy after the death of others, against fraudulent concealment of their deaths, it is enacted that all persons on whose lives any lands or tenements are holden shall (upon application to the Court of Chancery and order made thereupon) once in every year, if required, be produced to the court or its commissioners; or, upon neglect or refusal, they shall be taken to be actually dead, and the person entitled to such expectant estate may enter upon and hold the lands and tenements till the party shall appear to be living (*p*).] 2. By 31 Vict. c. 4, it has been provided that no purchase of any reversionary interests, made *bonâ fide* and without fraud or unfair dealing, shall hereafter be opened or set aside merely on the ground of *under value*—a circumstance which, as the law was previously administered in the courts of equity, was in some cases held to vacate the transaction.

(*p*) See *Ex parte Grant*, 6 Ves. 561; *Re Isaac*, 4 Myl. & Cr. 11; *Re 512; Ex parte Whalley*, 4 Russ. 12 Sim. 104.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF ESTATES IN SEVERALTY, JOINT-TENANCY, COPARCENARY, AND COMMON.

[WE come now to treat of estates, with respect to the number and connection of their owners, the tenants who occupy and hold them (*a*). And, considered in this view, estates of any quantity or length of duration, and whether they be in actual possession or in expectancy, may be held in four different ways; in severalty, in joint-tenancy, in coparcenary, and in common.

I. He that holds lands or tenements in *severalty*, or is sole tenant thereof, is he that holds them in his own right only, without any other person being joined or connected with him in point of interest during his estate therein. This is the most common and usual way of holding an estate; and therefore we may make the same observations here that we did upon estates in possession, as contradistinguished from those in expectancy, in the preceding chapter: that there is little or nothing peculiar to be remarked concerning it, since all estates are supposed to be of this sort, unless the contrary is expressed; and in laying down general rules and doctrines, we usually apply them to such estates as are held in severalty. We shall therefore proceed to consider the other three species of estate, in which there are always a plurality of tenants.]

All the three last-mentioned species of estate have this common characteristic,—that the tenants hold *pro indi-*

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 230.

viso, or promiscuously (*b*). So that one person is not seised or possessed exclusively of one acre, and another person of another, (for then they would be tenants in severalty,) but the interest and possession of each extend to every specific portion of the whole land of which they are joint-tenants, coparceners, or tenants in common. And accordingly, though only one of them should happen to be in actual possession, yet his possession is considered for many purposes as that of all (*c*). But in many points of view these different species of estate are materially distinguishable from each other in their character and properties, and it will be necessary therefore to consider them separately and in succession.

II. An estate then in *joint-tenancy* is where an estate is acquired by two or more persons in the same land, by the same title (not being a title by descent), and at the same period; and without any limitation by words importing that they are to take in distinct shares (*d*). Thus, if there be a conveyance of lands to A. and B., without more, this makes them joint-tenants of the freehold; if to A. and B. and their heirs, this makes them joint-tenants of the fee. [The estate so acquired is called an estate in joint-tenancy (*e*), and sometimes an estate in *jointure*, which word, as well as the other, signifies an union or conjunction of interest; though in common speech the term *jointure* is usually confined to that estate, which, by

(*b*) Co. Litt. 189 a, 190 b, 163 a.

(*c*) See *Doe v. Taylor*, 5 Barn. & Adol. 583; *Ford v. Grey*, 1 Salk. 285; *Doe v. Keen*, 7 T. R. 386; *Doe v. Pearson*, 6 East, 173. But now by the Limitation Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 12, if one or more of several persons entitled as coparceners, joint-tenants, or tenants in common, shall have been in the possession of the entirety, or more than his undivided share, or shares for

his or their own benefit, or for the benefit of any person or persons *other than the person or persons entitled to the other share or shares*, such possession shall not be deemed to have been the possession of such last-mentioned person or persons or any of them.

(*d*) As to this estate, see Co. Litt. 180 a—188 b.

(*e*) Litt. s. 277.

[virtue of the statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10, is sometimes vested in the husband and wife before marriage, as a full satisfaction and bar of the woman's dower (*f*).

This estate of joint-tenancy has several conditions and properties, which require to be distinctly pointed out before a just conception of its nature can be attained.

1. Among joint-tenants there is a *unity of title* (*g*), that is, their estate must be created by one and the same act, whether legal or illegal,—as by one and the same grant, or by one and the same disseisin (*h*).] 2. The estate of joint-tenants *vests in them at one and the same period* (*i*). Thus, if an estate be granted to J. S. for life, with remainder to A. and the eldest son of B. (B. having no son at the time), and their heirs, A. does not take in joint-tenancy with B.'s eldest son; because A. takes a vested remainder in a moiety immediately on the execution of the conveyance, while the remainder in the other moiety does not vest until a son is born to B.; nor at all if J. S. dies first. And even if a son is born to B. in J. S.'s lifetime, still A. had up to that period no joint interest with him; and the tenancy, not being *ab initio* a joint-tenancy, cannot become so afterwards. On the other hand, in a case of remainder to A. and B. and their heirs, after a previous life estate, they take in joint-tenancy, because they both take at once a vested remainder. 3. Among joint-tenants there is also a *similarity of interest* as regards the quantity of estate. [One joint-tenant cannot be entitled to one period of duration or quantity of interest in lands, and the other to a different; one cannot be tenant for life, and the other for years; one cannot be tenant in fee, and the other in tail (*k*).] Yet there may be joint-tenants as to a portion of the fee, with

(*f*) Vide sup. p. 273.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 181.

(*h*) Litt. s. 278.

(*i*) 2 Bl. Com. 181; Co. Litt. 188 a. But with respect to the applicability of this doctrine to estates

raised by way of *use* or *devise* (as to which vide post, bk. II. pt. I. cc. XVIII., xx.), see Fearn, by Butler, 312, 9th ed.; Co. Litt. by Harg. 188 a, n. (13).

(*k*) Co. Litt. 188 a.

a several interest in one or more of them as to the residue. Thus, if land be granted to A. and B. for their lives, and to the heirs of A.; here A. and B. are joint-tenants of the freehold during their joint lives, and A. has a several inheritance in fee simple; or if land be given to A. and B., and the heirs of the body of A.; here both have a joint estate for life, and A. has a several inheritance in tail (*l*). 4. There is an *entirety* and *equality of interest* among the tenants; for while they continue to hold together, they are not considered as holding in distinct shares, but each is equally entitled to the *whole*. And, on the other hand, though the entirety ceases for the purpose of alienation, every co-tenant being entitled (if he thinks proper) separately to transfer his own share, yet the equality remains; for each is capable of conveying an equal share with the rest.

This combination of entirety of interest with the power of transferring in equal shares, is expressed by the antient law maxim, that every joint-tenant is seised *per my et per tout* (*m*). And this is considered as an essential charac-

(*l*) Litt. s. 285. Blackstone's expression (vol. ii. p. 181) is, that "A. has the *remainder* in severalty" in these cases. But Littleton says, "one hath a freehold and the other a fee-simple," and Lord Coke, that "they are joint tenants for life, "and the fee-simple or estate tail is "in one of them;" and though he afterwards speaks of "him in remainder," his remarks show that it is not a remainder properly so called; and, that though a joint-tenancy for life subsists with all the usual incidents, yet the estate of the joint-tenant, who has the fee, is for many purposes (particularly that of alienation) an entire inheritance, not broken into a particular estate and remainder thereon. (Co. Litt. 184 b, and note 2, by Harg.; Wiscot's case,

2 Rep. 60 b.) See also Forrester v. Whiteway, 3 Exch. 367.

(*m*) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 182) gives, as the meaning of this expression, that each has "the entire possession, as well of every parcel as of the whole," and in this he follows the words of Littleton, s. 288. The expression, however, seems more properly to import that they are all jointly seised of the whole, with a right to transfer in equal shares, as explained in the text. Accordingly, in commenting on the words *per my et per tout*, Lord Coke (citing Bracton) remarks, "*Et sic totum tenet, et nihil tenet, scil. totum conjunctim et nihil per se separatim.*" "And albeit they are so "seised, as for example, where there "be two joint-tenants in fee, yet to

teristic of a joint estate; and therefore if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are not properly joint-tenants, but are said to be tenants by *entireties*; [for husband and wife being considered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are seised of the entirety, *per tout et non per my*; the consequence of which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor (*n*).] And so if a joint estate in land be conveyed to a husband and wife, and to a third person, the husband and wife take a moiety, and the third person the other moiety, in the same manner as if the grant had been to only two persons (*o*).

From the entirety of interest in each of the co-tenants results the most remarkable incident or consequence of a joint estate, viz., that it is subject to *survivorship*. [For when two or more persons are seised of a joint estate of freehold, or are jointly possessed of any chattel interest in lands, the entire tenancy, upon the decease of any of them, remains to the survivors, and at length to the last survivor; and he shall be entitled to the whole estate, whatever it be, whether an inheritance or a freehold only, or even a less estate (*p*). This is the natural and regular consequence of the union and entirety of their interest. One has not a distinct moiety from the other, but while the joint-tenancy continues each joint-tenant has a concurrent interest in the whole; and therefore, on the death

"divers purposes each of them hath
"but a right to a moiety, as to en-
"feoff, give, or demise, or to forfeit,
"&c." (Co. Litt. 186 a.) As to
the meaning of the expression *per
my et per tout*, the reader is also
referred to a learned note by Mr.
Serjeant Manning, *Murray v. Hall*,
7 C. B. 455 n. (*a*).

(*n*) Litt. s. 665; Co. Litt. 187 b;
Bro. Abr. t. *cui in vita*, 8; 1 Prest.

Est. 131; and see *Back v. Andrew*,
2 Vern. 120; *Purefoy v. Rogers*, 2
Lev. 39; *Greneley's case*, 8 Rep.
71 b; *Beaumont's case*, 9 Rep. 138;
Doe v. Parratt, 5 T. R. 652.

(*o*) Litt. s. 291. But if a grant
be made to a husband and wife, ex-
pressly to hold as *tenants in com-*
mon, they hold accordingly. (Co.
Litt. 187 b.)

(*p*) Litt. ss. 280, 281.

[of his companion, the sole interest in the whole remains to the survivor. For the interest which the survivor originally had, is clearly not divested by the death of his companion; and no other person can now claim to have a *joint* estate with him, for no one can now have an interest in the whole, accruing by the same title, and taking effect at the same time with his own; neither can any one claim a *separate* interest in any part of the tenements, for that would be to deprive the survivor of the right which he has in all and every part. As, therefore, the survivor's original interest in the whole still remains, and as no one can now be admitted, either jointly or severally, to any share with him therein, it follows that his own interest must now be entire and several, and that he shall alone be entitled to the whole estate (whatever it be) that was created by the original grant.

The right of survivorship is called by our antient authors the *jus accrescendi*, because the right, upon the death of one joint-tenant, accumulates and increases to the survivors; or, as they themselves express it, "*pars illa communis accrescit superstitibus, de personâ in personam, usque ad ultimam superstitem*" (q).] And the rule is that *jus accrescendi præfertur oneribus* (r); so that no dower or curtesy can be claimed out of a joint estate (s). Indeed even where one of the joint-tenants alienes his share (which discharges it from any claim of his co-tenant in respect of survivorship), yet the wife of the alienor shall not be entitled to her dower (t); the reason of which seems to be, that the land never was in his seisin, except as subject to the paramount claim of the

(q) Bracton, l. 4, tr. 3, c. 9, s. 3; Fleta, l. 3, c. 4, s. 2. It may deserve remark that in English law there is no presumption as to survivorship from age or sex among persons whose death happened by one and the same cause, as by ship-

wreck. See *Wing v. Angrave*, 8 H. of L. Cas. 183.

(r) Co. Litt. 185 a.

(s) As to *dower* and *curtesy*, vide sup. pp. 266, 263.

(t) Co. Litt. 31 b, and n. 4, by Harg.

survivor; and therefore there was no seisin out of which the dower can arise (*u*).

The remaining subject for our consideration is, how an estate in joint-tenancy may be dissolved or destroyed. And this may be done:—1. *By partition*. Thus, if two joint-tenants agree to part their lands, and to hold them in severalty, the effect thereof is to make them no longer joint-tenants, for they no longer hold promiscuously; and it follows that the right of survivorship, also, is by such separation destroyed (*v*). But with regard to such a transaction, the provision of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, is to be borne in mind, viz., that a partition of any tenements or hereditaments (not being copyhold) made after the 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law unless made by deed. [By the common law all the joint-tenants might agree to make partition of the lands, but one of them could not compel the other so to do (*x*); for this being an estate originally created by the act and agreement of the parties, the law would not permit any one or more of them to destroy the united possession without a similar universal consent.] But by statute 31 Hen. VIII. c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII. c. 32, joint-tenants were, in case of refusal by any of them, made compellable by *writ of partition* to divide their lands; and though this writ, together with other antient forms of real action, was abolished by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 36, the necessity of submitting to division still exists. For the antient proceeding by way of a real action in the Common Pleas became in practice, at an early period, superseded by proceedings in equity, praying the same relief (*y*); and this course is that which is now adopted in order to compel a partition (*z*). 2. [*The jointure may be destroyed by alien-*

(*u*) As to the necessity for the husband's seisin, vide sup. p. 269.

(*v*) Co. Litt. 188 a, 198 a.

(*x*) Litt. s. 290.

(*y*) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 169 a, n. (2); 1 Fonb. Tr. Eq. 18.

(*z*) See also 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 85, as to partition of *copyhold*

[*ation without partition.* As if one joint-tenant alienes and conveys his estate to a third person: here the joint-tenancy is severed, and turned into tenancy in common; for the grantee and the remaining joint-tenant hold by different titles,—one derived from the original, the other from the subsequent, grantor; though, till partition made, the undivided tenancy continues (*a*). And so if one of two joint-tenants releases his share to the other, the joint-tenancy is dissolved, and turned to an estate in severalty (*b*). But a devise of one's share by will is no severance of the jointure, the *jus accrescendi* being preferred *ultimæ voluntati* (*c*): for no testament takes effect till after the death of the testator; and by such death, the right of the survivor, which accrued at the original creation of the estate and has therefore a priority to the other (*d*), is already vested (*e*). 3. *The jointure may also be destroyed by an accession of interest.* Thus, if there be two joint-tenants for life, and the inheritance is purchased by or descends upon either, it is a severance of the jointure (*f*), for such event renders their interests dissimilar as regards the quantity of estate; though, if an estate is originally limited to two for life, and after to the heirs of one of them, the freehold shall remain in jointure, without merging in the inheritance; because, being

and *customary* estates; and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40 (see *Landell v. Baker*, Law Rep., 6 Eq. Ca. 268; *Osborn v. Osborn*, ib. 338; *Miller v. Marriott*, ib. 7 Eq. Ca. 1; *Lys v. Lys*, ib. 126; *Slade v. Barlow*, ib. 296; *Peters v. Bacon*, ib. 8 Eq. Ca. 125; *Silver v. Udall*, ib. 9 Eq. Ca. 227), as to the power of the court to order a sale and distribution of the proceeds, in place of decreeing a division of the property. By this last Act (the Partition Act, 1868), where the property to be divided does not exceed in value the sum of

500*l.* the proceedings may be in the *county* court. It may be observed that one who is only a *reversioner* cannot maintain a suit for a partition. (*Evans v. Bagshaw*, Law Rep., 5 Ch. App. 340.)

(*a*) Litt. s. 292.

(*b*) See *Avery v. Cheslyn*, 3 Ad. & El. 75.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 185 b. And see *Swift v. Roberts*, 3 Burr. 1488; *Ambl.* 617.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 185 b.

(*e*) Litt. s. 287; 3 Burr. 1488.

(*f*) Cro. Eliz. 470.

[created by one and the same conveyance, they are not separate estates (which is requisite in order to a merger), but branches of one entire estate (*g*).

It is proper to add, that whenever or by whatever means the jointure ceases or is severed, the right of survivorship or *jus accrescendi* the same instant ceases with it (*h*). Yet, if one of three joint-tenants aliens his share, the two remaining tenants still hold their parts by joint-tenancy and survivorship (*i*); and if one of three joint-tenants releases his share to one of his companions, though the joint-tenancy is destroyed with regard to that part, yet the two remaining parts are still held in jointure (*k*).

In general it is advantageous for the joint-tenants to dissolve the jointure; since thereby the right of survivorship is taken away, and each may transmit his own part to his own heirs. Sometimes, however, it is disadvantageous to dissolve the joint estate: as if there be two joint-tenants for life, and they make partition, this dissolves the jointure; and, though before they each of them had an estate in the whole for his own life and the life of his companion, now each has an estate in a moiety only, for his own life merely; and on the death of either, the reversioner shall enter on his moiety (*l*).

III. An estate held in *coparcenary* is where lands of inheritance descend from the ancestor to two or more persons (*m*). It arises either by common law or particular custom. By common law: as where a person seised in fee simple or in fee tail dies, and his next heirs are two or more females, his daughters, sisters, aunts, cousins, or their representatives; in this case they shall all inherit,

(*g*) Wiscot's case, 2 Rep. 60; Co. Litt. 182 b.

(*h*) "*Nihil de re accrescit ei, qui nihil in re quando jus accresceret habet.*"—Co. Litt. 188 a.

(*i*) Litt. s. 294.

(*k*) Ibid. s. 304.

(*l*) 1 Jones, 55; Co. Litt. 191 a.

(*m*) As to this estate, see Co. Litt. 163 a—180 a.

[as will be more fully shown, when we treat of descents hereafter; and these co-heirs are then called *coparceners*, or, for brevity, *parceners* only (*n*); though in some points of view the law considers them as together making only one heir (*o*). Parceners by particular custom are where lands descend, as in gavelkind, to all the *males* in equal degree, as sons, brothers, uncles, &c. (*p*).]

An estate in coparcenary resembles, in some respects, that in joint-tenancy, there being the same unity of title and similarity of interest. But in the following respects they materially differ:—1. Parceners always claim by *descent*, whereas joint tenants always claim by *the act of parties*. [Therefore, if two sisters purchase lands, to hold to them and their heirs, they are not parceners, but joint-tenants (*q*); and hence it likewise follows, that no lands can be held in coparcenary but estates of inheritance, which are of a descendible nature; whereas not only estates in fee and in tail, but for life or years, may be held in joint-tenancy.] 2. There is no *entirety of interest* among coparceners. They are properly entitled each to a distinct share (*r*), and of course there is no *jus accrescendi* or survivorship between them, for each part descends severally to their respective heirs, though the undivided tenancy continues. And as long as the lands continue in a course of descent, and are held promiscuously, so long are the tenants therein, whether male or female, called parceners. 3. Though the interest of coparceners accrue by the same title, yet *they may accrue at different periods*. [For if a man hath two daughters, to whom his estate descends in coparcenary, and one dies before the other, the surviving daughter and the heir of the other, or when both are dead, their two heirs, are still parceners (*s*); the estates vesting in each of them at dif-

(*n*) Litt. ss. 241, 242.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 163 b, 164 a; Vin. Ab. Parceners (Q); and see R. v. Bonsall, 3 B. & C. 173.

(*p*) Litt. s. 265.

(*q*) Ibid. s. 254.

(*r*) Co. Litt. 163, 164.

(*s*) Ibid. 164, 174.

[ferent times, though it be the same quantity of interest, and held by the same title.] 4. And lastly, though persons related in equal degree to the ancestor are entitled in equal shares, yet as their heirs will represent them, or stand in their place, there is no necessary *equality of interest* among parceners. Thus, if a man die leaving four grand-daughters, three of them the issue of an elder daughter, and one of a younger, all four shall inherit; but the daughter of the younger shall take as much as all the other three (*t*).

With respect to an estate in coparcenary, the following rule deserves notice: that if one of two or more sisters, to whom lands descended in coparcenary, held an estate which had been given to her in *frankmarriage* (*u*) by the same ancestor from whom the lands thus descended to her, she could not take her share of them without first adding to them her estates in frankmarriage, in order that the whole property might be equally divided between all the sisters (*x*). [This mode of division was known in the law of the Lombards, which directs the woman so preferred in marriage and claiming her share of the inheritance, “*mittere in confusum cum sororibus, quantum pater aut frater ei dederit, quando ambulaverit ad maritum*” (*y*). With us it is denominated bringing those lands into *hotchpot* (*z*); which term shall be explained in the very words of Littleton (*a*); “It seemeth that this word, *hotchpot*, is in English a pudding; for in a pudding is not “commonly put one thing alone, but one thing with other “things together.” By this housewifely metaphor our ancestors meant to inform us that the lands, both those given in frankmarriage and those descending in fee simple, should be mixed and blended together, and then divided in equal portions among all the daughters (*b*). But this

(*t*) Co. Litt. 164 b.

(*u*) Vide sup. p. 244, n. (*c*).

(*x*) Bracton, l. 2, c. 34; Litt. s.

266 to 273.

(*y*) L. 2, t. 14, c. 15.

(*z*) Britton, c. 72.

(*a*) Litt. s. 267.

(*b*) Ibid. s. 268.

[was left to the choice of the donee in frankmarriage; and if she did not choose to put her lands into hotchpot she was presumed to be sufficiently provided for, and the rest of the inheritance was divided among her sisters. The law of hotchpot took place then only, when the other lands descending from the ancestor were fee simple; for if they descended in tail, the donee in frankmarriage was entitled to her share, without bringing her lands so given into hotchpot(c). And the reason is, because lands descending in fee simple are distributed by the policy of law, for the maintenance of all the daughters; and if one has a sufficient provision out of the same inheritance, equal to the rest, it is not reasonable that she should have more; but lands descending in tail are not distributed by the operation of the law, but by the designation of the giver, *per formam doni*; it matters not, therefore, how unequal this distribution may be. Also no lands but such as are given in frankmarriage, shall be brought into hotchpot; for no others are looked upon in law as given for the advancement of the woman, or by way of marriage portion(d). And, therefore, as gifts in frankmarriage are fallen into disuse, the law of hotchpot would hardly have been worth notice, had not this method of division been revived and copied by the statute “for distribution of personal estates,” which we shall hereafter consider at large(e).

The modes of dissolving an estate in coparcenary are as follows:—1. *By partition(f)*. Parceners are so called, saith Littleton, because they may be constrained to make “partition”(g); and he mentions many methods of making it, four of which are by consent and one by compulsion(h).

(c) Litt. 274.

(d) Ibid. s. 275.

(e) As to the Statute of Distributions, vide post, bk. II. pt. II. c. VII.

(f) Though the partition dis-

solves the coparcenary, the parceners are still *in* by *descent*, Doe *d.* Crosthwaite *v.* Dixon, 5 Ad. & El. 834.

(g) Litt. s. 241.

(h) Ibid. ss. 243—264.

[The first is, where they agree to divide the lands into equal parts in severalty, and that each shall have such a determinate part. The second method is, when they agree to choose some friend to make partition for them, and then the sisters shall choose each of them her part according to seniority of age, or otherwise, as shall be agreed. The privilege of seniority is in this case personal; for if the eldest sister be dead, her issue shall not choose first, but the next sister. But, if an advowson descend in coparcenary, and the sisters cannot agree in the presentation, upon the first turn the eldest and her issue, nay, her husband, or her assigns, shall present alone, before the younger, to whom the next turn will in that case belong (*i*). And the reason given is, that the former privilege, of priority in choice upon a division, arises from an act of the parceners, the agreement to make partition; and, therefore, is merely personal: the latter, of presenting to the living, arises from the act of the law: and is annexed not only to the person of the eldest, but to her estate also. A third method of partition is, where the eldest divides, and then she shall choose last; for the rule of law is, *cujus est divisio, alterius est electio*. The fourth method is, where the sisters agree to cast lots for their shares.] And these are the methods by consent; with regard to all of which, however, the enactment of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, which requires that a partition, in order to be effectual, must now be *by deed*, should be borne in mind (*k*). Partition by compulsion (the other method mentioned by Littleton) used at the common law to be, where one or more parceners sued out a *writ of partition* against the others; but that writ being now abolished (*l*), partition of an estate held in co-parcenary can at present be compelled only by the decree of a court of equity, as in the case of a

(*i*) Co. Litt. 166 b, and see note
(2) by Harg.; Walker's case, 3 Rep.
22; Buller v. Bishop of Exeter, 1

Ves. sen. 340.

(*k*) Vide sup. p. 344.

(*l*) Ibid.

joint-tenancy (*m*). [It is, however, to be noticed that there are some things which are in their nature impartible. The mansion-house, for example, and certain hereditaments of an incorporeal kind, shall not be divided; but the eldest sister, if she pleases, shall have them, and make the others a reasonable satisfaction in other parts of the inheritance; or if that cannot be, then they shall have the profits of the thing by turns, in the same manner as they take the advowson (*n*).]

Besides the method of partition, the estate in coparcenary may be dissolved, 2, *by the alienation of one of the parties*, which destroys the unity of title; or, 3, *by the whole at last descending to and vesting in a single person*, which brings it to an estate in severalty (*o*).

IV. A *tenancy in common* is, where two or more hold the same land, with interest accruing under different titles; or accruing under the same title (other than *descent*), but at different periods (*p*); or conferred by words of limitation, importing that the grantees are to take in distinct shares (*q*).

In this tenancy there is not necessarily any *unity of title*; for one may hold by descent and the other by purchase, or the one by purchase from A. and the other by purchase from B.; nor any *unity in the time of vesting*, for the one's estate may have vested fifty years ago, and the other's but yesterday; nor any necessary *similarity or equality* of interest, for one tenant in common may hold in fee-simple, and the other in tail or for life; one may be

(*m*) The powers of the court in regard to decreeing a sale instead of dividing the property, are the same as in the case of a joint tenancy as referred to, sup. p. 344, n. (*z*).

(*n*) Co. Litt. 164 b, 165 a.

(*o*) 2 Bl. Com. 191; *Doe v. Dixon*, 5 Ad. & El. 839.

(*p*) Where several parties take under the same title *by descent*, accruing at different periods, they hold in coparcenary. Vide sup. p. 347.

(*q*) As to tenants in common, see Co. Litt. 188 b—201 a; *Murray v. Hall*, 7 C. B. 441.

entitled to two-thirds, and the other to one-third. Nor is there any *entirety* of interest, for each is seised or possessed of a distinct (though undivided) share; from which also it follows that there is no *survivorship* (*r*). The union consists only in this, that they hold the same land promiscuously.

[Tenancy in common may be created by the destruction of an estate held in joint-tenancy or of one held in coparcenary, or by special limitation in a deed. By destruction is here meant not such destruction as brings the joint estate into two or more estates in severalty, but such as puts an end only to the jointure or coparcenary: as if one of two joint-tenants in fee alienes his estate for the life of the alienee, the alienee and the other joint-tenant are tenants in common; for they now have several titles, the other joint-tenant by the original grant, the alienee by the new alienation (*s*). So, if one joint-tenant gives his part to A. in tail, and the other gives his to B. in tail, the donees are tenants in common, as holding by different titles and conveyances (*t*). If one of two parceners alienes, the alienee and the remaining parcener are tenants in common (*u*); because they hold by different titles,—the parcener by descent, the alienee by purchase. So likewise, if there be a grant to two *men*, or two *women*, and the heirs of their bodies, here the grantees shall be joint-tenants of the life estate, but they shall have several inheritances (*x*); because they cannot possibly have one heir of their two bodies, as might have been the case had the limitation been to *a man and woman*, and the heirs of their bodies begotten (*y*): and in this, and the like cases, their issues shall be tenants in common; because they

(*r*) Land, however, may be given to two persons in such manner as to make them tenants in common with benefit of survivorship. (*Doe v. Abey*, 1 Mau. & Sel. 428.)

(*s*) Litt. s. 292.

(*t*) Ibid. s. 295.

(*u*) Ibid. s. 309.

(*x*) *Doe v. Green*, 1 H. & H. 314; vide sup. p. 341.

(*y*) Litt. s. 283.

[must claim by different titles, one as heir of A., and the other as heir of B.; and those, too, not titles by purchase, but descent. In short, whenever an estate in joint-tenancy or coparcenary is dissolved, so that there be no partition made, but the undivided tenancy continues, it is turned into a tenancy in common.

A tenancy in common may also be created by express limitation in a conveyance: but here care must be taken to insert words implying that the grantees are to take distinct, though undivided, shares; for a grant without such words would give a joint estate. And it is laid down in our books that the common law is apt in its constructions to favour joint-tenancy rather than tenancy in common (*z*); because the divisible services issuing from land (as, for example, rent,) are not divided, nor the entire services (as fealty) multiplied, by joint-tenancy,—as they must necessarily be upon a tenancy in common. Accordingly, if land be given to two, to be holden the one moiety to one, and the other moiety to the other, this is an estate in common (*a*); and, if one grants to another *half* his land, the grantor and grantee are also tenants in common (*b*);—because, as has been before observed, joint-tenants do not take by distinct halves or moieties (*c*); and by such grants the division and severalty of the estate is so plainly expressed, that it is impossible that they should take a joint interest in the whole of the tenements.] Yet, on the other hand, an estate given, in a conveyance at common law, to A. and B. *equally to be divided* between them, hath been said to be a joint-tenancy (*d*), for it implies no more than what the law has annexed to that estate, viz. divisibility (*e*). Such a limitation however in a will, or in a conveyance founded on the statute of uses, (of which we shall have occasion to treat hereafter,) is certainly a

(*z*) Fisher v. Wigg, Salk. 392.

(*a*) Litt. s. 298.

(*b*) Ibid. s. 299.

(*c*) Vide sup. p. 341.

(*d*) 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 291.

(*e*) Fisher v. Wigg, 1 P. Wms. 17.

tenancy in common (*f*); for though the tendency of the antient law was to favour a joint-tenancy, the leaning in later times has been the other way (*g*); the right of survivorship being often inconvenient and harsh in its effect. And therefore in wills and the conveyances above referred to—both of which came into use in comparatively modern times and with regard to which a more liberal construction is in some respects allowed, than in the case of a common law conveyance—a tenancy in common will be created by words which might operate in a conveyance not founded on the statute, as a limitation in joint-tenancy.

We may take this opportunity of remarking, that when lands are given to two or more as tenants in common, it frequently happens that a particular estate is limited to each of the grantees in his share, with remainder over to the other or others of them—as if a man give lands to his two children as tenants in common in tail, and direct that upon failure of the issue of one of them his share shall go over to the other in tail, and *vice versâ*. Such ulterior estates as these are called *cross remainders*, because each of the grantees has reciprocally a remainder in the share of the other; and it is a rule respecting them, that in a *deed* they can be given only by express limitation, and shall never be implied (*h*); though it is otherwise with respect to *wills*, which are here, again, expounded more liberally, with a view to the presumable intent of the donor. Hence in these, cross-remainders may be raised not only by actual limitation, but by any expression from which the design to create them can reasonably be inferred (*i*).

(*f*) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 190 b, n. (4); 1 Sand. Us. 126; Ratcliffe's case, 3 Rep. 59 b; 1 Vent. 32; Goodtitle v. Stokes, 1 Wils. 341.

(*g*) Joliffe v. East, 3 Bro. C. C. 25; Fisher v. Wigg, 1 P. Wms. 14.

(*h*) 1 Saund. by Wms. 185, n. (6); Cole v. Levingston, 1 Vent. 224; Doe v. Worsley, 1 East, 416.

(*i*) A learned disquisition on the nature of cross-remainders will be found in 1 Prest. Est. 94, 115; and see Co. Litt. 195 b, n. (1), by Butler.

A tenancy in common may be dissolved, in the first place, *by partition*; for tenants in common, like joint-tenants, were compellable by the statutes of 31 Hen. VIII. c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII. c. 32 (though not at common law), to divide their lands by writ of partition (*h*); and they may be still driven to a partition by means of proceedings in equity (*l*). They may also effect a partition by mutual agreement without having recourse to the court, though by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, it is now made essential that such partition shall be by *deed* (*m*). A dissolution of the tenancy in common is also brought about *by uniting all the titles and interests in one tenant*, by purchase or otherwise, which brings the whole to one severalty.

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 344.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 344, n. (*z*). The provisions mentioned there apply, also, to the partition of an estate held in common. It may be noticed here that *partitions* (whether of hereditaments held in joint-tenancy,

coparcenary or in common) may also, under the provisions of modern acts of parliament, be effected in some cases by the orders of the *Inclosure Commissioners*, as to whom vide post, cap. XXXIII.

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 344.

CHAPTER IX.

OF USES AND TRUSTS.

THE modes of ownership hitherto considered all belong to the division of *legal* estates, to which our attention was in the first instance to be directed (*a*). And we may also remark of them, that they constitute the *primary* and *proper* forms of property in land; having been known in this country from the earliest era in the history of the Anglo-Norman jurisprudence, while all others are of considerably later introduction. But it is now time to take some notice of those of the *equitable* kind; which, in relation to the former, are not only of posterior but derivative origin, and proportionally more complex and artificial in their character: though unmixed, on the other hand, with those principles of feudal tenure fundamentally inherent, as we have seen, in the legal or common law estates.

The only example of equitable estate to which we have hitherto had occasion to refer, is that which resides in a person who, having conveyed his land by way of mortgage, is still entitled to the equity of redemption (*b*). But other interests of a various and somewhat intricate nature remain to be examined, which are embraced under the general appellation of *Uses* and *Trusts*.

Uses and trusts were in their origin closely united, but not identical (*c*). A *trust* was the confidence reposed by

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 230.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 306. An equity of redemption is said to be a *title in equity* and not merely a trust;

1 Sand. Uses, 203, 2nd ed.; Plunket v. Penson, 2 Atk. 290.

(*c*) As to the manner of the introduction of uses into our law, vide

one man in another when he invested him with the nominal ownership of property, to be dealt with in some particular manner, or held for some particular person or purpose pointed out. If the trust was of a certain description, viz., to hold land for the benefit of another person, generally, and to let him receive the profits, the sort of interest or right which consequently attached to the latter person was called a *use*, to distinguish it from the nominal ownership or estate of the *trustee* (*d*).

[The general idea of a use or trust answered more to the *fidei commissum* than the *usus fructus* of the civil law (*e*); which latter was the temporary right of using a thing without having the ultimate property of full dominion of the substance (*f*): but the *fidei commissum* (which usually was created by will) was the disposal of an inheritance to one, in confidence that he should convey it, or dispose of the profits, at the will of another (*g*). The right of the latter, was originally considered in the Roman law as *jus precarium* (*h*)—that is, one for which

Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 364, vol. iv. pp. 340, 516, 520; Co. Litt. by Butler, 271 b, n. (1), 290 b, n. (1).

(*d*) The books are rather vague, and not always correct in their account of the original meaning of these terms. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 327) says that "Uses and trusts" were in their original of a nature "very similar, or rather exactly the same." There can be no doubt, however, that there might be "trusts" which involved no "uses," in the proper meaning of that term. Thus Lord Bacon expressly distinguishes a *use* from a "special" or "transitory" *trust*.—(Bac. Read. Us.) Again it is clear that a "*trust*" was referable rather to the person in whom the confidence was reposed, "use" to the person for whose

benefit it was reposed. Thus it is said by Ld. Ch. Baron Gilbert, "If the use be not a thing annexed to the land, it will be asked of me what it is: to which I answer, that a use is the equitable right to have the profit of lands, the legal estate whereof is in the feoffee, only to the trust and confidence reposed in him."—(Gilb. Us. ed. by Sugd. 374.) And again Ld. Bacon remarks, "For a trust, which is the way to a use, it is exceedingly well defined by a civilian of great understanding. *Fides est obligatio conscientie unius ad intentionem alterius*."—(Bac. Read. Us.)

(*e*) Gilb. Uses, by Sugd. 3, (n.).

(*f*) Ff. 7, l. 1.

(*g*) Inst. 2, t. 23, ss. 1, 2.

(*h*) 1 Cruise, Dig. 394.

[the remedy was only by entreaty or request; but by subsequent institution it acquired a different character (*i*). It then became *jus fiduciarium*, and entitled to a remedy from a court of justice, and it was the business of a particular magistrate, the *prætor fidei commissarius*, to enforce the observance of these confidences (*k*).]

This notion of a use was transplanted into England from the civil law, about the close of the reign of Edward the third (*l*); and by the means of the foreign ecclesiastics, who introduced it to evade the statutes of mortmain. To explain this, we must remark that the religious houses to which these clergy belonged, fell under the legal description of *corporations*; a species of social institution on which we shall have occasion to dilate hereafter, and of which at present we shall only say, that they consist either of collective bodies of men, or of single individuals—the first called corporations *aggregate*, the second, corporations *sole*,—to whom the law allows an artificial, distinct from their natural, personality; and who possess, as persons corporate, the character of perpetuity: their existence being constantly maintained by the succession of new individuals in the place of those who die, or are removed (*m*). The lands belonging to corporations were consequently said to be *in mortuâ manu*, or in *mortmain*, because they produced no advantage to the feudal lord by way of escheat or otherwise (*n*): and therefore, by the policy of the antient law, corporations were prohibited from the purchase of land, unless a licence in mortmain (as it was called) was obtained for the purpose. This principle was enforced by a variety of statutes, called the statutes of mortmain, which the clergy of the day were constantly exerting their ingenuity to evade. One of their expedients was to obtain grants of land, not to their religious houses directly, but to some person to hold to the *use*

(*i*) 1 Cruise, Dig. 395.

(*k*) Inst. 2, tit. 23, s. 1.

(*l*) Sand. Uses, p. 17, 2nd ed.

(*m*) See further as to corporations, bk. iv. pt. III. c. 1.

(*n*) Co. Litt. 2 b.

of such religious houses. A gift of this kind conferred no estate or interest whatever, in contemplation of law, on those whose benefit was designed; for the principle of the feudal tenure was to look no further than to the actual and ostensible tenant, and to consider him alone as the proprietor (*o*). The use, therefore, declared upon such a gift, being in the view of the ordinary courts of justice a non-entity, escaped the operation of the statutes of mortmain. On the other hand, however, it did not remain without protection: for the clerical chancellors of those days maintained the doctrine that such gifts, though not effectual in the ordinary courts of law, were binding in conscience; and ought, like the *fidei commissa* of the Romans, to be enforced. And as these were subjected by the imperial institutions to the jurisdiction of a particular magistrate, the prætor, so the chancellors claimed the right of compelling the performance of the trusts in question in their Court of Chancery; a tribunal which administered justice upon the principles of *equity*, in contradistinction to the common law of the realm (*p*).

As regards the corporate bodies or religious houses themselves, indeed, this evasive contrivance of uses proved to be of little avail; being crushed in its infancy by statute 15 Rich. II. c. 5, which enacted that, for the future, uses should be subject to the statute of mortmain, and forfeitable like the lands themselves, unless the licence of the crown were duly obtained. Yet the idea being once introduced, was afterwards applied to purposes not contemplated by its inventors, and took root in our system of jurisprudence; being chiefly recommended by two considerations—first, that uses were, as to the manner of their creation and transfer, and the modifications of interest to which they might be subject, free from the restrictive rules which

(*o*) 1 Cruise, Dig. 402.

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 14; 3 Bl. Com.

51; Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 192.

applied to the common law estates: secondly, that they were not, in general, liable, like these estates, to forfeiture (*q*), and originally not even to forfeiture for treason (*r*). [And owing to this latter circumstance in particular it happened that, during our long wars in France and the subsequent civil commotions between the houses of York and Lancaster, uses grew almost universal; through the desire that men had of securing their estates from forfeiture when each of the contending parties, as they became uppermost, alternately attainted the other. And about the reign of Edward the fourth, before whose time Lord Bacon remarks that there are not six cases to be found relating to the doctrine of uses the courts of equity began to reduce them to something of a regular system (*s*).]

With respect to the kinds of property that might be the subject of a use, we may observe, in general, that all corporeal hereditaments, whether in possession, remainder, or reversion;—and many that are incorporeal, for example, rents and advowsons,—might be granted to a use; but not those of which the use was inseparable from the possession and *quæ ipso usu consumuntur*, as ways, commons, and the like (*t*).

The manner in which a use was commonly created was as follows. The owner, or actual tenant of the land, conveyed it by feoffment, upon the trust or confidence, which often rested upon merely oral agreement (*u*), that the feoffee should hold the land to the use of some third person, or it might be to the use of the feoffor himself (*x*). The effect of this transaction (as already in part explained) was, that the legal seisin or feudal tenancy of the land

(*q*) Vide sup. pp. 200, 288.

(*r*) See 33 Hen. 8, c. 20.

(*s*) See Bac. Read. Us.

(*t*) 2 Bl. Com. 330; 1 Sand. Uses, 70, 2nd ed.; 1 Cruise, Dig. 408; W.

Jones, 127; Ld. Willoughby's case, per Doddridge, J., Gilb. Uses, 485, 3rd ed. by Sugd.

(*u*) 1 Sand. Uses, 17, 2nd ed.

(*x*) 1 Cruise, Dig. 392.

became severed from the substantial and beneficial ownership or use; the former being vested in the trustee, otherwise called *feoffee to uses*, the latter, in the person to whose use he held, who received the appellation of *cestui que use*. Of these divided interests, that of the feoffee alone obtained protection in the court of common law; where he was considered as absolute owner. But a different doctrine was maintained in the courts of equity, which treated *cestui que use*, on the other hand, as the true proprietor; and compelled the feoffee to account to him for the rents and profits, and to hold the land at his disposal.

Uses, however, might be created, not only by an express agreement or declaration, but by mere implication from the nature of the conveyance itself. Thus if a man made a feoffment in fee to another, without any consideration, equity would presume that he meant it to the use of himself, and would therefore raise an implied use for his benefit (*y*); unless, indeed, he expressly declared it to be to the use of another, and then nothing was presumed contrary to his own expressions (*z*). And here we may observe, that uses thus returning by way of implication to the grantor himself, were called *resulting* uses (*a*). Uses also were capable of being raised in some cases upon mere contracts, without the formality of any conveyance; and this either expressly or by implication (*b*). For if a man in consideration of natural affection, *covenanted*, that is, contracted under the solemnity of a deed, *that he would stand seised of his land to the use* of some near relative named; or of a wife, actual or intended; a court of equity, even though no valuable consideration passed, would enforce the use, and treat the covenantor thereafter as a mere

(*y*) 1 Sand. Us. 68, 2nd ed.; Vin. Uses, F.; 1 Cruise, Dig. 442, 446, 450; Gilb. 118.

(*z*) 2 Bl. Com. 330.

(*a*) 1 Cruise, Dig. 442, 446, 450;

2 Bl. Com. 335; Doe v. Rolfe, 8 Ad. & El. 650.

(*b*) 1 Sand. Us. 118, 2nd ed.; ibid. II. 50; Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 139 b.

trustee for the party whose benefit was designed (*d*). So if a man had *bargained and sold* his land to another, (that is, agreed to sell it him,) for pecuniary consideration, but had made no actual feoffment or conveyance, equity would, under such circumstances, consider the estate as belonging to the party who had paid the money; and would consequently hold the bargainor to be seised of the land from thenceforth, to the use of the bargainee (*e*).

No contracts of either kind, however, would be enforced in equity, unless founded upon the particular species of consideration above described as appropriate to the case; a gratuitous engagement, in favour of a stranger, being insufficient to raise a use.

In general all persons were of capacity thus to become trustees and to hold to a use (*f*). There were, however, some exceptions. For persons attainted and aliens were for this, (as for all other purposes,) disqualified from holding land (*g*); and the doctrine was also established, that neither the king nor queen, on account of their dignity royal,—nor any corporation aggregate, on account of its limited capacity,—could be seised to any use but their own; that is, they might hold the lands but were not compellable to execute the trust (*h*).

As the person seised to uses was considered at the common law as absolute owner, his estate was of course subject to all the incidents which would attach to one held for his own benefit. It would devolve to his legal representative at his death, and might be aliened, or forfeited by his act while living; or become subject to execution for his debts, or to escheat for want of an heir. His wife also would be entitled to dower therein; and where the person so seised

(*d*) 2 Bl. Com. 304; Gilb. Uses, 93; Sugd. Introd. to Gilb. xlvii.

(*e*) 2 Sand. Us. 50, 2nd ed. But the precise technical words of *bargain and sale*, or *covenant to stand seised*, are not essential, if there

are words tantamount. (Treat. on Equity, book ii. chap. 3, s. 1.)

(*f*) 1 Sand. Us. 62, 2nd ed.

(*g*) Ibid. 65.

(*h*) 2 Bl. Com. 330; 1 Sand. Us. 65, 2nd ed.

was a married woman, her husband might claim the estate by the curtesy (*k*).

It is to be observed, too, that those who claimed under such derivative titles from the persons seised to uses, were in some cases entitled to hold for their own benefit, free from any equitable obligation to perform the trust. Originally, indeed, it was held that the Court of Chancery could give relief only against the person himself in whom the trust was first reposed, and not against such as might derive title through him. [But this was altered in the reign of Henry the sixth with respect to the heir (*l*); and afterwards, by a parity of reason, with respect to such alienees as had purchased either without a valuable consideration, or with an express notice of the use (*m*). But a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, or a creditor obtaining execution, might hold the land discharged of the use (*n*): and so if the person seised to uses died without heir, or committed a forfeiture, or married, neither the lord who entered for his escheat or forfeiture, nor the husband who retained the possession as tenant by the curtesy, nor the wife to whom dower was assigned,—were liable to perform the use: because they were not parties to the trust, but came in by act of law: though doubtless their title, in reason, was no better than that of the heir (*o*).]

The capacity of becoming *cestui que use*, was even more extensive than that of becoming trustee; and it may be sufficient to observe generally, that all persons competent to take a conveyance of land might also take an interest in it by way of use (*p*).

The nature of this interest, constituting as it did a new sort of ownership, wholly distinct from the common law

(*k*) 1 Sand. Us. 75, 76, 2nd ed.;

1 Cruise, Dig. 403; Gilb. Us. by Sugd. 3rd ed. p. 15; 2 Bl. Com. 330.

(*l*) Keilw. 42; see the Year-book, 22 Edw. 4, c. 6.

(*m*) Keilw. 46.

(*n*) Gilb. Uses, by Sugd. 3rd ed. pp. 15, 16.

(*o*) See 1 Sand. Uses, 229, 2nd ed.

(*p*) 1 Sand. Uses, 66.

or legal estate, to which alone our attention was formerly directed, demands a particular consideration. It was in its nature so exclusively *equitable*, that the courts of common law accounted the *cestui que use*, if out of possession, as a mere stranger to the land; if in possession, as no more than a tenant at sufferance. They consequently allowed no effect to his alienation or demise of the land, if made without the consent of the trustee; and they held it not liable to forfeiture for his default, nor to execution for his debts (*q*). In equity, however, the properties or incidents of this kind of ownership were in a great measure assimilated to those of a legal estate; while on the other hand they were settled, in certain respects, upon principles more advantageous to the owner. These properties were principally as follows:—1. Contrary to the course of the common law with respect to freehold estate, uses even for life, or for a greater interest, might be created or assigned by secret deeds between the parties, or might be devised by last will or testament (*r*); for as the legal estate in the soil was not transferred by these transactions, no *livery of seisin* was necessary, or in its nature applicable to the case. 2. As a use was exempt from the restrictions of the common law as to the manner of creation or transfer, so it enjoyed a similar freedom as regards the modification of the interest itself. Thus uses might not only be in possession, reversion, or remainder, (vested or contingent,) according to the fashion of legal estates; but might also be limited for future interests not corresponding with the legal idea of a remainder. When in the nature of estates in possession, reversion, or vested remainder, they were called uses *in esse*; in other cases they were described as uses *in futuro*, *contingent* uses, or uses in *possibility* (*s*). 3. [A use was not, as before remarked, subject

(*q*) 2 Bl. Com. 331; 1 Sand. Uses, 73, 74, 2nd ed.

(*r*) Bac. Read. Uses, 312, 308; 1 Sand. Uses, 72, 2nd ed.

(*s*) Chudleigh's case, 1 Rep. 136 b, 211 b; Lovies' case, 10 Rep. 85 a; Bac. Read. Us.; Bac. Ab. Uses, (G).

[to forfeiture (*t*); and did not escheat upon attainder, or other defect of blood; for escheats and the like are the consequence of *tenure*, and uses are held of nobody. 4. Again, no wife could claim dower, or husband an estate by curtesy, of a use (*u*); for no trust was declared for their benefit, at the original grant of the estate. And therefore (as we have seen) it became customary, when most estates were put in use, to settle before marriage some joint estate to the use of the husband and wife for their lives, which was the original of modern jointures (*x*). 5. Lastly, a use could not be extended by writ of elegit, or other legal process, for the debts of *cestui que use*; though the legal estate *was* liable to such execution for the debt of the legal tenant.]

The state of things here described was, however, attended with a variety of inconveniences. A person in possession of the land as apparent owner, would often, in reality be a mere *cestui que use*, and consequently no more than a tenant at sufferance in regard to the legal estate; or he might, on the other hand, be a mere trustee, the equitable ownership and the right to receive the profits residing in another (*y*): and as putting an estate into use was often a secret transaction, with which strangers had no means of becoming acquainted, they were in constant danger of being deceived as to the true state of the title (*z*). [We cannot therefore be surprised at Lord Bacon's complaint that this course of proceeding "was turned to deceive many of their just and reasonable rights. "A man that had cause to sue for land, knew not against whom to bring his action, or who was the owner of it. The wife was defrauded of her thirds, the husband of his curtesy, the lord of his wardship, relief, heriot, and escheat, the creditor of his extent for debt, and the

(*t*) Vide sup. p. 360.

(*u*) Vernon's case, 4 Rep. 1 b; 2 And. 75. As to *dower* and *curtesy*, vide sup. pp. 267, 263.

(*x*) Vide sup. p. 273.

(*y*) Bac. Ab. Uses and Trusts, p. 83.

(*z*) 1 Sand. Us. 17, 18, 23; Preamble of Stat. of Uses.

["tenant of his lease" (a). To remedy these inconveniences abundance of statutes were provided, which made the lands liable to be extended by the creditors of *cestui que use* (b); allowed actions for the freehold to be brought against him if in actual pernancy or enjoyment of the profits (c); made him liable to actions of waste (d); established his conveyance and leases made without the concurrence of his feoffees (e); and gave the lord the wardship of his heir, with certain other feudal perquisites (f).

These provisions all tended to consider *cestui que use* as the real owner of the estate; and it being at length resolved to carry this idea into full effect, that celebrated Act was passed in the reign of Henry the eighth, (27 Hen. VIII. c. 10,) which is usually called the *Statute of Uses*, or, in conveyances and pleadings, the *Statute for transferring Uses into Possession*. The hint seems to have been derived from what was done at the accession of King Richard the third; who having, when Duke of Gloucester, been frequently made a feoffee to uses, would upon the assumption of the crown (as the law was then understood) have been entitled to hold the lands discharged of the use (g). But to obviate so notorious an injustice, an act of parliament (1 Ric. III. c. 5) was immediately passed, which ordained that, where he had been so enfeoffed jointly with other persons, the lands should vest in the other feoffees as if he had never been named; and that, where he solely stood enfeoffed, the estate itself should vest in *cestui que use* in like manner as he had the use.] And so the statute of Henry the eighth, after reciting the various inconveniences before mentioned, and many others, enacts that, where any person or persons shall be seised of lands, tenements, or other heredita-

(a) Bac. Use of the Law, 153.

(b) Stat. 50 Edw. 3, c. 6; 2 Rich. 2, st. 2, c. 3; 19 Hen. 7, c. 15.

(c) 1 Rich. 2, c. 9; 4 Hen. 4, c. 7; 11 Hen. 6, c. 3; 1 Hen. 7, c. 1.

(d) Stat. 11 Hen. 6, c. 5.

(e) Stat. 1 Rich. 3, c. 1.

(f) Stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 17; 19 Hen. 7, c. 15.

(g) Vide sup. p. 362.

ments (*h*) to the use, confidence or trust of any other person or persons, or body politic, by any means whatsoever, (whether the use, confidence or trust be in fee simple, fee tail, for life or for years, or otherwise, and whether it be in possession, remainder or reverter,) the estate of the person or persons so seised to uses shall be deemed to be in him or them that *have* (i. e. are beneficially entitled to) the use, trust or confidence: and he or they shall thenceforth stand and be seised or possessed of the said lands or other hereditaments of and in the like estates as he or they had in the use, trust or confidence. The effect of this statute, wherever it comes into operation, is to *execute* the use; that is, it instantaneously (*i*), and as by a kind of parliamentary magic (*h*), transmutes the equitable interest of *cestui que use* into a legal estate of the same nature, and makes him tenant of the land accordingly, in lieu of the feoffee to uses, or trustee: whose estate, on the other hand, is at the same moment annihilated (*l*). The use is also said to be *transferred into possession* (*m*); that is, the legal estate conferred on *cestui que use* is considered as an estate in actual seisin or possession (according to its nature), and such as requires no further ceremony for its completion (*n*). Thus if a feoffment be made to A. and his heirs to the use of B. and his heirs, an estate in fee simple in possession is *eo instanti* vested by force of the statute, and without livery of seisin, in B.; and A. takes nothing (*o*): or if a person seised in fee bargains and sells to A. for a year, for a pecuniary consideration—which we may remember constitutes a

(*h*) The words in the Act are “honours, castles, manors, lands, tenements, rents, services, reversions, remainders, or other hereditaments;” 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, s. 1.

(*i*) 2 Bl. Com. 333.

(*h*) Ibid. 338.

(*l*) Ibid. 333.

(*m*) 1 Saund. 251, n. (2), 234 b, n. (4).

(*n*) As to the effect upon the statutory seisin, of *cestui que use disclaiming* the use, see *Burdett v. Spilsbury*, 6 Man. & Gr. 456, *in notis*.

(*o*) A.'s momentary seisin vests no estate in him. (*James v. Plant*, in error, 4 Ad. & El. 766.)

seisin in the bargainor to the use of A. (*p*)—A. immediately becomes, by force of the statute and without entry, possessed of the land for the term of one year; the reversion remaining in the bargainor.

Here we must observe, however, that to bring the statute into operation, it is essential that there should not only be a use, but a person *seised* to the use (*q*); for its provisions are confined to the case where “one person shall be seised to the use of any other person.” And therefore where an existing term of years is limited to a use, as where a term of 1000 years is assigned to B. to the use of C., it was decided by the common law judges soon after the statute passed, and has been since uniformly held, that the provisions of the statute do not apply to the case, and that the use will consequently remain unexecuted. For of such estates as these, (being mere chattels,) the termor is not *seised*, but only *possessed* (*r*); and therefore there is no person “seised to a use” as the statute requires (*s*). Upon the same principle of close adherence to the words of the statute, it is held, that the seisin should be vested in a different person from *cestui que use* himself: for otherwise the case does not arise of one person seised to the use of *another* (*t*). And the seisin should be for an estate as extensive as the use itself; for the statute only executes the use so far as there is a corresponding seisin. Thus if land be conveyed to A. for life to the use of B. in fee; the statute will vest the legal estate in B. only during the life of A. (*u*).

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 362.

(*q*) 1 Sand. Us. 97, 113, 133; 2 Sand. Us. 58.

(*r*) Vide sup. p. 281.

(*s*) 1 Sand. Us. 198, 2nd edit.; Gilb. Us. 79; Bac. Read. Us. 335; Dillon v. Fraine, Poph. 76. This case, of the limitation of a term of years to a use, must be carefully distinguished from the limitation of

the *freehold* to a use for a term of years; for the latter *is* executed by the statute. (Gilb. Us. 80.)

(*t*) 1 Sand. Us. 96.

(*u*) 1 Sand. Us. 113; Gilb. Us. 430. There was once a great controversy on the question out of what seisin “contingent uses” are in certain cases to be executed; and this involved the curious doctrine of

As regards the use itself, also, a similar rigour of construction was adopted by the early expounders of the statute (*x*); and their doctrines have long since passed into settled law. The decisions of the common law courts on this subject were as follows:—1. It was held that *no use can be limited upon a use* (*y*). Thus where A., being seised, bargains and sells for a pecuniary consideration to B., the legal estate passes (as we have seen) by force of the statute to B., to whom the use is limited by the effect of the bargain and sale; and from this it might seem reasonable to infer that where A. bargains and sells

scintilla juris. Thus where land is conveyed by feoffment to A. and his heirs, to the use of B. for life, remainder to the use of his unborn sons successively in tail, remainder to the use of C. in fee; it is necessary, in order that the statute should transmute all these uses into legal estates, that there should be a seisin out of which to execute not only the uses *in esse* to B. and C., but the future uses to the sons of B. And by some persons it was thought necessary, also, that this seisin should exist with respect to each use at the time of its possessing the character of a use *in esse*. But all the actual seisin of the feoffee A. is exhausted before any son of B. is born, being drawn out of him to execute the uses *in esse* to B. and C.; which uses, taken together, extend to the entire inheritance. Here, therefore, was the difficulty; and in order to meet it, it was held by great authorities that there still remains in the feoffee, though not an actual seisin, yet a *scintilla juris*, or possibility of *future* seisin, to serve the future uses as they come into *esse*. But, according to others, there was no necessity for resorting to this

theory; it being sufficient in their opinion, for the purpose of the statute, that at the time of the creation of the future uses there should be a seisin to serve them, though there should be none at the time of their coming into *esse*; and they concluded that in the case supposed there would remain in A. neither any seisin nor any possibility of seisin, after the uses to B. and C. were executed. (See Sugd. Pow. 8th ed. p. 19.) The controversy, however, is now disposed of by Act of Parliament; it being provided by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 7, that such uses shall take effect when and as they arise by force of the original seisin to the uses; and that no *scintilla juris* shall be necessary or deemed to remain.

(*x*) This strictness has been attributed to a disinclination on the part of the judges, to carry the abolition of uses so far as had been intended by the legislature. (First Real Prop. Rep. 8.)

(*y*) Gilb. Us. 347; 1 Sand. Us. 198, 2nd edit.; 2 Bl. Com. 335. See *per curiam*, Gilbertson v. Richards, 4 H. & N. 297.

to B., *to the use of C.*, the legal estate would vest in C., for the ultimate use is here limited to *him*. But the judges held that it would vest in this case also in B., and that C. would take nothing; for the statute, they said, would execute the first use limited to B., but not the second, limited to C.; the latter use being a mere nullity, inasmuch “as no use can be engendered of a use” (*z*). Upon the same principle a feoffment to A., to the use of B. in trust for C., was held to vest the legal estate in B.; and C. was allowed to take nothing (*a*). This maxim, that there can be no use upon a use, proceeded upon the principle that, after the limitation of one, another must be considered as *repugnant*, and therefore void. Yet the doctrine, however firmly settled, is, upon the whole, not satisfactory; for it was clearly intended, in the cases above supposed, that C. should have the beneficial interest; and the instant the first use was executed in B. he might without impropriety have been considered as seised to the use of C.; which second use the statute might as well have been permitted to execute as it did the first (*b*).

2. It was held that *where the person entrusted has any active duty to perform, he cannot be considered as holding to a use, or at least not such a use as the statute executes* (*c*). Thus, if lands be given to B. and his heirs, with a direction to *receive* and *pay over* the profits to C., this shall be no use in C.; though, on the other hand, if the direction were to *permit C. to take* the profits, this would be a use executed in him; for in the case last supposed, there is no *active duty* appointed for the trustee (*d*).

(*z*) Tyrrell's case, Dy. 155.

(*a*) 2 Bl. Com. 336; Gilb. Us. Sugd. lx.

(*b*) 2 Bl. Com. ubi sup.

(*c*) Bro. Feoff. al Uses, 52. See also 2 Saund. by Wms. 11 a, n. (17); Browne v. Ramsdon, 8 Taunt. 564; Doe v. Homfray, 6 A. & E. 206; Doe v. Scott, 4 Bing. 507.

(*d*) In reference to the distinction noticed in the text, we may observe, that though the trustee to whom some active duty is appointed takes the legal estate, he takes one only commensurate in duration with the period during which the duties are to be performed. Thus if land be given to B. and his heirs, with

The uses (or intended uses) which were thus excluded from the operation of the statute, because there was no seisin to support them, or because they were limited on a precedent use, did not fail, nevertheless, to obtain protection from the courts of equity; for, in both cases, it was evident that the person directed to hold to the purpose which the statute was incompetent to execute, was never intended by the parties to have any beneficial interest, and that his capacity was merely fiduciary (*e*). Therefore the Court of Chancery determined that though the purposes pointed out were not uses executable by the statute, yet a *trust* subsisted in the person directed to perform the purpose; and that such trust was binding, if not at law, yet in conscience and in *equity*. To this the reason of mankind assented; and the interests in question, though rejected at law as *uses*, became established in equity, under the denomination of *trusts* (*f*). A similar protection was also given, for the same reason, and under the same name, to all those confidences which were excluded from the operation of the statute, on account of the active duties imposed on the trustee; and these were a very numerous and important class, comprising not only cases where he was directed to receive and pay over the profits to other persons, but those where he was to sell the land for their benefit or to divide it among them, or the like. These, indeed, seem always to have been described as *trusts*, or special trusts, and never to have received the appellation of uses (*g*). They were obviously of a very

directions to pay over the profits to C. during the life of C., and then to permit D. to take the profits, the legal estate is vested in B. during C.'s life, but on D.'s remainder vesting in possession, *he* has a legal estate in virtue of the statute. (See *Barker v. Greenwood*, 4 Mee. & W. 429; *Adams v. Adams*, 6 Q. B. 860; *Doe d. Muller v. Claridge*, 6 C. B. 641.) As to the case where land is

given to B. and his heirs, with directions to permit C., a *married woman*, to take the profits, see *Doe d. Stevens v. Scott*, 4 Bing. 505; *Doe d. Shelley v. Edlin*, 4 Ad. & El. 582; *Williams v. Waters*, 14 Mee. & W. 166.

(*e*) See 2 Bl. Com. 336.

(*f*) *Ibid*.

(*g*) *Bac. Read. Us.* 805; 1 *Sand. Us.* 2, 6, 10, 203, 2nd ed.

different nature from those aimed at in the statute of uses; and were some of them so essential to the purposes of civilized society, and to the protection of those who were unable to act for themselves, that it is difficult to imagine a period in our legal history when they could be wholly unknown, or to suppose that they owed their origin to the introduction of uses.

Both these kinds of trust have ever since continued to be copiously created: the uses not executed by the statute because limited on a precedent use, or from want of seisin to support them (or *passive* trusts as they are sometimes called), with a view to the same advantages in general as were derived from uses before the statute; the *active* or special trusts for reasons sufficiently apparent. The person whose benefit is designed by either species of trust is called *cestui que trust*, and his interest is described as *trust estate*; which distinguishes it from a *use* on the one hand, and from *legal estate* on the other.

It will be evident, however, from preceding explanations, that, in the case of a passive trust, the trust estate cannot be effectively created without taking care to reduplicate the use, or to limit it upon a term of years instead of a freehold interest. Thus, if it is intended to give C. a trust estate, which shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and not a legal estate subject to the jurisdiction of the common law, it will not suffice (as we have seen) to convey by feoffment to B. and his heirs "to the use of," or even "in trust for," C. and his heirs; for that use would be executed by the statute, and the legal estate would vest in C. But, on the other hand, the object may be accomplished by enfeoffing "A. and his heirs to the use of B. and his heirs, in trust for C. and his heirs:" for there being in this case a use upon a use, the first only will be executed by the statute, and the trust estate is undisturbed. So it may be accomplished by enfeoffing "A. and his heirs to the use of A. and his heirs, in trust for C. and his heirs;" for though the first

use is not such a one as the statute executes (the seisin and the use being vested in the same person), yet there cannot be a use upon a use, whether the statute executes the first use or not; and therefore the interest of C. is not a use executed, but a trust (*h*). In like manner the object will be attained if an existing term for 1000 years be assigned "to A. to the use of C. and his heirs;" for A. not being seised, but possessed only, to the use of C., the statute will not execute the use, and A. remains trustee for C. As for the case of an active trust, no such artifice of conveyancing is necessary to constitute the trust estate; the duties required to be performed being sufficient in themselves to determine its character.

Among the kinds of trusts cognizable in equity, it may be right also briefly to advert to a large class with which we have at present no direct concern, viz., those which are constituted in respect of personal chattels; for the trusts of which we have hitherto spoken relate (it will be observed) exclusively to the realty and chattels real. As to personalty, it was never considered as capable of being held to a *use*, in the proper meaning of that term (*i*); and the statute of uses is confined in its terms to "lands, tenements, and hereditaments;" but, in the nature of things, a *trust* of personal chattels must always have been of frequent occurrence; and it has long been the subject of protection in the courts of equity. In some instances, indeed, the breach of it finds remedy in those of the common law (*k*).

The wide field of exclusive jurisdiction which the courts of equity thus gradually acquired, under the general denomination of "trusts," they have from time to time sedu-

(*h*) *Tipping v. Cousins*, Comb. 312; 1 Sand. Us. 97, 2nd ed.; 2 Sand. Us. 72; and see *Doe v. Lloyd v. Passingham*, 6 Barn. & Cress. 305.

(*i*) Gilb. Us. by Sugd. 485; 1 Sand. Us. 70; per Doddridge, W. Jones, 127.

(*k*) 1 Sand. Us. 10; 2 Fonbl. Treat.

Eq. 1, n. (*a*); 3 Bl. Com. 432; see *The Queen v. Abrahams*, 4 Q. B. 159. In cases where the value of the trust estate or fund does not exceed 500*l*. the county courts have now a concurrent equitable jurisdiction with the Court of Chancery. (28 & 29 Vict. c. 99, s. 1.)

lously improved, and by a long series of uniform determinations, with some assistance from the legislature, they have raised a new system of rational jurisprudence, by which trusts have been made to answer in general all the beneficial ends of uses, without their inconvenience or frauds (*l*). Of this system, so far as it regards the nature of the estate of the trustee, and that of the *cestui que trust*, we will here endeavour to point out the fundamental principles; the subject being much too copious to be fully handled in a general treatise upon the English law.

First, with respect to the word “trust” itself: it has varied somewhat, we may perceive, from its antient meaning. It formerly applied to every case where a use was created, as well as to other confidences; but where there is a use which the statute is competent to execute, there can no longer be said to exist a trust. The true definition of this term, at the present day, seems to be a confidence reposed by one man in another with respect to property committed to him as the nominal owner, but not involving a use which the statute is competent to execute. In practice, however, the term *trust*, as well as *trust estate*, is applied to express the beneficial interest of the *cestui que trust*, as well as the confidence reposed in his trustee.

Besides the distinction between *active* and *passive*, trusts are also frequently described as *executory*, or *executed*—the former term being applied to cases where the party, whose benefit is designed, is to take through the medium of a future instrument of conveyance which the trustee is directed to execute for the purpose; the latter to cases where no transaction of that kind is contemplated, but the trust estate is completely limited in the first instance (*m*). Again trusts (like uses) may be either expressly *declared*, or they may be *implied* from circumstances. Thus, if the legal estate in land be conveyed to A. upon such trusts as the grantor shall thereafter appoint; as such trusts are,

(*l*) See 2 Bl. Com. 337.

Bac. Abr. Uses, A.; Butl. Fearne,

(*m*) 1 Fonbl. Treat. Eq. 441, n.;

90, 118, 139, &c., 9th ed.

prior to appointment, incapable of taking effect, and as it is clear that A. is not intended to hold the land for his own benefit; there arises, by necessary implication, until the appointment be made, a trust for the grantor (*n*). And trusts, when thus raised by implication for the benefit of the grantor himself, are called *resulting* trusts (*o*).⁴ So if an estate be purchased in the name of one person, and the consideration-money belong to or be paid by another, the land purchased will be subject to a trust for the person to whom the money belonged (*p*). And an agreement for the sale of land, when once concluded, will make the vendor a trustee in equity for the purchaser (*q*).

Though neither the crown nor a corporation aggregate could be seised (as we have seen) to any use but their own (*r*), the case is otherwise with respect to a trust (*s*); and it may be laid down generally, that every description of person capable of holding land, is capable also of being a trustee. It is also a maxim in equity, that a trust shall never fail on account of the disability of the person appointed to perform it, or even from the omission to appoint any person as trustee. The Court of Chancery will consider the trust, when once substantially constituted, as fixing itself upon the person who, by reason of such disability or omission, may become entitled to the legal estate and will accordingly compel him to its observance (*t*).

The estate of the trustee is at *law* (as distinguished from *equity*) subject to all the incidents which attend an ordinary ownership of land. It devolves, therefore, when he dies, to his legal representative; and is liable, while he lives, to alienation by himself; but the claim of the representative, and in general also of the alienee, is subject, in contemplation of equity, to the original trust (*u*). With

(*n*) 1 Cruise, Dig. 477.

(*o*) As to a resulting trust in stock, see *Sayre v. Hughes*, Law Rep., 5 Eq. Ca. 376.

(*p*) 1 Sand. Us. 212, 2nd ed.

(*q*) Sugd. Vend. 154, 5th ed.

(*r*) Vide sup. p. 362.

(*s*) 1 Sand. Us. 227.

(*t*) Ibid. 226.

(*u*) 1 Sand. Us. 227; Gilb. Sugd. 13, n. (5).

respect to the latter, however, the same rule is established as formerly with respect to uses, that a person who becomes alienee by purchase, for valuable consideration, and without notice that the trust existed, is not compellable in a court of equity to its observance (*v*). As his claim is not inferior, in point of natural justice, to that of *cestui que trust*, equity will not interpose between them; the consequence of which is, that the legal title of the purchaser takes effect for his own benefit, while the latter is left to his remedy against the alienor personally, for his breach of trust. On the other hand, where the legal estate still remains in the trustee or his heir, but the purposes of the trust are satisfied, he is always compellable to divest himself of it in favour of the person beneficially entitled, by executing a proper conveyance. And it is provided by modern statutes (13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55), the first of which is usually cited as the "Trustee Act, 1850," that if the trustee should refuse or neglect to convey when required (*w*), or if he should be an infant (*x*), or out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be found (*y*), or if it should be uncertain (where there are several trustees) which was the survivor (*z*); or uncertain whether the trustee last known to have been seised is living or dead, or, if dead, uncertain who is his heir or devisee (*a*); or if a person seised of land in trust dies intestate as to such land and without an heir (*b*),—in all these cases the Court of Chancery (*c*) shall have power either to make an order vesting the estate in such person or persons, in such manner and for such estate, as the court shall direct; or may appoint some person to make the conveyance in lieu of the trustee or his heir (*d*).

(*v*) 1 Sand. Us. 228; vide sup. p. 363.

(*w*) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55, s. 2.

(*x*) 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, ss. 7, 8.

(*y*) Sects. 9, 10.

(*z*) Sect. 13.

(*a*) Sects. 14, 15.

(*b*) Sect. 15.

(*c*) By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 99, the jurisdiction herein of the Court of Chancery is conferred also on the county courts, in cases where the trust fund does not exceed 500*l*.

(*d*) 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 20. See also *ib.* s. 16, and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55, s. 2, containing like provisions,

It is further to be noticed that, at *law*, the estate of the trustee is liable to be taken in execution for his debts (*e*); and his wife is entitled to dower (*f*), and the husband of a female trustee to curtesy (*g*). Upon these points it will be recollected that the position of the feoffee to uses, before the statute of Henry VIII., was the same; while, on the other hand, *cestui que use* remained without protection from the effect of these claims (*h*). But herein the modern trust differs remarkably from the use; for *equity* will now interfere in each of these cases, on behalf of *cestui que trust*, and give him relief against the party who sets up any title of this description to the legal estate. Formerly, also, the incidents of forfeiture and escheat applied (generally speaking) to the estate of the trustee (*i*). But even prior to the recent enactment of 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, by which escheat and forfeiture for felony is taken away, it was provided by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, ss. 46, 47, that no land, stock, or chose in action, held in trust or by way of mortgage, should escheat or be forfeited so as to affect the interest of the *cestui que trust* or mortgagor, by reason of the attainder or conviction of the trustee or mortgagee for any offence (*j*).

Such are the points that most deserve attention in regard to the estate of the trustee. If we turn now to the other party or *cestui que trust*, we may remark, in the first place, that every person is competent to stand in that capacity, unless labouring under such disability as would disqualify him from becoming the tenant of land. As to the nature of his interest, it is not the subject of protection, or even of notice (generally speaking), in the superior

where lands are subject to a contingent right in trust; and 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, ss. 3, 4, in reference to the case of a *lunatic* trustee.

(*e*) 1 Sand. Us. 230, 231; 1 P. Wms. 278.

(*f*) 2 Ves. sen. 634. As to *dower*, vide sup. p. 267.

(*g*) 7 Vin. Ab. 159. As to *curtesy*, vide sup. p. 263.

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 362.

(*i*) 1 Sand. Us. 230.

(*j*) And see 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55, s. 8, authorizing the appointment of a new trustee in the place of a convict trustee.

courts of common law, but subsists in equity only (*k*); and there it may be of various kinds or degrees, according to the particular character of the trust created. It is in some instances a mere *charge* on the land; the *ownership* being vested in another person: as where a man by his will devises land to one, and directs that it shall be charged with the payment of the legacy to another. In other instances it amounts, in contemplation of equity, to the actual *ownership*: and then the *cestui que trust's* estate or interest is modelled, in general, upon the rules of the common law with respect to legal estates. For in this and in other particulars, the principle professed by the courts of equity is that *æquitas sequitur legem* (*l*). Thus there may be an equitable estate for life or years, or in fee or tail; and in the latter case, the method of barring the entail will be the same as if the estate were legal. So an equitable interest may be either in possession or expectancy, as in the case of a legal estate. But where it is in the nature of a *contingent remainder*, it has never been held subject to the common law rule, (now abolished,) of being defeated by the determination of the particular estate before the contingency happens (*m*). The doctrine of "merger" also seems to apply to equitable as well as legal estates,—providing the coalescing estates be both of the equitable description, and the merger would not be productive of any injustice or inconvenience (*n*). So the same rules of construction will in general apply to equitable as to legal estates; and particularly the important rule in *Shelley's case* (*o*). A trust of inheritance is also subject to the curtesy of the husband

(*k*) See *Britten v. Britten*, 4 Tyrw. 473; *Roe v. Read*, 8 T. R. 118.

(*l*) 2 Bl. Com. 380.

(*m*) 1 Prest. Est. 241; *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, Cās. temp. Talb. 44; 1 Atk. 590. As to the recent enactment with respect to this rule, vide sup. p. 334.

(*n*) See 3 Prest. Conv. 558; *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, 1 Atk. 592; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 1 P. Wms. 41. As to *merger*, vide sup. p. 317.

(*o*) *Fearne*, by Butl. 124, 9th ed.; *Bale v. Coleman*, 1 P. Wms. 142. As to the "Rule in *Shelley's case*," vide sup. p. 334.

of *cestui que trust*, as if it were an estate at law (*p*); and in this respect it is placed on a more satisfactory footing than a use, which was exempt, as we have seen, from curtesy (*q*). It followed, indeed, till a comparatively recent period, the nature of a use, in being exempt from dower: a circumstance resulting rather from the cautious adherence to some hasty proceedings, than to any well-grounded principle (*r*); but by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105, s. 2, the widow was made capable of claiming dower in equity out of any estate of inheritance in possession (other than in joint-tenancy), to which the husband was entitled beneficially, and in which she is not dowable at law; and this, whether the estate of the husband was wholly equitable, or partly legal and partly equitable (*s*). Again, a trust estate, though formerly protected like a use from execution for debt, is now (with more regard to justice) made subject to such process. For, by the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 10), and the modern provisions for extending the remedies of creditors against the property of debtors contained in 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, the lands and tenements of which any person is seised or possessed *in trust* for a judgment debtor are made liable to be given over in execution to the judgment creditor (*t*).

But though, in general, a trust follows the nature of a common law estate, yet, on the other hand, it may be limited, like a use, in forms that the common law will not allow. It is also exempt in its nature from the common law restrictions with respect to the manner of conveyance; for it has always been capable of being created or assigned, (even for an estate of freehold duration,) by deed without livery, or by last will and testament. It might originally,

(*p*) 1 Sand. Us. 205. As to *curtesy*, vide sup. p. 263.

(*q*) Vide sup. p. 365.

(*r*) 2 Bl. Com. 337.

(*s*) Vide sup. p. 270.

(*t*) The reader is referred to a

later part of the work (viz. bk. v. c. x.) for an explanation of the effect of a *judgment* of a court of common law, and of the law of execution.

indeed, have been established upon mere parol evidence. But now, by the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 9), all trusts and confidences of lands, except such as arise by implication of law, must be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party, or by his written will. And the same Act makes the like ceremony essential to the validity of any grant or assignment of this species of interest (*u*). A trust also was never subject to forfeiture by reason of the attainder or conviction of the trustee for any offence (*v*); nor does a trust of inheritance escheat for want of inheritable blood: for the defect of an heir confers no title, in this case, on the lord; it merely enables the trustee to hold the land discharged of the trust (*x*). Nor did such a trust of inheritance ever escheat to the lord on the attainder of the *cestui que trust* for felony (*y*). In these incidents the modern trust, it will be observed, follows the principle of the antient use.

It may be proper before we conclude, to take some notice of the subject of terms held *in trust to attend the inheritance*. Upon the purchase of real property it has been common to assign upon a trust of such description, any mortgage term or trust term connected with the title, but of which the purposes have been satisfied. Thus, where land held in fee is mortgaged for a long term of years (as a thousand years), and, upon the estate being sold, the mortgagee is paid off out of the purchase money,

(*u*) As to the effect of the provisions of the Statute of Frauds with respect to trust estates, see 2 Saund. by Wms. 11 a, n. (*m*); Harris v. Pugh, 4 Bing. 335; Harris v. Booker, *ibid.* 96; Scott v. Scholey, 8 East, 467.

(*v*) 1 Sand. Us. 206; Hob. 214; Attorney-General v. Sands, Hard. 490; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, ss. 46, 47. There was formerly an exception as to this in the case of treason. (See

33 Hen. 8, c. 20; 1 Sand. Us. 207.)

(*x*) 2 Bl. Com. 337; and see Burgess v. Wheate, 1 W. Bl. 123; 1 Eden, 177; Barclay v. Russell, 3 Ves. 430.

(*y*) See 1 Sand. Us. 288. Such a trust, however, is said by Hale (1 P. C. 249) to have been forfeited to the crown on the trustee's attainder for *treason*. (But see now 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 1.)

—it has been usual for the purchaser (instead of taking a surrender of the term to himself and so merging it in the inheritance) to keep it on foot and have it assigned to a trustee of his own nomination, in trust for himself (the purchaser), “and to attend and protect the inheritance.” The reason of this practice was, that the beneficial or equitable interest in a term assigned upon such a trust, followed (though a mere chattel) all the limitations of the inheritance—belonged to the heir or devisee of the new owner, and not to his executor or administrator—and was subject to the other incidents of a fee simple (z); so that for all purposes of convenience, the case was the same as if it had merged into the inheritance; while, on the other hand, it afforded the purchaser a security which he could not have had if a merger had actually taken place. For if it afterwards turned out that prior to the purchase, but posterior to the creation of the term, there had been an intermediate alienation or incumbrance of the fee in favour of another person, to which the then trustee of the outstanding term had been no party, and of which the subsequent purchaser had had no notice when he took his conveyance and paid his purchase money, he would be protected against it, through the medium of the term: for this, being the elder title, would also take the priority in point of legal effect; and, being assigned expressly in trust for him, became, for all beneficial purposes, his property. No such protection, however, resulted from such satisfied term where the precaution of thus assigning it over was neglected; for though, by construction of equity, the term would in that case also become attendant on the inheritance, the effect of this was only to make it attendant for the benefit of the different persons who from time to time became entitled to the inheritance; so that, in the example above given, the mortgage term, if left outstand-

(z) *Best v. Stamford*, Prec. Ch. Williams, 1 P. Wms. 137; 1 Sand. 252; 2 Freem. 288, S. C.; *Wray v. 229; Cooke v. Cooke*, 2 Atk. 67.

ing and not assigned, would be held in trust for the first and not for the second purchaser,—the title of the former being preferable in point of date (*a*). And by a recent change in the law, the practice of assigning such satisfied terms is now at an end. For the protection afforded by the assignment thereof to a trustee being for several reasons precarious, and, even when effectual, being obtained at the expense of an innocent party, whose title was in point of natural justice at least as good as that of the party protected, it was provided by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112(*b*),—with respect to satisfied terms of years,—that such as should, either by express declaration or by construction of law, on the 31st December, 1845, be attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands, should on that day absolutely cease and determine as to the land upon the inheritance or reversion whereof they should be so attendant; with a proviso, however, that every such term of years made so attendant by *express declaration*, (although thereby made to cease and determine,) should afford to every person the same protection as it would have afforded him if it had continued to subsist, but had not been assigned or dealt with after 31st December, 1845; and should, for the purpose of such protection, be considered in every court of law and of equity to be a subsisting term. And with respect to terms of years (then subsisting or thereafter to be created) becoming satisfied after the 31st December, 1845, that such as should, either by express declaration or by construction of law, after that day become attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands should, immediately upon the same becoming so attendant, absolutely cease and determine as to the land upon the inheritance or reversion whereof such term should become so attendant.

(*a*) Second Report of Real Property Commissioners, p. 8.

(*b*) As to this provision, see *Doe d. Hall v. Mouldsdales*, 16 Mee. & W.

689; *Plant v. Taylor*, 7 H. & N. 211; *Shaw v. Johnson*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 412.

We have now touched the principal points in the law of Uses and Trusts, considered as species of estates; and for the present may dismiss them from our view. With respect to uses, indeed, there is another aspect under which they will very soon require to be again examined, viz., in their important (but incidental) connection with our system of *conveyances*. But this is a subject which belongs not to the present chapter. It will find a more proper place when we are engaged in the consideration of Title, or the manner in which estates may be acquired or lost (c).

(c) As to conveyances under the Statute of Uses, vide post, c. XVIII.

CHAPTER X.

OF TITLE IN GENERAL.

HAVING described the tenures by which lands or corporeal hereditaments may be held, and the kinds of estate that may be had in such as are of free tenure, we are next to consider, in pursuance of the division before laid down, the *title* to them, or manner of acquiring and losing estates therein (*a*). And the learning on this subject, though applicable to equitable as well as to legal estates, is of more importance with regard to the latter; because equitable estates are capable of being created or transferred by simpler methods than those in use at the common law, and indeed by any instrument sufficiently indicating the intention of the parties: the only formality to which they are in general subject being that introduced by the provision of the Statute of Frauds, referred to in the last chapter; which requires that all grants and assignments of any trust or confidence shall be in writing, and under the signature of the party (*b*). It is however to be observed, that conveyances of the same kind are commonly used, whether the estate dealt with be legal or equitable, and also that the rule of *descent* is the same in both (*c*).

[In proceeding to treat of the manner in which estates may be acquired and lost, it is obvious that we shall not have occasion to detach the consideration of loss from that of acquisition, but that they are reciprocal ideas; because, by whatever method one man gains an estate, by that

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 172.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 380.

(*c*) Goodright v. Wells, Doug. 771.

[same method, or its correlative, some other man has lost it. As where the heir acquires by descent, or the devisee by will, the ancestor or testator has first lost or abandoned his estate by death; where the lord gains land by escheat, the estate of the tenant is first of all lost by the extinction of all his hereditary blood; where a man gains an interest by occupancy, the former owner has previously relinquished his right of possession. So, in case of forfeiture, the tenant by his own mistaken view or neglect has renounced his interest in the estate; whereupon it devolves to that person who by law may take advantage of such default. And in alienation by common assurances, the two considerations of loss and acquisition are so interwoven and so constantly contemplated together, that we never hear of a conveyance without at once receiving the ideas as well of the grantor as the grantee.]

The acquisition of an estate in land or other corporeal hereditament is commonly said to be either by *descent* or *purchase*; but, more accurately speaking, it is either by *act of law* or *act of the party* (*d*); which last is technically called *purchase* (*perquisitio*).

(*d*) This division is, in substance, suggested by Mr. Hargrave, Co. Litt. by Harg. 18 b, n. (2). Blackstone, (vol. ii. pp. 201, 241,) considers all title as either by *descent* or *purchase*, and defines *purchase* (after Littleton, sect. 12) as “the possession of lands and tenements which a man hath by his own act or agreement, and not by descent from any of his ancestors or kindred.” And according to Blackstone, (Ib. p. 244,) *purchase* comprises *escheat*; which, however, it may be observed, falls under the negative part only, and not the positive part of Littleton’s definition. And accordingly Lord Coke remarks, “that an escheat or the

“like” is “not said to be a purchase,” “because the inheritance is cast upon, or a title vested in the lord, by act in law, and not by his own deed or agreement.” (Co. Litt. 18 b.) The truth is, that it is impossible to reduce all titles to the alternative of *descent* or *purchase*; and as to *escheat* more particularly, it seems clear that it is neither the one nor the other. We may observe here, that in the Inheritance Act, (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106,) the meaning of the word *purchaser* is settled by a definition contained in the Act itself. But this is only so far as its particular provisions are concerned; vide post, p. 391.

Title by act of *law* expresses all those modes of acquisition, where the law itself casts the right to the estate upon the acquirer, independently of any act or interference of his own, or of any other person, for that purpose. Of these the principal kind is title by *descent*; but the term will also properly include title by *escheat*, and also that of tenant by the *curtesy*, and of tenant in *dower* (*d*).

Purchase, on the other hand, though in its vulgar and confined acceptation it is applied only to such acquisitions of land, as are obtained by way of bargain and sale for money or some other valuable consideration (*e*); yet it properly includes every lawful (*f*) mode of coming to an estate by the act of a party, as opposed to the act of law: among which, our attention will chiefly be directed to the title by *occupancy*, by *forfeiture*, and by *voluntary transfer*; which last is usually described as that by *alienation* or *conveyance* (*g*).

This use of the term *purchase*, by which it is distinguished from title by mere act of law, and more particularly from descent, corresponds, it may be remarked, with that of *conquest* (*conquæstus* or *conquisitio*) among the feudists (*h*), and in the law of Scotland (*i*). [And in like manner, the first purchaser (or he who first brought the

(*d*) Co. Litt. 18 b. As to *escheat*, sup. p. 200; as to *curtesy*, p. 263; as to *dower*, p. 267.

(*e*) 2 Bl. Com. 241.

(*f*) According to Lord Coke, the term purchase imports only a *lawful* acquisition, for he says, that "such as attain to lands by mere injury or wrong, as by disseisin, intrusion, abatement, usurpation, &c. cannot be said to come in by purchase, no more than robbery, burglary, piracy, or the like, can justly be termed purchase." (Co. Litt. 18 b.)

(*g*) There are other methods of

transferring land belonging to the head of *purchase*; which it is deemed expedient to reserve for discussion in subsequent divisions of the work; those, for example, which the statute law has provided by the seizure of lands under an execution by elegit (vide post, bk. v. c. x.), and by which the estate of a bankrupt is vested in his trustee. (Vide post, bk. II. pt. II. c. vi.) As to the purchase of *personal* property vide post, bk. II. pt. II. c. v., where the *contract of sale* is discussed at large.

(*h*) Craig, l. 1, t. 10, s. 13.

(*i*) Dalrymple on Feuds, 10.

[estate into the family which at present owns it) was styled, among the Norman jurists, the conqueror or *conquereur* (*h*); which seems to be all that was meant by the appellation which was given to William the Norman, when his manner of ascending the throne of England was in his own and his successors' charters, and by the historians of the times, entitled *conquæstus*, and himself *conquæstor* or *conquisitor*; signifying that he was the first of his family who acquired the crown of England, and from whence therefore all future claims by descent must be derived.]

Among the different titles that have been enumerated, we have already been led incidentally to discuss those of tenant by the curtesy and tenant in dower (*l*). At present, therefore, we may confine our attention to *descent*, *escheat*, *occupancy*, *forfeiture* and *alienation*; the two first being titles by act of law, the three last titles by purchase.

(*h*) Gr. Coustum. Gloss. c. 25. vide sup. p. 263; as to dower, vide

(*l*) As to tenancy by the curtesy, sup. p. 267.

CHAPTER XI.

OF TITLE BY DESCENT.

WE have seen in a former place that an estate of inheritance in fee simple or fee tail, is, on the death of the owner without having disposed of it during his lifetime by a conveyance *inter vivos* or by his will, cast by the law on his heir by a title called *descent* (*a*). We are now to consider more particularly the nature of such descent, and the rules by which it is governed (*b*). The discussion will turn principally, indeed, upon the nature of the descent in fee simple, for that in fee tail is only in the nature of an exception or variation upon the ordinary law of succession; and when that law is fully understood, the general explanations before given with respect to estates tail, will throw sufficient light on descent in an estate of that nature.

[The doctrine of descent, or law of inheritance in fee simple, is a point of the highest importance, and is indeed the principal object of the laws of real property in England. All the rules relating to purchases, whereby the legal course of descent is broken and altered, perpetually refer to this settled law of inheritance as a *datum* or first principle universally known, and upon which their subsequent limitations are to work. In order to treat a matter of this universal consequence more clearly, it will be expedient

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 232.

(*b*) As to descent, see Co. Litt. 237 a—250 a; and the Act for improvement of the law of inheritance. (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106.) In this Act “descent” means “the title to in-

“herit land by reason of consanguinity; as well where the heir shall be an ancestor or collateral relation, as where he shall be a child or other issue.”

[to lay aside such matters as will only tend to breed embarrassment and confusion in an inquirer. We shall therefore decline considering, at present, who are and who are not capable of being heirs, reserving that for the chapter on escheats (*c*).] We shall also pass over descents by particular custom, as to all the sons in gavelkind and to the youngest in borough-English (*d*); for these cannot conveniently form a subject for special consideration in such a treatise as the present. And our present inquiry will therefore almost exclusively relate to the subject of descent in fee simple as generally established.

[It may be right, however, before we proceed further, to make this preliminary remark with respect to the nature of the heir's title,—that no inheritance can vest, nor can any person be the actual complete heir of another, till the ancestor is previously dead. *Nemo est hæres viventis*. Before that time, the person who is next in the line of succession is called an heir *apparent* or heir *presumptive*. An heir apparent is one whose right of inheritance is indefeasible, provided he outlives the ancestor: as the eldest son, who must by the course of the common law be heir to the father whenever he happens to die. An heir presumptive is one who, if the ancestor should die immediately, would be his heir; but whose right of inheritance may be defeated by the contingency of some nearer heir being born: as a brother or nephew, whose presumptive succession may be destroyed by the birth of a child; or a daughter, whose present hopes may be hereafter cut off by the birth of a son. Nay, even if the estate hath descended, by the death of the owner, to such brother or nephew, or daughter; in the former cases the estate shall be divested and taken away by the birth of a posthumous child, and in the latter, it shall also be totally divested by the birth of a posthumous son (*e*).]

It may also be material to observe, that the estate

(*c*) Vide post, c. xii.

(*e*) 2 Bl. Com. 208.

(*d*) Vide sup. pp. 56, 211, 213.

claimed by the heir must necessarily be one that remained in the ancestor, or deceased owner, at the time of his death, and of which he has made no testamentary disposition; the title of an alienee in his lifetime, or of a devisee under his will, being preferable to that of the heir.

These things being premised, let us now examine the doctrine of descent itself; or the rules according to which the heir to an estate in fee simple is to be ascertained, when the succession to it opens or becomes vacant upon the death of the proprietor.

This branch of law is founded for the most part not on statute, but on the custom of the realm; being in point of antiquity referable to a period at least as early as the reign of Henry the second (*f*). At that time, indeed, its development appears to have been in some degree imperfect; but it had attained to complete maturity in the reign of Henry the third, or at latest in that of Edward the first (*g*); after which, it underwent no change for the space of more than five hundred years, until at length partially reconstructed in the year 1833 by the Act of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106, passed “for amendment of the law of inheritance” (*h*).

In proceeding to delineate the present state of this branch of the law, it will be expedient in the first instance to mention that there are a few rare cases of descent which will require a particular and separate consideration, which consideration they will accordingly receive before the chapter closes; but passing these by for the present, and confining ourselves to the ordinary and general view of descent, we may lay down with respect to it the follow-

(*f*) This appears from the treatise of Glanville (written about the year 1181), whose account of the law of inheritance comprises all the principal features of the system now existing.

(*g*) Hale’s Hist. C. L. c. 11;

Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. i. p. 311; vol. ii. pp. 246, 317.


(*h*) This statute was founded on the first report of the commissioners appointed in 1828, to revise the laws of real property.

TABLE OF DESCENT.

Applying to a death occurring prior to 1st January 1834.

Paternal Line

Maternal Line



ing rules or canons applicable to all descents taking place on a death on or after 1st January, 1834 (*i*):—

I. In every case the descent shall be traced from the purchaser.

This primary law of descent is laid down in the form here propounded by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106, s. 2, and the Act gives its own definition of the sense in which the expression of *the purchaser* is here to be understood—a definition not entirely harmonizing with that of the word *purchase*, as given in the last chapter; for (in substance) the statute defines *the purchaser* to mean the person who last acquired the land otherwise than by descent (*k*).

(*i*) The Inheritance Act does not affect the mode of tracing descent in a manor subject to a particular custom of descent (*Muggleton v. Barnett*, 2 H. & N. 653). The statute also applies to no descent which took place on a death *prior to the 1st of Jan.* 1834. For such descents, we must refer to the system of Blackstone, according to which the annexed Table of Descent (No. I.) is arranged, and of which the Rules (or Canons) are as follows:—

Rule 1. That inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of the person who last died actually seised, *in infinitum*, but shall never lineally ascend.

Rule 2. That the male issue shall be admitted before the female.

Rule 3. That when there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit, but the females all together.

Rule 4. That the lineal descendants *in infinitum* of any person deceased shall represent their ancestor; that is, shall stand in the same place as the person himself would have done had he been living.

Rule 5. That, on failure of lineal descendants or issue of the person last seised, the inheritance shall descend to his collateral relations, being of the blood of the first purchaser, subject to the three preceding rules.

Rule 6. That the collateral heir of the person last seised must be his next collateral kinsman of the whole blood.

Rule 7. That in collateral inheritance the male stocks shall be preferred to the female (that is, kindred derived from the blood of the male ancestors, however remote, shall be admitted before those from the blood of the female, however near), unless where the lands have in fact descended from a female.

(*k*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 1. The words of the Act are, that the purchaser “shall mean the person “who last acquired the land otherwise than by descent; or than by “any *escheat, partition, or enclosure*, by the effect of which the “land shall have become part of or “descendible in the same manner as “other land acquired by descent.”

The effect then of the Rule above laid down is as follows: that if the deceased owner of an estate in fee simple came to it by purchase, that is, in any other manner than by descent, the party claiming it as heir must make *him* the *propositus*, or person from whom consanguinity is to be traced; while, on the other hand, if he came to it by descent from some purchasing ancestor, *that ancestor* must be made the *propositus*. Thus if John Stiles, in the annexed Table of Descent (No. II.), dies the proprietor of an estate, which he is known to have acquired by purchase, any person claiming it as heir must prove that he is heir to John Stiles; that is, stands in such relation of consanguinity to John Stiles as the laws of descent hereafter laid down make sufficient in the particular case: but if John dies owner of an estate which descended to him from Geoffrey his father, by whom it appears to have been originally purchased, the claimant must prove that he is heir to Geoffrey the father; who becomes in that case the *propositus* instead of John, the last owner: the consequence of which is, that no relation to John *ex parte maternâ* can, as such, ever inherit. Again, if the estate descended to John from Lucy Baker, his mother, who is known to have been the purchaser, the descent must in that case be traced from *her*; and John's relations *ex parte paternâ* are, on the same principle, necessarily excluded. It often happens, however, especially in long descents, that it is uncertain by whom an estate was originally purchased; and against this difficulty of proof the act of parliament provides by the following rule of *evidence*, which is to be understood as a necessary supplement to the rule of descent under consideration; viz. that the last owner, or (as the Act describes him) the person "last entitled to the land" (*m*), shall be considered to

(*m*) In this statute, the expression "*last entitled*," is made to extend "to the last person who had a right thereto, whether he did

"or did not obtain the possession, or the receipt of the rents and profits thereof" (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 1); and the word "land"

have been the purchaser, unless it shall be proved that he inherited it; and that the same rule shall be constantly applied at every step upward of the pedigree(*n*). Therefore if John Stiles is the person last entitled to an estate, and dies, and it does not appear whether he purchased it or not, the claimant must prove descent from *him*. So if it appears that he inherited it from his father Geoffrey, but it is unknown whether Geoffrey purchased it or not, the claimant must make himself heir to *Geoffrey*; and, on the same principle, if it can be shown that Geoffrey took by descent from George, then *George* must be made the *propositus*.

This 1st canon, though newly introduced by the Inheritance Act of 1833, is mainly founded on the antient maxim, that *none shall claim as heir who is not of the blood of the purchaser*(*o*); [a maxim peculiar to our own laws, and those of a similar original; for it was entirely unknown among the Jews, Greeks, and Romans, none of whose laws looked any further than the last owner of the estate, but assigned him an heir without considering by what title the estate was gained, or from what ancestor derived. But the antient law of Normandy agreed with ours in this respect; nor indeed is that agreement to be wondered at, since the law of descent in both is of feudal origin, and this rule cannot otherwise be accounted for than by recurring to feudal principles(*p*).

When feuds first began to be hereditary, that is, subject to succession according to consanguinity, it was made a necessary qualification of the heir who would succeed to a feud, that he should be lineally descended from the first feudatory or purchaser(*q*). In consequence whereof, if a

to all hereditaments, whether corporeal or incorporeal, of whatever tenure, and whether the estate is in possession, reversion or remainder, &c. (Ibid.)

(*n*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 2.

(*o*) "And note, it is an old and

"true maxim in law, that none shall inherit any lands as heir, but only the blood of the first purchaser."—Co. Litt. 12 a; and see 2 Bl. Com. 220.

(*p*) Grand Constum. c. 25.

(*q*) 1 Feud. 20.

[vassal died seised of a feud of his own acquiring, or *feudum novum*, it could not descend to any but his own offspring,—not even to his brother,—because he was not descended nor derived his blood from the first acquirer. But if it was *feudum antiquum*, that is, one descended to the vassal from his ancestors, then, in failure of his own descendants, his brother, or such other collateral relation as was descended (or derived his blood) from the first feudatory, might succeed to such inheritance.

To this purpose speaks the following rule: “*frater fratri sine legitimo hærede defuncto, in beneficio quod eorum patris fuit, succedat; sin autem unus e fratribus a domino feudum acceperit, eo defuncto sine legitimo hærede, frater ejus in feudum non succedit*”(r). The true feudal reason for which rule was this, that what was given to a man for his personal service and personal merit, ought not to descend to any but the heirs of his person; and therefore as now in estates tail, (which a proper feud very much resembled,) so in the feudal donation, “*nomen hæredis in primâ investiturâ expressum tantum ad descendentes ex corpore primi vasalli extenditur, et non ad collaterales, nisi ex corpore primi vasalli sive stipitis descendant*”(s). The will of the donor or original lord, when feuds were turned from life estates into inheritances, not being to make them absolutely hereditary, like the *allodium*(t), but hereditary only *sub modo*; not hereditary to the collateral relations or lineal ancestors, or husband or wife of the feudatory, but to the issue descended from his body only.]

Under this system therefore it was necessary that a person claiming by descent on the death of the last proprietor, should prove himself not only to be of the blood of, but lineally descended from, the purchaser; for neither in a *feudum novum* nor *feudum antiquum* were the collateral relations of the purchaser entitled to succeed.

(r) 1 Fend. sect. 2.

(t) As to *allodium*, vide sup. pp.

(s) Craig, l. 1, tit. 9, sect. 36.

173, 185.

However, in process of time, when the feudal rigour was in part abated, a method was invented to let in the collateral relations, in failure of the descendants of the grantee to the inheritance, by granting him a *feudum novum* to hold *ut feudum antiquum*; that is, with all the qualities annexed to a feud derived from his ancestors (*u*); and then (though the lineal ancestors themselves were always excluded, for reasons which will hereafter appear,) yet the collateral relations of the purchaser,—that is, the descendants of those ancestors,—were admitted to succeed, even *in infinitum*, because they might have derived their blood from the first *imaginary* purchaser. [For since it was not ascertained in such general grants whether this feud should be held *ut feudum paternum*, or *feudum avitum*, but merely that it should be held *ut feudum antiquum*, as a feud of indefinite antiquity,—that is, since it was not ascertained from which of the ancestors of the real purchaser this feud should be supposed to have descended,—the law would not ascertain it either, but would suppose any of his ancestors *pro re natâ* to have been the first purchaser. And therefore it admitted any of his collateral kindred (who had the other necessary requisites) to the inheritance, because every collateral kinsman must be descended from some one of his lineal ancestors (*v*).]

Of this nature, it is said, were all the feudal grants of fee simple estates in this kingdom (*x*). They were no other than grants of a *feudum novum*, to be held *ut antiquum*, or feud of indefinite antiquity; while, on the other hand, a gift in tail (where none but the lineal descendants of the first donee are admitted) proceeded on the principle of a *feudum strictè novum*.

But while the old feudal requisite of a lineal descent from the real purchaser was thus substantially set aside, it continued nevertheless to be necessary that the claimant

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 221.

(*x*) See Wright's Tenures, 180;

(*v*) See the case of Kynnaired *v.* 2 Bl. Com. 222.

Leslie, Law Rep., 1 C. P. 389.

should be of his *blood*; for no person, without being related to him either lineally or collaterally, could be supposed to be lineally descended from the imaginary purchaser. And as it was necessary that the claimant should be of his blood, so it was from him, as a root, that the descent was in some cases to be traced. For if the estate which descended was of a kind in which the owner cannot acquire actual seisin of the land, (as in a reversion or remainder expectant upon freehold, in which case the actual seisin belongs to the particular tenant,) the rule was that the claimant must trace his descent from (or, as it was usually expressed, *make himself heir to*,) the purchaser (*y*). Supposing the estate descended, however, to have been of a kind in which the owner *can* acquire actual seisin, as in the case of an estate in possession, or a reversion or remainder expectant on a term of years (*z*), the rule was different; for here another antient maxim intervened, and required that *the claimant should make himself heir to the person last actually seised of the inheritance* (*a*); every person who obtained an actual seisin, whether he were an original purchaser, or derived his title by descent, being considered as a new root, from which all future claimants were to spring; a principle that was briefly expressed by the adage *seisina facit stipitem* (*b*). Thus if Geoffrey Stiles, the father, died seised

(*y*) Ratcliffe's case, 3 Rep. 42 a; Co. Litt. 15 b, 191 b; Burton's Compend. 112; Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 649, 656; Roe v. Thorne v. Lord, 2 Bl. Rep. 1099.

(*z*) As to an estate in possession, and one in reversion, vide sup. pp. 313—319.

(*a*) "A man that claimeth as heir in fee simple to any man by descent must make himself heir to him that was last seised of the actual freehold and inheritance."—Co. Litt. 11 b; and see Ratcliffe's

case, 3 Rep. 41 b, 42 a.

(*b*) Hale's Hist. C. L. c. 11. Blackstone's explanation of this principle is, that the law required notoriety of possession as evidence that the ancestor had that property in himself which was to be transmitted to his heir; "which notoriety," says he, "had succeeded in the place of the antient feudal investiture, whereby, while feuds were precarious, the vassal on the descent of lands was formerly admitted in the lord's court, and

of land of which he was the purchaser, and which descended to John as his heir, and John died before entry, the next claimant was to make himself heir to Geoffrey; but if John entered and obtained actual seisin, it would then be necessary to claim as heir not to Geoffrey, but to John. And the difference was material; because the heir to the person last seised and the heir to the purchaser were not necessarily the same person. If John, for example, died leaving a half brother, his father's son, the latter might possibly, on John's decease, be next heir to Geoffrey the father; but it was impossible, as the law then stood, that he should be heir to John, descent not then being allowed between those related by the half blood (*c*). The rule of which we speak did not make it the less necessary, indeed, that the claimant should be of the *blood* of the purchaser; for this, in every case of descent, was universally required: but if he had that qualification, and could make himself heir to the person last seised, he was entitled to succeed, whether he could make himself heir to the purchaser or not; while, on the other hand, his being heir to the purchaser was not sufficient, unless he was also heir to the person last seised (*d*). Thus if John Stiles had purchased land and died, leaving no other kindred than his father's brother and his own brother of the half blood (his father's son), the uncle would have been his heir, as the brother (by the rule already noticed) could not have claimed in that character; and if the uncle had also obtained seisin and died, without other kindred than John's half brother, the latter would then have been entitled to

"there received his seisin in the
 "nature of a renewal of his ancestor's grant, in the presence of the
 "feudal peers; till at length, when
 "the right of succession became
 "indefeasible, an entry on any part
 "of the lands within the county
 "(which, if disputed, was to be afterwards tried by those peers), or

"other notorious possession, was admitted as equivalent to the formal
 "grant of seisin, and made the
 "tenant capable of transmitting his
 "estate by descent."—2 Bl. Com.
 209.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 15 b.

(*d*) Hale's Hist. C. L. c. 11.

succeed, for he would have been heir to the person last seised, and of the blood of the purchaser, though not the heir of the purchaser(*e*). On the other hand, if John Stiles had inherited land purchased by Geoffrey, and died seised without other kindred than his half brother (his father's son), the latter could not have inherited, because unable to make himself heir to John; and yet he would have been heir to Geoffrey.

It is to be observed, however, that in many cases to trace descent from the person last seised, amounted in effect to the same thing as tracing descent from the purchaser. For where the last owner (or person on whose death the succession became vacant) happened to have been in fact the purchaser of the estate, he would also be the person last actually seised. Thus if it were an estate in possession acquired by feoffment, this implied (as elsewhere shown) a real delivery to him of the actual seisin(*f*); and supposing it to have been acquired by devise (under the statute of wills), or by a conveyance under the statute of uses (of the nature of which we shall speak hereafter), the case would be in effect the same; for the actual seisin (so far at least as would suffice to make him the root of descent) would here be transferred to him without entry, by construction of law(*g*). So if his estate were a reversion or remainder in fee expectant on a term for years, he would be clothed with an actual seisin of the fee (upon a

(*e*) H. Chit. Desc. 115.

(*f*) Vide sup. p. 176.

(*g*) Per Holt, 1 Show. 74; R. v. Sutton, 3 A. & E. 611; and see Watk. Desc. c. 1, s. 6. The expression used by the learned author of that treatise is, that "such a property" is thereby "vested or fixed" in the purchaser, as to make the land descendible to his heirs. But as regards estates in possession, it seems more correct not to depart from the expression *actual seisin*,

as nothing short of this will suffice to satisfy the terms of the rule, *seisina facit stipitem*. It is true, that Lord Coke appears to consider the seisin acquired under a devise or the statute of uses as a seisin in law; but he probably means by this, an actual seisin by construction of law. It is clearly not such a seisin in law as that of the heir, which requires to be completed by entry, and is no actual seisin. (See Co. Litt. 111 a, 266 b.)

principle before explained), through the medium of the possession of the particular tenant (*h*). In all such cases, therefore, if the claimant made himself heir to the purchaser, he would also make himself heir to the person last actually seised; and as he would thereby moreover prove his consanguinity to the purchaser, he would satisfy both the conditions required to make out a descent in fee simple.

These explanations will suffice not only to explain the nature of the new rule now laid down by the Inheritance Act, but to prove also its convenience and propriety. It discards in effect the maxim of *seisina facit stipitem*; and establishes in a general sense the rule, which formerly obtained only in certain instances, that descent shall be traced from the purchaser. In point of simplicity and uniformity of system, the advantage is consequently obvious; while, on the other hand, nothing is sacrificed which it could be useful to retain. In very numerous instances, the descent (as we have seen) was in effect already traced from the purchaser; and though it was otherwise in cases where the last owner had become entitled by descent to an estate of a kind in which actual possession can be acquired, no sufficient reason could at the present day be shown (whatever may formerly have existed) in favour of such a distinction. Indeed the maxim of *seisina facit stipitem* was attended with material inconvenience; for it was sometimes difficult to determine what would amount to a seisin sufficient to constitute a *stipes*; and highly unsatisfactory besides, that the right to the succession should in any case depend on so unimportant a circumstance, as the omission of the owner to make entry, before his death, on the land he had acquired by inheritance (*i*).

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 323.

(*i*) See First Real Prop. Rep. p. 15. The operation of the 1st Canon requiring descent to be traced, in every case, from the purchaser,

has been the subject of discussion in the particular instance of a man who, after purchasing lands in fee simple, dies intestate leaving two daughters, whereof one dies intes-

Before we dismiss the Rule under consideration, it must be remarked that though the “purchaser” is defined in the act as the person who last acquired the land otherwise than by descent, yet to apply the definition properly in cases of a certain description, it is necessary to take some other parts of the statute into account. Thus it might be doubted, in the absence of a positive rule, whether under given circumstances a man acquires by *descent* or not, so as to bring the case within the definition; as where a man devises land in fee to his heir or to the person by name, who, at his decease, becomes his heir. In this case, if the devise was made in such form that the devisee would take an estate in fee, of precisely the same quality that he would otherwise have taken by descent, it was the rule of the common law that the descent would take effect and not the devise; for the law gave the preference to the descent as the elder title (*k*). The contrary rule, however, which is manifestly more consonant with reason and convenience, is now established by the legislature, it being provided by the Inheritance Act (sect. 3), “that when any land shall have been devised by any “testator who shall die after 31st December, 1833, to the “heir, or to the person who shall be the heir of such “testator, such heir shall be considered to have acquired “the same as a devisee, and not by descent” (*l*). Again, it might be doubted, in the absence of a positive rule, what

tate leaving a son. And it has been established, that to such son the whole of his mother’s moiety passes, as being, in respect of that share, the heir of the purchaser. See *Cooper v. France*, 14 Jur. 214; and Lord St. Leonards on Real Property Statutes, p. 282.

(*k*) 2 Bl. Com. 242; 2 Saund. by Wms. 7, n. (4); 1 Roll. Abr. 626; Doe *d.* Timins, 1 Barn. & Ald. 530. This is the reason assigned in the books. It seems probable, however,

that the rule had a feudal object, and that it was intended for the protection of the lord, who would lose the fruits of his seigniorship if the heir did not take by descent.

(*l*) A question has been raised, but not determined, as to the effect of this provision in the case of the heir disclaiming all interest under the will and entering *as heir* of the testator. (*Bickley v. Bickley*, Law Rep., 4 Eq. Ca. 216.)

amounts to the *last acquisition* of an estate, so as to bring the case within the meaning of the definition; as where land is limited by any assurance to the person, or to the heirs of the person, who shall have thereby conveyed the land; for the rule of the common law was that such person acquired nothing by such assurance, but was entitled as of his former estate (*m*). It is, however, now provided by the Inheritance Act (sect. 3), “that when any land shall “have been limited by any assurance executed after the “31st of December, 1833, to the person or to the heirs of “the person who shall thereby have conveyed the same “land, such person shall be considered to have acquired “the same as a purchaser by virtue of such assurance, “and shall not be considered to be entitled thereto as his “former estate or part thereof.”

II. A second general Rule or canon is, that inheritances shall in the first place lineally descend to the issue of the purchaser, *in infinitum*.

The principle of placing the lineal descendants first in succession to their ancestor is, under all systems of descent, invariably adopted, and may be said to be of universal obligation or propriety; for even if it be held that the laws by which property is transmitted from one man to another, are in every case of an arbitrary nature, and *juris positivi* only (a doctrine which there is great difficulty in admitting as regards the succession of relatives), yet at least, in the choice of rules, it may happen that there are some much more consonant than others to the common feelings of mankind and the natural sense of propriety; and such principles as these seem universally to suggest, that whenever a right of property transmissible to representatives is admitted, the possessions of the parents should go, upon their decease, in the first place to their offspring, as

(*m*) See Co. Litt. 22 (b).

those to whom they have given being, and for whom they are therefore bound to provide (*m*).

III. We may lay it down as a third Rule, that the children of the purchaser are preferred to their own issue; that, among such children, males are preferred to females; and that an elder male is preferred to a younger, but females (where there are several) take together.

1. The children of the purchaser are preferred to their own descendants, because (among other obvious reasons), they are nearer to him in blood; accordingly, if any child of the purchaser, living at his decease, has issue also living at the same period, the estate will descend to the child (who is more nearly related to the purchaser), and not to the grandchild or other descendants, who are more remote.

2. But, secondly, among the children of the purchaser, males take before females, or, as our male lawgivers have expressed it, the worthiest of blood shall be preferred (*n*). Thus if John Stiles hath two daughters, Margaret and Charlotte, and afterwards two sons, Matthew and Gilbert, and dies: first Matthew, and (in case of his death without issue) then Gilbert, shall be admitted to the succession, in preference to both the daughters.

[This preference of males to females is entirely agreeable to the law of succession among the Jews(*o*), and also among the states of Greece, or at least among the Athenians(*p*); but was totally unknown to the laws of Rome(*q*) (such of them, at least, as are now extant), wherein brethren and sisters are allowed to succeed to equal portions of the inheritance. Without entering into the comparative merit of the Roman and the other constitutions in this particular, or examining into the greater

(*m*) 2 Bl. Com. 210.

(*n*) Hale's Hist. Com. Law, c. 11.

(*o*) Numbers, chap. xxvii.

(*p*) Petit. LL. Attic. lib. 6, tit. 6.

(*q*) Inst. iii. l. 6.

[dignity of blood in the male or female sex, it is sufficient to observe that our present preference of males to females seems to have had its source in the feudal law. For though our British ancestors (the Welsh) appear to have given a preference to males (*r*), yet our Danish predecessors who succeeded them seem to have made no distinction of sexes, but to have admitted all the children at once to the inheritance (*s*). But the feudal law of the Saxons on the continent, (which was probably brought over hither and first altered by a law of King Canute,) gives an evident preference of the male to the female sex. “*Pater aut mater defuncti, filio non filiæ hæreditatem relinquent. Qui defunctus non filios sed filias reliquerit, ad eas omnis hæreditas pertineat*” (*t*). It is possible, therefore, that this preference might be a branch of that imperfect system of feuds which obtained here before the Conquest; especially as it subsists among the customs of gavelkind, and as, in the charter or laws of King Henry the first, it is not (like many Norman innovations) given up, but rather enforced (*u*). The true reason of preferring the males must be deduced from feudal principles; for by the genuine and original policy of that constitution no female could ever succeed to a proper feud (*x*), inasmuch as they were incapable of performing those military services for the sake of which that system was established. But our law does not extend to the total exclusion of the females, as the Salic law and others, where feuds were most strictly retained. It only postpones them to males; for though daughters are excluded by sons, yet they succeed where there is no son: our law, like that of the Saxon feudists before mentioned, thus steering a middle course between the actual rejection of females, and the putting them on a footing with males.]

3. Primogeniture is established among the male chil-

(*r*) Stat. Wall. 12 Edw. 1.

(*t*) Tit. 7, s. 1 and 4.

(*s*) Wilkins, Leges Anglo-Sax.

(*u*) Leg. Hen. 1, c. 70.

LL. Canut. c. 68.

(*x*) 1 Feud. 8.

dren of the purchaser, but not among the female. [As if a man hath two sons, Matthew and Gilbert, and two daughters, Margaret and Charlotte, and dies; Matthew, his eldest son, shall alone succeed to his estate, in exclusion of Gilbert, the second son, and both the daughters; but if both the sons die without issue before the father, the daughters Margaret and Charlotte shall both inherit the estate as coparceners (*y*).

This right of primogeniture in males seems antiently to have only obtained among the Jews, in whose constitution the eldest son had a double portion of the inheritance (*z*); in the same manner as with us, by the laws of King Henry the first, the eldest son had the capital fee or principal feud of his father's possessions, and no other pre-eminence (*a*); and as the eldest daughter had afterwards the principal mansion, when the estate descended in coparcency (*b*). The Greeks, the Romans, the Britons, the Saxons, and even originally the feudists, divided the lands equally; some among all the children at large, some among the males only. This is certainly the most obvious and natural way, and has the appearance (at least in the opinion of younger brothers) of the greatest impartiality and justice. But when the emperors began to create honorary feuds or titles of nobility, it was found necessary, in order to preserve their dignity, to make them impartible, or, as they styled them, *feuda individua*, and in consequence descendible to the eldest son alone (*c*). This example was further enforced by the inconveniences that attended the splitting of estates: namely, the division of the military services, the multitude of infant tenants incapable of performing any duty, the consequential weakening of the strength of the kingdom, and the inducing younger sons to take up with the business and

(*y*) Litt. s. 5; Hale's Hist. C. L. c. 11. As to coparceners, vide sup. p. 346.

(*z*) Selden de Succ. Ebr. c. 5.

(*a*) Leg. Hen. 1, c. 70.

(*b*) Glanv. l. 7, c. 3.

(*c*) 2 Feud. 55.

[idleness of a country life; instead of being serviceable to themselves and the public, by engaging in mercantile, in military, in civil, or in ecclesiastical employments (*d*). These reasons occasioned an almost total change in the method of feudal inheritances abroad, so that the eldest male began universally to succeed to the whole of the lands, in all military tenures; and in this condition the feudal constitution was established in England by William the Conqueror. Yet we find that socage estates frequently descended to all the sons equally, so lately as when Glanville wrote, in the reign of Henry the second (*e*); and it is mentioned in the *Mirroure*, as a part of our antient constitution, that knight's fees should descend to the eldest son, and socage fees should be partible among the male children (*f*). However, in Henry the third's time we find by Bracton, that socage lands, in imitation of lands in chivalry, had almost entirely fallen into the right of succession by primogeniture, as the law now stands (*g*); except, indeed, in Kent, where they gloried in the preservation of their antient gavelkind tenure, of which a principal branch was the joint inheritance of all the sons (*h*),—and except, also, in some particular manors and townships, where their local customs continued their descent, sometimes to the youngest son only, or in other more singular methods of succession.

As to the females, they are still left as they were by the antient law, for being all equally incapable of performing any personal service, and therefore one main reason for preferring the eldest not applying, such preference would have been injurious to the rest; and the other principal purpose (the prevention of the too minute subdivision of estates) was left to be considered and provided for by the lords, who had the disposal of these heiresses in marriage. However, the succession by primogeniture, even among females, takes place as to the inheritance of the *crown*;

(*d*) Hale's Hist. C. L. c. 11.

(*g*) Bract. lib. ii. c. 30, 31.

(*e*) Glanv. l. 7, c. 3.

(*h*) Somner, Gavelkind, 7.

(*f*) *Mirroure*, c. i. s. 3.

[wherein the necessity of a sole and determinate succession, is as great in the one sex as the other (*i*). And the right of sole succession, though not of primogeniture, is also established with respect to female dignities and titles of honour. For if a man holds an earldom to him and the heirs of his body, and dies, leaving only daughters, the eldest shall not, as a matter of course, be countess, but the dignity is in suspense or abeyance till the king shall declare his pleasure; for he, being the fountain of honour, may confer it on which of them he pleases (*k*); in which disposition is preserved a strong trace of the antient law of feuds, before their descent by primogeniture even among the males was established; viz. that the lord might bestow them on which of the sons he thought proper; “*progrcssum est ut ad filios deveniret, in quem scilicet dominus vellet beneficium confirmare*” (*l*).]

The last rule supposed all the children of the purchaser to be living at his decease; but in the case of the death of any of them, then—

IV. A fourth Rule is, that the issue of the children of the purchaser *represent* or take the place of their parents *in infinitum*; the children of the same parent being always subject (among each other) to the same law of inheritance as contained in the third Rule.

[Thus the child, grandchild, or great-grandchild, either male or female, of the eldest son, succeeds before the younger son, and so *in infinitum*; and these representatives shall take neither more nor less, but just so much as their principals would have done (*m*). As if there be two sisters, Margaret and Charlotte, and Margaret dies, leaving six daughters; and then John Stiles, the father of the two sisters, dies without other issue: these six daughters shall take among them exactly the same as their mother Margaret would have done had she been

(*i*) Co. Litt. 165 a.

(*k*) Ibid.

(*l*) 1 Feud. 1.

(*m*) Hale's Hist. C. L. c. 11.

[living,—that is, a moiety of the land of John Stiles, in coparcenary; so that upon partition made, if the land be divided into twelve parts, thereof Charlotte, the surviving sister, shall have six, and her six nieces, the daughters of Margaret, one a-piece.

This taking by representation is called succession *per stirpes*, according to the roots; since all the branches inherit the same share that their root, whom they represent, would have done. And in this manner also, was the Jewish succession directed (*n*). In our law, indeed, it is a necessary consequence of the double preference given, first, to the male issue, and next to the first-born among the males. For if all the children of three sisters were to claim *per capita*, in their own right, as next of kin to the ancestor, without any respect to the stocks from whence they sprung,—and those children were partly male and partly female,—then the eldest male among them would exclude not only his own brethren and sisters, but all the issue of the other two daughters; or else the law in this instance must be inconsistent with itself, and depart from the preference which, by the first rule, it gives to the males and the first-born, in the descent to issue. Whereas by dividing the inheritance according to the roots or stirpes, the rule of descent is kept uniform and steady; the issue of the eldest son excludes all other pretenders, as the son himself, if living, would have done; but the issue of two daughters divide the inheritance between them, provided their mothers, if living, would have done the same: and among these several issues or representatives of the respective roots, the same preference to males and the same right of primogeniture obtain, as would have obtained at the first among the roots themselves—the sons or daughters of the deceased. As if a man hath two sons, A. and B., and A. dies, leaving two sons, and then the grandfather dies: now the eldest son of A. shall succeed

(*n*) Selden de Succ. Ebr. c. 1.

[to the whole of his grandfather's estate; and if A. had left only two daughters, they should have succeeded also to equal moieties of the whole, in exclusion of B. and his issue. But if a man hath only three daughters, C., D. and E., and C. dies, leaving two sons, D. leaving two daughters, and E. leaving a daughter and a son who is younger than his sister; here, when the grandfather dies, the eldest son of C. shall succeed to one-third, in exclusion of the younger; the two daughters of D. to another third, in coparcenary; and the son of E. to the remaining third, in exclusion of his elder sister. And the same right of representation, guided and restrained by the same rules of descent, prevails downwards *in infinitum*.

Yet this right does not appear to have been thoroughly established in the time of Henry the second, when Glanville wrote: and therefore, in the title to the crown especially, we find frequent contests between the younger (but surviving) brother and his nephew (being the son and representative of the elder deceased), in regard to the inheritance of their common ancestor; for the uncle is certainly nearer of kin to the common stock, by one degree than the nephew, though the nephew, by representing his father, has in him the right of primogeniture. The uncle also was usually better able to perform the services of the fief, and besides had frequently superior interest and strength to back his pretensions and crush the right of his nephew. And even in times comparatively modern, we find that proximity of blood took place of representative primogeniture, in the lower Saxony; that is, the younger surviving brother was admitted to the inheritance before the son of an elder deceased,—which occasioned the disputes between the two houses of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Strelitz, in 1692 (o). Yet Glanville with us, even in the twelfth century, seems to declare for the right of the nephew by representation; pro-

[vided the eldest son had not received a provision in lands from his father, or (as the civil law would call it) had not been forisfamiliated in his lifetime (*p*). King John, however, who kept his nephew Arthur from the throne, by disputing the right of representation, did all in his power to abolish it throughout the realm (*q*); but in the time of his son, King Henry the third, we find the rule indisputably settled in the manner we have here laid it down (*r*).] And thus much for descents to the *issue* of the purchaser.

V. A fifth Rule is, that on failure of the issue of the purchaser, the inheritance shall descend to the nearest lineal ancestor then living in the preferable line;—supposing no issue of a nearer deceased ancestor in that line to exist.

Under this Rule we are to remark, that,

1. After the issue, the next descent is to the lineal ancestry.

This principle is but recently adopted into our law (*s*), which, in failure of descendants of the deceased, would admit the descendants of his lineal ancestor (that is, his own collateral heirs,) under colour of a fiction formerly explained (*t*); but always excluded the lineal ancestor himself: so that the land would rather escheat to the lord (*u*) than ascend to a father or a grandfather; to illustrate which the inheritance of an estate is compared, by an antient writer, to the descent of a falling body. “*Descendit jus* (says Bracton) *quasi ponderosum quid, cadens deorsum rectâ lineâ; et nunquam reascendit eâ viâ quâ descendit*” (*x*). This resulted, like many other of our

(*p*) Glanv. l. 7, c. 3.

(*q*) Hale's Hist. C. L. c. 11.

(*r*) Bract. lib. ii. c. 30, s. 2.

(*s*) It was however the rule among the Anglo-Saxons. See Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 467, 7th ed., citing Leges Hen. 1, c. 70.

(*t*) See Rule I.

(*u*) Litt. s. 3.

(*x*) Bract. lib. ii. c. 29. It has been remarked that the words *eâ viâ quâ descendit* are a necessary qualification. For the inheritance might ascend *indirectly*, as from

institutions, from the doctrines of feudal tenure. [For it was an express rule of the feudal law, that “*successionis feudi talis est natura quod ascendentes non succedunt*” (*y*), and we find the same principle recognized in the old law of France (*z*). Our Henry the first indeed, among other restorations of the old Saxon laws, restored the right of succession in the ascending line (*a*) ; but this soon fell again into disuse, for so early as Glanville’s time we find it laid down as an established law, that *hæreditas nunquam ascendit*, which from that time remained an invariable maxim (*b*). These circumstances evidently show this antient peculiarity of our law to be of feudal original, and taken in that light, there were some arguments in its favour. For if the feud of which the son died seised was really *feudum antiquum*, or one descended to him from his ancestors, the father could not possibly succeed to it, because it must have passed him in the course of descent before it could have come to the son, unless indeed it were *feudum maternum*, or one descended from his mother, and then the father would be excluded by the feudal maxim already considered, as he did not derive his blood from the purchaser. And if it were *feudum novum*, or one newly acquired by the son, the father would still be excluded by the same maxim : which was founded not only upon the personal merit of the vassal which might be transmitted to his children, but also upon this consideration of military policy, that the decrepit grandsire of a vigorous vassal would be but indifferently qualified to succeed him in his feudal services. Nay, even if this *feudum novum* were held by the son *ut feudum antiquum*, such a feud must in all respects have descended as if it had been really an antient feud ; and therefore could not go to the

the son to the uncle.—Coleridge’s
Blackstone, vol. ii. p. 212, (n.)

(*y*) 2 Feud. 50.

(*z*) Domat, part 2, lib. 2 ; Montesq. Esp. des Lois, lib. 31, c. 33.

(*a*) Ll. Hen. 1, c. 70 ; Blackborough v. Davis, 1 P. Wms. 40.

(*b*) See Glanv. (temp. Hen. 2), lib. 7, c. 1.

[father, because if it had been an antient feud, the father must have been dead before it could have come to the son. Thus, whether the feud were strictly *novum* or strictly *antiquum*, or whether it was *novum* held *ut antiquum*, in none of these cases could the father possibly succeed (c).] Such at least have been alleged, (and apparently with truth,) as the reasons of the rule which excluded the ascending line (d). The reasoning, however, was not consistently applied: for it has been justly observed, that if the father is not to inherit the estate, because it must be presumed to have already passed him in the course of descent, the elder brother should, upon the same principle, never be heir to the younger; and if the object is merely to pass over a decrepit feudatory, the father's eldest brother should never succeed to his nephew; and yet a succession in both these collateral lines was always permitted by law (e). The rule besides was opposed to natural justice, and the common feelings of mankind: which evidently suggest not only that a man's progenitors should be allowed to inherit his estate, but that their proper place in the succession is second only to that of his posterity. Such accordingly is now the rule; and we owe this great improvement to the Inheritance Act of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106, to which we have already had occasion to refer. Its provision on this subject is as follows: "that every lineal ancestor shall be capable of being heir to any of his issue; and in every case where there shall be no issue of the purchaser, his nearest lineal ancestor shall be his heir, in preference to any person who would have been entitled to inherit, either by tracing his descent through such lineal ancestor, or in consequence of there being no descendant of such lineal ancestor (f): so that the father shall be preferred to a

(c) 2 Bl. Com. 212.

(d) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 11 a,
n. (1.)

(e) Christ. Black. ubi sup.

(f) In this statute the expression "*descendants*" of any ancestor, "shall extend to all persons who must trace their descent through

“ brother or sister, and a more remote lineal ancestor to
 “ any of his issue other than a nearer lineal ancestor or
 “ his issue” (*f*).

2. The descent is to the nearest living ancestor in the preferable line.

How the preference is to be settled between two different lines of ancestry, will appear by the next Rule. But in the mean time we are to observe, that in the same line the nearest of blood has the precedency.

Thus, if in failure of the issue of John Stiles, we proceed to inquire for his heir, among his lineal ancestors, we are to prefer Geoffrey Stiles, his father, to George, his grandfather (supposing both to be living); and so we are to prefer Lucy, his mother, to Esther, his maternal grandmother (*g*).

This branch of the Rule, though in a direct sense also resting on the same positive enactment, is not, like the other, new in its *principle*, but agrees in substance with the law as it stood prior to the Inheritance Act. For though the lineal ancestors were not themselves permitted to succeed, yet they were always regarded as the fountains of inheritable blood, and the stocks from which the next succession must spring, so that their issue were admitted, in right of descent from *them*, to the inheritance (*h*); and as to their issue, the rule was, that the descendants of a nearer lineal ancestor, in the preferable line, were preferred to those of one more remote (*i*). Very similar to which, as Blackstone observes, was the law of inheritance among the antient Germans our progenitors, “*hæredes successoresque sui cuique liberi, et nullum testamentum: si liberi non sunt, proximus gradus in possessione, fratres, patru, avunculi*” (*k*).

3. The Rule applies only in the event of the issue of

such ancestor.” (3 & 4 Will. 4,
 c. 106, s. 1.)

(*f*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 6.

(*g*) See Table of Descent (No. II.)

(*h*) 2 Bl. Com. 226.

(*i*) Ibid.

(*k*) Ibid. citing Tacitus de Mor.

Germ. 21.

every nearer deceased ancestor in the same line being extinct. For if the issue of any such ancestor exist, the order of succession is governed, as we shall see hereafter, by a different rule.

VI. It may be laid down as a sixth Rule, that, among the lineal ancestors of the purchaser, the paternal line (whether of the purchaser, or of any ancestor male or female,) is always preferred to the maternal.

Therefore Geoffrey, the father, in the annexed Table of Descent, (No. II.,) will succeed rather than Lucy, the mother; and if Geoffrey be dead, any of his male ancestors, George, Walter, and Richard, (according to their proximity,) will have the preference to any of his maternal ancestors, or to the maternal ancestors of George, or Walter respectively; though, on the other hand, all these maternal ancestors will take precedence of Lucy, the mother, or any ancestor of hers. Upon the same principle, when, upon failure of the male line of John's paternal ancestry by the extinction of the blood of Richard, we inquire for the next heir—we are to select Ann Godfrey, the mother of the more remote male paternal ancestor, in preference to Christian Smith, the mother of a male paternal ancestor less remote; for if we were to give the preference to Christian, we should be resorting to the maternal line of George, instead of his paternal, which would be contrary to our rule.

This preference of the paternal line, is now founded on the express enactment of the Inheritance Act (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106); which provides, (by sect. 7,) “that none
“of the maternal ancestors of the person from whom the
“descent is to be traced, nor any of their descendants,
“shall be capable of inheriting, until all his paternal
“ancestors and their descendants shall have failed; and
“also that no female paternal ancestor of such person,
“nor any of her descendants, shall be capable of inherit-
“ing until all his male paternal ancestors and their de-

“scendants shall have failed; and that no female maternal ancestor of such person, nor any of her descendants, shall be capable of inheriting until all his male maternal ancestors and their descendants shall have failed.” And by section 8, “that where there shall be a failure of male paternal ancestors of the person from whom the descent is to be traced, and their descendants, the mother of his more remote male paternal ancestor, or her descendants, shall be the heir or heirs of such person in preference to the mother of a less remote male paternal ancestor, or her descendants; and where there shall be a failure of male maternal ancestors of such person, and their descendants, the mother of his more remote male maternal ancestor, and her descendants, shall be the heir or heirs of such person in preference to the mother of a less remote male maternal ancestor, and her descendants.”

The first of these sections is a mere adoption of the principle of the former law, under which the blood of the paternal ancestor of the purchaser was constantly preferred to that of the maternal; the blood of the male paternal ancestor of the purchaser to that of the female paternal; and the blood of the male maternal to that of the female maternal (*l*).

[In the preference of relatives *ex parte paternâ*, the English law is not singular, but warranted by the examples of the Hebrew and Athenian laws, as stated by Selden (*m*), and Petit (*n*); though among the Greeks in the time of Hesiod (*o*), when a man died without wife or children, all his kindred, without any distinction, divided his estate among them. It is likewise warranted by the example of the Roman laws; wherein the *agnati*, or relations by the father, were preferred to the *cognati*, or relations by the mother, till the edict of the Emperor

(*l*) 2 Bl. Com. 234.

(*m*) De Succ. Ebr. c. 12.

(*n*) LL. Attic. Lib. 1, tit. 6.

(*o*) ὁμογενία, 606.

[Justinian abolished all distinction between them (*p*). It is also conformable to the customary law of antient Normandy (*q*), which indeed in most respects agrees with our English law of inheritance.]

The principle no doubt originated (with us) in that maxim of the antient feudal institutions, to which we have already more than once referred,—that the heir must in all cases derive his blood, that is, be lineally descended, from the purchaser. An actual adherence to this rule would have excluded altogether both the lineal ancestors and collateral relations of a man who died tenant of land which he had acquired by *purchase*; but where his estate therein was in fee simple, his collateral relations were nevertheless (as we have seen) let in by the aid of a fiction which supposed him to hold it as a feud of indefinite antiquity; in other words, to have acquired it, not by purchase, but by *descent* from an unknown antecedent purchaser, at some former period (*r*). The collaterals (however remote) were thus admitted, because they might be supposed to descend from this unknown purchaser, so as to satisfy the feudal maxim; but upon the same principle those collaterals who would be most likely to have descended from him (supposing such an ancestor to have existed) were entitled to have the preference over those whose pretensions would be less probable. Now the collaterals of the last tenant, *ex parte paternâ*, would be more probably of the blood of this unknown purchaser, than those *ex parte maternâ*; because the estate presumably came to the last tenant through his male progenitors rather than his female. For, as, by the third and fourth Rules (which are founded on the common law, and have always prevailed), males are constantly preferred (in the course of descent) to females, it is more likely that the land should have belonged to his father,

(*p*) Nov. 118.

(*r*) Vide sup. p. 393.

(*q*) Gr. Coustum. c. 25.

than his mother; to his father's father than to his father's mother; and so continually upwards.

The 8th section of the new Act has settled a question which had formerly been the subject of much controversy. For though the universal preference of the stocks in the male paternal line was always free from doubt, yet where, upon failure of the male paternal line, it became necessary for the first time to resort to a female stock, it was an unsettled point whether the descent should be traced through the mother of the nearer or more remote ancestor in that line. Thus it was disputed, whether the issue of the paternal grandfather's maternal grandfather, or the issue of the paternal grandmother's father, were the true heir of the purchaser(*s*). According to many antient authorities, including Lord Bacon and Sir Matthew Hale(*t*), the latter had the better claim, it being held by these writers (in conformity with a more antient opinion), that all the female ancestors, on the part of the father, were equally worthy of blood, and that in that case *proximity* shall prevail. Blackstone, however, had dissented from that doctrine(*u*); and his view would seem to be the more correct one; for, reverting to what has been just said of the fiction by which collaterals were introduced into the succession, it will appear, that as we are led by a chain of successive presumptions to suppose the estate of John Stiles; in the annexed Table of Descent (No. II.), to have descended from his father Geoffrey, rather than his mother Lucy, and from his grandfather George Stiles, rather than his grandmother Cecilia Kempe; so, if it did not descend to George, from Walter his father, the next presumption would be, that it descended from his mother Christian Smith, who again would presumably derive it from her father William; so that the issue of William Smith, the paternal grand-

(*s*) See First Real Property Rep. Law, c. 11.
p. 11.

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 238; see Davies

(*t*) Bac. Elem. c. 1; Hist. Com. v. Lowndes, 5 Bing. N. C. 169.

father's maternal grandfather, would necessarily have better title than the issue of Luke Kempe, the paternal grandmother's father, who stands lower (if we may so speak) in the chain of presumptions.

But whatever may have been the merits of this question, it is now set at rest by the 8th section of the Inheritance Act, which, in accordance with the view taken by Blackstone, prefers the maternal line of the more remote male paternal or male maternal ancestor, to the maternal line of the nearer, both as regards the issue of lineal ancestors, and the lineal ancestors themselves, now first introduced into the succession (*x*).

VII. A seventh Rule is, that where an ancestor, to whom, if living at the purchaser's death, the inheritance would, according to the fifth Rule, have descended, dies before the purchaser, leaving issue, the issue of such ancestor *in infinitum* shall represent him, according to the same law of succession as before laid down with respect to the issue of the purchaser; but with this addition, that those related by the whole blood to the purchaser, are preferred to those related by the half-blood.

It is obvious from the nature of consanguinity, which means a descent from the same common ancestor, that, as regards the purchaser, the issue of his lineal ancestor are necessarily his collateral kindred, and that such of them as becomes his heir, in capacity of issue to his ancestor, must inherit as collateral heir to himself. The seventh Rule thus transfers us from the subject of *lineal* inheritance (to which alone our preceding rules referred) to that of collateral inheritance.

On the subject of collateral inheritance, it deserves remark, in the first place, that the right of collaterals no longer depends (as it formerly did) on the fiction that the estate of the purchaser was granted as a feud of indefinite

(*x*) See First Real Property Rep. p. 14.

antiquity (*y*), but on a positive statute-law of descent. For the Inheritance Act has now by express provision introduced both the “lineal ancestors” of the purchaser and their “descendants” into the succession (*z*). Indeed, when the right of the former was established, that of the latter would follow of course, upon the common law principle of representation. It would seem, therefore, that an estate purchased in fee-simple can no longer be considered as granted to hold *ut feudum antiquum*, but rather as a new feud, with inheritable properties different from those which attached to a new feud under the antient system, being descendible not only to those who derive their blood from the purchaser, but those also from whom he derives his, and to their descendants.

It is also to be observed, that the right of collaterals is now referable universally, and in every case, to that of the ancestor from whom they descend; and it is only in his right, that they can ever be considered as heirs to the purchaser. Under the former system this was subject, in a particular case, to exception, it being held that between brothers and sisters, the descent was to be considered, for some purposes, as *immediate* (*a*). But by the new Act, no brother or sister shall be considered to inherit immediately from his or her brother or sister, but every descent from a brother or sister shall be traced through the parent (*b*).

But to revert to the Rule under consideration.

First, the issue of the purchaser’s lineal ancestor represent him *in infinitum*; and that according to the same law of succession as prevails among the issue of the purchaser.

Thus, if John Stiles, in the annexed Table of Descent (No. II.), purchases land, and dies entitled to the same, without issue, and his father Geoffrey be dead, it descends

(*y*) Vide sup. p. 395.

(*z*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, ss. 7, 8.

(*a*) 2 Bl. Com. 226; Watk. Desc. 111, n.; H. Chit. Desc. 64, 354;

Kynnauld v. Leslie, Law Rep., 1 C. P. 389.

(*b*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 5.

to Francis (the eldest son of Geoffrey, and the brother of John), rather than to George the grandfather; or if Francis be also dead, leaving several children, then to the eldest son of Francis, the nephew of John, and does not pass to any remoter ancestor of John, unless the issue of Geoffrey are exhausted. So, it will descend to a son, or even a *daughter* of Francis (if he left no son) rather than to Oliver Stiles, the brother of John; for such son or daughter represents the father, who, as the eldest son of Geoffrey, represented *him*.

This branch of the Rule is open, in general, to the same remarks as those which have been already made under Rules III. and IV., and will require no further discussion; though it may be worth while to notice the correspondence of the Jewish law with ours in this particular, as well as in the representation among the issue of the deceased (*c*); for on failure of issue, the father or other lineal ancestor was himself said to be the heir, though long since dead, as being represented by the persons of his issue, who were held to succeed, not in their own rights, as brethren, uncles, (or as the case might be,) but in right of representation, as the offspring of the father, grandfather, or other ancestor of the deceased (*d*).

As to the remaining branch of the Rule, viz., that which regards the distinction between the whole and half-blood,—it results from the first branch thereof (taken in connection with Rule VI.) that the collateral heir of the purchaser is the issue of the nearest of his lineal ancestors in the preferable line, who has left posterity living at the death of the purchaser, subject to the principles as to sex, primogeniture, and representation. But among such issue, some may be relations to the purchaser of the whole blood, and some of the half-blood only; and it is consequently necessary to lay down an additional principle to determine whether both these classes are admissible, and

(*c*) 2 Bl. Com. 226.

(*d*) Num. c. 27; Seld. de Succ. Ebræor. c. 12.

whether any and what precedence is to be allowed between them.

[A kinsman of the whole blood, is he that is derived, not only from the same ancestor, but from the same couple of ancestors. For every man's blood is compounded of the bloods of his respective ancestors; and he only is of the whole or entire blood with another, who hath, so far as the distance of degrees will permit, all the same ingredients in the composition of his blood, that the other hath. Thus, the blood of John Stiles being composed of those of Geoffrey Stiles his father and Lucy Baker his mother, therefore his brother Francis, being descended from both the same parents, has entirely the same blood with John Stiles, or he is his brother of the whole blood (*d*). But if, after the death of Geoffrey, Lucy Baker the mother marries a second husband, Lewis Gay, and hath issue by him, the blood of this issue, being compounded of the blood of Lucy Baker (it is true) on the one part, but that of Lewis Gay instead of Geoffrey Stiles on the other part, it hath therefore only half the same ingredients with that of John Stiles, so that he is only his brother of the half-blood.] So also if the father has two sons, A. and B., by different wives (or, according to the technical expression, by different venters), now these brethren are not brethren of the whole blood, but of the half-blood only.

The Inheritance Act assigns to such of the purchaser's collateral kinsmen as are of the whole blood, and their issue, the preference to those who are of the half-blood only, in the same degree, but admits the latter to the next place in the succession (*e*). Thus if the father have a son A., by one wife,—and two sons, B. and C., and a daughter by a second wife,—and B. purchases land, and dies without issue, and the father be also dead, C., the younger brother, or, on failure of C. and his issue, the sister, shall succeed in preference to A., the elder brother. But the latter (though only of the half-blood) and his

(*d*) Table of Descent (No. II.) (*e*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 9.

issue will succeed in preference to any collateral relation not descended from B.'s father, though of the whole blood with B. So on the death of John Stiles the purchaser, in the annexed Table (No. II.), without issue, his father Geoffrey being also dead, he will be succeeded, not only by his elder brother Francis, or his second brother Oliver, but even by his sisters Bridget and Alice, in preference to his half-brother, the son of his mother Lucy and Lewis Gay, who cannot indeed inherit until the paternal line are exhausted; for his mother, whom he represents, could not (by the sixth Rule) have taken while any of the paternal line remained. But the son of Lucy and Lewis Gay (and his issue after him) will stand next to his mother, in the order of succession, and in preference to any other collateral relation of John Stiles *ex parte maternâ*, though of the whole blood with John Stiles.

In the admission of the half-blood, the Inheritance Act introduces a new principle of inheritance; for, as the law before stood, the half-blood (like the lineal ancestor) were totally excluded, and the land would rather escheat to the lord than go to any kinsman (however near), bearing that kind of relation to the person from whom descent was to be traced. Therefore A. in one of the cases just supposed, and the son of Lucy and Lewis Gay in the other, would have been absolutely incapable of the succession. Nay, even when a father died, and his lands descended to his eldest son A., who entered thereon, and died seised without issue, still B., the son of the same father by another wife, could not be heir to these lands, because he was only of the half-blood to A., the person last seised; but they would descend to a sister (if any) of the whole blood to A., for in such cases the maxim was, that *possessio fratris facit sororem esse hæredem*. Yet if A. had died without entry, then B. might have inherited; not as heir to A. his half-brother, but as heir to their common father, who was the person last actually seised (*f*).

This exclusion of the half-blood was a feature almost peculiar to the law of England; and (it must be added) one of the most harsh and unreasonable aspect. Its vindication was rested entirely upon the plea that it ought to be considered as a mere auxiliary rule, to carry into effect that principle of the feudal law which required the heir to derive his blood from the purchaser. For as it was a consequence from this principle (as already shown), that the collaterals of the deceased purchaser could only be let in by supposing them to be lineal descendants of some one of his ancestors, from whom the estate had been originally derived; so it was obvious that those related to him of the whole blood were in general more proper subjects for that supposition, than those of the half-blood. This results from the consideration that he who is the kinsman of the whole blood to the person deceased can have no ancestors beyond or higher than the common stock, but what are equally the ancestors also of the deceased, and *vice versâ*; and therefore is very likely to be derived from that unknown ancestor of his from whom the inheritance is supposed to have descended. But a kinsman of the half-blood in the same degree with the other, is not so probably sprung from the same original purchaser; for he has but one half his ancestors, beyond or higher than the common stock, the same with those of the deceased.

To illustrate this by example (*g*):—Let there be John Stiles and his brother Francis, by the same father and mother, and another brother born of the same mother by Lewis Gay, a second husband. Now if John dies seised of lands, but it is uncertain whether they descended to him from his father or mother, in this case his brother Francis of the whole blood is sure to be in the line of descent from the first purchaser, whether it were the line of the father or mother. But his half-brother by Lewis Gay is to the full as likely not to be descended from the

original purchaser as to be descended, and there is consequently no reasonable presumption of his being derived from the original purchaser. It was argued, therefore, by the apologists of the antient rule of exclusion, that it should not be thought hard that collateral relations of the half-blood should be disinherited; for as they owed their admission only to the fiction that they were the issue of an imaginary purchaser, it was just to exclude them in every case where, supposing that purchaser to have really existed, there would be no fair reason to suppose that they could in truth have descended from him (*h*). It was obvious, however, even to the apologists themselves, that the exclusion was carried further in practice than the principle on which it was founded would warrant; for a kinsman of the half-blood to the deceased, supposing him to have derived the estate from some unknown ancestor, would in some instances have the same chance of being descended from that ancestor as a kinsman of the whole blood in a remoter degree, and in other instances a much greater. Thus a brother of the half-blood would have the same chance as an uncle of the whole, on the same side, and more than a great uncle; and yet, in these instances, the remoter kinsman was always admissible, while the nearer was incompetent to succeed. The rule of exclusion was, besides, applied even where the deceased tenant did not take by purchase, but by descent, and had a relative of the half-blood known to be descended as well as himself from the purchaser;—as in the case already noticed, where upon the death of A. without issue, seised of lands which had descended to him from his father, his half-brother B., son of the same father, was debarred from the inheritance. This was universally allowed to carry a hardship with it, even upon feudal principles; for as the estate notoriously descended from the father, and as both the brothers confessedly sprung from him, it was demonstrable that the half-brother must be of the blood of the

(*h*) See note by Christian, 2 Bl. Com. 231.

purchaser, who was either the father or one of the father's ancestors. [And indeed it should seem as if originally the custom of excluding the half-blood, in Normandy, extended only to exclude a *frater uterinus* where the inheritance descended *a patre*, and *vice versâ*; and possibly in England also (*i*): as even with us it remained a doubt in the time of Bracton and of Fleta whether the half-blood on the father's side was excluded from the inheritance which originally descended from the common father; or only from such as descended from the respective mothers, and from newly-purchased lands. So also the rule of law, as laid down by our Fortescue, extends no further than this, *frater fratri uterino non succedet in hæreditate paternâ* (*h*). It is moreover worthy of observation, in this place, that the crown (which is the highest inheritance in the nation) has always been held capable of descending to the half-blood of the preceding sovereign (*l*), so that it be the blood of the first monarch of the reigning family who was *conqueror* (which in feudal language is the same as *purchaser*) of the realm (*m*). Thus it actually did descend from King Edward the sixth to Queen Mary, and from her to Queen Elizabeth, who were respectively of the half-blood to each other.] For though none can be a claimant to the crown unless known to be descended from the original stock—which was formerly King William the Norman, and is now, by act of parliament, the Princess

(*i*) Gr. Constum. c. 25.

(*h*) Fort. De Laud. Leg. Ang. c. 5. With respect to the exclusion of the half-blood in England, Mr. Maine, in his "Antient Law," asserts that it arose from the adoption into England of the customs of Normandy, which borrowed from antient Roman law the rules of *agnation* forbidding kinship to exist between any not subject to the same *patria potestas*, and consequently excluding all the descendants of

females from participating in the *agnatic kinship*. And he holds, that this rule being transplanted to England, the judges, ignorant of its source, extended it to a general prohibition against the succession of the half-blood, instead of limiting it, as originally intended, to *uterine* brothers. (See Maine, pp. 151, 152.)

(*l*) Plowd. 245; Co. Litt. 15 b.

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 387.

Sophia of Hanover (*n*)—yet, when such descent is known, the feudal rule is satisfied, whether he be related to the last sovereign by the whole, or by the half-blood. And upon the same principle, in titles of honour (*o*) and in all estates tail (*p*), half-blood was never an impediment to the descent, because in these cases the pedigree from the first donee must be strictly proved; and the feudal maxim is consequently carried into effect, without resorting to any auxiliary rule. But now, as we have seen, the maxim which excluded the half-blood has given way, in *every* case, to a sounder and more satisfactory principle. Having been long generally disapproved, as founded on defective reasoning and opposed to natural justice, it was at length abolished by the Inheritance Act, the provision of which, as regards this subject, is expressed in the following terms:—"That any person related to the person from whom the descent is to be traced by the half-blood shall be capable of being his heir; and the place in which any such relation by the half-blood shall stand in the order of inheritance, so as to be entitled to inherit, shall be next after any relation in the same degree of the whole blood and his issue, where the common ancestor shall be a male, and next after the common ancestor where such common ancestor shall be a female; so that the brother of the half-blood on the part of the father shall inherit next after the sisters of the whole blood on the part of the father and their issue, and the brother of the half-blood on the part of the mother shall inherit next after the mother" (*q*).

Having now treated of descent in general, we next arrive at the few and rare cases formerly referred to as requiring a separate consideration.

1. First, then, there are cases in which a man may

(*n*) 2 Bl. Com. 233. On this princess, granddaughter of James I., and the heirs of her body (being Protestants), the crown was settled by 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 3. See

bk. iv. pt. i. c. iii.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 15.

(*p*) Litt. ss. 14, 15 b.

(*q*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 9.

acquire land by purchase, under a limitation to the “heirs,” or “heirs of the body,” of one of his ancestors.

Thus if the owner of lands conveys them to A. for life, remainder to the “heirs” or “heirs of the body” of B., and B. be then deceased, or be then living but die during the continuance of the particular estate(*r*), the person who at the time of the conveyance in the first case, or at the time of B.’s death in the second, answers the description of his “heir,” or “heirs of his body,” will, by the rule of the common law, take the remainder as purchaser, and his estate will be a fee simple or fee tail, as the case may be; for such words amount not only to a description of the grantee, but to a limitation of the estate which he is to take(*s*). By the Inheritance Act, however, the estate so acquired by purchase is anomalous as regards its descendible quality; for by the 4th section, “When any person shall have acquired any land by purchase under a limitation to the heirs or to the heirs of the body of any of his ancestors, contained in an assurance executed after the 31st December, 1833; or under a limitation to the heirs or heirs of the body of any of his ancestors (or under any limitation having the same effect) contained in a will of any testator who shall depart this life after the said 31st December, 1833; then and in any of such cases, such land shall descend, and the descent of it shall be traced, *as if the ancestor named in such limitation had been the purchaser.*”

2. Secondly, it is provided by a more recent statute, viz., the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 19, that “Where there shall be a total failure of heirs of the purchaser, or where any land shall be descendible as if an ancestor had been the purchaser thereof(*t*), and there shall be

(*r*) If B. were to survive A., the limitation in remainder would fail for want of a person to take, for *nemo est hæres viventis*, vide sup. p. 389.

(*s*) Co. Litt. 10 a, 319 b; 1 Roll. Abr. 627; 2 Bl. Com. 241; 1 Prest. Est. 280, 452, 453.


(*t*) As in the case just mentioned, sup. p. 418.

TABLE OF DESCENT.

under 3 & 4 W. 4 C. 106 upon deaths on & after 1 January 1834.

Paternal Line.

Maternal Line.



“ a total failure of the heirs of such ancestor, then and in every such case the land shall descend; and the descent shall thenceforth be traced from *the person last entitled to the land, as if he had been the purchaser thereof*” (u).

Having now brought our account of the present law of descent to a close, we may remark, as the result of the investigation, that, upon the death of the owner of an estate in fee simple, we are to ascertain the heir, by considering, first, who was the *purchaser* or *quasi purchaser* of that estate,—meaning by the term *quasi purchaser*, the person from whom descent is to be traced *as if he had been the purchaser*, as in the two cases just noticed:—and we are then to look for the heir, first, among his issue,—where the heir will be his descendant next to him in blood, but subject to the principles which obtain as to sex, primogeniture, and representation: and, failing his issue, among his lineal ancestors or their issue—where the heir will be his lineal ancestor next in blood in the preferable line, or the issue of such ancestor, if deceased; applying the same law of succession as in the case of the purchaser’s issue, and also the principle which prefers the whole to the half-blood.

Before we conclude this branch of our inquiries, however, it may not be amiss to *apply* the rules more particularly, and to supply the reader with a short sketch of the manner in which we must search for the heir of a person,—as John Stiles,—who dies entitled to land, of which he was the purchaser or *quasi purchaser* (x).

In the first place succeeds the eldest son, Matthew Stiles, or his issue, No. 1. If he and his heirs be extinct, then Gilbert Stiles, and the other sons respectively in order of birth, and their issue, No. 2. In default of these, all the daughters together, Margaret and Charlotte Stiles, or their issue, No. 3. On failure of the descendants of John Stiles, his father Geoffrey (being his nearest lineal

(u) The object of this provision will appear in the next chapter.

(x) See Table of Descent (No. II.)

ancestor in the preferable line) is admitted, No. 4. Then the issue of his father, viz., first, Francis Stiles, the eldest brother of the whole blood or his issue, No. 5; then Oliver Stiles and the other whole brothers respectively, in order of birth, or their issue, No. 6; then the sisters of the whole blood all together, Bridget and Alice Stiles, or their issue, No. 7; then the son of Geoffery (the paternal brother of the half-blood), No. 8, or his issue; and the paternal sisters of the half-blood, No. 9, or their issue. In default of them, George Stiles, the paternal grandfather, is admitted, No. 10, and then his issue, viz., first, his issue of the whole blood with John, No. 11, then his issue of the half-blood with John, No. 12. In default of these, Walter Stiles, the paternal grandfather's father, is admitted, No. 13. Then the issue of Walter, viz., first, his issue of the whole blood with John, No. 14, then his issue of the half-blood, No. 15. In default of these, Richard Stiles, the paternal grandfather's paternal grandfather, is admitted, No. 16, or his issue, No. 17, and so on, in the paternal line of Walter Stiles, *in infinitum*. In failure of this line (this is supposing the decease of Richard, and of all his maternal and paternal ancestors, and the failure of their issue both of the whole and of the half-blood,) we are next to resort to the maternal line of Walter Stiles, rather than of a nearer male ancestor; and the paternal grandfather's paternal grandmother, Ann Godfrey (according to the maiden name), No. 18, will consequently be the person next entitled to succeed, and so on in the maternal line of Walter Stiles, *in infinitum*. In failure of which we are to resort to the maternal line of George Stiles; and the paternal grandfather's mother, Christian Smith, No. 19, will be the person next entitled, and then her issue of the half-blood to John, No. 20. Then the paternal grandfather's maternal grandfather, William Smith, No. 21; and then his issue, No. 22; and so on in the paternal line of Christian Smith, *in infinitum*. On failure of which, we are to resort to her

maternal line; and the paternal grandfather's maternal grandmother, Jane King, No. 23, will be the person next entitled, and so on in the maternal line of Christian Smith, *in infinitum*. On failure of which we are to resort to the maternal line of Geoffrey Stiles; and the paternal grandmother, Cecilia Kempe, No. 24, will be the person next entitled; and then her issue of the half-blood to John, No. 25. Then the paternal grandmother's father, Luke Kempe, No. 26; then his issue of the whole blood to John, No. 27. Then his issue of the half-blood to John, No. 28. Then the paternal grandmother's paternal grandfather, Thomas Kempe, No. 29. Then his issue, No. 30, and so on in the paternal line of Luke Kempe, *in infinitum*. In failure of which we are to resort to his maternal line; and the paternal grandmother's paternal grandmother, Sarah Browne, No. 31, will be the person next entitled; and so on in the maternal line of Luke Kempe, *in infinitum*. On failure of which we are to resort to the maternal line of Cecilia Kempe; and the paternal grandmother's mother, Frances Holland, No. 32, will be the person next entitled. Then her issue of the half-blood to John, No. 33. Then the paternal grandmother's maternal grandfather, Charles Holland, No. 34; then his issue, No. 35; and so on in the paternal line of Frances Holland, *in infinitum*. In failure of which, we are to resort to the maternal line of Frances Holland; and the paternal grandmother's maternal grandmother, Mary Wilson, No. 36, will be the person next entitled; and so on in the maternal line of Frances Holland, *in infinitum*. In failure of which, the paternal blood of John Stiles entirely failing, recourse must then, and not before, be had to his maternal relations, or the blood of the Bakers, Nos. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47; the Bates's, No. 48; the Willes's, Nos. 49, 50, 51, 52; the Carters, No. 53; the Thorpes, Nos. 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60; the Bishops, No. 61; the Whites,

Nos. 62, 63, 64, 65 ; and the Wards, No. 66, in the same regular successive order as in the paternal line.

We have thus seen how land is acquired by descent in fee simple. But before we conclude the chapter, it will be proper to notice some miscellaneous points of law connected with title.

1. We may remark, that in order to make the title complete, where the estate descended is one in possession, the heir is required to make *entry* on the land ; for until then he is said to have seisin in *law* only and not in *deed* ; and is incompetent to bring any action of trespass for injuries committed to the land (*y*). If the estate be one in expectancy, he has of course no right of entry until the particular interest determines : but if it be a reversion or remainder immediately expectant on an estate for *years*, the possession of the particular tenant operates, upon a principle before explained, as that of the heir ; whose seisin is in that case considered as a seisin in deed, and not in law only (*z*). The distinction, however, between these kinds of seisin, as regards the heir, has recently lost much of its importance—which chiefly resulted from this consideration, viz., that until entry he could not become the root of a future descent ; for this is a capacity which can no longer in any case attach to him, as, by the new provision of the Inheritance Act, the purchaser is now the only root from which descent can be traced.

2. It may be useful to explain the phrase which sometimes occurs in the books of *breaking* the descent. It is to be observed, then, that the estate which a man has acquired by descent, retains in his hands its former quality of descending only to the blood of the same pur-

(*y*) Bac. Ab. Trespass (C.) ; (*z*) Co. Litt. 15 a ; Doe v. Keen, Browning v. Beston, Plowd. 142 ; 7 T. R. 390 ; Doe v. Whichelo, 8 Goodtitle v. Newman, 3 Wils. 516. T. R. 213 ; et vide sup. p. 316.

chaser, or *quasi* purchaser, so that, on decease of the owner, none of his relations on the mother's side can ever be entitled to succeed, supposing the estate to have descended to him in the paternal line, nor *vice versâ* any relation on the father's side, if it came in the maternal line; except only in the case of a relation who, being heir in one of these lines, happens to belong to the other also,—a case which may occur when the owner's parents have been connected by consanguinity. In this respect the title by descent differs remarkably from that by purchase; for by the latter the estate acquires a new inheritable quality, and is descendible to the owner's blood in general, that is, first to those of the paternal, and then to those of the maternal line. And from this it follows, that if a person who has acquired an estate by descent conveys it to a new purchaser, the line of descent is *broken*: and even if that purchaser conveys it back again to him, the interruption still continues; for the former owner will then hold it as by purchase, and not as by descent, and will therefore be able to transmit it to his heirs on either side. Thus, if a man seised of lands as heir on the part of his mother (and which consequently no relation on the father's side can, as such, inherit), conveys them to another, and afterwards obtains a reconveyance of them, to hold to him and his heirs, and then dies without issue, his heirs on the part of his father shall inherit, and in preference to those on the mother's side (a). But a mere alteration in the quality or circumstances of an estate will not break the descent; and therefore if parceners make partition of their land, they are still *in* of their respective shares by inheritance,

(a) Co. Litt. 12 b; Doe v. Morgan, 7 T. R. 105; 1 Prest. Est. 420, 458, 459. And in like manner the descent will now be broken where a person who took by descent makes a conveyance (subsequent to 31st

December, 1833), although an estate should be limited to *himself* by the same conveyance. (See the Inheritance Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 3.)

though those shares are no longer held in coparcenary, but in severalty.

3. An estate in fee simple descending on the heir, comes to him charged with the debts of the ancestor from whom it descended (*b*). This liability has always been recognized at law, in respect of such of the ancestor's obligations as (in legal language) have accrued by *specialty*, a term which includes an obligation accruing by "matter of record" (such as a judgment or other proceeding recorded in a court of justice) as well as an obligation arising on a deed, i. e., a contract under seal (*c*). But with regard to these last, a distinction is observed between deeds in which the ancestor has bound himself and his heirs *eo nomine*, and those in which the heirs are not bound; for to these last the liability of the heir has not been held to extend at law, though there is a remedy, as we shall presently see, in equity. Nor is he liable, whatever the kind of obligation may be, to be charged as of his own proper debt; but only so far as he has taken, in his character of heir, an estate of his ancestor sufficient to satisfy the debt; which sufficient estate is called, in law, *assets*, from the French word *assez*, enough (*d*). The assets which descend to an heir, however, may consist either of legal or equitable estate; and though equitable interests are not in general noticed at law, yet in this case it is otherwise: for by the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3), s. 10, if any *cestui que trust* shall die, leaving a trust in fee simple to descend to his heir, the trust shall be assets by descent, and the heir liable to be charged with the same, in the same manner as if the *legal* estate had vested in him.

But though the *heir* was thus subject at law to liability

(*b*) See *Bushby v. Dixon*, 3 Barn. & Cress. 298.

(*c*) See *Harbert's case*, 3 Rep. 12 b.

(*d*) 2 Bl. Com. 243, 244. The law on the subject of the heir's liability is fully stated, 2 Saund. by Wms. 7, n. (4).

for the specialty debts of his ancestor (to the extent at least of the estate inherited), no such liability at one time attached to a *devisee*, or person taking the estate of the deceased under his will; and therefore to protect creditors from such devises as might tend to their prejudice, it was provided by statute 3 & 4 William and Mary, c. 14, called "The Statute of Fraudulent Devises" (*e*), that where a deceased person shall have devised any real estate, without making it subject to the payment of his debts, his devisee shall be liable to be charged in respect of the real estate so devised, in the same manner as, and jointly with, the heir: and a creditor, bringing an action at law for that purpose, shall be entitled either to make the devisee a joint defendant with the heir, or to sue the devisee alone, where there is no heir liable (*f*).

Still, however, no remedy existed against the real estate of a deceased person (whether in the hands of an heir or devisee), to creditors claiming upon *simple contract* (i. e., not under deed), or claiming under deeds in which the heirs were not expressly bound. There have been few defects perhaps in the English jurisprudence more calculated to excite surprise than this, or more at variance with the natural sense of justice. And it is satisfactory, therefore, to be able to add that it exists no longer; for, though it was not thought convenient to alter the principle of the *common law* in this particular, the claims of creditors of every class have been effectually secured through the medium of proceedings in *equity*. Yet the redress came late, and by a slow and cautious advance. For at first it was confined to the case where the deceased was a person carrying on trade within the meaning of the

(*e*) This Act was repealed, but with a re-enactment of the provision in the text, by 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 47,—itself explained and amended, in some respects, by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 60, and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 87.

(*f*) As to these enactments, see *Farley v. Briant*, 3 Ad. & Ell. 839; *Hunting v. Sheldrake*, 9 Mee. & W. 256; *Coope v. Cresswell*, Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 106; 2 Ch. App. 112.

bankrupt laws; it being provided by 47 Geo. III. stat. 2, c. 74, and afterwards by 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 47, that, in a case of that description, the creditors by simple contract should be entitled by a suit in equity, in such manner as therein mentioned, to enforce payment out of the real estate descending on his heir, or devised by his will,—and not made subject to the payment of his debts. Subsequently, by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104, it was enacted more extensively—that when *any* person should die entitled to any real estate, not by his will made subject to his debts, such estate should be considered as assets to be administered in equity, for payment of his debts as well on simple contract as on specialty. Under this Act, however, a priority was secured to those who in their lifetime had placed their claims upon a basis of stronger obligation, for it was further provided, that, in the administration of assets, all creditors by specialty in which the heirs were bound, should be paid in full before any creditors by simple contract, or claiming on specialties in which the heirs were not bound. But by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46, it was subsequently enacted, that, in the administration of the estate of any person who should die on or after 1st January, 1870, no debt or liability of such person should be entitled to any priority or preference by reason merely that the same is secured by an instrument under seal, or is otherwise made a specialty debt; but that all his creditors, as well specialty as simple contract, shall be treated as standing in equal degree, and be paid accordingly out of his assets, whether they be legal or equitable. There is, however, a proviso that this enactment shall not prejudice any lien, charge or other security which any creditor may hold for his debt (*g*).

(*g*) In 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, will be found provisions to meet the case of a testator who, having charged his real estate with the payment of specific sums of money, has devised

the estate so charged to trustees, without making express provision for the mode in which such money is to be raised out of the estate.

CHAPTER XII.

OF TITLE BY ESCHEAT.



ESCHEAT, we may remember, was one of the fruits and consequences of feudal tenure (*a*). The word itself is originally French or Norman, in which language it signifies chance or accident; but with us it is applied to the case where the owner of an estate in fee simple dies without having disposed of it, and leaves no heir behind him to take it by descent; so that it results back, by a kind of reversion, to the original grantor or lord of the fee (*b*). And here it is to be observed, that the land so escheating afterwards follows the seignior, as being a fruit thereof. Therefore, if the lord was entitled to the seignior by purchase, the land escheated will descend to his heirs general; if by descent, it will be inheritable only by such of his heirs as are capable of inheriting the seignior (*c*).

In order to complete this title by escheat, it is necessary that the lord perform an act of his own, by *entering* on the lands and tenements so escheated; and on failure herein, or in doing any act that amounts to an implied waiver of his right, as by accepting rent of a stranger who usurps the possession, his title by escheat is barred (*d*). It is therefore in some respect a title acquired by his own act, as well as by act of law. Indeed, this may also be

(*a*) 2 Bl. Com. 244. Vide sup.
pp. 178, 200, 210.

(*b*) 11 Feud. 86; Co. Litt. 13 a.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 13 a.

(*d*) Bl. Com. ubi sup.; Bro. Ab.
tit. Acceptance, 25; Co. Litt. 268.

said of descents themselves, in which an entry or other seisin is required, in order to make a complete title; but as both descent and escheat vest an inchoate title at least in the party, without the active interference of any person whatever, they are both properly referable to the same head, of title by "act of law" (*e*).

The law of escheat is founded upon this single principle, that the inheritance of land held in fee simple having failed, it must become what the feudal writers denominate *feudum apertum*, and must result back again to the lord of the fee, by whom (or by those whose estate he hath) it was given (*f*).

Escheats have been frequently divided into those *propter defectum sanguinis*, and those *propter delictum tenentis*; the one sort, if the tenant should die without an heir, the other, if his blood be attainted (*g*); and we propose successively to advert to both sorts, beginning with—

I. Escheats *propter defectum sanguinis*. By the law, as it stood till recently, an escheat of this sort took place,

First, where the owner in fee simple of land, of which he had been himself the purchaser, died without disposing of the same, and leaving none related to him by consanguinity, or none who was not subject to some disability such as prevented his becoming heir to any person whatever (*h*).

Secondly, where the owner in fee simple of land which he had derived by descent from some person as purchaser, (or which was descendible as if one of the owner's ancestors had been the purchaser,) died without disposing of the same, and leaving none related by consanguinity to such purchaser or ancestor, or none not subject to such disability as just mentioned (*i*).

(*e*) Vide sup. p. 387.

(*f*) 2 Bl. Com. 245.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 13 a, 92 b.

(*h*) As to the term "purchaser"

in connection with the acquirement of land, vide sup. pp. 386, 393.

(*i*) Vide sup. p. 395.

But it has latterly been considered as a hardship that, in the second case, the land should thus go over by escheat to a stranger, if the last owner died leaving a person related to *him* by consanguinity, and able to take land as heir—a possible event—because he may have left a person falling under that description, though not a relation on the side of him from whom the land had descended, or was descendible (*j*). It has now therefore been provided by 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 19 (as stated in the last chapter), that where there shall be a total failure of heirs of the purchaser, or where any land shall be descendible as if an ancestor had been the purchaser thereof, and there shall be a total failure of the heirs of such ancestor, then, and in every such case, the land shall descend, and the descent shall thenceforth be traced from the person last entitled to the land, as if he had been the purchaser thereof (*k*).

The law having been thus altered, an escheat now takes place only in the following cases,—First, where the person last entitled to land in fee simple dies without having disposed of the same, and leaving none related by consanguinity either to the person (if any) from whom as purchaser, (or as quasi purchaser,) he derived by descent,—or to himself. Secondly, where he dies without having disposed of the land, and leaving none so related who is not at the same time subject to a personal disability to take as heir. The first of these cases requires no further remark. As to the second, the persons who are under such disability, may be classed as follows:—

1. [A monster, which hath not the shape of mankind, but in any part evidently bears the resemblance of the brute creation, hath no inheritable blood, and cannot be heir to any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage; but, although it hath deformity in any part of its body, yet if it hath human shape, it may be heir. This is a

(*j*) As in *Doe v. Blackburn*.
Blackburn, 1 Moody & Robinson,
p. 547.

(*k*) This provision is, by sect. 20,
incorporated with the "Inheritance
Act," as to which vide sup. p. 390.

[very antient rule in the law of England, and its reason is too obvious and too shocking to bear a minute discussion (*l*). And if there appears no other heir than such a prodigious birth, the land shall escheat to the lord.

2. Bastards are incapable of being heirs. Bastards, by our law, are such children as are not born of lawful wedlock (*m*). Such are held to be *nullius filii*, the sons of nobody; for the maxim of the law is, "*Qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur, inter liberos non computantur*" (*n*). Being thus the sons of nobody, they have no blood in them, at least no inheritable blood; consequently none of the blood of the first purchaser; and therefore, if there be no other claimant than such illegitimate children, the land shall escheat to the lord (*o*). The civil law differs from ours in this point, and allows a bastard by birth to succeed to an inheritance, if legitimated after it was born by the lawful marriage of its father and mother (*p*): and also if the father had no lawful wife or child, then, even if the concubine was never married to the father, yet she and her bastard son were admitted each to one-twelfth of the inheritance (*q*); and a bastard was likewise capable of succeeding to the whole of his mother's estate, although she was never married; the mother being sufficiently certain, though the father is not (*r*). But our law, in favour of marriage, is much less indulgent to bastards.

There is indeed one instance in which our law has shown them some little regard; and that is usually termed the case of *bastard eigné* and *mulier puisné*. This happens when a man has a bastard son, and afterwards marries the mother, and by her has a legitimate son, who in the

(*l*) See Co. Litt. 7 b; Bract. l. 1, c. 6, s. 7, and l. 5, tr. 5, c. 30, s. 10.

(*m*) "Bastards by our law are "such children as are not born "either in lawful wedlock or within "a competent time after its determination."—2 Bl. Com. 247. See

further as to bastardy, post, bk. III. c. III.

(*n*) Co. Litt. 8 a; Bract. l. 1, c. 6, s. 7.

(*o*) Finch, Law, 117.

(*p*) Nov. 89, c. 8.

(*q*) Ibid. c. 112.

(*r*) Cod. 6, 57, 5.

[language of the law is called a *mulier*, or, as Glanvil expresses it in his Latin, *filius mulieratus* (*s*); the woman before marriage being *concubina*, and afterwards *mulier*. Now here the eldest son is bastard, or *bastard eigné*; and the younger son is legitimate, or *mulier puisné*. If then the father dies, and the *bastard eigné* enters upon his land, and enjoys it to his death, and dies seised thereof, whereby the inheritance descends to his issue; in this case the *mulier puisné* and all other heirs (though minors, married women, or under any incapacity whatsoever) are totally barred of their right (*t*). And this, 1. As a punishment on the *mulier* for his negligence, in not entering during the bastard's life, and evicting him. 2. Because the canon law (following the civil) did allow such *bastard eigné* to be legitimate, on the subsequent marriage of his mother: and therefore the laws of England (though they would not admit either the civil or canon law to rule the inheritances of this kingdom, yet) paid such a regard to a person thus peculiarly circumstanced, that, after the land had descended to his issue, they would not unravel the matter again, and suffer his estate to be shaken. But this indulgence was shown to no other kind of bastard; for if the mother was never married to the father, such bastard could have no colourable title at all (*u*).

As bastards cannot be heirs themselves, so neither can they have any heirs but those of their own bodies. For all collateral kindred consists in being derived from the

(*s*) L. 7, c. 1.

(*t*) Litt. s. 399. The rule also applies if a man has two *daughters*, the elder a bastard, and they both enter peaceably as co-parceners; Co. Litt. 244 a.

(*u*) Litt. s. 400; Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 248) here gives as an additional reason for the rule as to bastard *igné*, that "the law will not suffer "a man to be bastardized after his

"death, who entered as heir, and "died seised, and so passed for "legitimate in his lifetime." And the same reason is given in Co. Litt. 244 a. But the correctness of this view is questionable; for there is no other case in which the temporal courts allow the maxim, that a man shall not be bastardized after his death; see Co. Litt. by Butler, 244 b, n. (1).

[same common ancestor, and as a bastard has no legal ancestors, he can have no collateral kindred; and consequently can have no legal heirs, but such as claim by a lineal descent from himself. And therefore if a bastard purchases land, and dies seised thereof without issue, and intestate, the land shall escheat to the lord of the fee (*x*).] But though the descent from a bastard is necessarily confined to his issue, yet he is capable of holding land in fee simple, in such sense at least that he may make an unlimited alienation of it (either by conveyance *inter vivos* or by way of devise), and that the alienee will take an estate to his heirs general (*y*).

3. As the law stood until a very recent period aliens also were incapable of taking by descent; for they were not allowed to have any inheritable blood in them; rather indeed upon a principle of national or civil policy, than upon reasons strictly feudal (*z*). And therefore, if a man left no other relations but aliens, his land escheated to the lord.

As aliens could not inherit, so far they were on a level with bastards; but as they were also disabled to hold real estate by *purchase*, they were under still greater disabilities (*a*). And as they could neither hold by purchase, nor by inheritance, so they could have no heirs, since they could have nothing for an heir to inherit (*b*).

At common law, too, aliens could not be the *channels* of descent, for we are told by Sir Edward Coke, that if an alien cometh into England, and there hath issue two sons, who are thereby natural-born subjects, and one of them purchases land and dies; yet neither of these brethren can be heir to the other (*c*). For the *commune vinculum*, or common stock of their consanguinity, is the father; and as he had no inheritable blood in him, he

(*x*) Bract. l. 2, c. 7; Co. Litt. 244.

(*y*) 1 Prest. Est. 468.

(*z*) 2 Bl. Com. 249; Co. Litt. 8 a.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 2 b.

(*b*) Ibid.; 1 Lev. 59.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 8 a.

could communicate none to his sons; and, when the sons can by no possibility be heirs to the father, the one of them shall not be heir to the other. And though this opinion of his was afterwards overruled (*d*), it was only on the ground that the descent from one brother to the other might be considered as *immediate*, and without regard to the *commune vinculum* (*e*).

The subject, however, of tracing descent through an alien, became regulated since the time of Lord Coke by act of parliament. [For it was enacted by the statute 11 & 12 Will. III. c. 6 (*f*), that all persons, natural-born subjects of the king, might inherit and make their titles by descent from any of their ancestors (lineal or collateral), although their father or mother, or other ancestor, by, from, through, or under whom they derived their pedigrees, were born out of the king's allegiance.] And such is still the law as to tracing descent in regard to any estate which accrued before the 12th May, 1870,—the day on which passed the "Naturalization Act" of that year (33 Vict. c. 14). But by the second section of that statute it was provided, with regard to all titles accruing *after* that date, that real and personal property of every description may be taken, acquired, held and disposed of by an alien, in the same manner in all respects as by a natural-born British subject; and that a title thereto may be derived through, from, or in succession to an alien as if he had been such a subject (*g*).

Such is the state of the law with respect to escheats *propter defectum sanguinis*; as to which we shall only further observe, that by the Trustee Act, 1850, another

(*d*) *Collingwood v. Pace*, 1 Vent. 415; 1 Lev. 59; 1 Sid. 193. See acc. *Kynnaid v. Leslie*, Law Rep., 1 C. P. 389.

(*e*) As to this, vide sup. p. 418.

(*f*) See also 25 Geo. 2, c. 39, explanatory of this statute, as to which see Co. Litt. by Harg. 8 a, (n.)

(*g*) 33 Vict. c. 14, s. 2. But the act confers no right on an alien to hold real property *out* of the United Kingdom; nor to hold any municipal, parliamentary or other office or franchise (*ibid.*), or to be the owner of a British ship (s. 14).

case, besides that which we have already noticed, is withdrawn from the operation of escheat,—viz., where the land was held by the party deceased, *under a trust or mortgage*,—it being provided by this (as in substance by former statutes) for the protection of the party beneficially interested, that where a trustee or mortgagee dies intestate without an heir (or his heir or devisee is not known), the Court of Chancery shall have power to make an order vesting the lands in such person and in such manner as the court shall direct (*f*).

II. We now arrive at the consideration of escheats *propter delictum tenentis*; which arose, where by attainder, the blood of the person attainted became, in the eye of the law, so corrupted as to be no longer inheritable.

Attainder imports that extinction of civil rights and capacities which took place whenever a person who had committed treason or felony received judgment of death or outlawry for his crime (*g*); and (besides other consequences) it involved in certain cases *the corruption of blood*, so as to prevent the descent of land (which depends, as we have seen, on blood or consanguinity) to the offender or his heirs.

The old law with respect to corruption of blood upon attainder, and the consequent escheat of the offender's lands and tenements to the lord of the fee, has been so much altered by the modern enactments to which we shall presently refer, as to have lost much of its former importance. As explanatory however of these, and as throwing light on the researches of the student, its doctrines continue to deserve our attention; and we shall here proceed to examine them (*h*).

According to the antient law, by the commission of treason, or other felony, the blood of the tenant was cor-

(*f*) 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, ss. 14, 19.

(*g*) See further as to attainder, post, bk. VI. c. XXIII.

(*h*) See 2 Bl. Com. 252—256.

rupted and stained, and the original donation of the feud was thereby determined, it being always granted to the vassal on the implied condition of *dum bene se gesserit*; upon the thorough demonstration of which guilt by legal attainder, the feudal covenant and mutual bond of fealty were held to be broken, the estate instantly fell back from the offender to the lord of the fee, and the inheritable quality of his blood was extinguished and blotted out for ever.

This escheat to the *lord* by reason of his tenant's attainder, must be carefully distinguished from forfeiture to the *crown*; consequences which by reason of their similitude in some points, and because the crown being very frequently the immediate lord of the fee, was therefore entitled to both, have been often confounded together. For, independently of any escheat, the felon's lands and tenements (to the extent of his interest therein) were, by force of the attainder, immediately forfeited to the crown (*i*).

Escheat to the lord, therefore, operated in subordination to forfeiture to the crown; indeed, the law of forfeiture was (in the case of treason at least) of older date in this country than that of escheat; for the former doctrine prevailed in the old Saxon times (*k*), while the latter appears to have been the result of the introduction of the Norman tenures (*l*).

Hitherto we have only spoken of estates vested in the offender, at the time of his attainder. And here the law of forfeiture stopped; but the law of escheat pursued the matter still further. For the blood of the tenant being, on his attainder, utterly corrupted and extinguished, it followed, not only that all that he then had should escheat from him, but also that he should be incapable of inheriting anything for the future: and this may further

(*i*) 2 Inst. 64; 1 Salk. 85.

(*k*) Wilkins' *Leges Anglo-Sax.*

Ll. Alfred. c. 4; Ll. Canut. 54.

(*l*) 2 Bl. Com. 252.

illustrate the distinction between forfeiture and escheat. If, therefore, a father was seised in fee, and the son committed treason and was attainted, and then the father died, here the land would escheat to the lord; because the son, by the corruption of his blood, was incapable to be heir, and there could be no other heir during his life; but nothing would be forfeited to the king, for the son never had any interest in the lands to forfeit (*m*). In this case the escheat operated, and not the forfeiture; but in the following instance the forfeiture worked and not the escheat. As where a new felony was created by act of parliament, and it was provided (as was frequently the case) that it should not extend to corruption of blood; here the lands of the felon would not escheat to the lord, but yet the profits of them would be forfeited to the king for a year and a day and so long after as the offender lived (*n*).

There was yet a further consequence of the corruption and extinction of hereditary blood, which was this, that the person attainted would not only be incapable himself of inheriting, or transmitting his own property by heirship; but would also obstruct the descent of lands or tenements to his posterity, in all cases where they were obliged to derive their title through him from any remoter ancestor. The channel which conveyed the hereditary blood from his ancestors to him, was not only exhausted for the present, but totally dammed up and rendered impervious for the future. This was a refinement upon the antient law of feuds; which allowed that the grandson might be heir to his grandfather, though the son in the intermediate generation was guilty of felony (*o*). But, by the law of England, a man's blood was so universally corrupted by attainder, that his sons could neither inherit to him nor to any other ancestors, at least on the part of their attainted father (*p*).

(*m*) Co. Litt. 13 a.

(*n*) 3 Inst. 47.

(*o*) Van Leeuwen, in 2 Feud. 31.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 391 b.

This corruption of blood could not be absolutely removed but by authority of parliament. The king might excuse the public punishment of an offender; but could not abolish the private right, which had accrued, or might accrue, to individuals as a consequence of the criminal's attainder. He might remit a forfeiture, in which the interest of the crown is alone concerned; but he could not wipe away the corruption of blood; for therein a third person had an interest, the lord who claimed by escheat. If, therefore, a man had a son, and was attainted, and afterwards pardoned by the king, this son could never inherit to his father, or his father's ancestors; because his paternal blood, being once thoroughly corrupted by his father's attainder, must continue so; but if the son had been born after the pardon, he might inherit; because by the pardon the father was made a new man, and might convey new inheritable blood to his after-born children (*q*).

Upon the whole it appears, that a person attainted was neither allowed to retain his former estate, nor to inherit any future one; nor could he transmit any inheritance to his issue, either immediately from himself, or mediately through himself from any remoter ancestor; for his inheritable blood, which is necessary either to hold, to take, or to transmit any feudal property, was blotted out, corrupted, and extinguished for ever; and the consequence was that estates, thus impeded in their descent, resulted back and escheated to the lord.

But the doctrine of corruption of blood on attainder, arising as it did from feudal principles, and perhaps extending further than even those principles would warrant, gradually came to be regarded as a peculiar hardship, at least as regarded the family of the offender. And therefore in most (if not all) of the new felonies from time to time created by parliament since the reign of Henry the eighth, it was declared that they should not extend to any cor-

ruption of blood (*r*). And in our own times the spirit of those enactments became infused into the general law of the realm; and whatever savoured of inhumanity or harshness under the antient system was effectually (though by degrees) removed. For by 54 Geo. III. c. 145, it was provided that no attainder for felony, except for *treason* or *murder*, should extend to the disinheriting of, nor to the prejudice of any person other than the offender himself during his life. Again, by the Inheritance Act, (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106,) that when the person, from whom descent is to be traced, should have had any relation, who having been attainted had died before such descent; such attainder should not prevent the descent from being traced through such relation, unless the estate had escheated on such attainder before 1st January, 1834 (*s*). Moreover, by the Trustee Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 60), it was enacted that no lands, stock, or chose in action, vested in any person upon any *trust*, or by way of *mortgage*, should escheat by reason of the attainder or conviction, for any offence of the trustee or mortgagee. And the doctrine of escheat *propter delictum tenentis*, gradually reduced in importance by these several enactments, seems now to have been altogether set aside; it having been provided by the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 1, reciting it to be “expedient to abolish the forfeiture of lands and goods for treason and felony,” that after the passing of that act no confession, verdict, inquest, conviction, or judgment for any treason or felony or *felo de se* shall cause any attainder or corruption of blood or any forfeiture or escheat (*t*).

In conclusion of the chapter we may remark, that

(*r*) By 7 Anne, c. 21, it was enacted, that after the death of the Pretender and his sons, no attainder for treason should operate to the prejudice of other than the offender himself; but this provision (the operation of which was postponed

by 17 Geo. 2, c. 39) was repealed by 39 Geo. 3, c. 93.

(*s*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 10.

(*t*) The act, however, preserves *in statu quo* the law of forfeiture consequent on *outlawry* (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 1).

where (under the former law) an escheat or forfeiture of lands actually took place, its consequences were frequently remitted, when the crown was the party entitled to take the benefit. For, in such event, the sovereign, by modern acts of parliament, was frequently empowered to make grants for the purpose of restoring the land to the family of the former owner; or to carry into effect any grant, conveyance, or devise of the same that such owner might have intended to make (*u*).

(*u*) See, for example, 39 & 40 sess. 2, c. 24; 59 Geo. 3, c. 94; Geo. 3, c. 88, s. 12; 47 Geo. 3, 6 Geo. 4, c. 17.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF TITLE BY OCCUPANCY.



[OCCUPANCY is the taking possession of those things which before belonged to nobody. This, as we have seen, is the true ground and foundation of all property; that is, of holding those things in severalty, which by the law of nature, unqualified by that of society, were common to all mankind (*a*). But when once it was agreed that everything capable of ownership should have an owner, natural reason suggested, that he who could first declare his intention of appropriating anything to his own use, and in consequence of such intention actually took it into possession, should thereby gain the absolute property of it; according to the doctrine recognized by the laws of Rome, *quod nullius est, id ratione naturali occupanti conceditur* (*b*).

This right of occupancy, so far as it concerns real property (for of personal chattels we do not in this place speak), hath been confined by the laws of England within a very narrow compass and extended only to a single instance; namely, where a man was tenant *pur autre vie*, that is, had an estate granted to himself only (without mentioning his heirs) for the life of another man, and died during the life of *cestui que vie*, (or him by whose life it was holden): in this case, he that could first enter on the land might lawfully retain the possession so long as *cestui que vie* lived, by right of *common* occupancy (*c*).

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 152.

(*b*) Ff. 41, 1, 3.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 41 b. As to title by

occupancy, see *Geary v. Bearcroft*,
Carter, 59; Vaughan, 187.

[This seems to have been recurring to first principles, and calling in the law of nature to ascertain the property of the land, when left without a legal owner. For it did not revert to the grantor, though at one time it was supposed so to do (*d*); for he had parted with all his interest so long as *cestui que vie* lived: it did not escheat to the lord of the fee, for all escheats must be of the absolute entire fee, and not of any particular estate carved out of it, much less of so minute a remnant as this; it did not belong to the grantee, for he was dead; it did not descend to his heirs, for there were no words of inheritance in the grant;] nor could it vest in his executors, for (at the period of which we speak) an estate *pur autre vie* seems not to have been devisable by will (*e*). [Belonging therefore to nobody, like the *hæreditas jacens* of the Romans, the law left it open to be seized and appropriated by the first person that could enter upon it during the life of *cestui que vie*, under the name of an occupant.] But if the estate *pur autre vie* had been granted to a man and his heirs during the life of *cestui que vie*, there could not be a title by common occupancy, but the heir of the grantee would succeed, and was called a *special* occupant (*f*). And so the law continues to this day,—the heir succeeding, according to the doctrine most commonly received, in virtue of a special exclusive right (by the terms of the original grant) to enter upon and occupy the land during the residue of the estate granted; for as there is no estate of inheritance, he cannot, properly speaking, take by descent. But by other authorities, the heir (though termed a special

(*d*) See Bract. l. 2, c. 9; l. 4, tr. 3, c. 9, s. 4; Flet. l. 3, c. 12, s. 6; l. 5, c. 5, s. 15.

(*e*) See 1 Powell on Devises, p. 34.

(*f*) See Atkinson v. Baker, 4 T. R. 229, and the other authorities cited in Carpenter v. Dunsmure, 3 Ell. &

Bl. 918. As to the case where an estate *pur autre vie* is granted to a man and "his executors, administrators, and assigns," see Westfaling v. Westfaling, 3 Atk. 460; Williams v. Jekyl, 2 Ves. sen. 683; Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. 425; Fitzroy v. Howard, 3 Russ. 230.

occupant) does in reality take by descent; and his estate, though not a fee, is a descendible freehold (*g*).

An estate *pur autre vie* may be granted, not only to a man and his heirs, but to a man and the heirs of his body; and this is termed a *quasi entail*; the interest so granted not being properly an estate tail,—for the statute *De donis* applies only where the subject of the entail is an estate of inheritance (*h*),—but yet so far in the nature of an estate tail, that it will go to the heir of the body of the grantee as special occupant, during the life of *cestui que vie*. And such estate may be also granted with a remainder thereon during the life of *cestui que vie*: but the alienation of the *quasi* tenant in tail will bar not only his issue but those in remainder; and the alienation for that purpose (unlike that of an estate tail properly so called) may be effected by *any* method of conveyance *inter vivos* (*i*).

In order to remedy the inconvenience attaching to the previous law with regard to the occupancy of estates *pur autre vie*, during the interval between the death of the owner and that of *cestui que vie*, careful provisions have been made by the legislature in modern times. For by the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 12 (as explained by 14 Geo. II. c. 20, s. 9), any estate *pur autre vie* was rendered devisable by will, and (in default of such disposition) made liable, in the hands of the heir as special occupant, or of the personal representatives, as the case might be, to the debts of the deceased owner, and, subject thereto, to distribution among the next of kin (*j*).

(*g*) See *Holden v. Smallbroke*, Vaughan, 201; *Doe v. Martin*, 2 W. Bl. 1150; *Doe d. Blake v. Luxton*, 6 T. R. 291; *Bearpark v. Hutchinson*, 7 Bing. 188.

(*h*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 20 a, n. (5).

(*i*) See 3 P. Wms. 265, n. (5th ed.); *Norton v. Frecker*, 1 Atk. 524; *Grey v. Mannock*, 2 Eden, 339; *Doe*

v. Luxton, ubi sup.; *Campbell v. Sands*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 294; *Dillon v. Dillon*, 2 Ball & B. 77; *Hopkins v. Ramadge*, 1 Batty, 365.

(*j*) See *Doe d. Jeff v. Robinson*, 8 Barn. & Cress. 296; *Doe d. Lewis v. Lewis*, 9 Mee. & W. 662; see also Co. Litt. by Harg. 41 (b), n. (*s*).

And though these provisions were repealed by the New Will Act (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26), fresh enactments were made in that statute, in terms somewhat more extensive, to the following effect (*k*);—that an estate *pur autre vie*, of whatever tenure, and whether it be a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament, may be devised by last will and testament (*l*): that if no disposition by will be made of an estate *pur autre vie* of a freehold nature, it shall be chargeable in the hands of the heir (if it comes to him by reason of special occupancy) as assets by descent, as in the case of freehold land in fee simple (*m*): that in case there shall be no special occupant of an estate *pur autre vie*, of whatever tenure, and whether a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament, it shall go to the executor or administrator of the party that had the estate thereof by virtue of the grant: and that, in every case where it comes to the hands of such personal representative, whether by special occupancy or in virtue of that Act, it shall be assets in his hands, to be applied and distributed in the same manner as personal estate (*n*).

It is only in an estate *pur autre vie* (as already remarked), that our law affords any example of the acquisition of land by occupancy. It is difficult at least to put any other instance wherein there is not some owner of the land appointed by the law (*o*). [In the case of a sole corporation, as a parson of a church, when he dies or resigns, though there is no *actual* owner of the land till a successor be appointed, yet there is a *legal, potential* ownership subsisting in contemplation of law; and when the successor is appointed, his appointment shall have a retrospect and relation backwards, so as to entitle him to all the profits

(*k*) The repeal does not extend to the estates of persons dying prior to 1st January, 1838 (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 2, 34).

(*l*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3. The earlier statutes did not

apply to copyholds, *Zouch v. Forse*, 7 East, 186.

(*m*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 6. As to assets, vide sup. p. 432.

(*n*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 6.

(*o*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 261.

[from the instant that the vacancy commenced. And in all other instances, when the tenant dies intestate, and no other owner of the lands is to be found in the common course of descent, there the law vests an ownership in the crown, or in the subordinate lord of the fee, by escheat.

So also, where the laws of other nations give a right by occupancy, as in lands newly created by the rising of an island in the sea or in a river, or by the alluvion or dereliction of the waters; in these instances the law of England assigns them an immediate owner.] Thus, in case a new island rise in the *sea*, though the civil law gives it to the first occupant (*p*), yet ours gives it to the sovereign (*q*). And as to lands gained from the sea, either by *alluvion*, that is, the washing up of sand and earth, so as in time to make *terra firma*; or by *dereliction*, as when the sea shrinks back below the usual water-mark; in these cases the law is held to be, that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it shall go to the owner of the land immediately behind, for *de minimis non curat lex*. But if the alluvion or dereliction be sudden and considerable, in this case it belongs *de jure communi* to the crown; for the soil, when the sea flowed over it, was *primâ facie* the crown's property (*r*), and therefore ought to remain so, though no longer covered by the sea (*s*). And upon the same principle, a sudden inun-

(*p*) Inst. 2, 1, 22.

(*q*) Hale, *de Jure Maris*, 17; Callis of Sewers, 45, 2nd edit. The treatise, *de Jure Maris*, was published by Mr. Hargrave, and has been generally received as a work of Lord Hale; but doubt is thrown on this point in a learned argument of Mr. Serjeant Merewether, in *Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c. of London*, before the Court of Chancery.

(*r*) Hale, *ubi sup.* p. 14; see *Blundell v. Catterall*, 5 B. & Ald. 268.

(*s*) 2 Bl. Com. 262; Hale, *ubi sup.*; 2 Roll. Ab. 170; Dyer, 326; Callis, 51, 53; and see *Rex v. Lord Harbrough*, 3 Barn. & Cress. 91; 5 Bing. 163; *Scrutton v. Brown*, 4 Barn. & Cress. 505. It is to be observed, however, that in Hale (pp. 12, 17), it is laid down that the king may grant a manor *cum littore maris* to a subject, and that the shore (that is, the space between the ordinary high and low-water mark) will pass; and it would seem that after such a grant, a sudden increase

dation from the sea will not deprive the former owner of the land submerged, of his right (*t*); though, on the other hand, it has been decided, that where the sea gains upon the land by gradual advance, (the crown being the owner between high and low water-mark,) the crown becomes also the owner of the land newly covered with water (*u*). [It is said too by Bracton, that if an island rise in the middle of a *river*, it belongs, in common, to those who have lands on each side thereof; but if it be nearer to one bank than the other, it belongs only to him who is proprietor of the nearest shore (*x*). Yet this seems only to be reasonable where the soil of the river is equally divided between the owners of the opposite shores; for if the whole soil is the freehold of any one man,—as it usually is whenever a several fishery is claimed (*y*),—there it seems just (and so is the constant practice) that the eyots or little islands, arising in any part of the river, shall be the property of him who owneth the piscary and the soil. It is further laid down in our books, that if a river running between two lordships, by degrees gains upon the one, and thereby leaves the other dry; the owner who loses his ground thus imperceptibly has no remedy: but if the course of the river be changed by a sudden and violent flood, or other hasty means, his land will not be lost (*z*). And this law of alluvions and derelictions, with regard to rivers, is nearly the same in the imperial law, from whence indeed those our determinations seem to have been drawn and adopted; but we ourselves, as islanders, have applied them to *marine* increases (*a*).]

of land by alluvion or dereliction, within these limits, must belong to the grantee.

(*t*) Hale, *de Jure*, &c., pp. 15, 17.

(*u*) *In re Hull and Selby Railway*, 5 Mee. & W. 327.

(*x*) Bract. lib. 2, c. 2.

(*y*) *Smith v. Kemp*, Salk. 637.

(*z*) Callis, 51, 2nd edit. In Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 262) the statement on this subject is, that he “shall have what the river has left in any other place;” but this seems not to be supported by the authorities.

(*a*) 2 Inst. 1, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF TITLE BY FORFEITURE.

[FORFEITURE is a punishment annexed by law to some illegal act, or negligence, in the owner of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, whereby he loses all his interest therein, and they go to the party injured as a recompense for the wrong which either he alone, or the public together with himself, hath sustained.]

Lands may be forfeited by various means; some of which it will not be convenient to discuss in this place, as they are incidental only to subjects of a more general description, belonging to other divisions of the work (*a*). But there are three kinds of forfeiture which require a distinct and separate consideration, and to which the present chapter will consequently be devoted. The first of them accrues by alienation in mortmain; the second, by the wrongful alienation of particular tenants; the third, by wrongful disclaimer.

1. [Alienation in *mortmain*, in *mortuâ manu*, is an alienation of lands or tenements to any corporation,—sole or aggregate, ecclesiastical or temporal (*b*). But these purchases having been chiefly made by religious houses, in consequence whereof the lands became perpetually inherent in one “dead hand,” this hath occasioned the general appellation of mortmain to be applied to such alienations; and the religious houses themselves to be principally con-

(*a*) As to forfeiture of lands by attainder under the law as it existed prior to the passing of the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, vide post,

bk. VI. c. XXIII.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 2 b. As to corporations, vide sup. pp. 358, 362, 375; post, bk. IV. pt. III. c. I.

[sidered in forming the statutes of mortmain : in deducing the history of which statutes, it will be matter of curiosity to observe the great address and subtle contrivance of the ecclesiastics in eluding from time to time the laws in being, and the zeal with which successive parliaments have pursued them through all their finesses ; how new remedies were still the parents of new evasions ; till the legislature at last, though with difficulty, obtained a decisive victory.]

By the common law, a corporation is as capable of purchasing lands as an individual (*c*) ;—subject to this distinction, that persons corporate ~~take~~ the fee to hold to their *successors*, instead of their *heirs*. Yet it has always been necessary for corporations to have a licence in mortmain from the crown, to enable them to become the holders of lands (*d*) ; for as the king is the ultimate lord of every fee, he ought not, unless by his own consent, to lose his privilege of escheats and other feudal profits, by the vesting of lands in tenants who can never die. [And such licences of mortmain seem to have been necessary among the Saxons, above sixty years before the Norman conquest (*e*). But besides this general licence from the king, as lord paramount of the kingdom, it was also requisite, whenever there was a mesne or intermediate lord between the king and the alienor, to obtain his licence also (upon the same feudal principles), for the alienation of the specific land. And if no such licence was obtained, the king or other lord might respectively enter on the lands so aliened in mortmain, as a forfeiture.] Yet such were the influence and ingenuity of the clergy, that, notwithstanding this fundamental principle, we find that the

(*c*) Case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Rep. 30 ; Co. Litt. 2 b.

(*d*) F. N. B. 221.

(*e*) Selden, Jan. Angl. l. 2, s. 45. It should be observed, however, that a doubt is expressed by a writer

of great authority, whether before Magna Charta, any restraint was put by the common law upon alienations in mortmain ; see Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 321, 7th edit.

largest and most considerable dotations of religious houses without licence, happened within less than two centuries after the Conquest. [But, when these began to grow numerous, it was observed that the feudal services, ordained for the defence of the kingdom, were every day visibly withdrawn; and that the lords were curtailed of the fruits of their seigniories,—their escheats, wardships, reliefs, and the like. And therefore in order to prevent this (*f*), it was ordered by the second of king Henry the third's great charters (*g*), and afterwards by that printed in our common statute books, that all such gifts should be void, and the land forfeited to the lord of the fee (*h*).

But as this prohibition extended only to religious *houses*, bishops and other sole corporations were not included therein; and the aggregate ecclesiastical bodies—who, Sir Edward Coke observes (*i*), in this were to be commended, that they ever had of their council the best learned men that they could get—found many means to creep out of this statute, by buying in lands that were holden of themselves as lords of the fee, and thereby evading the forfeiture; or by taking long leases for years, which first introduced those extensive terms, for a thousand or more years, which became so frequent in conveyances. This produced the statute *De religiosis*, 7 Edw. I.;—which

(*f*) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 269) enumerates, as another of the mischiefs, the prevention of which was designed, “that the circulation of “landed property from man to man “began to stagnate.” Lord Coke, however, in 2 Inst. 75, lays it down (in conformity with the language of the statute *De religiosis*), that the causes of the law were two, viz., that the services for defence of the realm were withdrawn, and that the lords lost their escheats and the like; (and see Co. Litt. 2 b.) Though the holding of lands in mortmain natu-

rally tended to restrain alienation, this does not appear to have formed one of the reasons on which the policy of the law of mortmain was originally founded.

(*g*) A.D. 1217, c. 43, edit. Oxon.

(*h*) Mag. Chart. (9 Hen. 3, c. 36.) It is laid down by Lord Coke that the prohibition extended as well to the case where the religious house *kept* the land so conveyed, as where they *gave it back* to hold of themselves; (2 Inst. 74.)

(*i*) 2 Inst. 75.

[provided, that *no person*, religious or other whatsoever, should buy, or sell, or receive under pretence of a gift or a term of years or any other title whatsoever; nor should by any art or ingenuity appropriate to himself; any lands or tenements in mortmain: upon pain that the immediate lord of the fee, or, on his default for one year, the lords paramount, and, in default of all of them, the king, might enter thereon as a forfeiture.

This seemed to be a sufficient security against all alienations in mortmain; but as these statutes extended only to gifts and conveyances between the parties, the religious houses now began to set up a fictitious title to the land which it was intended they should have, and to bring an action to recover it against the tenant, who by fraud and collusion made no defence; and thereby judgment was given for the religious house, which then *recovered* the land by sentence of law upon a supposed prior title. And thus they had the honour of inventing those fictitious adjudications of right which afterwards became the great assurance of the kingdom, under the name of *common recoveries* (*k*). But upon this, the statute of Westminster the Second (13 Edw. I. c. 32) enacted, that in such cases a jury shall try the true right of the demandants or plaintiffs to the land; and if the religious house or corporation be found to have it, they shall still recover seisin; otherwise it shall be forfeited to the immediate lord of the fee, or else to the next lord, and finally to the king, upon the immediate or other lord's default. And the like provision was made by the succeeding chapter (13 Edw. I. c. 33), in case the tenants set up crosses upon their lands (the badges of knights templars and hospitallers) in order to protect them from the feudal demands of their lords, by virtue of the privileges of those religious and military orders. So careful indeed was this provident prince to prevent any future evasions, that when the statute of *Quia*

(*k*) Vide sup. p. 247; post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XIX.; Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. ii. p. 155.

[*emptores* (18 Edw. I. c. 3) abolished all subinfeudations, and gave liberty for all men to alienate their lands to be holden of their next immediate lord, a proviso was inserted that this should not extend to authorize any kind of alienation in mortmain (*l*). And when afterwards the method of obtaining the king's licence by writ of *ad quod damnum* was recognized by 27 Edw. I. (stat. 2), it was further provided by statute 34 Edw. I. (stat. 3) that no such licence should be effectual without the consent of the mesne or intermediate lords (*m*).

Yet still it was found difficult to set bounds to ecclesiastical ingenuity; for when they were driven out of all their former holds, they devised a new method of conveyance, by which the lands were granted, not to themselves directly, but to nominal feoffees *to the use of* these religious houses; thus distinguishing between the *possession* and the *use*, and receiving the actual profits, while the seisin of the lands remained in the nominal feoffee; who was held by the courts of equity (then under the direction of the clergy) to be bound in conscience to account to his *cestui que use* for the rents and emoluments of the estate. And it is to these inventions that our practisers are indebted for the introduction of "uses and trusts," the foundation of modern conveyancing (*n*). But unfortunately for the inventors themselves, they did not long enjoy the advantage of their new device; for the statute 15 Rich. II. c. 5, enacted, that the lands which had been so purchased to uses should be amortised by licence from the crown, or else be sold to private persons; and that for the future, uses should be subject to the statutes of mortmain, and forfeitable like the lands themselves. And whereas the statutes had been eluded by purchasing large tracts of land adjoining to churches, and consecrating them by the name of churchyards, such

(*l*) 2 Inst. 501.

(*m*) As to the nature of the writ
ad quod damnum, see Hist. Eng.

Law, by Reeves, vol. ii. p. 230.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 356.

[subtle imagination was also declared to be within the compass of the statutes of mortmain. And civil or lay corporations, as well as ecclesiastical, were also declared to be within the mischief, and of course within the remedy provided.]

The policy of these statutes prohibitory of alienation in mortmain, was afterwards considered as fit to be extended also to the case where lands, though not conveyed to corporate bodies, were given *on trust* for parish churches, or other institutions, “erected and made of devotion;”—for the trustees to carry such uses into effect being generally numerous, and the land belonging, on the decease of each trustee, to the survivors, these gifts operated like gifts in mortmain, properly so called, to the diminution of descents with their attendant feudal perquisites; and, for the same reason, to the diminution of escheats (*o*). It was consequently declared by the statute 23 Henry VIII. c. 10, that all future grants of lands in trust for any of the purposes aforesaid, if for any longer term than twenty years, should be void.

[As to the prohibition, however, to aliene to bodies corporate, it is to be observed, that during all this time it was in the power of the crown, by granting a *licence of mortmain*, to remit the forfeiture, so far as related to its own rights; and to enable any spiritual or other corporation to purchase and hold any lands or tenements in perpetuity; which prerogative is declared and confirmed by the statute 18 Edw. III. stat. 3, c. 3. But as doubts were conceived at the time of the Revolution how far

(*o*) See the preamble of 23 Hen. 8, c. 10, and the argument in Porter's case (1 Rep. 23 b.) The protection of the feudal rights, however, was probably not the only object. “As the age became enlightened” (remarks an useful writer), “gifts of this kind were viewed with a less favourable eye. These senti-

ments, concurring with the designs of the enterprising prince upon the throne, contributed towards the general attack which was soon afterwards made on one branch of such institutions” (those erected for devotion), the “religious houses.”—Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iv. p. 237.

[such licence was valid (*p*),—since the king had no power to dispense with the statutes of mortmain by a clause of *non obstante*, which was the usual course, though it seems to have been unnecessary (*q*), and as, by the gradual declension of mesne seigniories through the long operation of the statute of *Quia emptores*, the rights of immediate lords were reduced to a very small compass,—it was therefore declared by the statute 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 37, that the crown for the future, at its own discretion, might grant licences to aliene or take in mortmain, of whomsoever the tenements might be holden (*r*).

Nor is this the only relaxation that has taken place in the law of mortmain; for after the dissolution of monasteries under Henry the eighth, though the policy of the next popish successor affected to grant a security to the possessors of abbey lands, yet, in order to regain so much of them as either the zeal or timidity of their owners might induce them to part with, the statutes of mortmain were suspended for twenty years, by the statute 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 8; and during that time any lands or tenements were allowed to be granted to any spiritual corporation without any licence whatsoever.] And long afterwards, under the influence of much more commendable views, it was enacted by 17 Car. II. c. 3 (*s*), and by many subsequent Acts—among which may be particularized 2 & 3 Anne, c. 11 (*t*), 43 Geo. III. c. 108, 55 Geo. III. c. 147, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 60, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 37, s. 22, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 84, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 104,

(*p*) See 2 Hawk. P. C. 391; Co. Litt. by Harg. 99 a, n. (1); stat. 1 W. & M. stat. 2, c. 2.

(*q*) Co. Litt. 99 a.

(*r*) Since this statute the writ of *ad quod damnum*, in order to obtain a licence of mortmain, seems no longer necessary.—See Coleridge's Blackstone, vol. ii. p. 273, n. (2); and Co. Litt. by Harg. 99 a,

n. (1).

(*s*) By 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, s. 15, the statute of 17 Car. 2, c. 3, was repealed *in toto*; but it is revived, so far as this subject is concerned, by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 37, s. 25.

(*t*) By this Act, and the subsequent statutes passed for its amendment, the fund usually called *Queen Anne's Bounty* is regulated.

s. 23—that augmentations of *poor livings* may be made free from the restrictions of the statutes of mortmain; and under other modern statutes grants of land are now permitted to be freely made to corporate bodies, for several purposes, and particularly for such as are connected with the *education of the poor*, and with *charities* in general (*u*).

In another direction, however, the law of mortmain as it existed in the time of Henry VIII. was afterwards made more stringent. It was held that the statute 23 Hen. VIII. before mentioned did not extend to any thing but *superstitious* uses (*x*): and that therefore a man might give lands notwithstanding that statute, on trust for the maintenance of a school, or the sustenance of poor people, or any other *charitable* use (*y*). But as it was apprehended “from recent experience,” that persons on their death-beds might make “large and improvident” dispositions even for these good purposes, to the disherison of their lawful heirs (*z*); it was therefore enacted by the “Mortmain Act,” 9 Geo. II. c. 36 (*a*), that no

(*u*) Among recent enactments in relaxation of the law of mortmain are 4 & 5 Vict. c. 38; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 37; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 137, s. 27; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 112; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 124, ss. 35, 41, and 81 & 32 Vict. c. 44, as to sites for buildings for *religious, educational, literary, scientific* and other charitable purposes; 22 Vict. c. 27, ss. 1, 2, and 34 Vict. c. 13, as to *recreation grounds, public parks, &c.*; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 134, s. 3, as to certain *Roman Catholic charities*. There is also a provision in the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61, s. 9, enabling *highway boards* to take lands without licence. Also the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, ss. 18, 21, enables *registered companies* to hold land to a certain extent without licence. And, finally, by the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 34, trust funds held for *public and charitable purposes*

are permitted to be invested in real securities without the trustees being deemed thereby to have acquired land within the meaning of the mortmain laws.

(*x*) Porter’s case, 1 Rep. 24. See also Adams & Lambert’s case, 4 Rep. 104; *Da Costa v. De Pas*, Ambl. 228.

(*y*) As to charitable uses, see also 43 Eliz. c. 4; 52 Geo. 3, c. 101; Bac. Abr. Char. Us.

(*z*) 2 Bl. Com. 273.

(*a*) The 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, is thus commonly called. As to its construction, see Att.-Gen. v. Stewart, 2 Meriv. 161; *Doe v. Lloyd*, 5 Bing. N. C. 741; *Jefferies v. Alexander*, 8 House of Lords Cases, p. 594; *Entwisle v. Davis*, Law Rep., 4 Eq. Ca. 272; *Hawkins v. Allen*, ib., 10 Eq. Ca. 246.

lands or hereditaments, or money to be laid out in the purchase thereof, shall be given or conveyed, or anyways charged or incumbered, in trust for, or for the benefit of any *charitable* use whatsoever, unless by deed (*a*), executed in the presence of two witnesses, twelve calendar months before the death of the donor (*b*), and enrolled in the Court of Chancery, within six calendar months after its execution (*c*),—and unless such gift be made to take effect immediately (*d*), and be without power of revocation, or other clause or covenant for the benefit of the donor, or those claiming under him. And if these several conditions are not complied with, not only is the charitable use inoperative, but the conveyance itself is void to all intents and purposes (*e*). But by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 9 (amended by 25 & 26 Vict. c. 17), the restriction in the Mortmain Act as to clauses in favour of the donor is so far qualified that there may now be, in any deed or assurance for charitable uses made after the 17th May, 1861, such a clause or covenant,—provided it shall consist of a grant or reservation of a *nominal* rent, or of mines, minerals or easements: or shall consist of provisions as to buildings, roads, and the like, for the better enjoyment as well of the property granted as of adjacent property; or of provisions as to re-entry on breach of such covenant, or other stipulation of the like nature. The donor, however, in all such cases, must reserve for his representatives

(*a*) Under the Mortmain Act, such deed was required also to be *indented*, but by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 9, s. 1, it need now neither be indented nor purport to be indented: and in the case of assurances of land of copyhold and customary tenure, no deed is required.

(*b*) See *Wickham v. Marquis of Bath*, Law Rep., 1 Eq. Ca. 17.

(*c*) However, by 29 & 30 Vict. c. 57, deeds otherwise valid, but not hitherto enrolled, may be autho-

rized to be enrolled, on the Court of Chancery being satisfied that the deed was made *bonâ fide* for full and valuable consideration, and that the omission to enrol arose from mere ignorance, inadvertence or accident.

(*d*) See *Wickham v. Marquis of Bath*, *ubi sup.* A demise will be deemed to take effect *immediately*, if it take effect within a year from its date. (26 & 27 Vict. c. 106.)

(*e*) *Doc v. Wrighte*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 710.

the same benefits as for himself, if he would prevent the operation of the statute.

It will be observed that the Mortmain Act prevents any disposition *by will*, of lands (or of money to be laid out on land) in trust for any charitable use (*f*). On the other hand, its provisions are made subject to partial exception in the case of *stock in the public funds*; as to which, instead of a deed executed *twelve* months before the donor's death, it is required that the transfer in the bank books should be made *six* months at least before his death (*g*). There is also an exception where the transaction is a *bonâ fide* purchase, a full valuable consideration being paid down, or reserved by way of annual payment (*h*): and such purchases will (by more recent Acts) be valid, notwithstanding the death of the vendor within twelve months after the execution of the deed; and also though a *substantial* and not a nominal rent be reserved to the vendor as consideration for the assurance (*i*). Gifts to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, or any of their colleges, or in trust for the scholars on the foundations of Eton, Winchester and Westminster (*k*),—or in favour of the British Museum (*l*),—are also entirely exempted from the operation of the Mortmain Acts.

2. Alienations by *particular tenants*, when they conveyed by a common law conveyance, such as feoffment, fine, or recovery, a greater estate than the law entitled them to make, were, at common law (as already noticed), forfeitures to the person in immediate remainder or reversion (*m*). As if tenant for his own life aliened by feoffment

(*f*) See *Brook v. Badley*, Law Rep., 4 Eq. Ca. 106; 3 Ch. App. 672; In re Watmough's Trusts, ib., 8 Eq. Ca. 272.

(*g*) 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, s. 1.

(*h*) Ibid.

(*i*) See 9 Geo. 4, c. 85; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 13, s. 4.

(*k*) 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, s. 4.

(*l*) 5 Geo. 4, c. 39.

(*m*) Vide sup. pp. 317, 325. According to Blackstone, (vol. ii. p. 274,) "the forfeiture accrues "when the alienations are greater "than the law entitles them to "make, and *divest the remainder*

for the life of another, or in tail or in fee;—these being estates which either must or may last longer than his own, the creating them was not only beyond his power, and inconsistent with the nature of his interest, but was also a forfeiture of his own particular estate, to him in remainder or reversion, who was entitled to enter immediately (*n*). For which the reason seems to be, that the tenant, by thus taking upon himself to assert a more extensive right than he derived from the lord of the fee, violated the feudal compact (which bound him to fidelity), and consequently no longer deserved to retain its benefit (*o*). He had therefore, by his own act, determined his own original interest; and, on such determination, the next taker was entitled to enter regularly, as in his remainder or reversion (*p*). The same law which is thus laid down with regard to tenants for life, held also with respect to lessees and other tenants of mere chattel interests; but if a tenant in tail aliened in fee, this was no immediate forfeiture to the remainder-man, but a mere *discontinuance*, as it was called, of the estate-tail (*q*), which the issue might afterwards avoid by one of the class of actions called *real*; or, after the abolition of real actions, simply by entry (*r*):

“*or reversion*,” which is also the expression of Lord Coke. (Co. Litt. 251 a.) But where the reversion or remainder is in the crown, it is not divested, and yet a forfeiture equally accrued. (Co. Litt. 251 b.) So the levying of a fine in fee, by the particular tenant, of a thing lying in grant, used to work a forfeiture; and yet it did not divest the remainder or reversion; (ibid. And see Podger’s case, 9 Rep. 106 b.)

(*n*) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 274) cites Litt. s. 415.

(*o*) Vide sup. pp. 177, 298; et Gilb. Ten. 38, 39, where, after observing that if the vassal renounced the fief this was always a cause of

forfeiture by the old feudal law, the learned author proceeds to remark, that “if the tenant for life makes “a feoffment, or levies a fine, it “is palpably contrary to his oath “of fidelity to the reversioner, and “therefore that is a plain renunciation of the feud.”

(*p*) See Bl. Com. vol. ii. p. 274.

(*q*) Co. Litt. 328 a; 2 Inst. 335; Co. Litt. by Butler, 333 a, n. (1).

(*r*) A *discontinuance* formerly took away the right of entry, and put the issue, and those in reversion and remainder, to the necessity of bringing a real action. (Litt. ss. 595, 596, 597; Doe v. Finch, 1 Nev. & M. 130.) But now by the 39th

[for he in remainder or reversion hath only a very remote and barely possible interest therein, until the issue in tail is extinct.] This kind of forfeiture, viz. by alienation contrary to law, differs materially, it is to be observed, from forfeiture by breach of condition in deed, to which we had occasion to refer in a former chapter(s); for in that case the reversioner is *in* as of his former seisin; and consequently not only the estate of the tenant himself, but all interests derived out of it (even though derived before the forfeiture) are defeated(t): but in case of forfeitures by wrongful alienation, all legal estates previously created, (as if tenant for twenty years granted a lease for fifteen,) and all charges lawfully made on the land, are good and available in law. The whole subject, however, of forfeiture by alienation has now lost much of its former importance, in consequence of changes in the state of the law relative to the chief conveyances by which this doctrine of the common law was brought into operation; viz. the abolition of fines and recoveries by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, and the provision of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, formerly noticed, “that a feoffment made after 1st of October, 1845, shall “not have any tortious operation”(u).

3. [Analogous both in its nature and its consequences, to an illegal alienation by the particular tenant, is his *disclaimer*: as where a tenant neglects to render his lord the due services, and, upon an action brought to recover them, disclaims to hold of his lord. Which disclaimer of tenure, in any court of record, is a forfeiture of the lands upon reasons most apparently feudal(x).] And so, likewise, if the particular tenant does any act which amounts

sect. of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27,
(abolishing most of the real actions,) it is enacted that no discontinuance shall take away any right of entry.

(s) Vide sup. p. 298.

(t) Gilb. Ten. 200; Dy. 344 a;
4 Rep. 24 a; Co. Litt. 234 a; 1 Rol.
Ab. 474.

(u) Vide sup. p. 317.

(x) Finch, 270, 271.

to a *virtual* disclaimer,—as if, being tenant for life only, he claims, in any court of record, to have in the estate a larger interest (*y*). And in a case, where tenant for years gave up possession of the premises demised to a third party who claimed paramount to the landlord, with intent to assist that party in setting up the adverse title—such behaviour was held a virtual disclaimer, and to work a forfeiture of his lease (*z*).

(*y*) Co. Litt. 251 b.

4 Tyrw. 619. See Doe *d.* Graves

(*z*) Doe *d.* Ellerbrook *v.* Flynn,

v. Wells, 10 Ad. & El. 427.

CHAPTER XV.

OF TITLE BY ALIENATION IN GENERAL.



THE most usual title to real estates is that of *alienation* or conveyance : under which may be comprised any method wherein estates are voluntarily resigned by one man, and accepted by another ; whether that be effected by sale, gift, marriage settlement, devise, or other transmission of property by the mutual consent of the parties.

The acquisition of an estate by way of alienation is of more recent origin in the law of England, than taking property by way of descent. [For we may remember that, by the feudal law, a pure and genuine feud could not be transferred from one feudatory to another, without the consent of the lord : lest thereby a feeble or suspicious tenant might have been substituted and imposed upon him to perform the feudal services, instead of one on whose abilities and fidelity he could depend (*a*). And as the feudatory could not aliene it in his lifetime, so neither could he by will defeat the succession, by devising his feud to another family ; nor even alter the course of it, by imposing particular limitations, or prescribing an unusual path of descent. Nor could he aliene the estate, even with the consent of the lord, unless he had also obtained the consent of his own next apparent or presumptive heir (*b*). And therefore it was usual in very antient feoffments, to express that the alienation was made by consent of the heirs of the feoffor : or sometimes for the heir apparent

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 178.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 94 ; Wright, Ten. 169.

[himself to join with the feoffor in the grant (*c*). And, on the other hand, as the feudal obligation was looked upon to be reciprocal, the lord could not aliene or transfer his seigniority without the consent of his vassal: for it was esteemed unreasonable to subject a feudatory to a new superior, with whom he might have a deadly enmity, without his own approbation; or even to transfer his fealty, without his being thoroughly apprised of it, that he might know with certainty to whom his renders and services were due; and be able to distinguish a lawful distress for rent, from a hostile seizing of his cattle by the lord of a neighbouring clan (*d*). This consent of the vassal was expressed by what was called *attorning*, or professing to become the tenant of the new lord; and the doctrine of attornment was afterwards extended to all lessees for life or years, between whom and the lessor there still exists (as we have seen) the feudal relation of lord and tenant (*e*). Accordingly, if one bought an estate with any lease for life or years standing out thereon, and the lessee refused to attorn to the purchaser, the grant or contract was in most cases void, or at least incomplete; and this was also an additional clog upon alienations (*f*).

(*c*) Madox, Formul. Angl. Nos. 316, 319, 427.

(*d*) Gilb. Ten. 83.

(*e*) Vide sup. pp. 256, 296. It is to be observed, however, that the attornment of the particular tenant was also necessary upon the grant of a *remainder*, as a *reversion*; and yet there is no feudal relation between the particular tenant and the remainder-man. The reasons assigned for attornment here, were, 1st, that the remainder-man came in by the feudal feoffment, and therefore the remainder would not pass without the utmost notoriety; and this was by attornment *coram*

paribus, to which such notoriety was attributed, that the feudal feoffment could not be altered without it; 2nd, because the action of waste, and the right of forfeiture of tenant for life, accrued to him in remainder; and therefore, the tenant for life being to some purposes attendant on the remainder-man, it was fit that he should attorn to his grant.—Gilb. Ten. 90, 91.

(*f*) Litt. § 551. In such cases, however, the lessee might be compelled to attorn, by the landlord's levying a fine. (See *Brown v. Storey*, 1 Man. & Gr. in notis, p. 129.)

[But by degrees this feudal severity is worn off; and experience hath shown that property best answers the purposes of civil life, especially in commercial countries, when its transfer and circulation are totally free and unrestrained. The road was cleared, in the first place, by a law of King Henry the first, which allowed a man to sell and dispose of lands which he himself had purchased; for over these he was thought to have a more extensive power, than over what had been transmitted to him in a course of descent from his ancestors (*g*); a doctrine which is countenanced by the feudal constitutions themselves (*h*): but he was not allowed to sell the whole of his own acquisitions, so as totally to disinherit his children, any more than he was at liberty to aliene his paternal estate (*i*). Afterwards a man seems to have been at liberty to part with all his own acquisitions, provided he had previously purchased to him and his assigns by name (*k*); and he was also allowed to part with one-fourth of the inheritance of his ancestors, without the consent of his heir (*l*): but by the great charter of Henry the third, no alienation was permitted of any part of the land, unless sufficient was left to answer the services due to the superior lord (*m*); which sufficiency was probably interpreted to be one-half or moiety of the land (*n*). But these restrictions were, in general, removed by the statute of *Quia emptores* (18 Edw. I. c. 1); whereby all persons except the king's tenants *in capite*, were left at liberty to aliene all or any part of their lands at their own discretion (*o*): sub-

(*g*) "*Emptiones vel acquisitiones suas det cui magis velit. Terram autem quam ei parentes dederunt, non mittat extra cognationem suam.*"—Wilkins, Leg. Anglo-Sax. LL. Hen. 1, c. 70.

(*h*) Feud. l. 2, t. 39.

(*i*) "*Si questum tantum habuerit is, qui partem terræ suæ donare voluerit, tunc quidem hoc ei licet; sed non totum questum, quia non*

potest filium suum hæredem exheredare."—Glanv. l. 7, c. 1.

(*k*) Mirr. c. 1, s. 3. This is also borrowed from the feudal law. (Feud. l. 2, t. 48.)

(*l*) Mirr. ibid.

(*m*) 9 Hen. 3, c. 32.

(*n*) Dalrymple of Feuds, 95; 2 Bl. Com. p. 161.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 199.

[ject only to the provision that all conveyances of the fee should be to hold of the chief lord, and not of the grantor (*p*). And even these tenants *in capite* were by the statute 1 Edw. III. c. 12, permitted to aliene on paying a fine to the king (*p*). Again, by the temporary statutes 7 Hen. VII. c. 3, and 3 Hen. VIII. c. 4, all persons attending the king in his wars were allowed to aliene their lands without licence, and were relieved from other feudal burdens. And, lastly, fines for alienations were, in all cases of freehold tenure, entirely abolished by the statute 12 Car. II. c. 24.] The restraint of *devising* lands by will, (except in some cases by particular custom,) after being partially taken off by the statute of wills, 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1, was at length totally removed, on the abolition of military tenures by the statute of Charles just mentioned. The doctrine of *attornments* continued later than any of the rest, and became extremely troublesome, though many methods were invented to evade them (*q*); till at last they were by statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 9, made no longer necessary to complete any grant or conveyance, while, on the other hand, the fraudulent attornment of a tenant to a stranger, claiming title, to the prejudice of his landlord's possession, was rendered wholly inoperative by the statute 11 Geo. II. c. 19, s. 11 (*r*).

The result of these several relaxations has at length been the complete disengagement of the realty from all the feudal restraints on alienation;—so that it may be

(*p*) 2 Inst. 67.

(*q*) 2 Bl. Com. 290. An attornment was not necessary where the estate vested by the Statute of Uses, or of Wills. (See *Brown v. Storey*, 1 Man. & Gr. in notis, p. 129.)

(*r*) It is said that the term "attornment" is now, since the above statutes, chiefly applied (somewhat

inaccurately) to such acknowledgment of tenancy as operates by way of estoppel (see *Brown v. Storey*, ubi sup.). But a legal attornment may still be required,—as where the new landlord claims rent not under a grant or conveyance, but as tenant by elegit, or otherwise, under a judgment. (See *Harris v. Booker*, 4 Bing. 99.)

laid down as a general maxim, subject to very few exceptions, that all estates in land are now freely transferable, unless granted under express stipulation to the contrary. And even such stipulations are in some instances inefficacious to the end designed; and are disregarded as repugnant in their nature or contrary to the policy of the law. Thus if an estate be conveyed in fee simple, with condition prohibiting the grantee and his heirs, or the grantee himself, from all alienation thereof, the condition is merely void(*s*): and a similar proviso annexed to an estate tail, will not prevent the tenant from making a valid conveyance in fee simple, in such method as the law has prescribed for that purpose (*t*). Estates at will or at sufferance, however, are, for reasons obviously resulting from their nature and constitution, not assignable. And besides these, there were, at the common law, some other interests which, generally speaking, were incapable of transfer. For a man who had been ousted of the possession of his land by the wrongful act of a stranger so as to retain a *right of entry* only, could not in general convey that right to another, lest pretended titles might be granted to great men, whereby justice might be trodden

(*s*) Co. Litt. 222 b, 223 a.

(*t*) Ibid. 223 b; Mary Portington's case, 10 Rep. 35. Such a condition, however, if annexed to a lease for years, is binding. (Co. Litt. 223 b; *Roe v. Galliers*, 2 T. R. 133.) The reason assigned by Coke for the invalidity of a condition restraining a tenant in fee simple or fee tail from any alienation whatever, is the repugnancy of such a restriction to the nature of the gift. A condition, however, restraining him and his *heirs* from alienation, is also opposed to that policy of the law which will not suffer any attempt to create a *perpetuity*, that is, to confine property in a given course

of devolution *in perpetuum*;—a subject on which we shall have occasion to say more hereafter. It is to conditions restraining tenants in tail from alienation, that the term “perpetuity” seems to have been first applied.—(See Third Real Property Report, p. 30.) As to the validity or invalidity of provisions restrictive of alienation in other cases,—a subject which would lead to too lengthy a discussion for this place,—see *Roe v. Galliers*, *ubi sup.*; *Ware v. Cann*, 10 Barn. & Cress. 433; *Brandon v. Robinson*, 18 Ves. 433; *Jackson v. Hobhouse*, 2 Mer. 483; *Scarborough v. Borman*, 1 Beav. 34; see also 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 37.

down and the weak oppressed (*u*): and the same law was established with respect to a *contingent* interest (*x*); as to which, however, this further doctrine obtained, that though not generally transferable at law, yet the assignment of it for a valuable consideration was considered as effectual in a court of equity (*y*). But by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3, both a right of entry and a contingent interest were made capable of passing *by devise*. And by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, this class of interests may now also pass *by deed*;—it being provided that after the 1st October, 1845, a contingent, an executory, and a future interest, and a possibility coupled with an interest, in any tenements or hereditaments of any tenure, whether the object of the gift or limitation of such interest or possibility be or be not ascertained;—and also a right of entry, whether immediate or future, and whether vested or contingent, in or upon any tenements or hereditaments in England, of any tenure,—may be disposed of by deed; with a saving, however, as to the regular modes of alienation of the interests of tenants in tail and married women,—which are still to be observed (*z*).

Having made these remarks on the subject of alienation in general, we shall now proceed to inquire, first, *who* may aliene, and to *whom*; and then, more largely, *how* a man may aliene, or the several modes of conveyance.

1. [Who may aliene, and to whom: or, in other words, who is capable of conveying and who of purchasing, the latter term being of course here used, not in its popular

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 290.

(*x*) See *Forrester v. Goodright*, 8 East, 552; *Doe v. Tomkinson*, 2 M. & Sel. 170. As to the binding of a contingent interest by *estoppel*, see *Goodtitle v. Morse*, 3 T. R. 371; *Doe v. Martin*, 5 Barn. & Cress. 527; *Christmas v. Oliver*, 10 Barn. &

Cress. 181; *Right v. Bucknell*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 278.

(*y*) 1 Prest. Est. 89; 1 Fonb. Tr. Eq. 213, 214.

(*z*) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 6. As to this section, see *Hunt v. Remnant*, 9 Exch. 635.

[but in its technical sense (*a*). And herein we must consider rather the incapacity than capacity of the several parties; for all persons are *primâ facie* capable both of conveying and purchasing, unless the law has laid them under any particular disabilities.]

At one period of our law all *attainted* persons, though they might purchase lands, were disabled from holding them (*b*),—the lands so purchased being subject to escheat and forfeiture, as already explained (*c*). They were also incapable of conveying, as against the crown and the lord, and that from the time of the offence committed; for such conveyance by them might tend to defeat the crown of its forfeiture, or the lord of his escheat (*d*). But as regards the present state of the law, these positions will now require qualification, being materially affected by the recent statutes, to which we had occasion to refer in our chapter on Title by Escheat (*e*).

In like manner *corporations*, religious or others, may purchase lands (*f*); yet unless they have a licence to hold in mortmain, they cannot retain such purchase, but it shall be forfeited to the lord of the fee (*g*). As to their power of *alienation*, they might in general, at the common law, make estates at their pleasure of any lands and tenements they held in their corporate right (*h*)—though, as to ecclesiastical corporations *sole*, this power was somewhat restrained by the necessity of obtaining the confirmation of certain other parties to make the alienation binding on their successors;—and with this general right of alienation the legislature has only interfered in particular instances (*i*). Thus the powers of alienation

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 386.

(*b*) *Bullock v. Dodds*, 2 B. & Ald. 275.

(*c*) Vide sup. p. 443.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 42 b. But it seems that such conveyances would bind all persons except the king and the lord. (*Doe v. Pritchard*, 5 B. &

Adol. 782.)

(*e*) Vide sup. p. 446.

(*f*) Vide sup. p. 358.

(*g*) See however the exceptions noticed sup. pp. 459–463.

(*h*) 2 Bl. Com. 318.

(*i*) *Colchester v. Lowten*, 1 Ves. & B. 226.

belonging to ecclesiastical corporations—as well as to such *lay* corporations as are colleges or hospitals—are now regulated by a variety of Acts, of which an account will be found in that chapter of this work which treats of the endowments and provisions of the Church (*j*). The powers of alienation belonging at common law to corporations, have also been restrained in the case of such *lay* corporations as are called *municipal* (viz. incorporated towns),—for these are disabled by 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 94, from selling or mortgaging any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, (and in general also from demising them for any term exceeding thirty-one years,) except in pursuance of some agreement entered into by the body corporate before 5th June, 1835 (*k*): though by the same Act, and by 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 104, s. 2, it is provided, that any disposition whatever of such lands, tenements or hereditaments may nevertheless be made by the approbation of the lords of the treasury, or any three of them; and on such terms as they may think fit to approve (*l*).

The conveyances of *idiots and insane persons* (except during a lucid interval) are also, generally speaking, void (*m*). It is said, indeed, that the feoffment of a lunatic is not absolutely *void* but *voidable* only, owing to the solemnity of the livery, which is an essential part of

(*j*) Vide post, bk. iv. pt. II. c. III.

(*k*) By 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 69, s. 3, also, municipal corporations were restrained from selling lands, &c., to defray the expenses of parliamentary elections.

(*l*) See also 4 & 5 Vict. c. 38, s. 6; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 98; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 56; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 49; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 24; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 49; 23 Vict. c. 16, as to the mortgage or sale of municipal corporate land for the purposes of borough prisons or court houses, or for sites of schools for the poor, &c., and as to charg-

ing municipal land with the expenses of improvements by way of drainage. As to the sale, by municipal corporations, of their church patronage, see 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 139; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 77, s. 26; c. 104, s. 3; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 31. As to grants by corporations of seaport towns, of sites for Sailors' Homes, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 546; and as to grants by any municipal corporation, for public recreation or play-grounds, 22 Vict. c. 27, s. 3.

(*m*) *Thompson v. Leach*, Comb. 468.

that conveyance (*n*)—the practical difference between a void and a voidable transaction being chiefly this, that the former is a mere nullity, and therefore incapable of confirmation, but the latter may be either avoided or confirmed *ex post facto* (*o*). And it is also held, that, though the feoffment may be avoided during the lunatic's life by the person legally authorized to act for him; or, after his death, by his heir, or any other person interested (*p*); yet it cannot be avoided by himself, on the ground of his own past insanity; there being a maxim in the law, in regard to transactions merely voidable, that no man shall be allowed to stultify himself, that is, to plead his own unsoundness of mind in a court of justice (*q*). But this is a maxim which has no application where the transaction (as is the case with any conveyance by one *non compos*, other than by way of feoffment,) is absolutely void (*r*). And even with regard to a feoffment the doctrine above laid down must now be taken in connection with the enactment of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, by which a feoffment made after 1st October, 1845, is made void at law unless evidenced *by deed*. Such being the state of the law with respect to alienation by one insane, it is laid down, on the other hand, that he is competent to *purchase*, and also to retain what he purchases (*s*); though he cannot be compelled to retain it,—the transaction (if found to be disadvantageous to him) being liable to subsequent avoidance on the ground of his insanity (*t*).

(*n*) Thompson *v.* Leach, Comb. 468.

(*o*) 2 Bl. Com. 293. See also Whelpdale's case, 5 Rep. 119; 2 Inst. 483; Moor, 43.

(*p*) 2 Bl. Com. 292.

(*q*) Ibid.; Beverley's case, 4 Rep. 123 b; Stroud *v.* Marshall, Cro. Eliz. 398; Sugd. Pow. 395, 2nd edit.

(*r*) 2 Bl. Com. 291; Yates *v.*

Boen, 2 Stra. 1104; Beverley's case, ubi sup.; Sugd. ubi sup.; F. N. B. 202; Litt. s. 405; Jenk. 40; 3 Mod. 310; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 279.

(*s*) Co. Litt. 3 b.

(*t*) See 2 Bl. Com. 292; Sugd. Purch. vol. ii. p. 107, 9th edit.; Beavan *v.* M'Donnell, 9 Exch. 309; 10 Exch. 184.

The conveyances and purchases of *infants*, that is, persons under twenty-one, are in general not void, but voidable; and they may be avoided either by themselves in their lifetime, or by their representatives after their death (*x*). But if a voidable transaction has been confirmed by the infant on his coming of age, and he should then die, it cannot afterwards be impeached by his representative, on the ground of its having been contracted during infancy (*y*).

[The case of a *married woman* is somewhat different. She may *purchase* an estate without the consent of her husband; and the conveyance is good during the coverture, till he avoids it by some act declaring his dissent (*z*). And though he does nothing to avoid it, or even if he actually consents, the feme covert herself may, after the death of her husband, waive or disagree to the same; nay, even her heirs may waive it after her, if she dies before her husband, or if in her widowhood she does nothing to express her ratification of the transaction (*a*).] But all *conveyances* of her estate by a married woman (except so far as regards her interest in land settled to her separate use) are absolutely void, unless made in such particular method as the law has specifically appointed for that purpose (*b*). And this was formerly, for the most part, by fine or recovery; but by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, it is provided that in lieu of these proceedings (which the Act abolishes) her conveyance shall, after 31st December, 1833, be by deed *acknowledged* (after having been first

(*x*) See *Zouch v. Parsons*, 3 Burr. 1794; *Moor*, 43; *Baylis v. Dineley*, 3 Man. & Sel. 477; *Gibbs v. Merrill*, 3 Taunt. 307.

(*y*) 2 Bl. Com. 292; 2 Inst. 483; 5 Rep. 119.

(*z*) Co. Litt. 3 a.

(*a*) Ibid.

(*b*) 2 Bl. Com. 293. By the Married Women's Property Act, 1870

(33 & 34 Vict. c. 93), s. 1, the earnings of any married woman gained by her in any employment, occupation, or trade in which she is engaged separately from her husband, or through the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill, and *all investments of the same*, shall be deemed property held and settled to her separate use.

examined thereupon apart from her husband) in such form as therein directed, and executed with the concurrence of her husband (*c*). And in this method she may now in general dispose of any estate which she either alone, or she and her husband in her right, may have in lands of any tenure (*d*). And by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 7, it is moreover provided, that an estate or interest in any tenements or hereditaments in England, of any tenure, may be *disclaimed* by a married woman by deed made conformably to the above provisions.

The case of an *alien* is also peculiar (*e*). For though he has always been able to acquire property by purchase, yet after purchase he could, formerly, hold no land, house or other tenement, except (provided he were an alien friend and merchant) a lease for years of a house; for all other purchases, when found by an inquest of office, were immediately forfeited to the king, whether previously conveyed away by the alien or not (*f*): and even this limited capacity was made subject to exception, for if the lease was made to an alien *artificer*, then, by statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 16, s. 13, it was altogether void (*g*). The state of the law however on this subject has been recently brought into accordance with more enlightened views; for by the Naturalization Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 14), an alien may now not only acquire and hold real and personal property of every description in the same manner in all respects as a natural-born British subject, but may also as freely dispose of the same. But this provision does not apply to

(*c*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 77, 79, 91; and see 17 & 18 Vict. c. 75. As to this acknowledgment, see also Reg. Gen., C. P., H. T. 1834, and the following cases:—*Ex parte Ann Duffill*, 5 M. & G. 378; *In re Maria Pickersgill*, 6 M. & G. 250; *In re Way and Campbell*, *ibid.* 1046; *In re Sarah Woodcock*, 1 C. B. 437; *Bancks v. Ollerton*, 10 Exch. 168; *In re Hannah Packer*, Law Rep.,

5 C. P. 424.

(*d*) Vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XIX.

(*e*) See the definition of an alien, sup. p. 134.

(*f*) 2 Bl. Com. 293. See *Anon.*, 4 Leon. 84.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 2b, and note (7) by Harg.; *Jevens v. Harridge*, 1 Saund. by Wms. 6, and n. (1); *Lapierre v. McIntosh*, 1 Per. & Dav. 629.

any estate or interest acquired before the passing of that Act, and it will not qualify an alien for any municipal, parliamentary or other franchise (*i*).

Having now considered the capacities of persons as alienors and alienees respectively, we may take occasion in connection with the first branch of the subject, viz., the capacity of *alienors*, to advert to the legislative provisions which have been made at various times to prevent the inconveniences apt to arise from the disability of parties, (through insanity, infancy, coverture, or otherwise, as above explained,) to exercise such powers of alienation as would otherwise be incident to their estates. And here notice is, in the first place, due to a variety of statutes which, in respect of the alienation of estates generally considered, have empowered the Lord Chancellor (or committees, guardians and others acting under his authority) to execute instruments for a lunatic or infant, where loss or disadvantage would be sustained by his incapacity to execute for himself (*k*). To these, however, a very important addition was made in the year 1856, by the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, in reference to the alienation of settled estates (*l*). It is in the case of *these*, that (by reason of limitations in favour of parties yet unborn, or owing to the infancy, coverture, or other disability of various parties in existence,) the inconveniences, above referred to, had been chiefly felt; and particularly as regards the impossibility, under such circumstances, of making effectual leases or sales as the interest of the settled property at large was found from time to time to require. In order therefore to

(*i*) 33 Vict. c. 14, s. 1. By this Act a previous statute (7 & 8 Vict. c. 66), which allowed aliens to hold leases for residence or trade for a term of twenty-one years, is repealed.

(*k*) See 43 Geo. 3, c. 75; 59 Geo. 3, c. 80, s. 2; 6 Geo. 4, c. 74; 9 Geo. 4, c. 78; 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c.

65; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 33, 91; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 97, s. 3, c. 118, ss. 20, 137; 13 & 14 Vict. cc. 35, 60; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70; 18 & 19 Vict. cc. 13, 43; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 13; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 86, ss. 12—17.

(*l*) As to these, vide sup. pp. 252, 257, 266, 279.

“facilitate leases and sales of settled estates,” it was provided by the above Act (which has been since amended by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 77, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 45), that the Court of Chancery—upon the application of any person entitled to the possession or to the receipt of the rents and profits of any such settled estate, for a term of years determinable on his death, or for life, or for any greater interest (*m*)—may authorize leases or sales to be made of such estate (*n*). These enactments, however, are qualified by a direction that the application shall be made only by consent of certain specified parties (*o*)—including the trustees of settlements, on behalf of unborn children, and the guardians and committees of infants and lunatics (*p*)—or, if not so made, shall not take effect so as to bind such parties (*q*); and that the powers conferred on the court shall only be exercised in cases where it deems such a course “proper and consistent with due regard to the “interests of all parties entitled under the settlement” (*r*); “and shall not be exercised in any case where an express “declaration or manifest intention that they shall *not* be “exercised is contained in the settlement, or may reasonably be inferred therefrom, or from extrinsic circumstances or evidence” (*s*).

In connection also with the second branch of the subject that has been under discussion, viz. the capacity of *alienees*, it may be fit to remark, that no person can be compelled to take an estate by purchase against his will. If land,

(*m*) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 16.

(*n*) Sects. 2, 11.

(*o*) Sect. 17.

(*p*) Sect. 36.

(*q*) Sect. 18. By this section it is provided, “that unless there shall “be a person entitled to an estate of “inheritance whose consent or concurrence shall have been refused “or cannot be obtained, it shall be “lawful for the court, if it shall “think fit, to give effect to any peti-

tion” (viz. petition to exercise the powers conferred by the Act), “subject to and so as not to affect the “rights, estate or interest of any “person whose consent or concurrence has been refused or cannot “be obtained; or whose rights, estate “or interest ought, in the opinion of “the court, to be excepted.”

(*r*) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, ss. 2, 11.

(*s*) Ibid. s. 26.

therefore, be conveyed *in invitum*, (as not unfrequently happens, where it is given in trust by will, without the consent of the proposed trustee having been first obtained,) the effect of the conveyance may always be avoided, by the execution of a deed of disclaimer on the part of the dis-sentient alienee (*t*).

II. We are next, but principally, to inquire *how* a man may aliene or convey; which will lead us to consider the several modes of conveyance.

[A translation or transfer of property being once admitted by law, it became necessary that this transfer should be properly evidenced: in order to prevent disputes, either about the fact, as whether there was any transfer at all; or concerning the persons by whom and to whom it was transferred; or with regard to the subject matter, as what the thing transferred consisted of; or lastly, with relation to the mode and quality of the transfer, as for what period of time (or, in other words, for what estate and interest) the conveyance was made. The legal evidences of this translation of property, are called the *common assurances* of the kingdom; whereby every man's estate is assured to him, and all controversies, doubts, and difficulties are either prevented or removed.]

These common assurances or *conveyances* (as they are otherwise termed) will be examined in their order; but because most of them are usually transacted by the means of that particular kind of instrument called a *deed*, we purpose to consider the nature of deeds separately, and in the first instance, before we enter upon the different kinds of conveyance.

(*t*) See *Townson v. Tickell*, 3 *Barn. & Ald.* 31; *Nicholson v. Wordsworth*, 2 *Swanst.* 365; *Begbie v. Crook*, 2 *Bing. N. C.* 70. As to disclaimer by a married woman, vide *sup.* p. 477.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF DEEDS.

IN treating of deeds we shall consider, first, what a deed is; secondly, its requisites; thirdly, how it may be avoided; and lastly, the general rules which the law has laid down for its construction.

I. First, then, a deed is a writing sealed and delivered, and is used in a great variety of different transactions; among which, one of the most important is the alienation of real estates (*a*). We shall, accordingly, in the present chapter speak more particularly (though what is said will generally apply to others also) of such instruments as are intended to carry out that object—it being indeed by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, expressly provided, that certain conveyances in that Act specified, made after the 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law, unless made by deed (*b*). [Such a writing under seal and delivered is sometimes called a charter, *carta*, from its materials (*c*); but most usually, when applied to the transactions of private subjects, it is called “a deed,” *factum, κατ’ ἐξοχήν*, because it is the most solemn and authentic act that a man can possibly perform,

(*a*) Co. Litt. 171 b. A contract reduced to writing, but *not* sealed and delivered, is called a *simple* or *parol* contract; and the same terms are used with regard to a contract by word of mouth only; vide post, bk. II. pt. II. c. v.

(*b*) The conveyances required by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, to be by deed are a “feoffment” (other than a feoffment made under custom by an infant); a “partition” or an “ex-

change” of hereditaments, not being copyhold; a “lease,” required by law to be in writing, of any hereditaments; an “assignment” of a chattel interest, not being copyhold, in any hereditaments; and a “surrender” in writing of an interest in any hereditaments, not being a copyhold interest, and not being an interest which might by law have been created without writing.

(*c*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 9 b, n. (1.)

[with relation to the disposal of his property; and therefore a man shall always be *estopped* by his own deed, that is, shall not be permitted to aver or prove any thing in contradiction to what he has once so solemnly and deliberately avowed (*d*).] And for the same reason, when an engagement has been made by way of simple contract (that is, without deed), and afterwards the very same engagement is made between the same parties by deed, the first contract is merged in the second (*e*); to which may be added this further rule, that a contract by deed is not capable of being contradicted or explained by any other contract or declaration between the same parties, which is not itself also under seal (*f*). If a deed be made by more parties than one, there ought to be regularly as many copies of it as there are parties; and the deed so made is called an *indenture*, because each part used formerly to be cut or indented in acute angles (*instar dentium*, or serrated) on the top, or side, to tally or correspond one with the other (*g*). [Formerly too, when deeds were more concise than at present, it was usual to write both parts on the

(*d*) We may here remark, that there are two other species of estoppel besides the estoppel by *deed* mentioned in the text, viz. estoppel by *record*, and estoppel by matter *in pais*. The first obtains in the case where any fact is alleged in a court of record, or any judgment given therein: the second where an act is done out of court. By such matter of record, persons who were parties to the suit—and by such matter *in pais* persons who were parties to the act in question—are in general precluded from afterwards alleging matters which would be contradictory to what the record or act imports. For further information as to estoppel, and the different species thereof, see Plowd. 434; Co.

Litt. 260, 352 a; 1 Saund. by Wms. 325 a, n. (4) and (c); 2 Saund. by Wms. 148; Smith's Leading Cases, vol. ii. pp. 436, 460. See also Hill v. Manchester Company, 2 Barn. & Adol. 544; R. v. Leominster, 5 Q. B. 640; Pargeter v. Harris, 7 Q. B. 708. As to the effect *in equity* of a mistaken recital in a deed, see Brooke v. Haymes, Law Rep., 6 Eq. Ca. 25.

(*e*) See Byles on Bills, 8th ed. p. 216; Sharpe v. Gibbs, 16 C. B., N. S. 527.

(*f*) Gwynne v. Davy, 1 Man. & G. 857.

(*g*) See Co. Litt. 47 b; Litt. s. 371. The history of the practice of indenting is given in Co. Litt. by Butl. 229 a, n. (1).

[same piece of parchment, with some word or letters of the alphabet written between them; through which the parchment was cut, either in a straight or indented line, in such a manner as to leave half the word on one part and half on the other. Deeds thus made were denominated *syngrapha* by the canonists(*h*); and with us *chirographa*, or hand-writings(*i*); the word *cirographum* or *cyrographum*, being usually that which was divided in making the indenture;] and in the indentures of a fine, this custom continued to be observed until the abolition of that species of conveyance. But for a long time past the practice of cutting through any letters has, in all other instances, been disused; and even that of indenting saw-wise: a more modern method being to cut the top of the parchment in a waving line. Neither this, however, nor any other method of indenting, is now necessary to the legal validity of the instrument(*h*). [When the several parts of an indenture are interchangeably executed by the several parties, that part or copy which is executed by the grantor is usually called the *original*, and the rest are *counterparts*; though of late it is most frequent for all the parties to execute every part; which renders them all originals. A deed made by one party, only, is not indented, but *polled* or shaved quite even; and is therefore called a *deed-poll*, or a single deed(*l*).

II. We are, in the next place, to consider the requisites of a deed. The first of which is, that there be persons able to contract and be contracted with, for the purposes

(*h*) Lyndew. l. 1, t. 10, c. 1.

(*i*) Mirrour, c. 2, s. 27; Co. Litt. by Harg. 143 b, u. (4).

(*k*) In certain cases a deed *indented* is made by statute essential to the validity of the transaction. (Co. Litt. by Butl. 229 a, n. (2).) And in such cases it was, till lately, necessary that the deed should have

been *actually* indented; but by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 5, a deed, purporting to be an indenture, is to have the effect of an indenture though not actually indented. Et vide sup. p. 462, u. (*a*).

(*l*) Mirrour, c. 2, s. 27; Litt. s. 371, 372; Gardner v. Lachlan, 8 Sim. 123.

[intended by the deed; and also a thing, or subject-matter, to be contracted for; all which must be expressed by sufficient names (*m*). Thus in every grant there must be a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted; in every lease a lessor, a lessee, and a thing demised.

Secondly, the deed must be *written* or *printed* (in any character or in any language) upon either paper or parchment; for it is said that if on stone, board, linen, leather, or the like, it is no deed (*n*). Wood or stone may be more durable, and linen less liable to rasures, but writing on paper or parchment unites in itself, more perfectly than any other way, both those desirable qualities; for there is nothing else so durable, and at the same time so little liable to alteration. It must also have the regular stamps imposed on it by the several statutes for the increase of the public revenue; else it cannot be given in evidence (*o*).

Thirdly, the matter of the deed must be *legally* and *orderly* set forth; that is, there must be words sufficient to specify the agreement and bind the parties; which sufficiency must be left to the courts of law to determine (*p*).

(*m*) Co. Litt. 35 b.

(*n*) Ibid. 229 a; F. N. B. 122.

(*o*) 2 Bl. Com. 297. The principal enactments now in force, regulating the *stamps* on deeds, are contained in the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, and the Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 97). By the 16th section of this last statute (in substitution of a provision to the same general effect contained in the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854) it is provided, that on the production of an instrument chargeable with any duty, as evidence in any court of civil judicature, it shall be the duty of the officer of the court reading such instrument to call the attention of the judge to any omission or

insufficiency of the stamp; and if the instrument be one which may legally be stamped after execution (a proviso which excludes, it may be remarked, bills of exchange and promissory notes), it may be received in evidence, saving all just exceptions on other grounds, on payment to the officer of the amount of the unpaid duty, and of the penalty payable by law on stamping after execution—which penalty is fixed, by the 15th section of the act, at the sum of 10*l.*, together with interest on the amount of the unpaid duty where it exceeds 10*l.*—and of the sum of 1*l.* in addition.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 225 a.

[It is not indeed absolutely necessary in law to have all the formal parts that are usually drawn out in conveyances, so as there be sufficient words to declare clearly and legally the party's meaning. But as these formal and orderly parts are calculated to convey that meaning in the clearest, distinctest, and most effectual manner, and have been well considered and settled by the wisdom of successive ages, it is prudent not to depart from them without good reason or urgent necessity; and therefore they shall be here mentioned in their usual order (*q*).]

1. The *premises* may be used to set forth the number and names of the parties, with their additions or titles; and, in the case of an indenture, the deed is always formally described as made *inter partes*, that is, as made between such an one *of the one part*, and such another *of the other part*. As to which, this distinction was formerly established, that one named as party in an indenture could not covenant with a stranger (or person not named as party), nor could the latter take an estate by the deed, except by way of remainder (*r*); though, on the other hand, a stranger might covenant with one who was party,

(*q*) Co. Litt. 6 a. Two Acts may be noticed here which were passed, in 1845, to enable parties, if they think proper, to abridge the language in which deeds relating to real property have been usually drawn, viz. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 119 and c. 124. But it is believed that they have not been much acted upon. It may be useful to notice also here the practice, which customarily prevails among conveyancers, as to the preparation of deeds relating to real property. On a sale of such property, the vendor delivers an abstract of all such instruments as have been executed in regard to the property for the last *sixty* years. (See *Prosser v. Watts*, 6 Madd. 59; *Frend*

v. Buckley, Law Rep., 5 Q. B. 213.) When the abstract has been verified by examination of the instruments, &c., and approved by the purchaser, the latter prepares the draft of the conveyance; and when that draft is approved by the vendor, the purchaser prepares an engrossment of the deed properly stamped, and sees to the execution of it accordingly. When the transaction is not a sale, but a lease, the practice is different. No abstract is delivered, and the draft and engrossment, properly stamped of the lease, are usually prepared not by the lessee but by the lessor.

(*r*) See *Reeves v. Watts*, Law Rep., 1 Q. B. 412.

and bind himself by executing the deed (*s*). But by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 5, it is now provided, that an immediate estate and interest in any hereditaments, and benefit of a condition or covenant respecting any hereditaments, may be taken, though the taker be not named a party to the same indenture. The premises also contain the *recital*, if any, of such deeds, agreements or matters of fact, as are necessary to explain the reasons upon which the present transaction is founded; and herein also is set down the consideration upon which the deed is made. And then follows the certainty of the grantor, grantee, and thing granted (*t*). With respect to the last, that is, the description of the thing granted, a conveyance of any *land* will suffice (as we have elsewhere seen) to pass also the structures or buildings thereon, as well as all mines below the surface (*u*); but a conveyance of certain land, or of a certain house, (even adding the words *with the appurtenances*,) will not pass other land not specified, although it may have been usually occupied together with the property which is specified: unless indeed the land not specified should consist of the orchard, garden, or curtilage of a house conveyed, in which case it would pass under a grant of the house and its *appurtenances*, or even (as it should seem) under a grant of the house simply (*v*).

2, 3. [Next come the *habendum* and *tenendum*. The office of the *habendum* is properly to determine what estate

(*s*) Co. Litt. 259 b; *Salter v. Kidgley*, Carth. 76; *Storer v. Gordon*, 3 M. & Sel. 322; *Berkeley v. Hardy*, 5 B. & Cress. 355.

(*t*) 2 Bl. Com. 298.

(*u*) Vide sup. p. 169.

(*v*) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 5 b, n. (1); 2 Saund. by Wms. 401, n. (2). As to the word *appurtenances*, see Co. Litt. 121 b; *Hinchliffe v. Kinnoul*, 5 Bing. N. C. 1, 25. It is to be noticed here, that by the Acts of 8 & 9 Vict. referred to supra,

p. 485, n. (*g*), it is provided that every deed made conformably to those Acts shall, *unless any exception be specially made therein*, be held to include all houses, out houses, &c., and hereditaments, and appurtenances whatsoever to the lands therein comprised belonging, or in anywise appertaining, &c.; and also (in the case of a conveyance of the fee) the reversion and remainders, &c., and all the estate, &c., both at law and equity, of the grantor, &c.

[or interest is granted by the deed ; though this may be performed, and is sometimes performed, in the premises (*x*). In which case the *habendum* may lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict, or be repugnant to, the estate granted in the premises. As if a grant be “to A. and the heirs of his body” in the premises, *habendum* “to him and his heirs for ever,” or *vice versâ* ; here A. has an estate tail and a fee simple expectant thereon (*y*). But had it been in the premises “to him and his heirs,” *habendum* “to him for life,” the *habendum* would be utterly void (*z*) ; for an estate of inheritance is vested in him before the *habendum* comes, and shall not afterwards be taken away or divested by it. The *tenendum* “and to hold” is now of very little use, and is only kept in by custom. It was sometimes formerly used to signify the tenure by which the estate granted was to be holden ; viz. “*tenendum per servitium militare, in burgagio, in libero socagio, &c.*” But all these being now reduced to free and common socage, the tenure is never specified. Before the statute of *Quia emptores* (18 Edw. I.), it was also sometimes used to denote the lord of whom the land should be holden ; but that statute directing all future purchasers to hold, not of the immediate grantor, but of the chief lord of the fee, this use of the *tenendum* hath been also antiquated ; though for a long time after we find it mentioned in antient charters, that the tenements shall be holden *de capitalibus dominis feodi* ; but as this expressed nothing more than the statute had already provided for, it gradually grew out of use (*a*).

4. Next follow the terms of stipulation, if any, upon which the grant is made ; the first of which is the *red-dendum*, or reservation whereby the grantor doth create or reserve some new thing to himself out of what he had

(*x*) See *Shaw v. Kay*, 1 Exch. 412.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 21 a ; *Thurman v. Cooper*, 2 Rol. Rep. 19, 23 ; Cro. Jac. 476. And see *Goodtitle v.*

Gibbs, 5 B. & Cress. 709.

(*z*) *Baldwin's case*, 2 Rep. 23 ; *Earl of Rutland's case*, 8 Rep. 56.

(*a*) *Madox*, Formul. passim.

[before granted. As “rendering for the same, yearly, the sum of 10s.,” or a peppercorn, or two days ploughing, or the like. Under the pure feudal system, this return or rent consisted, in chivalry, principally of military services; and in villenage, of the most slavish offices. But in socage it has usually consisted of money, though it may still consist of services, or of any other certain profit (*b*). To make a *reddendum* good, if it be of any thing newly created by the deed, the reservation must be to the grantors, or some or one of them, and not to any stranger to the deed: But if it be of antient services or the like, annexed to the land, then the reservation may be to the lord of the fee (*c*).

5. Another of the terms upon which a grant may be made is a *condition*; which is a clause of contingency, on the happening of which the estate granted may be defeated; as “provided always, that if the mortgagor shall pay the “mortgagee 500*l.* upon such a day, the whole estate “granted shall determine,” and the like (*d*).]

6. As to the clause of *warranty* formerly inserted in conveyances, it has fallen into disuse, but in its connection with the previous state of the law it still deserves some attention from the student (*e*). By this clause the grantor did for himself and his heirs “warrant” and secure to the grantee the estate conveyed. And the origin of this practice seems to be in the feudal constitution, whereby, if the vassal’s title to enjoy the feud was disputed, he might “vouch,” or call the lord or donor to warrant or ensure his gift; which if he failed to do, and the vassal was evicted, the lord was bound to give him another feud of equal value in recompense (*f*). And so, by our antient law, if a man enfeoffed another in fee (a mode of assurance

(*b*) Vide sup. pp. 189, 205.

(*c*) *Browning v. Beston*, Plowd. 132; *Whitlock’s case*, 8 Rep. 71.

(*d*) As to mortgages, vide sup. p. 304.

(*e*) As to *warranty*, see Co. Litt.

by Butl. 365 a, n. (1), 373 b, n. (2), where the whole subject is copiously discussed.

(*f*) 2 Bl. Com. 300; Feud. l. 2, t. 8 and 25.

analogous to the original feudal donation), the law annexed a warranty to the grant (*g*). [So, also, after a partition or exchange of lands of inheritance, if either party or his heirs were evicted of his share, the other and his heirs were bound to warranty (*h*). And, again, upon a gift in tail or lease for life, rendering rent, the donor (or lessor) and his heirs were bound to warrant the title (*i*). But in other forms of alienation bearing no sort of analogy to the gift of a feud, no warranty whatsoever has ever been held to be implied; and therefore in such cases it became necessary to add an express clause of warranty in order to bind the grantor and his heirs; though where such clause was in fact superadded, it was held that such warranty not only bound the warrantor himself to protect and assure the title of the warrantee, or yield him other lands in their stead, but it also bound the heir of the warrantor to the same effect—provided he had other sufficient lands by descent from the warranting ancestor (*j*); and this, whether the warranty was *lineal*, or *collateral* to the title of the land. *Lineal* warranty was, where the heir derived, or might by possibility have derived, his title to the land warranted, either from or through the ancestor who made the warranty; as where a father, or an elder son in the life of the father, released to the disseisor of either themselves or the grandfather, with warranty,—this was lineal to the younger son (*k*). . *Collateral* warranty was, where the heir's title to the land neither was, nor could have been derived from the warranting ancestor; as where a younger brother released to his father's disseisor, with warranty;—this was collateral to the elder brother (*l*).]

But though the heir was only bound to insure the title of the grantee on his ancestor's warranty, provided he had

(*g*) Co. Litt. 384 a.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 174, 384 a. By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, it is now enacted, that an exchange or partition made by deed executed after 1st October, 1845, shall not imply any condition

in law.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 384 b.

(*j*) Ib. 102 a.

(*k*) Litt. ss. 703, 706, 707.

(*l*) Ib. 705, 707.

assets, yet he was, whether assets descended or not, perpetually bound from claiming the land *himself*(*m*). But this doctrine being found under certain circumstances to produce inconvenient and unjust results, statutes were passed to restrain the force of a warranty in this respect in a variety of instances; and the practice itself, of inserting in deeds clauses of warranty at all, fell by degrees out of use(*n*).

7. [A deed of conveyance usually also contains, *covenants, conventiones*, — which are clauses of agreement therein, whereby either party may stipulate for the truth of certain facts, or may bind himself to perform or to abstain from something, or to give something to the other. Thus the grantor may covenant that he hath a right to convey; or for the grantee's quiet enjoyment or the like; the grantee may covenant to pay his rent, or keep the premises in repair, or not to use them in a certain manner, and the like(*o*).] By the common law, the use of the words "demise," "grant," or "give," raised an *implied* covenant for quiet enjoyment, &c., on the part of the grantor, except so far as it might be controlled by some express covenant in the same deed(*p*); but (so far as regards the words "grant" and "give") the law on this head is now altered: it being enacted by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, that neither of those words in any deed executed after 1st October, 1845, shall imply any covenant, except so far as they may by force of any *act of parliament* imply a covenant(*q*). A covenant in any deed gives to the covenantee and his representatives, in case of its breach, a right of action for damages against the covenantor and his representatives; and in a deed of

(*m*) As to assets, vide sup. p. 432.

(*n*) See 6 Edw. 1, c. 3; 11 Hen. 7, c. 20; 4 & 5 Ann. c. 16, s. 21; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 39; c. 74, s. 14.

(*o*) As to the effect of an *impossible* covenant, see *Clifford v. Watts*, Law Rep., 5 C. P. 577.

(*p*) See Cro. Eliz. 674; Merrill

v. Frame, 4 Taunt. 319; *Baber v. Harris*, 9 Ad. & El. 532.

(*q*) See, for example, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, s. 132, where the word *grant* in certain conveyances, is to operate as the express covenants for title there mentioned.

conveyance, a covenant directly relating to the land conveyed will also, in general, *run with the land*; that is, not only will the original parties or their representatives, but each successive owner of the land, be entitled to its benefit, or liable (as the case may be) to its obligation (*r*). It is consequently usual, so far as covenants for title are concerned, for a person who sells land which he himself bought, to covenant only against his own acts; or if he did not acquire it in that method, then to extend the covenant as far back as to the acts of the last buyer, but no further: and this is a sufficient security to the vendee, where all former vendors have entered into a similar covenant; because all these engagements run with the land, • and consequently operate for his protection (*s*).

8. [Lastly, comes the *conclusion*, which mentions the execution and date of the deed, or the time of its being given or executed, either expressly or by reference to some day and year before mentioned therein. Not but a deed is good, although it mention no date, or hath a false date; or even if it hath an impossible date, as the 30th of February: provided the real day of its being dated or given, that is, of its being delivered, can be proved (*t*).

Fourthly, the parts of a deed being now discussed, we may proceed to the consideration of the *reading* of it. This is necessary, wherever any one of the parties desire it; and if it be not done on request, the deed is void as to

(*r*) As to covenants *running with the land*, see Co. Litt. 384 b, 385 a; Shep. Touch. 161; Third Real Property Report, pp. 45—58; Spencer's case, 5 Rep. 16 a; Mayor of Congleton v. Pattison, 10 East, 130; Vyvian v. Arthur, 1 Barn. & Cress. 410; East-erby v. Sampson, 6 Bing. 644; Lambert v. Norris, 2 Mee. & W. 333; Simpson v. Clayton, 4 Bing. N. C. 780; Marshall v. Oakes, 2 H. & N. 793; Wilson v. Hart, Law Rep., 1 Ch. Ap. 463; Morland v. Cook,

ib., 6 Eq. Ca. 252; Stevens v. Copp, ib., 4 Exch. 20; Thomas v. Hayward, 311.

(*s*) Browning v. Wright, 2 Bos. & Pul. 22; and Sugd. Law Vend. vol. ii. p. 450, 10th ed. It may be remarked, that, in a transaction by way of *mortgage*, the covenants for title are not limited as above stated.

(*t*) Co. Litt. 46 b; Dyer, 28. As to the "date" of a deed, see Styles v. Wardle, 4 Barn. & Cress. 908.

[him (*u*). If he can, he should read it himself: if he be blind or illiterate, another must read it to him. If it be read falsely, it will be void; at least for so much as is misrecited: unless, indeed, it be agreed by collusion that the deed shall be read false, on purpose to make it void; for in such case it shall bind the fraudulent party (*x*).

Fifthly, it is necessary that the party, whose deed it is, should *seal* (*y*), and now in most cases should *sign* it also. The use of seals, as a mark of authenticity to letters and other instruments in writing, is extremely antient. We read of it among the Jews and Persians, in the earliest and most sacred records of history (*z*). And in the book of Jeremiah there is a very remarkable instance, not only of an attestation by seal, but also of the other usual formalities attending a Jewish purchase (*a*). In the civil law also, seals were the evidence of truth; and were required, on the part of the witnesses at least, at the attestation of every testament (*b*). But in the times of our Saxon ancestors, they were not much in use in England (*c*). For though Sir Edward Coke relies on an instance of King Edwin's making use of a seal about an hundred years before the Conquest, yet it does not follow that this was

(*u*) Reading is not necessary unless the party executing the deed requires it. (*Rex v. Longman*, 1 Nev. & M. 576.)

(*x*) *Manser's case*, 2 Rep. 3; *Thoroughgood's case*, 2 Rep. 9; *Pigot's case*, 11 Rep. 27.

(*y*) Merely placing the finger on a seal or wafer already attached, is equivalent to sealing. (*Shep. Touch. 57*.) And there is indeed no necessity that there should be either wax or wafer, if only an impression be made on the parchment or paper, with the intent of sealing it. (See the *Queen v. Trustees of Covent Garden*, 7 Q. B. 238, n.)

(*z*) 1 Kings, c. 21; Daniel, c. 6; Esther, c. 8.

(*a*) "And I bought the field of Hanameel, and weighed him the money, even seventeen shekels of silver. And I subscribed the evidence, and sealed it and took witnesses, and weighed him the money in the balances. So I took the evidence of the purchase, both that which was sealed according to the law and custom, and that which was open."—Jer. c. 32.

(*b*) Inst. 2, 10, 2 and 3.

(*c*) See Palgrave, Eng. Com. ccxv.

[the usage among the whole nation (*d*); and perhaps the charter he mentions may be of doubtful authority, from this very circumstance of being sealed; since we are assured by all our antient historians, that sealing was not then in common use. The method of the Saxons was for such as could write, to subscribe their names; and whether they could write or not, to affix the sign of the cross; which custom our illiterate vulgar do, for the most part, to this day keep up, by signing a cross for their mark, when unable to write their names. And indeed this inability to write, and therefore making a cross in its stead, is honestly avowed by Caedwalla, a Saxon king, at the end of one of his charters (*e*). In like manner, and for the same unsurmountable reason, the Normans, (a brave but illiterate nation,) at their first settlement in France, used the practice of sealing only, without writing their names: which custom continued, when learning made its way among them, though the reason for doing it had ceased; and hence the charter of Edward the Confessor to Westminster Abbey,—himself being brought up in Normandy,—was witnessed only by his seal; and is generally thought to be the oldest sealed charter of any authenticity in England (*f*). At the Conquest, the Norman lords brought over into this kingdom their own fashions; and introduced waxen seals only, instead of the English method of writing their names, and signing with the sign of the cross (*g*). And in the reign of Edward the first, every freeman, and even such of the more sub-

(*d*) Co. Litt. 7 a.

(*e*) "*Propriâ manu, pro ignorantia literarum, signum sanctæ crucis expressi et subscripsi.*" (Seld. Jan. Ang. l. 1, § 42.) And this (according to Procopius) the Emperor Justin in the east, and Theodoric King of the Goths in Italy, had before authorized by their

example, on account of their inability to write.

(*f*) Lamb. Archeion, 51.

(*g*) "*Normanni chirographorum confectionem, cum crucibus aureis, aliisque signaculis sacris, in Angliâ firmari solitam, in cæram impressam mutant, modumque scribendi Anglicum rejiciunt.*"—Ingulph.

[stantial villeins as were fit to be put upon juries, had their distinct particular seals (*h*). The impressions of these seals were sometimes a knight on horseback, sometimes other devices; but coats of arms were not introduced into seals, nor indeed into any other use, till about the reign of Richard the first, who brought them from the crusade in the Holy Land; where they were first invented and painted on the shields of the knights, to distinguish the variety of persons of every Christian nation who resorted thither, and who could not, when clad in complete steel, be otherwise known or ascertained.

This neglect of signing, and resting only upon the authenticity of seals, remained very long among us; for it was held in all our books that sealing alone was sufficient to authenticate a deed; and so the common form of attesting deeds,—“*sealed and delivered*,” continues to this day. The Statute of Frauds, however, 29 Car. II. c. 3, revives the Saxon custom, and expressly directs the signing, in all grants of lands, and many other species of deeds: in which therefore signing seems to be now as necessary as sealing, though it hath been sometimes held that the one includes the other (*i*).

Sixthly, it is essential to a deed that it be *delivered* by the party himself or his certain attorney; which therefore is also expressed in the attestation, “*sealed and delivered* ;” and, in practice, is held to be performed by placing the finger on the seal, uttering the words, “I deliver this as my act and deed” (*h*). A deed takes effect only from this tradition or delivery; for if the date be

(*h*) Stat. Exon. 14 Edw. 1.

(*i*) 2 Bl. Com. 306; Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; Warneford v. Warneford, Stra. 764. It appears however, to be doubtful whether signing is required by 29 Car. 2, c. 3, in the case of *deeds*. (See 1 Shep. Touch. by Preston, 56; Aveline v. Whisson, 4 Man. & G.

801; Cooch v. Goodman, 2 Q. B. 580, 597.)

(*h*) As to delivery, see Talbot v. Hodson, 7 Taunt. 251; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67; Grugeon v. Gerrard, 4 You. & Coll. 119; Exton v. Scott, 6 Sim. 31; Hall v. Bainbridge, 12 Q. B. 699; Doe d. Richards v. Lewis, 11 C. B. 1046.

[false or impossible, the delivery ascertains the time of it. And if another person seals the deed, yet if the party delivers it himself, he thereby adopts the sealing (*l*). Moreover, a delivery may be either absolute, that is, to the party or grantee himself: or to a third person, to hold till some conditions be performed on the part of the grantee: in which last case it is delivered not as a *deed*, but as an *escrow*; that is, as a scroll or writing, which is not to take effect as a deed till the conditions be performed; and then it is a deed to all intents and purposes (*m*).

Finally, a deed must be duly *attested*, that is, show that it was executed by the party *in the presence of a witness or witnesses*: though this is necessary, rather for preserving the evidence, than for constituting the essence of the deed. Our modern deeds are in reality nothing more than an improvement or amplification of the *brevia testata* mentioned by the feudal writers; which were written memorandums introduced to perpetuate the tenor of the conveyance and investiture (*n*). With this view they registered in the deed the persons who attended as witnesses, which was formerly done without their signing their names (that not being always in their power), but they only heard the deed read; and then the clerk or scribe added their names, in a sort of memorandum, thus: “*hiis testibus Johanne Moore, Jacobo Smith, et aliis ad hanc rem convocatis*” (*o*). This, like all other solemn transactions, was originally done only *coram paribus* (*p*), and frequently when assembled in the court baron, hun-

(*l*) Perk. § 130.

(*m*) Co. Litt. 36 a. As to delivery as an escrow, see *Holford v. Parker*, Hob. 246; *Simpson v. Sikes*, 6 M. & Sel. 295; *Bowker v. Burdekin*, 11 M. & W. 128; *Millership v. Brookes*, 5 H. & N. 797; *Kidner v. Keith*, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 35. An escrow, on the

performance of the condition, takes effect as a deed from the date of the sealing and delivery. (*Froset v. Walsh*, Bridg. Rep. 51; *Graham v. Graham*, 1 Ves. jun. 274.)

(*n*) Feud. l. 1, t. 4.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 6 a.

(*p*) Feud. l. 2, t. 32.

[dred, or county court; which was then expressed in the attestation, *teste comitatu, hundredo, &c.* (*q*). Afterwards the attestation of other witnesses was allowed; the trial, in case of a dispute, being still reserved to the *pares*; with whom the witnesses (if more than one) were associated and joined in the verdict (*r*); till that also was abrogated by the statute of York, 12 Edw. II. st. 1, c. 2. And in this manner, with some such clause of *hiis testibus*, are all old deeds and charters, particularly *Magna Charta*, witnessed. And in the time of Sir Edward Coke, creations of nobility were still witnessed in the same manner (*s*). But in the sovereign's common charters, writs, or letters-patent, the style is now altered: for at present the letters-patent are attested thus: "*teste meipso*, witness ourself at Westminster, &c.," a form which was introduced by Richard the first (*t*), but not commonly used till about the beginning of the fifteenth century. Nor was the clause of *hiis testibus* entirely discontinued in royal grants till the reign of Henry the eighth (*u*); which was also the era of discontinuing it in the deeds of subjects,—learning being then revived, and the faculty of writing more general. And therefore ever since that time the witnesses have usually subscribed their attestations, either at the bottom, or on the back of the deed (*x*).

III. We are next to consider how a deed may be avoided, or rendered of no effect. And from what has been before laid down, it will follow that if there be wanting any of the essential requisites before mentioned: viz. 1, Proper parties, and a proper subject matter; 2, Writing on paper or parchment; 3, Sufficient and legal words, properly disposed; 4, Reading (if desired) before the execution; 5, Sealing, and by the Statute of

(*q*) Spelm. Gloss. 228; Madox, Formul. Nos. 21, 322, 660.

(*r*) Co. Litt. 6 b.

(*s*) 2 Inst. 77.

(*t*) Madox, Formul. No. 515.

(*u*) Ibid. Dissert. fol. 32.

(*x*) 2 Inst. 78.

[Frauds, in most cases, signing also; and, 6, Delivery—the instrument is a void deed *ab initio*. It may also be avoided by matter *ex post facto*: as, 1. By rasure, interlining, or other alteration in any material part; unless a memorandum thereof, properly attested, be made prior to the execution of the deed itself(*y*). 2. By breaking off or defacing the seal(*z*). 3. By delivering it up to be cancelled, that is, to have lines drawn over it in the form of lattice-work or *cancelli*; though the phrase is now used figuratively for any manner of obliteration or defacing it(*a*). 4. By the disagreement of those whose concurrence is necessary in order for the deed to stand: as of the husband, where a married woman is concerned; or of an infant or person under duress, when those disabilities are removed; and the like.

Deeds are also in some cases avoided by objections relating to the *consideration* on which they are founded, or to their want of consideration.

The consideration of a deed may be either a *good* or a *valuable* one. A good consideration is such as that of blood or of natural love and affection, where a man grants an estate to a near relation;—being founded on motives of generosity, prudence, and natural duty: a valuable consideration is such as money, marriage, or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent given for the grant(*b*).] Deeds made without any consideration whatever, and also those made for good, though not for valuable, consideration are said to be *voluntary*; and by force

(*y*) See Com. Dig. Fait (F. 1); Pigot's case, 11 Rep. 27; Matson v. Booth, 5 M. & Sel. 223; Hall v. Chandless, 4 Bing. 123; Hudson v. Revett, 5 Bing. 368; Davidson v. Cooper, 13 Mee. & W. 343. If there be an erasure or interlineation in a *deed*, it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have been made at or before the time of execution. (See Tatham v. Catta-

more, 20 L. J., Q. B. 364.) On the other hand, in a *will* the presumption is the other way. (Re James, 1 Swab. & Trist. 238.)

(*z*) Matthewson's case, 5 Rep. 23.

(*a*) As to the effect of cancellation, see Vin. Abr. Faits (X. 2, 3, 4); 1 Shep. Touch. 70; Todd v. Emly, 11 Mee. & W. 4.

(*b*) Twyne's case, 3 Rep. 83; 2 Rol. Abr. 779; Palm. 214.

of the statute 27 Eliz. c. 4 (*d*), voluntary deeds are void as against *bonâ fide* purchasers (*e*); and (by 13 Eliz. c. 5) are also void as against creditors, where the grantor is indebted to such creditors at the time, to the extent of insolvency (*f*). So any deed is liable to be impeached if founded on immoral or illegal consideration, or if obtained by fraud (*g*). But in general, its efficacy to bind the parties thereto to their engagements, will not be prevented by the mere want of consideration. For in this respect deeds are distinguished from simple contracts, that is, contracts not under seal; to the validity of which some consideration is essential: but a writing sealed and delivered as a deed, is supposed by the law to be made with due deliberation; and to express, fully and absolutely, the intention of the party by whom it is executed: and he is therefore bound by its execution, whether he received a consideration for that which it comprises, or not (*h*). We may add here, that whenever it appears that a deed was obtained by fraud, force, or other foul practice, or is proved to be an absolute forgery, such instrument is not only incapable (as above noticed) of being enforced, but

(*d*) Made perpetual by 39 Eliz. c. 18, s. 31.

(*e*) See *Johnson v. Legard*, 6 M. & Sel. 60; *Doe v. Manning*, 9 East, 59; *Doe v. Rolfe*, 8 Ad. & El. 650; *Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft*, 1 Ves. & Bea. 183; *Doe d. Richards v. Lewis*, 11 C. B. 1035.

(*f*) See *Bac. Abr. Fraud* (C); *Glaister v. Herver*, 8 Ves. 200; *Battersbee v. Farrington*, 1 Swanst. 113; *Holloway v. Millard*, 1 Mod. 419; *Johnson v. Legard*, Turn. & Russ. 293; *Tarleton v. Liddell*, 20 L. J., Q. B. 507; *Spirett v. Willows*, 3 D. J. & S. 303; *Freeman v. Pope*, Law Rep., 9 Eq. Ca. 206.

(*g*) See *Collins v. Blantern*, 2 Wils. 341.

(*h*) *Bac. Read. Uses*, 79; *Bunn v. Guy*, 4 East, 200; *Irons v. Small-*

piece, 2 Barn. & Ald. 554; *Pratt v. Barker*, 4 Russ. 507. According to Blackstone, (vol. ii p. 296,) a deed made without consideration is "as "it were of no effect, for it is construed to enure or to be effectual "only to the use of the grantor "himself." But this properly applies only to conveyances; and, even as to these, is too largely laid down: for it is clear, that a conveyance, if intended to be by way of mere gift, will operate accordingly; and be effectual for the benefit of the grantee, except as far as it may interfere with the rights of creditors or *bonâ fide* purchasers. (See *Irons v. Smallpiece*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 554; *Pratt v. Barker*, 4 Russ. 507.)

may be formally set aside by the judgment or decree of a court of judicature. This was antiently the province of the Court of Star Chamber, and it now belongs to the Court of Chancery (*i*). In reference, moreover, to this subject, it is to be observed, that a deed may not only be *avoided*, but *discharged*. For by a *release* a party may be discharged from the obligations even of a valid deed; but such release to be effectual must be itself by deed (*k*).

IV. As to the general rules which our law has established relative to the construction of deeds, they are principally as follows :

1. A deed is to be expounded according to the intention, where the intention is clear, rather than according to the precise words used (*l*). For "*verba intentioni debent inservire*;" and "*qui hæret in literâ, hæret in cortice*." [Therefore by a grant of a remainder, a reversion may well pass, and *è converso* (*m*). And upon a similar principle, it is a maxim that "*mala grammatica non vitiat chartam*," neither false English nor bad Latin will destroy a deed (*n*); which perhaps a classical critic may think to be no unnecessary caution.]

2. To explain an ambiguity in the language of a deed, no evidence *dehors* the deed itself is admissible (*o*). For

(*i*) 1 Shep. Touch. 70; 2 Bl. Com. 309.

(*k*) See *West v. Blakeway*, 2 M. & G. 729. It may, however, be right here to apprise the reader that in some cases where relief against a deed can be had in Chancery, recent enactments have allowed relief to be obtained also in a court of law; so that an action on such deed may be barred by a release *not* by deed. (See 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 83—85.)

(*l*) *Chapman v. Dalton*, Plowd. 289; *Hasker v. Sutton*, 1 Bing. 500.

(*m*) Hob. 27. And see 2 Saund. by Wms. 96 b, n. (1).

(*n*) *Osborn's case*, 10 Rep. 133; 2 Show. 334.

(*o*) Bac. Max. Reg. 23. The same general rule applies to written agreements *not* under seal. (See *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mee. & W. 844.) It is to be observed, however, that the terms of a contract may, in some cases, be expounded by reference to usage. (*Spicer v. Cooper*, 1 Q. B. 424; *Grant v. Maddox*, 15 Mee. & W. 745.)

in such cases, the doubt arises merely from the failure of the parties to express their own meaning in proper terms; and if the law allowed the difficulty to be removed by extraneous evidence, it would render precision of less importance, and introduce inconvenient laxity into the structure of deeds in general (*p*). But here it is necessary to distinguish between *patent* and *latent* ambiguities (*q*). The first are, where the doubt arises upon the face of the instrument itself; and to these the rule applies: the second are, where the doubt is introduced by the existence of a fact not apparent on the face of the deed; and to these the rule has no application: the reason for which seems to be, that where the ambiguity itself is produced by circumstances extraneous to the deed, its explanation must of necessity be sought for through the same medium (*r*).

3. The construction of a deed should be made upon the entire instrument, and so as to give effect, as far as possible, to every word that it contains (*s*).

4. [The construction should be *favourable*, and such that "*res magis valeat quam pereat*" (*t*). In connection apparently with which rule, it is also laid down, that if the words will bear two senses, one agreeable to and another against law, that sense shall be preferred which is most agreeable thereto (*u*). As if tenant in tail grants

(*p*) Or (as expressed by Lord Bacon) it would "make all deeds "hollow, and subject to averments." (Bac. Max. Reg. 23.)

(*q*) As to *patent* and *latent* ambiguity, see 4 Cru. Dig. 425; 6 Cru. Dig. 165; Bac. Max. Reg. 23; Sanderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N. C. 425; Doe d. Gains v. Rouse, 5 C. B. 422; Queen v. Wooldale, 6 Q. B. 549; Reffell v. Reffell, Law Rep., 1 P. & D. 139.

(*r*) In the case of a devise (to which, as to all other written instruments, the rule applies), a "latent" ambiguity has been thus illustrated,

that if a man devise to his son John, having two sons of that name, evidence will be admitted to show which son the testator meant. See 5 Rep. 68 b; 2 Atk. 372; 2 P. Wms. 135; Grant v. Grant, Law Rep., 5 C. P. 380; ib. 727.

(*s*) 2 Bl. Com. 379.

(*t*) See Plowd. 156; Shep. Touch. 82, 83; 2 Bl. Com. 380; 2 Saund. by Wms. 96, n. (1); Roe v. Tranmar, Willes, 682; James v. Plant, in error, 4 Ad. & El. 766; Doe d. Lewis v. Davies, 2 Mee & W. 516.

(*u*) Co. Litt. 42 a.

[a lease to have and to hold during life generally, it shall be construed to be a lease for his own life only, for that stands with the law; and not for the life of the lessee, which is beyond his power to grant.]

5. When any thing is granted, the means necessary for its enjoyment are also granted by implication; for it is a maxim that "*cuicunque aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa non esse potuit*" (x). Thus, if a man conveys a piece of ground in the midst of his estate, a right of way to come to it, over the land not conveyed, will pass also to the grantee.

6. If there be two clauses in a deed so totally repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together, the first shall be received, and the latter rejected (y).

7. [Ambiguous words shall be taken most strongly against the grantor, and in favour of the grantee. "*Verba fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem*" (z). For the principle of self-preservation will make men sufficiently careful not to prejudice their own interest, by the too extensive meaning of their words; and hereby all manner of deceit in any grant is avoided, for men would always affect ambiguous and intricate expressions, if they were afterwards at liberty to put their own construction upon them. But in general, this rule, being a rule of some strictness and rigour, is the last to be resorted to, and is never to be relied upon but where all other rules of exposition fail; and it does not apply to a grant by the Crown, at the suit of the grantee (a).]

(x) See Co. Litt. 56 a; Shep. Touch. 89; Liford's case, 11 Rep. 52; 1 Saund. by Wms. 323 a, n. (6); Lord Darcey v. Askwith, Hob. 234; Earl of Cardigan v. Armitage, 2 Barn. & Cress. 211; Harris v. Ryding, 5 Mee. & W. 60; Hinchliffe v. Kinnoul, 2 Bing. N. C. 24.

(y) 2 Bl. Com. 381. See Shep. Touch. 88; Hard. 94; Doe d. Leicest. 2 Taunt. 113; Doe d. Spencer v. Pedley, 1 Mee. & W. 677. The rule,

however, in such case, when arising on a *devise*, seems to be to consider the latter clause as the one to be followed. (See Co. Litt. 1126; Plowd. 541; Doe d. Spencer v. Pedley, ubi sup.)

(z) See Co. Litt. 36 a; Bac. Max. Reg. 3; 2 Bl. Com. 380; Doe v. Edwards, 1 Mee. & W. 556; Bullen v. Denning, 5 Barn. & Cress. 842.

(a) See Bac. Max. Reg. 3.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF ORDINARY CONVEYANCES—AND FIRST, OF THOSE
AT THE COMMON LAW.

THE branch of law which relates to “conveyances,” or the instruments of voluntary alienation is properly of a practical character, and seems in the nature of things capable of being regulated with great simplicity. It involves, however, in the English jurisprudence, considerations of a very complex and subtle kind, and has been elaborated into a highly artificial system, known under the denomination of *conveyancing*,—a system which maintains its own separate body of practitioners and professors, and constitutes a science in itself (*a*).

In the earlier times, and indeed down to so late a period as the reign of Henry the eighth, the chief distinction between the different modes of conveyance, as regards lands of free tenure, to which alone our attention is at present directed, was this, that they were either by matter *in pais*, or by matter of *record* (*b*); the first, which were the ordinary class, comprehending such as were transacted between two or more persons *in pais*, in the country—that is, according to the old common law, upon the very spot to be transferred; the second, such as were effected, by an assurance in the superior courts of justice (*c*). But in and subsequent to the reign just men-

(*a*) See 44 Geo. 3, c. 98, s. 14.
As to conveyancers, see 23 & 24
Vict. c. 127, s. 34.

47, 482, n. (*d*): and see the same
note, as to matter *in pais*.

(*c*) 2 Bl. Com. 294.

(*b*) As to *records*, vide sup. pp.

tioned, various acts of parliament have been passed, the effect of which has been to introduce a new class of conveyances; distinguished from the more antient ones, as deriving their force and authority from these statutes, and not from immemorial custom, or the common law of the realm; and it will be found convenient, in discussing the general subject of conveyances, to keep the latter distinction, as well as the former, prominently in view.

We shall therefore divide the conveyances of land of freehold tenure, first, into conveyances of the *ordinary* kind, being in effect the same with those antiently described as *in pais*: and secondly, into conveyances by *matter of record*; which, as compared with the other, are of a rarer or more special description. The first of these, we shall again subdivide into two classes, first, conveyances at *common law*; secondly, conveyances *by statute law*: and the conveyances at common law will constitute the subject of the present chapter.

I. A Feoffment. In the course of our past disquisition, we have already had frequent occasion to refer to this method of conveyance, because it was for ages the only method in ordinary use by which our ancestors were wont to convey the freehold of land in possession; and the doctrines relating to it are by consequence very closely connected with the fundamental principles of the law of real property, and essential to their illustration. And for the same reason, we shall proceed now to give a somewhat fuller account of its nature and properties, than its actual importance, in practice, would seem to justify. For it is necessary here to apprize the reader, that this conveyance has now fallen, in great measure, into disuse, having been almost entirely supplanted by some of that class which are founded on the statute law of the realm.

A feoffment, then, is derived from the verb to enfeoff, *feoffare* or *infeudare*, to give one a feud, and is a method of alienation applicable to the purpose above described;

viz. that of conveying an estate of freehold in possession in a corporeal hereditament; and to that purpose only (e).

[This conveyance is plainly derived from—or is indeed itself the very mode of—the antient feudal donation; for though it may be performed by the word “*enfeoff*” or “grant,” yet the aptest word of feoffment is “*do*” or “*dedi*” (f). And it is still directed and governed by the same feudal rules; insomuch that the principal rule relating to the extent and effect of the feudal grant, “*tenor est qui legem dat feudo*,” is, in other words, become the maxim of our law with relation to feoffments, “*modus legem dat donationi*” (g). And therefore as in pure feudal donations, the lord, from whom the feud moved, must expressly limit and declare the continuance or quantity of estate which he meant to confer, “*ne quis plus donasse præsumatur, quam in donatione expresserit*,” so, if one grants by feoffment lands or tenements to another, and limits or expresses no estate, the grantee (due ceremonies of law being performed) hath barely an estate for life (h). For as the personal abilities of the feoffee were originally presumed to be the immediate or principal inducement to the feoffment, the feoffee’s estate ought to be confined to his person, and subsist only for his life; unless the feoffor, by express provision in the creation and constitution of the estate, hath given it a longer continuance. It has therefore been the practice in all feoffments, from time immemorial, to limit, by express words, the nature of the estate intended to be conveyed.

But by the mere words of the donation the feoffment

(e) A reversion or remainder, however, and the particular estate on which it is expectant, may be created by the same feoffment (vide sup. p. 321). And so a freehold reversion already created, if expectant on a particular estate for years, may be transferred by feoffment, with the consent of the particular

tenant. (Co. Litt. 48 b.) But where his consent is not given, the conveyance must be by grant, and the livery is void. (Litt. s. 567; Co. Litt. 48 b.)

(f) Co. Litt. 9 a; vide sup. p. 490.

(g) Wright’s Ten. 21.

(h) Co. Litt. 42 a.

[is by no means perfected; there remains a very material ceremony to be performed, called *livery of seisin*, without which the transaction cannot operate as a feoffment (*i*). This livery of seisin is no other than the pure feudal investiture or delivery of corporal possession of the land or tenement, which was held absolutely necessary to complete the donation (*h*). “*Nam feudum sine investiturâ nullo modo constitui potuit*” (*l*); and an estate was then only perfect when, as the author of Fleta expresses it in our law, “*fit juris et seisinæ conjunctio*” (*m*).

Investitures, in their original rise, were probably intended to demonstrate in conquered countries the actual possession of the *lord*: and that he did not grant a bare litigious right, which the soldier was ill qualified to prosecute, but a peaceable and firm possession. And at a time when writing was seldom practised, a mere oral gift, at a distance from the spot that was given, was not likely to be either long or accurately retained in the memory of bystanders, who were very little interested in the grant. Afterwards investitures were retained as a public and notorious act, that the country might take notice of and testify the transfer of the estate; and that such as claimed title by other means, might know against whom to bring their actions.

In all well-governed nations, some notoriety of this kind has been ever held requisite, in order to acquire and ascertain the property of lands. In the Roman law, *plenum dominium* was not said to subsist, unless where a man had both the *right* and the *corporal possession*; which possession could not be acquired without both an actual intention to possess, and an actual seisin or entry into the premises, or part of them in the name of the whole (*n*). And even in ecclesiastical promotions where

(*i*) Litt. s. 70.

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 176.

(*l*) Wright's Ten. 37.

(*m*) L. 3, c. 15, s. 5.

(*n*) “*Nam apiscimur possessionem corpore et animo; neque per se corpore, neque per se animo. Non autem ita accipiendum est, ut*

[the freehold passes to the person promoted, corporal possession is required at this day to vest the property completely in the new proprietor; who, according to the distinction of the canonists, acquires the *jus ad rem*, or inchoate and imperfect right, by nomination and institution; but not the *jus in re*, or complete and full right, unless by corporal possession (*o*). Therefore in ecclesiastical dignities, possession is given by “instalment;” in rectories and vicarages, by “induction;” without which no temporal rights accrue to the minister, though every ecclesiastical power is vested in him by institution. So also even in descents of lands by our law, which are cast on the heir by act of the law itself, the heir, as we have seen, has not *plenum dominium*, or full and complete ownership, till he has made an actual corporal entry into the lands (*p*).

Yet the corporal tradition of lands being sometimes inconvenient, a symbolical delivery of possession was in many cases antiently allowed, by transferring something near at hand, in the presence of credible witnesses; which, by agreement, should serve to represent the very thing designed to be conveyed; and an occupancy of this sign or symbol was permitted as equivalent to occupancy of the land itself. Among the Jews, we find the evidence of a purchase thus defined in the book of Ruth: “Now
“this was the manner in former time, in Israel, concerning redeeming and concerning changing, for to confirm all things; a man plucked off his shoe, and gave it
“to his neighbour: and this was a testimony in Israel” (*q*).

qui fundum possidere velit, omnes glebas circumambulet; sed sufficit quantlibet partem ejus fundi introire.—Ff. 41, 2, 3.—And again: “*traditionibus dominia rerum, non nudis pactis, transferuntur.*”—Cod. 2, 3, 20.

(*o*) Decretal. l. 3, t. 4, c. 40.

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 430, where it is noticed that an heir before entry

cannot maintain an action of trespass. So under the rule that formerly required a title by descent to be traced from the person last seised of the inheritance, the heir was incapable, before entry, of being made the root of descent, vide sup. p. 397.

(*q*) Ruth, ch. iv. v. 7.

[Among the antient Goths and Swedes, contracts for the sale of lands were made in the presence of witnesses, who extended the cloak of the buyer, while the seller cast a clod of the land into it, in order to give possession; and a staff or wand was also delivered from the vendor to the vendee, which passed through the hands of the witnesses (*r*). With our Saxon ancestors, the delivery of a turf was a necessary solemnity to establish the conveyance of lands (*s*).] And to this day, the conveyance of our copyhold estates is usually made by the seller's delivery of a rod or verge to the lord or his steward, and then by the re-delivery of the same from the lord to the purchaser, in the presence of a jury of tenants.

Conveyances *in writing* were the last and most refined improvement. For the transaction, when depending on the remembrance and testimony of witnesses, was liable to be forgotten or misrepresented, and became frequently incapable of proof. Besides, the new occasions and necessities introduced by the advancement of commerce, required means to be devised of charging and encumbering estates, without an absolute sale thereof; and of making them liable to a multitude of conditions and minute designations. Writings were consequently introduced, in order to specify and perpetuate the peculiar purposes of the party who conveyed: and now by the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3), s. 1, no estate created by livery of seisin only, and not in writing signed by the party, or his agent by writing lawfully authorized, shall be of any force except to constitute an estate at will. Since this statute, therefore, a feoffment has not been effectual unless evidenced by writing; though the transaction has been nevertheless considered as deriving its legal force from the livery, and not from the written instrument (*t*). And now by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, a feoffment made after 1st October,

(*r*) Stiernhook, de Jure Sueon. l. 2, c. 4.

(*s*) Hickes, Dissert. Epistolar. 85.

(*t*) Co. Litt. 48 a; et vide sup. p. 494, n. (*i*).

1845, other than a feoffment made under a custom by an infant, shall be void at law unless evidenced *by deed* (*u*).

[Livery of seisin is either “in deed” or “in law.” Livery in *deed* is thus performed. The feoffer, lessor, or his attorney for the purpose, together with the feoffee, lessee, or his attorney (for this may as effectually be done by deputy or attorney as by the principals themselves in person), come to the land, or to the house; and there, in the presence of witnesses, declare the contents of the feoffment or lease on which livery is to be made. And then the feoffor, if it be of land, doth deliver to the feoffee (all other persons being out of the ground) a clod or turf, or a twig or bough there growing, with words to this effect: “I deliver these to you in the name of seisin of all the lands and tenements contained in this deed.” But if it be of a house, the feoffor must take the ring or latch of the door (the house being quite empty), and deliver it to the feoffee in the same form; and then the feoffee must enter alone, and shut to the door, and then open it, and let in the others (*x*). And in all these cases it is prudent and usual to indorse the livery of seisin on the back of the deed, specifying the manner, place and time of making it, together with the names of the witnesses (*y*). And thus much for livery in deed.

Livery in *law* is where the same is not made on the land, but in sight of it only; the feoffor saying to the feoffee, “I give you yonder land, enter and take possession.” Here, if the feoffee enters during the life of the feoffor, it is a good livery, but not otherwise.] By the

(*u*) As to feoffment by an infant, in gavelkind, vide sup. p. 213. A deed of feoffment is also called a *charter* of feoffment. (Co. Litt. 9 b, 36 a, n. (1).)

(*x*) Co. Litt. 48 a; West. Symb. 251. Further information will be found in Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 315) on this subject; and particularly as

to the cases in which more than one livery will be required, in consequence of the lands lying in different counties, or the like.

(*y*) As to the manner of making livery of seisin, see also *Roe v. Rashi-leigh*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 156; *Doe v. Taylor*, 2 Nev. & M. 508.

antient law, indeed, if he dared not enter through fear of his life or bodily harm, his *continual claim*—made yearly in due form—would suffice without an entry (*z*). But this is now altered by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 11, which provides that no right of entry or action shall in future be preserved by *continual claim*. Livery in law cannot be given or received by attorney, but only by the parties themselves (*a*).

By feoffment, not only a fee simple may be conveyed, but an estate tail or an estate for life; for these (as we have seen) are all estates of freehold. But the term “feoffment” is considered as importing more properly a conveyance of the *fee*; while the conveyance of an *estate tail* is more technically called *gift*; that of an estate for life, a *demise* or *lease* (*b*).

The last point (already incidentally noticed), that we shall mention with respect to this conveyance, is, that up to a recent period it was distinguished from others by the following property; that when made (without fraud) by a person in actual possession, it would always have the effect of passing to the feoffee a freehold, either by right or by wrong (*c*). For it was a delivery of the actual seisin, that is, of the actual possession, as for an estate of freehold, in fee, in tail or for life; so that if the feoffor was himself lawfully seised to the full extent of the estate that he conveyed, a freehold as of right would pass; and even if he was not lawfully seised, or not lawfully seised to that extent, a freehold would still pass, though a freehold by *wrong* (*d*). And when by such means, or by any other,

(*z*) Litt. s. 421; Co. Litt. 48 b; 2 Inst. 483.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 52 b.

(*b*) Litt. s. 59; Co. Litt. 9 a. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 316) enumerates “gift” as a separate conveyance; but, as he himself remarks, “it differs in nothing from a feoff-

ment, but in the nature of the estate passing by it.”

(*c*) Vide sup. p. 465.

(*d*) Litt. ss. 599, 611; Co. Litt. 367 a; Fermor’s case, 3 Rep. 77; Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60; Co. Litt. by Butl. 330 b, n. (1); 2 Sand. Us. 18, 20; Doe v. Hall, 2 Dow. &

a wrongful or tortious freehold was created, the effect was, that the person lawfully entitled to the freehold in possession was *disseised*; and if there were any persons in reversion or remainder, such reversion or remainder was *displaced* or *divested*, so that each of these parties ceased to retain (strictly speaking) an *estate*; though each nevertheless possessed a *right of entry*; that is, was entitled, in his proper turn, to enter, and eject the wrong-doer, and thus to revest his own estate (*e*). But all this doctrine, *so far as regards the operation of a feoffment by wrong*,—long diminished in practical importance by the growing rarity of feoffments, and by other causes, and latterly involved in some degree of obscurity,—is now abolished by the provision of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, to which we have had frequent occasion already to refer, that “a feoffment made after the 1st October, 1845, shall not have any tortious operation.”

II. A Grant is effected by mere deed, without livery of seisin, containing words expressive of the intention to convey. The appropriate words are “*dedi et concessi*,”

Ry. 38; Doe v. Lynes, 3 Barn. & Cress. 388; Doe v. Taylor, 5 Barn. & Adol. 575. The doctrine in the text, though no longer in force, yet deserves attention from its tendency to illustrate the principles of the law of real property. It is to be observed, that, independently of a feoffment, a tortious estate may be created by *any* act that produces a disseisin, or any wrongful ouster of the freehold. (Co. Litt. 2 a.) The nature of these wrongful acts will be explained in that part of the work which treats of civil injuries, vide post, bk. v. c. VIII.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 251 a, b, 327 b; 1 Sand. by Wms. 319, u. (1); Focus v. Salisbury, Hard. 401, 402. In the

particular case, however, of a wrongful feoffment by tenant in tail in possession, the effect was different; for it was a *discontinuance*, which formerly deprived the reversioner or remainder-man (as well as the issue in tail) even of his *right of entry*, and left him nothing but a *right of action*. (Co. Litt. 327 b.) But by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 39, a discontinuance is no longer to be attended with this effect (see also 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4). A discontinuance, besides, involved (as we have seen) no *forfeiture* of the particular estate; though it was otherwise with a wrongful feoffment by tenant for life or years. Vide sup. p. 465.

“have given and granted,” but they may be supplied by others of the like import (*f*). This was the regular method, by the common law, of transferring estates in expectancy (that is, reversions and remainders) in corporeal hereditaments, as feoffment was of transferring a freehold estate in possession (*g*). And the same mode, viz. grant, was appropriate also to the transfer (for whatever estate) of hereditaments incorporeal—such as advowsons, commons, rents, and the like,—of which we are to treat hereafter (*h*). For it obviously results from the nature both of things incorporeal, and of corporeal things in expectancy, that no livery can be made of them: not of the first, because they are not capable of possession; nor of the last, because the possession is in the particular tenant, and not in the grantor. For which reason they were formerly both said to *lie in grant*; while corporeal hereditaments in possession were said to *lie in livery* (*i*). And as the latter passed by force of the livery of seisin, so the former passed by force of the deed. But the conveyance by grant is now made applicable to all kinds of hereditaments; for by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2, it is enacted, that, “after the 1st October, 1845, all corporeal tenements and hereditaments shall, as regards the conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant as well as in livery” (*k*). It is also to be remarked under this head, that by the antient law, besides the grant itself, an additional ceremony was required where a reversion or remainder was the subject of transfer; viz. the *attornment* of the tenant of the particular estate, to the grantee (*l*).

(*f*) 2 Sand. Us. 47. The word “give” or “grant” is by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, to imply no covenant as to title or otherwise; vide sup. p. 490.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 172 a, 332 a, b.

(*h*) As to incorporeal hereditaments, vide sup. p. 170; post, c. XXI.

(*i*) 2 Rep. 31 b; Doe v. Cole, 7

Barn. & Cress. 243.

(*k*) It will be seen hereafter (post, p. 539) that the effect of this enactment has been to make a *grant* the usual method of passing real estate *inter vivos*, under the present system of conveyancing.

(*l*) Litt. ss. 568, 569; Doe v. Finch, 4 Barn. & Adol. 303.

But by the statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, this requisite is now dispensed with (*m*).

III. A Lease (or “demise”) is a conveyance by which a man grants lands or tenements (usually with the reservation of a rent) to another, for life, for years, or at will (*n*), such estate being short of the lessor’s own interest therein (*o*); for if it be to the full extent of that interest, it is then properly an “assignment,” and no lease (*p*). A lease of land for life, being a freehold interest, could not be constituted by the common law without livery of seisin; and therefore the lease could, in such case, be only by way of feoffment (*q*): but if the estate were for years, or at will, no livery was required (*r*); nor was a deed, or even any writing, formerly essential to the efficacy of a demise of land (*s*). The law, however, on this subject is now altered; for by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) ss. 1, 2, all leases whatever, with the exception of those not exceeding three years and with a rent of not less than two-thirds of the improved value, must now be put into writing and signed by the lessor or his agent lawfully

(*m*) See *Doe d. Agar v. Brown*, 2 El. & Bl. 331. As to attornment generally, vide sup. pp. 468, 470.

(*n*) Litt. s. 58. A lease may be either of land in the possession of the lessor, or of land whereof he has the reversion or remainder; for of the latter he may make a lease for years *in futuro*, to take effect in possession on the determination of the particular estate; and he may also grant the reversion for a term short of his own interest therein; but such grant must be by deed. See Co. Litt. 47 a; Bac. Abr. Leases (N.)

(*o*) As to the nature of leases generally, see Co. Litt. 43 b; and Bac. Abr., “Leases and Terms of

“Years,” “where” (says Blackstone, vol. ii. p. 323, *in notis*) “the subject is treated in a perspicuous and masterly manner: being supposed to be extracted from a manuscript of Sir Geoffrey Gilbert.” As to leases under powers defectively executed, see 12 & 13 Vict. cc. 26, 110; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 17.

(*p*) 2 Bl. Com. 317.

(*q*) Litt. s. 59.

(*r*) Ibid.

(*s*) But a lease of an *incorporeal* hereditament could not be made at common law without deed. (Co. Litt. 49; *Bird v. Higginson*, 6 Ad. & El. 824; *Rex v. Marquis of Salisbury*, 8 Ad. & El. 716.)

authorized in writing. And, by the statute of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, (sect. 3,) it has been now further provided, that a lease, required by law to be in writing, of any tenements or hereditaments, made after 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law unless made *by deed* (t): though, on the other hand,—by the effect of the same statute, (sect. 2,) providing that all corporeal hereditaments shall, as regards the conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant as well as in livery—a lease even for life may now be effected by grant, without livery of seisin. It results, however, from the former observations with respect to estates for years, that a lease of land for years will not vest in the lessee a complete estate for all purposes, until he has made *entry* on the land demised; and that in the mean time he takes nothing beyond an *interesse termini* (u).

When the lease is for years only, the estate may be granted to take effect in possession either immediately, or at some future time; and, in the latter case, the lessee has of course no right to enter until that future time has arrived (v). But it is important carefully to distinguish these leases *in futuro* from mere *agreements to let*; for an intended lessor may, without using such words as actually to divest himself of any interest present or future, simply engage to grant a lease at a future period; and as no interest in the mean time passes, this will be a mere agreement, and no lease (x). And with respect to such agreements, it is material to remark, that by 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 4, they are required, even where the term agreed for is less than three years, to be in writing (y).

(t) It may be remarked, that a parol instrument demising for more than three years, though void as a lease (under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106), and therefore passing no interest, may be good as an *agreement*, and if broken may be decreed to be specifically performed; (see *Parker v. Taswell*, 27 Law J., Ch. 812:) or be

ground for an action. (See *Bond v. Rosling*, 1 B. & S., Q. B. 371; *Tidey v. Mollett*, 16 C. B., N. S. 298; *Stranks v. St. John*, Law Rep., 2 C. P. 376.)

(u) Vide sup. p. 287.

(v) Vide sup. p. 322.

(x) See *Rollason v. Leon*, 7 H. & N. 73.

(y) See *Inman v. Stamp*, 1

[The usual words of operation in a lease are “demise, “grant, and to farm let,” *demisi concessi et ad firmam tradidi* (z). For *farm* or *feorme* is an old Saxon word signifying provisions (a); and it came to be used instead of rent or render, because antiently the greater part of rents were reserved in provisions—in corn, in poultry, and the like,—till the use of money became more frequent: so that a farmer, *firmarius*, was one who held his lands upon payment of a rent or feorme; though at present, by a gradual departure from the original sense, the word farm is brought to signify the very estate or lands so held upon farm or rent.] Neither the words “to farm let,” however, nor any of the others above specified, are necessary to effect a demise; any expressions sufficiently indicating the intention of one of the parties to divest himself of the possession, for a determinate period, in favour of the other, being clearly sufficient to constitute a lease (b). In reference to the covenants contained in a lease, we may here observe, that it results from what has been before stated as to such as *run with the land* (c), that the lessee is liable not only to the original landlord or reversioner, but in case of the grant of the reversion, then to the grantee also, for the future performance of all such covenants contained in the lease, on the part of the lessee; and is entitled, on the other hand, to enforce against the grantee, as well as the original landlord, the future performance of all such as are contained in it on the part of the lessor (d). As to the covenants in a lease, it is also material to notice, that, to improve the landlord’s security, the lease usually contains a proviso that, on breach of any of the covenants by the tenant, the landlord shall be at liberty to *re-enter*, and

Starkie, N. P. C. 12; Edge v. Stratford, 1 Tyrw. 293.

(z) Co. Litt. 45 b.

(a) Spelm. Gloss. 229.

(b) Bac. Abr. Leases, &c.; Doe v. Ashburner, 5 T. R. 163; Barry v.

Nugent, 5 T. R. 165, n.; Poole v. Bentley, 13 East, 168.

(c) Vide sup. p. 491.

(d) See Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. by Wms. 230 b; Wright v. Burroughes, 3 C. B. 344.

resume and hold possession of the premises as if no lease of them had ever been made. Such a proviso constitutes, in case of a breach of covenant by the tenant, a most advantageous addition to the landlord's remedies, which would otherwise be confined, in some cases, to a right of action for damages on the covenant (*e*).

IV. [An Exchange is a mutual grant of equal interests, the one in consideration of the other. The word "exchange" is so individually requisite and appropriated by law to this case, that it cannot be supplied by any other word or expressed by any circumlocution (*f*). The estates exchanged must be equal in quantity, not of *value* (for that is immaterial), but of *interest*;—as fee simple for fee simple, a lease for years for another lease for years, and the like (*g*). And no livery, even in exchanges of freehold, was, at the common law, necessary to perfect the conveyance (*h*); for each party stands in the place of the other, and occupies his right, and each of them hath already had corporal possession of his own land.] On the other hand, by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) ss. 1, 3, an exchange was required to be in writing; and by the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, it must now also be by deed, in every case except that of an exchange of copyhold. Moreover, by the common law, entry must be made on both sides; for if either party die before entry, the exchange is void for want of sufficient notoriety (*i*). And it was held, that if two parsons, by consent

(*e*) It may be observed, with regard to the *non-payment of rent*, that the landlord, in addition to his remedy by re-entry and his action on the covenant, has also a right of *distress*, as to which, vide post, bk. v. c. I.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 50, 51; Eton College *v.* Bishop of Winchester, 3 Wils. 468. See the provision, 8 &

9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, mentioned in the next page.

(*g*) Litt. ss. 64, 65. As to whether an exchange by lessee for twenty years with lessee for thirty or forty years would be good, see Perk. sect. 275; 2 Shep. Touch. 296.

(*h*) Litt. s. 62.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 51 b.

of patron and ordinary, exchanged their preferments, and the one were presented, instituted, and inducted, and the other presented and instituted, but died before induction,—the former should not keep his new benefice, because the exchange was not completed, and therefore he must return back to his own (*k*). It was also held, that if, after an exchange of lands or other hereditaments, either party were evicted of those which were taken by him in exchange, through defect of the other's title, he should return back to the possession of his own, by virtue of the implied warranty contained in all exchanges (*l*). But this doctrine seems now to be affected by the provision of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, whereby it is enacted, that an exchange of any tenements or hereditaments made by deed executed after 1st October, 1845, shall not imply any condition in law. It may be proper, too, before we conclude this head, to point the reader's attention to the distinction between the conveyance properly called an *exchange* (that is, one made in the method above pointed out), and a transaction where the parties execute *mutual conveyances* of their respective lands under some other form or forms of assurance; for to such a case the doctrines above laid down, as to *exchanges*, have no application (*m*).

V. [A Partition is where two or more joint-tenants, coparceners, or tenants in common, agree to divide the

(*k*) Perk. s. 288. As to exchange of preferments, see Downes v. Craig, 9 Mee. & W. 166.

(*l*) As to warranty, vide sup. p. 488.

(*m*) See Eton College v. Bishop of Winchester, 3 Wils. 491. It is further to be observed, that exchanges of land may now be effected, through the agency of the Inclosure Commissioners; and that the provisions of the General Inclosure Acts

on this subject are applicable not only in cases of inclosure, but even as regards lands not subject to be inclosed, or in respect of which no proceedings for inclosure are pending. (See 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, ss. 92, 147; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 70; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 111; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 99; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 83; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 53; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 79; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 97; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 43.)

[lands so held among them in severalty, each taking a distinct part (*n*). Here, as they all hold *pro indiviso* or promiscuously, it is necessary that they all mutually convey and assure to each other the several estates, which they are to take and enjoy separately (*o*).] By the common law, coparceners might make partition by parol only, accompanied by livery; but joint-tenants and tenants in common could not make it otherwise than by deed; though it would appear that if perfected by livery such deed did not require to be signed (*p*). However, under the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3,) an instrument in writing, signed by the party or his agent, was made necessary in every case of partition by way of agreement (*q*). And by the provision of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, partitions of all hereditaments (not being copyhold) made after 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law, unless made not only in writing, but by deed (*r*).

The common law conveyances which have been hitherto considered, are all (it may be remarked) of a *primary* or *original* character. Those which remain are of a *secondary* or *derivative* sort, which presuppose some other conveyance precedent; and only serve to enlarge, confirm,

(*n*) As to partition, see Co. Litt. 165 b.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 339.

(*p*) 2 Bl. Com. 324. Blackstone adds that the statutes 31 Hen. 8, c. 1, and 32 Hen. 8, c. 22, (which subjected joint tenants and tenants in common to a writ of partition,) did not affect the manner of conveyance when the partition was effected without writ. It may be remarked that in case of a partition between *joint tenants* (no delivery of seisin from one co-tenant to the other being required) a mutual *re-*

lease is the proper method of assurance.

(*q*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 169 a, n. (4). See, however, sup. p. 494, n. (*i*).

(*r*) It is also provided by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, that a partition of any tenements or hereditaments made by deed executed after 1st October, 1845, shall not imply any condition in law. Partitions, as well as exchanges, may now be effected under provisions specially devised for that purpose in the General Inclosure Acts. See the Acts referred to, sup. p. 516, note (*m*).

alter, restrain, restore, or transfer the interest granted by such original conveyance. As,—

VI. A Release; which may be defined as a conveyance of an ulterior interest in lands or tenements to a particular tenant, or of an undivided share therein to a co-tenant, (the releesee being in either case in privity of estate with the releasor,)—or of the right to such land or tenements, to a person wrongfully in possession thereof(*s*). It was always effected without livery of seisin, even though the interest conveyed were freehold; for the doctrine of release is founded on this principle, that though the freehold in possession could not pass at common law without livery (which made a notoriety to the country), yet where another person was already in the possession, the reason and propriety of that ceremony failed; and the grantor might consequently convey such right or interest as he had, by mere deed(*t*). A deed, however, is essential to the efficacy of this conveyance(*u*); and the proper operative word to be employed in it, is that of “*release*”(*x*): yet it is to be observed, that the release of a right may not only be *express*, but may also be *implied by law* from circumstances; and when it is of this kind, it may take place without deed(*y*).

A release (in conformity with the definition) may enure in several ways.

1. [By way of enlarging an estate, or *enlarger l'estate*. This is the species of release that most frequently occurs, and it consists of a conveyance of the ulterior interest of

(*s*) As to releases, see Co. Litt. 264 a. Some account of the early state of the law respecting them will be found in Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 354.

(*t*) 2 Bl. Com. 325; Gilb. Ten. 53.

(*u*) Co. Litt. 264 b.

(*w*) Vide sup. p. 499, as to the

use of this word in reference to the obligations of a deed. To which it may be added that this is the technical term employed in *all* cases where a renunciation of any right or claim is concerned; whether as regards real estate or things personal, or rights of action.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 264 b.

[the remainderman or reversioner to the particular tenant; as if there be tenant for life or years, remainder to another in fee, and he in remainder releases all his right to the particular tenant and his heirs, this gives him the estate in fee. But to the validity of such releases as these, it is necessary that the estate of the releesee should be a *complete and vested* one (*z*), for if there be lessee for years, and, before he enters and is in possession, the lessor releases to him all his right in the reversion, such release is void; and this because the lessee has, in such case, a mere *interesse termini*, and not an estate upon which a reversion can properly be expectant (*a*).] And further there must be a *privity of estate* between the releasor and releesee; that is, one of their estates must be so related to the other as to make but one and the same estate at law: as in the case where the ulterior estate conveyed is a reversion or remainder mediately or immediately expectant upon the particular estate of the releesee; all which, in contemplation of law, form parts of the same estate, as being derived at the same time, out of the same original seisin (*b*). Thus, if a man seised in fee make a lease for years, with remainder over for life, a

(*z*) Co. Litt. by Butl. 270 a, n. (3). If the estate of the releesee, therefore, is an estate in possession, he ought to be in actual possession of the land (see Litt. ss. 455, 456, 459); for otherwise his estate is incomplete. But otherwise actual possession of the land is not necessary: for "if a man make a lease for years, with remainder for years, and the first lessee doth enter, a release to him in the remainder for years is good to enlarge his estate."—Co. Litt. 270 a, 270 b.

(*a*) "Before entry," says Lord Coke, "the lessee has but *interesse termini*, an interest of a term and no possession; and therefore a

release, which enures by way of enlarging an estate, cannot work without a possession: for before possession, there is no reversion." (Co. Litt. 270 a.) It is to be observed, however, that if the estate for years be created by a conveyance under the Statute of Uses, and not at common law, no actual entry is necessary to give effect to the release. The reason of this will appear when we treat of conveyances of that class.

(*b*) See 2 Prest. Conv. 324; 2 Bl. Com. 325; Gilb. Ten. 70, 71; Goodright v. Forrester, 1 Taunt. 602.

release to the lessee for years is good; for he hath both a privity and an estate; and a release to him in the remainder for life is good also (*c*). But if A. makes a lease to B. for life, and B. makes a lease for years: and afterwards A. releases to the tenant for years, this release is void to enlarge his estate, because there is no privity between A. and the lessee for years (*d*). Upon the same principle a release to a tenant at will, is good, because he has a sufficient estate for the purpose, and a privity with the lessor; but a release to a tenant at sufferance is void, because he has a possession without privity (*e*). 2. [A release may enure by way of passing an estate, or *mitten l'estate*; as where one of two coparceners releases all her right to the other, this passeth the fee simple of the whole (*f*). But in this species of release, as well as the former, there must be a privity of estate between the releasor and releesee (*g*); and therefore one tenant in common cannot release to his companion, because they have distinct freeholds, and there is no necessary unity of title between them (*h*). 3. It may enure by way of *passing a right*, or *mitten le droit*; as if a man be disseised, and releaseth to his disseisor all his right; hereby the disseisor acquires a new right, which changes the quality of his estate, and renders that lawful which before was tortious or wrongful (*i*). 4. By way of *extinguishment*; as if my tenant for life makes a lease to A. for life, remainder to B. and his heirs, and I release to A.; this extinguishes my right to the reversion, and shall enure to the advantage of B.'s remainder as well as of A.'s particular estate (*k*). 5. By way of *entry and feoffment*; as if there be two joint disseisors, and the

(*c*) Co. Litt. 273 a.

(*d*) Ibid. 272 b.

(*e*) Ibid. 270 b. As to tenants by sufferance, vide sup. p. 293.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 273.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 325; Co. Litt. 273 b.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 200 b; Gilb. Ten. 74; vide sup. p. 351.

(*i*) Litt. s. 466.

(*k*) Ibid. 470.

[disseisee releases to one of them, he shall be sole seised, and shall keep out his former companion; which is the same in effect as if the disseisee had entered, and thereby put an end to the disseisin, and afterwards had enfeofed one of the disseisors in fee (*l*).] And here we may observe, with respect to the four last species of release, that the fee may be conveyed by any of them without the use of words of inheritance (*m*): in which respect they differ from releases to enlarge the estate; and indeed from feoffments also, and from grants; for as to all these, it is a general rule (though subject to exception in particular cases) that an estate of inheritance cannot be created without the word *heirs* (*n*).

VII. [A Confirmation is of a nature nearly allied to a release (*o*). Sir Edward Coke defines it to be a conveyance of an estate or right *in esse*, whereby a voidable estate is made sure and unavoidable, or whereby a particular estate is increased (*p*); and the words of making it are these, “have given, granted, ratified, approved, and confirmed” (*q*). An instance of the first branch of the definition is, if tenant for life leaseth for forty years, and dieth during that term; here the lease for years is voidable by him in reversion: yet if he hath confirmed the estate of the lessee for years, before the death of tenant for life, it is no longer voidable but sure (*r*). The latter branch, or that which tends to the increase of a particular estate, is the same in all respects with that species of release which operates by way of enlargement.] It is to be observed that a confirmation (like a release, and for the same reason) has always been effectual without livery

(*l*) Co. Litt. 278 a.

(*m*) Ibid. 9 b.

(*n*) Litt. s. 1; Co. Litt. 8 b; vide sup. p. 237.

(*o*) As to confirmations, see Co. Litt. 295 b, 308 b.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 295 b.

(*q*) Litt. ss. 515, 531. As to confirmations, see also Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. pp. 354, 355.

(*r*) Litt. s. 516.

of seisin, even though a freehold estate be the subject (*s*). Moreover, a deed is essential to the validity of a conveyance of this kind (*t*); though there may be a confirmation *implied by law* from circumstances, as well as a confirmation by deed (*u*).

VIII. [A Surrender, (*sursum redditio*, or rendering up,) is of a nature directly opposite to a release; for as that operates by the greater estate's decending upon the less, a surrender is the falling of a less estate into a greater (*x*). It is defined as a yielding up of an estate for life or years to him that hath an immediate reversion or remainder; wherein the particular estate may merge or drown, by mutual agreement between them (*y*). And accordingly it is held, that the surrenderee must have such an estate, that the estate surrendered may be capable of merging in it; so that tenant for life cannot surrender to him in remainder for years (*z*). A surrender is done by these words, "hath surrendered, granted and yielded "up," or the like (*a*). And though the estate surrendered be for life there was not, at common law, any occasion for livery of seisin (*b*); for there is a privity of estate between the surrenderor and the surrenderee; the one's particular estate and the other's remainder are one and the same estate; and livery having been once made at the creation of it, there is no necessity for having it afterwards.] Nor was either deed or other writing required, at common law, to effect the surrender of land (*c*).

(*s*) 2 Bl. Com. 326.

(*t*) Shep. Touch. by Preston, vol. ii. p. 312.

(*u*) See Co. Litt. 295 b; Doe v. Jenkins, 5 Bing. 469; Jenkins v. Church, Cowp. 482; Ludford v. Barber, 1 T. R. 86; Doe v. Archer, 1 Bos. & Pul. 531.

(*x*) As to surrender, see Co. Litt. 373 b.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 337 b; Burton v. Barday, 7 Bing. 757.

(*z*) Perk. s. 589.

(*a*) 2 Roll. Ab. 497.

(*b*) See Farmer v. Rogers, 2 Wils. 26; Co. Litt. 338 a; Shep. Touch. 307; Sleight v. Bateman, Cro. Eliz. 487.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 338 a; Shep. Touch. 307.

But by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) s. 3, no lease (except of copyhold) shall be surrendered otherwise than by deed or note in writing, signed by the party or his agent lawfully authorized by writing (*d*): though this provision did not prevent there being a surrender created without writing by *operation of law*; for a surrender, like a confirmation, may be implied by law from circumstances (*e*). And now by the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, (s. 3,) a surrender in writing of an interest in any tenement or hereditament,—not being a copyhold interest, and not being an interest which might by law have been created without writing,—made after the 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law unless made not only in writing but *by deed*. It is laid down that, upon a surrender, no entry is required to complete the title of the surrenderee, except for the purpose of bringing an action for any trespass committed; so that if a tenant for life or years surrender at a place off the land, to him in reversion, and the latter agree to it, he has the land in him without further ceremony (*f*).

As to the effect of this conveyance, we may also remark that if a lessee for life or years make a lease for years, reserving rent, and then surrender his estate to his landlord, the estate for years made out of the estate so surrendered will continue notwithstanding the surrender; but the under-tenant, at common law, was, by such surrender of the original lease, held discharged (in general) from the rent and other covenants of *his* lease; for the reversionary estate

(*d*) See *Roe v. Archbishop of York*, 6 East, 86; *Gore v. Wright*, 8 Ad. & El. 118. A mere cancellation of the lease is, of itself, no surrender; (*Doe v. Thomas*, 9 Barn. & Cress. 288;) but may, under particular circumstances, be evidence of one. (*Walker v. Richardson*, 2 Mee. & W. 882.) As to the effect of such cancellation, see also *Lord Ward v. Lumley*, 5 H. & N. 87, 656.

(*e*) *Shep. Touch.* 301; *Bac. Ab. Leases* (S.) 3. See also as to surrenders *in law*, *Davison v. Stanley*, 4 Burr. 2210; *Phipps v. Sculthorpe*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 50; *Dodd v. Acklom*, 6 Man. & G. 672. And the cases cited in the judgment in *Nickells v. Atherstone*, 10 Q. B. 944.

(*f*) *Shep. Touchstone*, 307, 308; *Thompson v. Leach*, 2 Vent. 198.

to which they were annexed ceased, on the surrender, to exist (*g*). And hence in the case of leases, surrendered for the purpose merely of being renewed, it was in the power of the under-lessees (by refusing to surrender, in their turn, notwithstanding they had covenanted to do so), greatly to prejudice their immediate landlords, the first lessees. But by the statute 4 Geo. II. c. 28, it was provided in the particular case of a lease surrendered for the purpose of *renewal*, that the new lessee should (without a surrender of the under-lease) have the like remedy as to the rent and covenants, and the under-lessee should hold, as if the original lease had been kept on foot; and that the chief landlord should have the like remedy, by distress or entry on the lands and hereditaments comprised in such under-lease, for the rents and duties reserved by the renewed lease, (so far as they exceeded not those reserved by the original lease,) as he would have had if such original lease had been kept on foot (*h*). And by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, (s. 9,) it is now provided more generally, that when the reversion expectant on a lease (made either before or after the passing of that Act) of any tenements or hereditaments of any tenure shall, after the 1st October, 1845, be surrendered or merge, the estate which shall, for the time being, confer as against the tenant under the same lease, the next vested right to the same tenements or hereditaments, shall,—to the extent and for the purpose of preserving such incidents to, and obligations on, the same reversion, as, but for the surrender or merger thereof, would have subsisted,—be deemed the reversion expectant on the same lease.

IX. An Assignment of land or real estate is properly a transfer, or making over to another, of a person's whole interest therein, whatever that interest may be; but it is

(*g*) Lord Treasurer *v.* Barton, Moore, 94; Webb *v.* Russell, 3 T. R. 402.

(*h*) See Doe *v.* Marchetti, 1 B. &

Ad. 715; Cousins *v.* Phillips, 35 L. J., Ex. 84. As to the renewal of leases of *crown* lands, see 8 & 9 Vict. c. 99, s. 7.

more particularly applied to express the transfer of an estate for life or years. And an assignment for life or years differs from a lease only in this, that by a lease a man grants an interest less than his own, reserving to himself a reversion; by an assignment, he parts with the whole property, and the assignee consequently stands in the place of the assignor (*i*). Thus where a lease is assigned, the assignee (as well as the lessee) is liable to the landlord or reversioner, for the future performance of the covenants made by the lessee: and he remains so, until he assigns over in his turn to another person (*k*). And this liability attaches to him even without entry (*l*). However, he is not liable by force of the assignment, except on such covenants as *run with the land* (*m*),—a term that has been explained in a former chapter (*n*). And he is also entitled to enforce against the reversioner any covenant of that kind which the lease contains in favour of the lessee; and in case the reversioner conveys his interest to another, then to enforce it, also, against the grantee of the reversion (*o*). It is to be observed, however, that if the transfer be for a single day short of the residue of the term, no liability or claim on the original covenants can arise between the transferee and the reversioner or the grantee of the reversion, for it is then an under-lease and no assignment; and the alienee not coming precisely into the place of the alienor, is in no privity with the reversioner (*p*). No deed or other writing was necessary, at common law, to the validity of an assignment (*q*); though in the case of a lease for

(*i*) 2 Bl. Com. 326.

(*k*) *Taylor v. Shum*, 1 B. & Pul. 21; *Burnett v. Lynd*, 5 B. & C. 589; *Moule v. Garrett*, Law Rep., 5 Exch. 132. As to the lessee continuing liable notwithstanding the assignment, see *Barnard v. Godscall*, Cro. Jac. 309.

(*l*) *Williams v. Bosanquet*, 1 Brod. & Bing. 248.

(*m*) *Whitton v. Peacock*, 2 Bing.

N. C. 411.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 491.

(*o*) 32 Hen. 8, c. 34; *Thursby v. Plant*, 1 Saund. by Wms. 230 b; *Wright v. Burroughes*, 3 C. B. 685.

(*p*) *Holford v. Hatch*, Doug. 182; *Baker v. Gostling*, 1 Bing. N. C. 19.

(*q*) *Noke v. Awder*, Cro. Eliz. 373, 436; *Moore*, 419, S. C.

life, it could not be effected without livery of seisin (*r*); but by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) the same provision as to the necessity of a deed or written instrument was made, with respect to an assignment, as before mentioned in the case of a surrender (*s*). And now, by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, an assignment of a chattel interest, not being copyhold, in any tenements or hereditaments, made after 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law, unless made not only in writing but by deed; while on the other hand, by the effect of the same statute, sect. 2, an assignment even of a lease for life may now be effected by deed of *grant* without livery of seisin. The proper operative words in an assignment are “assign, transfer, and set over;” but it may be effected by any words which are sufficient to express the intention (*t*).

X. [A Defeasance is a collateral deed, made at the same time with a feoffment or other conveyance, containing certain conditions, upon the performance of which the estate then created may be *defeated*, or totally undone (*u*). And in this manner mortgages were in former times usually made; the mortgagor enfeoffing the mortgagee, and he at the same time executing a deed of defeasance, whereby the feoffment was rendered void on repayment of the money borrowed at a certain day (*x*).] And this, when executed at the same time with the original feoffment, was considered as part of it by the antient law: and, on that account

(*r*) *Earl of Derby v. Taylor*, 1 East, 502.

(*s*) Vide sup. 523.

(*t*) *Parminter v. Webber*, 8 Taunt. 593. As to an agreement to assign, not amounting to an assignment, see *Hartshorn v. Watson*, 5 Bing. N. C. 477. A transaction which would be void as an assignment may still be held valid as an under-lease, if the intention of the parties can be so effected. (See *Poulteney v. Holmes*,

1 Stra. 405; *Pollock v. Stracey*, 16 Law Journ. (Q. B.) 132.) An under-lease *for the whole term* will operate as an assignment. (*Beardman v. Wilson*, Law Rep., 4 C. P. 57.)

(*u*) The term is derived from the French verb, *defaire*, *infectum reddere*. As to a defeasance, see Co. Litt. 236 b.

(*x*) Vide sup. p. 488.

only, indulged (*y*). For a conveyance of the freehold, at common law, could not be defeated or recalled by a deed executed *afterwards*; and if such conveyance contained a proviso that it should be lawful for the grantor by subsequent act to revoke the same, the proviso was void for repugnance (*z*). [But things that were merely executory, or to be completed by matter subsequent,—as rents, of which no seisin could be had till the time of payment, and so also annuities, conditions, warranties, and the like,—were always liable to be recalled by defeasances made subsequent to the time of their creation (*a*).] Defeasances of land are now of rare occurrence (*b*): the practice in modern times being (as in the case of a mortgage) to include in the same deed, both the conveyance of the land to the alienee, and the conditions (if any) to which it is to be subject, and by which its effect may be defeated.

XI. We will conclude this chapter by mentioning that there was also a common law conveyance once occasionally resorted to, but long since entirely laid aside, termed a *lease and release* (*c*). It obtained where one, desirous to convey in fee, first made a lease to the proposed alienee,—for example, for one year—which demise, if perfected by actual entry, conferred on him a complete estate of lease-

(*y*) Co. Litt. 236.

(*z*) Ibid. 237 a. But in a conveyance, not at common law but under the *Statute of Uses*, a proviso that the grantor shall have power to revoke the uses is good, and not repugnant.—Ibid. This subject will be noticed in the next chapter.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 237 a. If a thing, however, which is executory in its commencement be afterwards executed, it cannot then be defeated by a subsequent defeasance; Co. Litt. by Butler, 237 a, n. (1).

(*b*) In the case of *Cotterill v. Purchase*, Lord Talbot said “he should always discourage the practice of drawing an absolute deed “and making a defeasance, as it “wore the face of fraud.” (Ca. temp. Talbot, 61, 64.)

(*c*) See 2 Sand. Us. 70, where it is said not to have been frequent. See Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 357; vol. iv. p. 356. As to a lease and release operating under the *Statute of Uses*, vide post, p. 537.

hold (*d*). The lessee then became capable of receiving a release of the reversion, for he would be tenant of the particular estate on which that reversion was expectant (*e*), and the next step therefore was to execute a release of the land to him and his heirs, so that by the conjoint operation of the two conveyances he became without livery of seisin tenant in fee in possession.

(*d*) 2 Bl. Com. 144.

(*e*) Vide sup. p. 519.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF CONVEYANCES UNDER THE STATUTE OF USES.

THE subject of common law conveyances having now sufficiently engaged our attention, we are next to examine those which derive their force from the statute law ; among which, the first place is due to conveyances founded on the Statute of Uses.

It is evident from what was said in a former chapter, that this statute entirely failed to accomplish the object contemplated by its provisions (*a*). For instead of extinguishing equitable ownerships, it made only a slight alteration in the formal words by which they might be constituted, and changed their name from *uses* to that of *trusts*—under which they took root more firmly, and flourished in greater vigour than before. But while the statute thus missed its mark, it led to accidental results of a most important character, the nature of which we shall here proceed to explain.

The methods employed for creating or raising uses at the period when the statute passed, were principally three ; viz. feoffment, covenant to stand seised to uses, and bargain and sale (*b*). A feoffment transferred the legal estate in the manner already explained when we treated of common law conveyances ; and it was applied to the purpose now in question, by declaring in the deed of feoffment or some other collateral instrument to whose *use* the feoffee was to hold, and defining the estate or interest for which such use was to subsist (*c*). The covenant to stand seised and the

(*a*) Vide sup. pp. 359, 371.

(*c*) 1 Sand. Us. 172, 173 ; Sugd.

(*b*) Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, Gilb. Introd. xlii. ; vide sup. p. 526. vol. iv. p. 161—163.

bargain and sale emanated from the doctrine of equity that the owner of land who covenanted to stand seised of it to the use of some near relative, or who entered into a bargain and sale of it for pecuniary consideration,—was thenceforward to be considered as holding it to the *use* of such covenantee or bargainee respectively (*d*). As soon as this doctrine was established, the object of putting land into use was accomplished with the greatest facility, by the mere execution on the part of the owner of a deed of covenant to stand seised (or of bargain and sale), for such estate as therein mentioned, to the use of the intended *cestui que use*: because a use conformable to that estate immediately arose in favour of the covenantee or bargainee (*e*). And though the original owner continued seised (there being no transfer of the legal estate), his ownership became nominal only, for he held subject to the use. In these two latter modes, therefore, as well as by feoffment, it had become the common practice to raise uses before the statute passed.

After that event, it became obvious that uses had now become capable of being turned to a new purpose (though one that had not been designed by the legislature), viz. the conveyance of the legal estate upon a principle unknown to the common law. For we may remember that by the effect of the statute, whenever there is a *seisin to a use*, that use is executed, or (in other words) transmuted into equivalent legal estate (*f*). A party, therefore, who desired to aliene his land after the passing of this Act, had only to create (by whatever means) a seisin to the use of the proposed alienee, for such interest as intended (*g*); and a legal estate of the same description was then transferred to such alienee by force of the statute, as effectually as if it had been conveyed by one of the ordinary methods of the common law. It was also obvious that this new prin-

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 361.

(*f*) Vide sup. p. 360.

(*e*) 1 Sand. Us. 172; Fox's case,
8 Rep. 941, n.

(*g*) 1 Cruise, Dig. 440.

ciple of conveyance presented parties with the means of escaping from the many restrictions of the common law, with respect to the modification of estates; for uses (as we have seen) might be limited with greater freedom than the land itself (*h*); and as by a covenant to stand seised, or a bargain and sale, a seisin to uses might be created without any solemnity beyond the simple execution of a secret deed,—those who were desirous to avoid the publicity and other inconveniences connected with livery of seisin, might effect their purpose with ease, by resorting to one of these methods, and making it a medium for the operation of the new principle (*i*). Under these circumstances it naturally happened that the same three methods which, before the statute, had been ordinarily employed to raise uses, now began to be employed as modes of transferring the legal estate for the benefit of the transferee; and in connection with this they were also made, as often as occasion required, to fulfil their former office of creating equitable interests. And to effect this nothing more is necessary than to insert in them a limitation of one use upon another, in the manner described in the chapter on Uses and Trusts; for while the use is executed by the statute, and becomes legal estate, the second retains, under the name of *trust*, the equitable character designed (*h*). Such is the principle of conveyances under the statute of Uses, considered as a class. They comprise not only the feoffment to uses, the covenant to stand seised, and the bargain and sale, but also that species called a lease and release, (added to their number soon after the statute passed,) and a fifth, now recently introduced, which may be denominated a grant to uses. And this last, as we shall have occasion presently to explain, has nearly superseded all the rest, in the practice of conveyancing. Yet as some acquaintance with the four former will continue to be of im-

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 364.

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 371.

(*i*) 2 Sand. Us. 40; 2 Bl. Com. 337.

portance, so far as the investigation of antient titles to land, and the history of the law in general, is concerned, it will be necessary here to examine, individually and in some detail, the whole that have just been enumerated. And we will begin with—

I. A Feoffment to Uses (*l*). This is the ordinary conveyance of the common law, of which the nature was explained in the last chapter, but with a limitation to uses superadded (*m*). Thus if A. be desirous to convey to B. in fee, he may do so by enfeoffing a third person, C. (of course with livery of seisin), to hold to him and his heirs to the use of B. and his heirs; the effect of which will be to convey the legal estate in fee simple to B. For the legal estate passes to C. by means of the livery, in like manner as it would have done before the statute; but no sooner has this taken place, than the limitation to uses begins to operate, and C. thereby becomes seised to the use limited; the consequence of which is, that, by force of the statute, the legal estate is *eo instanti* taken out of him, and vests in B., for the like interest as was limited in the use, that is, in fee simple. B. thus becomes the legal tenant as effectually as if the feoffment had been made to himself, and without the intervention of a trustee. This method, however, involving as it does the necessity of making livery of seisin, has never been of frequent occurrence in modern practice and is not in present use (*n*).

II. A Covenant to stand seised to uses (*o*). This is a conveyance adapted to the case where a person seised of land in possession, vested remainder, or reversion, proposes to convey his estate to his wife, child, or kins-

(*l*) See 1 Sand. Us. 173; 2 Sand. Us. 13.

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 503.

(*n*) 2 Sand. Us. 13.

(*o*) See *Roe v. Tranmaer*, Willes, 682; *Doe v. Davies*, 2 Mee. & W. 503.

man (*p*); and in its terms it consists of a covenant by the owner to stand seised to the use of the intended transferee (*q*). Before the Statute of Uses, this would merely have raised a use in favour of such party; but since that Act, the legal estate was transferred to him; for, the covenantor being by the effect of his covenant seised to the use of the covenantee, the statute immediately executed that use. But the conveyance in question was held to be ineffectual, unless the parties to it stood to one another in the relation of marriage or of near consanguinity; for no use was raised in contemplation of equity, in case of a mere contract, unless such contract was founded on proper consideration, such as *natural affection*, and therefore, unless the parties were connected as above, there was no use for the statute to take effect upon (*r*). On account of inconveniences connected with this principle, and for other reasons, it has been now wholly laid aside (*s*).

III. A Bargain and Sale. This is a conveyance adapted to the case where a person seised of land in possession, vested remainder, or reversion, proposes to convey it to some other person. In its terms, it consists of a bargain and sale for money by the owner to the intended alienee; and at common law such bargain and sale might be a verbal one merely. By the effect of this contract, the bargainor becomes seised to the use of the bargainee, in fee, in tail, for life, or for years, (according to the nature of the limitation); and this before the statute was the whole effect of the instrument; but now the statute

(*p*) 2 Sand. Us. 34, 94.

(*q*) 2 Bl. Com. 338.

(*r*) 2 Sand. Us. 90, 94; Sharrington v. Stratton, Plowd. 300; Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iv. p. 162.

(*s*) 2 Fonb. Tr. Eq. 25; 2 Bl. Com. 338; 2 Sand. Us. 91; 2 Saund. by Wms. 97 a, n. (b). See Doe v. Starling v. Prince, 10 L. J. (C. P.) 223.

will execute that use, and clothe the alienee with a commensurate legal estate. But as it is essential to the efficacy of a covenant to stand seised, that it should be made in consideration of natural affection, so, for the like reason, it is requisite in the case of a bargain and sale, that it should be founded on *pecuniary* consideration; for otherwise no use would be raised, and there would be nothing for the statute to operate upon.

With respect to this conveyance, it is to be observed, that it possessed in a peculiar degree the recommendation to which we before adverted, of enabling parties to transfer a freehold without livery of seisin. For the covenant to stand seised could rarely be made available to the purpose, as it operated only between persons standing in particular relations to each other; but in the extensive class of conveyances which take place between seller and purchaser, a bargain and sale afforded the ready means of dispensing with livery of seisin and attornment; since by the insertion into the deed of a small sum of money, as the nominal consideration of a transfer, it was easy, even when the transaction was not really of the pecuniary kind, to obtain the benefit of this mode of conveyance (*x*). And not only the freehold in possession might be thus conveyed without livery, but a remainder or reversion might also be passed by the same method (as indeed it might also by covenant to stand seised), without *attornment* (*y*). But secret transfers of land were strongly opposed (for reasons before sufficiently explained) to the antient policy of the law. As soon therefore as the legislature perceived that these might be accomplished with facility, by means of a bargain and sale, it hastened to provide a remedy; and that devised for the purpose was, to connect with this new conveyance a new ceremony, calculated to ensure pub-

(*x*) 2 Sand. Us. 41.

(*y*) 2 Sand. Us. 40; 1 Saund. by Wms. 234 b, n. (4); *Shove v. Pincke*,

5 T. R. 124. As to attornment, vide sup. p. 470.

licity, and to operate as a permanent memorial of the transaction (*z*). It was accordingly enacted by statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 16 (called the Statute of Inrolments), that no bargain and sale should enure to pass a *freehold*, unless the same were by *deed indented*, and *enrolled* within six months after its date, in one of the courts of Westminster Hall, or else with the *custos rotulorum* of the county (*a*).

A bargain and sale, it is to be observed (and the remark is equally applicable to a covenant to stand seised), was also capable of conferring a complete estate for years, without entry; a property that belonged not to a conveyance at common law: for a lease for years gave (as formerly shown) no complete estate until entry has been made (*b*). It is, therefore, to be understood that if a man bargained and sold (or covenanted to stand seised in respect of) his land for a term of years, the use thus raised was executed and became a complete estate for years, by force of the statute, without any additional ceremony (*c*); upon the same principle that a bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, in respect of a freehold interest enured to pass the freehold, without livery of seisin (*d*). And though the Statute of Inrolments provided compensation for the tendency of bargains and sales to dispense with livery in freehold conveyances, it made no similar provision to guard against their effect in conveying a term of years without entry; for these chattel interests were of a very precarious nature

(*z*) 2 Sand. Us. 43, 44, 51; Bac. Use of Law; 2 Bl. Com. 338.

(*a*) 2 Sand. Us. 41. Hereditaments lying within any city or town corporate, the officers of which have authority to make inrolment of deeds, were excepted from this statute. (2 Sand. Us. 66.)

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 287.

(*c*) It should be observed, how-

ever, that even in cases to which the Statute of Inrolments did not apply, the bargain and sale was required under the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3) to be in writing; and by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, to be by deed.

(*d*) *Barker v. Keate*, 2 Mod. 249; *Mallory's case*, 5 Rep. 113.

till about six years before the Statute of Inrolments passed, and were not thought of sufficient importance to be included in its enactment (*e*). A bargain and sale for term of years will therefore be effectual without inrolment (*f*); and differs, in this respect, from a bargain and sale for an estate of freehold.

It is material to observe, that no particular form of words is essential to the legal efficacy either of a bargain and sale or a covenant to stand seised (*g*). “Bargain and sell” are the words of transfer ordinarily used in the one case, and “covenant to stand seised” in the other. But other words will have the same effect (*h*); and the distinctive character of each of these conveyances is determined by the consideration on which it is founded (*i*). Where the use is raised upon a pecuniary consideration, the conveyance will be good as a bargain and sale, whatever the terms used: where it arises on the consideration of natural affection, it will avail as a covenant to stand seised (*h*). If the words employed, however, are such as to indicate that there is no intention of transferring the property by the instrument in which they are contained; for example, if they amount merely to an engagement to convey by a future instrument no use will arise, and consequently no estate will pass (*l*).

The rule, which requires a bargain and sale to be founded on pecuniary consideration, is held to be matter of form only, and sufficiently complied with if the conveyance *purport* to be so founded; and for this purpose any trivial sum may be inserted, though the consideration which really passes between the parties be of larger amount, or even though it be in fact not of a pecuniary

(*e*) 2 Bl. Com. 338.

(*f*) Ibid.

(*g*) 2 Sand. Us. 56, 90; Doe v. Davies, 2 Mee. & W. 503.

(*h*) 2 Sand. Us. 90.

(*i*) 2 Fonb. Tr. Eq. 47.

(*h*) 2 Sand. Us. 90; 2 Saund. by Wms. 96 b, n. (1), n. (2).

(*l*) 1 Sand. Us. 118, 120.

nature (*m*). It is also immaterial whether the sum so inserted be actually paid or not (*n*).

IV. A Lease and Release. The conveyance so described is of a compound description, consisting of two separate parts; first, a bargain and sale; secondly, a common law conveyance of release: and, (like the bargain and sale,) it is adapted to the case where a person seised of land in possession, vested remainder, or reversion, proposes to convey his interest to another.

A conveyance of the same denomination was among those (it will be remembered) which obtained occasionally at the common law, and by its means an estate might be conveyed by lease and entry to a proposed alienee, without livery of seisin, in the manner explained in our last chapter (*o*). Now when the Statute of Inrolments had rendered it impossible to effect a secret and summary conveyance of the freehold, by the method of bargain and sale (*p*), the practitioners of the day were left to explore new means of attaining that favourite object; and they accordingly invented for the purpose, a new conveyance under the Statute of Uses; the hint and name of which was supplied by this common law expedient of lease and release (*q*). Instead of a lease, the conveying party was made to execute a bargain and sale for some leasehold interest, for example, for the term of one year. This, without any inrolment, passed the legal estate for a year to the bargainee, (the Statute of Inrolments extending to freeholds only,) and the estate so transferred was complete (as we have seen) without actual entry (*r*). The transferee therefore was capable of receiving a release of the freehold and reversion (*s*); which release was accordingly granted to

(*m*) 2 Sand. Us. 54.

(*n*) Sugd. Gilb. 96.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 527.

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 533.

(*q*) 2 Sand. Us. 71; 2 Prest. Conv. 219.

219.

(*r*) Vide sup. p. 533. See 2 Sand. Us. 71.

(*s*) 2 Sand. Us. 71; 2 Prest. Conv.

him on the next day (*t*). This compound conveyance—which is said to have been invented by Serjeant Moore soon after the Statute of Uses (*u*)—was called, like its common law prototype, a lease and release; though, properly speaking, it is rather a *bargain and sale* with release. As it was competent to pass the freehold without livery of seisin, entry, or inrolment, or any other ceremony than the execution of the deeds themselves (*x*), and was in some other technical points more advantageous than a bargain and sale, it soon grew into familiar use (*y*); and became so generally established as almost entirely to supersede every other method of conferring a freehold estate, whether at common law, or under the Statute of Uses. It is almost superfluous to add, that its legal validity, though formerly doubted by great lawyers, became, in progress of time, too firmly settled to be shaken (*z*).

On the release, some use was ordinarily engrafted. If it was one to the releesee himself in fee, he took the legal estate as at common law (*a*); for this is not such a use as the statute executes (*b*); but if the use were declared to a third person, it would be executed by the statute, and the legal estate in the freehold conveyed would pass accordingly to *him*.

The lease (or bargain and sale) and the release, in practice, used always to constitute separate deeds, the former bearing date the day before the latter; but if comprised in the same deed, they were understood to be equally effectual (*c*). And by 4 & 5 Vict. c. 21, intituled “An Act for rendering a release as effectual for the conveyance of freehold estates as a lease and release by the same parties,” every instrument purporting to be a release of a freehold estate (*d*), and expressed to be made

(*t*) 2 Sand. Us. 71; 2 Prest. Conv. 219.

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 338; Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iv. p. 355.

(*x*) 2 Sand. Us. 72.

(*y*) Ibid. 60.

(*z*) 2 Bl. Com. 339.

(*a*) 2 Sand. Us. 72.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 367.

(*c*) Sugd. Gilb. 229 (n.).

(*d*) For the purposes of this statute, the word *freehold* is defined to

in pursuance of that Act, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if a bargain and sale (or lease) for a year had been executed, although such bargain and sale (or lease) shall not in fact have been executed.

V. A Grant to Uses. Though we have not thought ourselves at liberty to dispense with the former learning relative to the lease and release, so lately the principal conveyance in our law, and to the other methods before enumerated in this chapter, these now rarely find a place in practice; for by the obvious effect of that most important provision of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2, to which we formerly had occasion to refer,—abolishing the antient maxim that corporeal hereditaments lie in livery only and not in grant, by enacting that they “shall, as regards the “conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed “to lie in grant as well as in livery,”—all conveyances of hereditaments, (whether corporeal or incorporeal, whether in possession or in expectancy, and whether for an estate of freehold or for an inferior estate,) may now be brought within the range of that common law conveyance discussed in the last chapter under the head of grant; though, in its antient and proper application, that conveyance was confined (as we have seen) to the transfer of incorporeal hereditaments and estates in expectancy: and this being the case, a grant has, in fact, supplanted, generally speaking, all these methods, and become the almost universal expedient for conveying real estate *inter vivos*. It is to be observed, however, that it is the practice of conveyancers to import into a grant of corporeal hereditaments, limitations to uses, and that a conveyance so framed takes effect under the Statute of Uses; for while the seisin to the use is created by force of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, the

extend to all lands and hereditaments, for the conveyance of which a bargain and sale (or lease) for a

year, as well as a release, would have been used if the Act had not been passed. (4 & 5 Vict. c. 21, s. 3.)

use is converted into legal estate by force of 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10 (*e*).

Having thus considered each of the different conveyances under the Statute of Uses, it is now time to make some remarks applicable to those conveyances as a *class*.

We may remark then, in the first place, that conveyances to uses must of course comprise all the circumstances necessary to bring the Statute of Uses into operation. Some use, therefore (either *in esse* or otherwise) must be raised by them, and some sufficient seisin to such use must be constituted (*f*); or, in the language of conveyancers, there must be a seisin proper to support or *serve* the use (*g*). And from this necessity of a seisin to a use it follows, that an existing term of years cannot be transferred by any method of conveyance depending on the Statute of Uses for its operation; for of a mere chattel interest there can be no seisin: though, on the other hand, the owner of the freehold may (as we have seen) convey it by these methods, for a term of years; for he has a seisin out of which the use for the term may be served (*h*). For the same reason it has also been supposed that a corporation aggregate cannot aliene land by a conveyance under the Statute of Uses (*i*); for, as formerly remarked, it was part of the antient doctrine with respect to uses, that such bodies as these could not be seised to any use but their own (*h*). When corporations aggregate, therefore, have had occasion to make conveyances of their lands, the method adopted has com-

(*e*) It may be as well to remark, that there may also be a grant of land containing *no* use; as if A. grant land directly to B. and his heirs. In such a case the conveyance takes effect, not under the Statute of Uses, but as a common law grant extended in its operative power by force of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, as already

explained, *sup.* p. 511.

(*f*) Vide *sup.* p. 368.

(*g*) 2 Sand. Us. 59; 1 Sand. Us. 97, 133, 140.

(*h*) 2 Sand. Us. 59.

(*i*) 2 Sand. Us. 58; 4 Cru. Dig. 175; Sugd. Gilb. 7, (n.)

(*h*) Vide *sup.* p. 362.

monly been that of a feoffment; or a lease with actual entry, followed by a release (*l*).

With respect, however, to the use which is required for the purpose of a conveyance under the statute, this may either be expressly declared, or implied by law. Thus, if A. conveys by feoffment or lease and release to B. in fee, without consideration, and without declaring any use, there will be a *resulting* use, by construction of law, to himself the grantor; and such use the statute will execute accordingly (*m*).

With respect to the limitation of estates by these methods of conveyance, it may be laid down as a general proposition, that a limitation of the legal estate by way of use, is governed by the same principles as apply to the creation of estates by a common law assurance (*n*). Thus we have seen that the word *heirs* is necessary, at common law, to create an estate of inheritance (*o*); and in like manner, if a man bargains and sells to A., without adding *and his heirs*, A. has only an estate for life (*p*). So an estate may be limited by way of use (as well as in a common law conveyance) in possession, in remainder, or in reversion (*q*); and, if in remainder, must be limited to take effect in possession immediately on the determination of the particular estate (*r*). So the remainder may be either vested or contingent (*s*); and is subject (if contingent) to the common law rule, that if it amount to freehold, it cannot be limited on a particular estate less than freehold (*t*). Legal estates created by way of use are also

(*l*) 2 Sand. Us. 59; Sugd. Gilb. 7, n. (1).

(*m*) Co. Litt. 271 b; 1 Sand. Us. 106, 109; Doe v. Rolfe, 3 Nev. & Per. 648. Vide sup. p. 361.

(*n*) 1 Sand. Us. 123, 124; Corbet's case, 1 Rep. 87 b. A more liberal construction, however, is in some cases allowed in a limitation to uses, than in a common law conveyance; vide sup. pp. 519, n. (*a*), 527, n. (*z*).

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 237; 2 Bl. Com. 109; Nevell v. Nevell, 1 Roll. Ab. 837.

(*p*) 1 Sand. Us. 124.

(*q*) Sugd. Gilb. lvii. lviii.

(*r*) Sugd. Gilb. ib. 164; vide sup. p. 323.

(*s*) Sugd. Gilb. lviii. 153, 164.

(*t*) Ibid. 164, 165; vide sup. p. 329.

subject, in general, to the same incidents as if created by the methods of the common law (*u*). Thus, where a particular estate was limited by way of use, it was formerly liable to forfeiture if the tenant made a feoffment for a larger estate than his interest warranted; and if a contingent remainder was limited by way of use, and the particular estate was destroyed before the contingency happened, the remainder was defeated (*x*). We have seen, however, that in both of these cases, the former law is now affected by the provisions of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 (*y*).

But while a limitation by way of use, is thus in general subject to common law principles, there are some very material particulars, in which it has always been allowed a greater latitude (*z*). The nature of these may be explained as follows.

1. By the common law, a man could not in any case be a purchaser, (that is, take an estate,) by his own conveyance; for he could not, in the nature of things, unite the opposite capacities of grantor and grantee (*a*). Thus A., seised in fee, could not convey to himself for life, remainder over to B. in fee; nor to B. for life, remainder to himself, the grantor, in fee. In the first case, the whole conveyance would be void; in the second, the remainder: A. in such case taking no remainder, but continuing in the *reversion*, as of his former estate (*b*). And the distinction involved this practical difference, that the

(*u*) 1 Sand. Us. 166.

(*x*) Sugd. Gilb. 298.

(*y*) Vide sup. p. 334.

(*z*) 1 Sand. Us. 130.

(*a*) Per Hale, *Pibus v. Mitford*, 1 Vent. 378; *Southcot v. Stowell*, 2 Mod. 210; 1 Sand. Us. 131, 132; "*Nemo potest esse agens et patiens*," 2 Prest. Est. 20. As to *personal* property, (including *chattels real*), a recent statute has made the following provision, viz., that any person

shall have power to assign personal property now by law assignable, (including *chattels real*), directly to himself and another person or other persons or corporations, by the like means as he might assign the same to another. (22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 21.)

(*b*) See Co. Litt. 22 b; Read v. Errington, Cro. Eliz. 321; 2 Bl. Com. 176, et sup. pp. 314, 319.

reversion, being the old estate, was in its descent confined to the blood of the same purchaser as before ; whereas if A. had taken (or in other words purchased) it as a remainder, it would (according to the general law of inheritance) have been descendible to his heirs general, whether his former title had been by purchase or descent (*c*). But indirectly, and through the medium of a limitation to uses, it has been always to a certain extent practicable for a man to become a purchaser of his own estate (*d*). Thus A. may by feoffment, or lease and release, convey to a third person C., to the use of himself, the grantor for life, with remainder to the use of B., in tail or in fee ; or to the use of B. for life, with remainder to the use of himself, the grantor, in tail ; and in all these cases he will take the legal estate by purchase accordingly (*e*). Yet if the remainder were to the use of himself in *fee*, he would not at one time have taken by purchase ; at least not in such sense as to make him a purchasing ancestor. For such a use was considered as amounting only to the *old use in reversion*, so that it would be converted by the statute into a legal estate in *reversion*, which would descend to the blood of the same purchaser as before (*f*). And such was the state of the law at the time of passing the Inheritance Act (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106) ; but that Act has now (in its third section) established a new rule with respect to the limitation which a man makes in his own favour, in his own conveyance ; the terms of the provision being as follows :—“ that when any land (*g*) shall have

(*c*) 2 Bl. Com. 176 ; Watk. Desc. 169 ; vide sup. pp. 391, 431.

(*d*) Per Hale, *Pibus v. Mitford*, 1 Vent. 378 ; *Southcot v. Stowell*, 2 Mod. 210 ; Watk. Desc. 180.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 22 b ; Co. Litt. by Harg. 13 a, u. (2) ; 1 Sand. Us. 135 ; Sugd. Gilb. 150, 151.

(*f*) 1 Rep. 129 b, 130 a ; Co. Litt. 23 a ; *Reed v. Errington*, Cro. Eliz.

321 ; *Ld. Raym.* 802 ; *Godolphin v. Abingdon*, 2 Atk. 57. The case was the same where the use in fee resulted to the grantor, instead of being expressly limited. As to resulting uses, vide sup. p. 361.

(*g*) The word *land* is used in this Act in a sense much larger than properly belongs to it ; and is to be understood to extend to all heredita-

“ been limited by any assurance, executed after the 31st December, 1833, to the person or to the heirs (*h*) of the person who shall thereby have conveyed the same land, such person shall be considered to have acquired the same as a *purchaser* by virtue of such assurance, and shall not be considered as entitled thereto as his former estate, or part thereof.” We may add here, that, upon the same principle which at common law made it impossible for a man to convey to himself, he could not convey to his wife (*i*) ; she being considered by that law as the same person with him. Yet the object might be effected through the medium of a limitation to uses ; that is, by creating a seisin in another person, and declaring a use to the wife (*k*).

2. At common law, a freehold cannot be created to commence *in futuro* ; or, in other words, cannot be limited to take effect at a future period, except by way of remainder upon some particular estate also passing at the same time out of the grantor ; for which rule, and the reasons on which it is founded, the reader is referred to a former part of the work (*l*). But this may be effectually done by a conveyance under the Statute of Uses : for a use was never subject to the like restriction, but may be

ments, corporeal or incorporeal, freehold or copyhold ; and every interest capable of being inherited, including chattels and other personal property, if transmissible to *heirs*. (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 1.)

(*h*) A limitation by a man to his own heirs, is equivalent to a limitation to himself and his heirs ; “ for,” says Lord Coke, “ *hæres est pars antecessoris*. And this appeareth in a common case, that if land be given to a man and his heirs, all his heirs are so totally in him, as he may give the land to whom he will.”—Co. Litt. 22 b ; and see 1

Vent. 378 ; 2 Bl. Com. 176. A limitation by a man to his own heirs was consequently subject, before the Inheritance Act, to the same rules as stated in the text with respect to a limitation by him to *himself* in fee, or to his own use in fee. (1 Rep. 129 b, 130 a ; Co. Litt. 22 b.)

(*i*) Co. Litt. 112 a ; *Moyse v. Giles*, 2 Vern. 385 ; *Lucas v. Lucas*, 1 Atk. 271 ; *Arthur v. Bokenham*, 11 Mod. 156.

(*k*) 1 Sand. Us. 132.

(*l*) Vide sup. pp. 321, 322 ; *Sugd. Gilb.* 163, (n.) ; 1 Sand. Us. 138.

limited for any extent of interest, to commence *in futuro* (*m*); and the statute, taking effect on such future interest, transmutes it into legal estate (*n*). Thus a man may covenant to stand seised in fee to the use of another (or to bargain and sell to him in fee) seven years hence, and such conveyance will be effectual (*o*). So by feoffment, or lease and release, an estate may be conveyed to A. and his heirs to the use of B. and his heirs, at the death of C. (*p*). A use thus limited *in futuro*, independently of any preceding estate, is called a *springing* use (*q*). Such a use is also often described as *executory*, because it is not executed by the statute until it comes into *esse* by the arrival of the period contemplated. Thus, in the two first examples, the whole fee remains in the covenantor or bargainor, till the seven years expire (*r*); in the two latter, a use results to the feoffor or releasor, till the death of C. (*s*). But on these events the springing use is executed, and the *cestui que use* is clothed with the legal estate in fee.

3. By a common law conveyance, an estate cannot be limited, upon a future event, to one person, in abridgment or defeasance of an estate of freehold, first limited to another (*t*); which is often expressed, where the dispositions are both in fee simple, by the maxim that *a fee cannot be limited on a fee* (*u*). Thus land cannot be con-

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 364.

(*n*) Sugd. Gilb. 161, (n.)

(*o*) 1 Sand. Us. 139.

(*p*) Ibid. 140.

(*q*) Sugd. Gilb. 153.

(*r*) Ibid. 161, (n.), 153, (n.)

(*s*) 1 Sand. Us. 140.

(*t*) Co. Litt. by Butl. 203 (b), n. (1); Cogan v. Cogan, Cro. Eliz. 360; Fearn, by Butl. 14, 15, 18, 264, 9th edit.

(*u*) Fearn, by Butl. 372, 9th ed.; 1 Sand Us. 143; 2 Bl. Com. 173, 164. This maxim applies not only

to such limitations as referred to in the text, but also to limitations of one fee upon another by way of *remainder*. For no remainder (as we have seen) can be limited on a fee-simple (vide sup. p. 321). And therefore if land be given to A. and his heirs, so long as B. has heirs of his body (which is a fee-simple qualified, vide sup. p. 239), with remainder in fee to C., this remainder is void. (Fearn, by Butl. 372, 9th edit.) And the maxim, in this sense of it, applies to convey-

veyed at common law to B. in fee, or for life, with provision that when C. returns from Rome, it shall thenceforth immediately go over to C. in fee (*x*). For this would be to defeat the first estate by force of a condition, which can only be done by the entry of the grantor, or his heirs; and the effect of such entry would be to destroy the second limitation as well as the first, and to restore the grantor and his heirs to their former estate (*y*). But a use might always be made to shift, in this manner, from one person to another (*z*); and therefore, since the statute, land may be conveyed through the medium of a use, in like manner; as by limiting it to A. and his heirs, to the use of B. and his heirs, with proviso, that when C. returns from Rome, the land shall be to the use of C. and his heirs (*a*). A use so limited in derogation of a preceding estate, is called a *shifting* or *secondary* use (*b*); and this also is of the *executory* kind, the operation of the statute being suspended till the event arrives (*c*). Thus, in the example just given, there is a use first executed by the statute in B., and when C. returns from Rome, the use to C. comes into *esse*, and is executed in him (*d*). It is, however, to be observed, that upon questions of legal construction, a preference is always given to the modifications of the common law; wherefore, it is firmly settled,

ances under the Statute of Uses, as well as those at common law. It is, however, to be recollected, that there may be *alternate* or *substituted* limitations of the fee, where each of them is by way of contingent remainder (vide sup. p. 328). See the maxim further discussed in the modern case of *Egerton v. Massey*, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 338.

(*x*) *Fearne*, by Butl. 14, 15, 9th edit.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 379 a; Litt. ss. 721, 722, 723; 1 Sand. Us. 151; vide sup. p. 301.

(*z*) Sugd. Gilb. 153, 154, (n.); 1 Sand. Us. 152.

(*a*) 1 Sand. Us. 149.

(*b*) 1 Sand. Us. 152; Sugd. Gilb. 152, (n.)

(*c*) Sugd. Gilb. 154, 155, (n.); 1 Sand. Us. 144.

(*d*) This form of disposition is sometimes called a *conditional limitation*, a term, however, which is also used in a different sense. See *Fearne*, by Butl. (9th ed.) pp. 13, 15; Sugd. Gilb. 178, (n.); 1 Sand. Us. 151.

that no estate capable of being considered as a remainder (according to the rules by which remainders are limited) shall ever be construed as a shifting or springing use (*e*).

4. The grantor, in a common law conveyance, cannot reserve to himself, nor confer on any other person, the power of revoking or altering the grant, by any future act or instrument: for that is deemed repugnant to the conveyance itself (*f*). The utmost that the common law allows, is a deed of defeasance (coeval with the grant, and therefore esteemed a part of it) upon events specifically mentioned (*g*). But the limitation of a *use*, subject to a power of this description, was not considered as involving any repugnancy; for a use was a mere direction to the trustee, how he was to deal with the legal estate; which might well be recalled or changed (*h*). Therefore, in a conveyance under the statute, a proviso giving to the grantor, the grantee, or a stranger, authority to revoke or alter, by a subsequent act, the estate first granted, will be valid; for it is in effect no more than an authority to revoke the use first limited, or to declare a new one (*i*). Such provisos are called *powers* (*k*); a term properly applicable, as we have seen, to *all* authorities, as distinguished from estates (*l*): and they are either mere *powers of revocation* (*m*), enabling the grantor simply to recall what he has bestowed; or *powers of revocation and new appointment* (*n*), authorizing the grantor, or some other person, to alter or make a new disposition of the estate conveyed. The first will of course hardly find a place

(*e*) 2 Saund. by Wms. 388; Fearn, by Butl. 393, 9th edit.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 237 a; 2 Bl. Com. 327. 335; 2 Fonb. 158, 159.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 335; vide sup. p. 526.

(*h*) Sugd. Gilb. 158, (n.)

(*i*) Ibid.

(*k*) "The limitation and modifying of estates by virtue of powers,

"came from equity into the common law with the Statute of Uses."—(1 Burr. 120.)

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 229.

(*m*) A power of appointment implies power of revocation, but not *à converso*. (4 Cruise, Dig. 232.)

(*n*) 1 Sand. Us. 155; 4 Cruise, Dig. 228.

except in grants of a gratuitous nature, (or *voluntary* conveyances as they are called,) though in these they are naturally to be expected(*o*); mankind, according to the remark of Lord Bacon, having always affected to have the disposition of their property revocable in their own time, and irrevocable ever afterwards(*p*). But with respect to powers of revocation and new appointment, they are of frequent occurrence in the more common case of conveyances founded on consideration, and particularly in family settlements; their object not being to indulge the caprice of any party, but to carry into effect with greater convenience the arrangements actually contemplated. Thus, if a life estate be limited to the settlor, with remainder over, it is common to insert a power enabling him from time to time to make effectual leases of the property in possession, for terms not exceeding twenty-one years; a privilege reasonable and convenient in itself, but such as is not incident to the estate of a tenant for life generally(*q*). Of the same nature, in general, are the usual powers of jointuring, selling, charging land with the payment of sums of money, and the like(*r*); and all these are technically described as powers of revocation and new appointment,—because, in authorizing a new disposition not made by the conveyance itself, they operate *pro tanto* as a revocation of those which it contains(*s*). Such

(*o*) 2 Fonb. 155, n. (*q*).

(*p*) 2 Bl. Com. 335.

(*q*) It is to be remembered here, that by a recent Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120) such leases may now be made by a tenant for life under a settlement even *without* a power to that effect in the settlement; provided it contains no express declaration to the contrary, and subject to such exceptions and provisions as are contained in that statute; (vide sup. pp. 252, 253).

(*r*) 2 Sand. Us. 81.

(*s*) 1 Sand. Us. 155; 4 Cruise, Dig. 228. The term *power of revocation and new appointment* is not, however, usually applied to a mere power of leasing, jointuring, or the like; but to powers of a different nature, as where a man conveys his estate to trustees to certain uses, with proviso that it shall be lawful for him at any future time to revoke these uses and declare new ones, &c.; *ibid.*; and see 1 Cruise, Dig. 438; *Doe v. Martin*, 4 T. R. 39.

a power, if closely considered, will be found to amount to an authority to create a use, to take effect in derogation, to a certain extent, of the uses first limited; or rather to the virtual limitation of an *executory* use of that description, in favour of such person, and for such estate, as shall be defined by the subsequent act of the donee of the power (*t*). This subsequent act or exercise of the power is called an *appointment* (*u*); and its effect (when it correctly pursues the authority) is to raise, in favour of the appointee, a use corresponding to the estate appointed (*x*); which being served out of the original seisin, is immediately executed by the statute, and transmuted into equivalent legal estate (*y*). An appointment is not considered as an independent conveyance (*z*). It is merely

(*t*) Sugd. Gilb. 152, 153 (n.); 2 Sand. Us. 81.

(*u*) 2 Sand. Us. 31. "In whatever mode the power is exercised, whether by grant, bargain, and sale, will, &c., the instrument in every case operates strictly as an appointment or declaration of the use; and therefore, in consequence of the rule before noticed, that there cannot be a use upon a use, the bargainee, &c., takes the legal estate, the appointment being made to him; and if any ulterior use is declared, it operates merely as a trust in equity." — Sugd. Powers, p. 457 (1861).

(*x*) As to the manner of executing a power to appoint by *will*, see 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 10, 27 (post, p. 599, *in notis*); as to *illusory* appointments, see 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 46; see also 12 & 13 Vict. c. 26, (suspended by 12 & 13 Vict. c. 110, and repealed in part by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 17,) and 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 12, giving relief against the defective execution of powers. By

the provision last mentioned, any deed executed after 13th August, 1859, in the presence of, and attested by two or more witnesses, in the manner in which deeds are *ordinarily* executed and attested, shall, so far as respects the execution and attestation thereof, be a valid execution of a power of appointment by deed, or by any instrument in writing *not testamentary*, notwithstanding it shall have been expressly required that a deed or instrument in writing, made in exercise of such powers, should be executed or attested with some additional or other form of execution, attestation or solemnity. Independently of this enactment, relief against a defective execution of powers is also sometimes afforded by the courts of equity. (See *Lucena v. Lucena*, 5 Beav. 249; *Garth v. Townsend*, Law Rep., 7 Eq. Ca. 220.)

(*y*) 2 Sand. Us. 82; 4 Cruise, Dig. 228.

(*z*) 2 Sand. Us. 84.

ancillary to the former deed; which (as already observed) contains, in effect, a prospective limitation of the new use. The appointee, therefore, is considered, for most purposes, as deriving his title under the original conveyance; and to be in the same position as if that instrument had actually contained a limitation in his favour, to the extent of the estate appointed (*a*).

Not only as to the limitation of estates, but in other particulars, there are differences between conveyances to uses, and those that take effect at common law. For most purposes (as we have seen) an actual possession is deemed to be given, by the former conveyances, equivalent to that which would have been obtained if the alienee (supposing the interest conferred to be freehold) had received livery of seisin, or (supposing it leasehold) had made actual entry after the demise (*b*). But as a bargain and sale, a covenant to stand seised, and a lease and release under the statute, convey the actual possession by construction of law only, so they differ from a feoffment, in such incidents as result from its real delivery in point of fact. Therefore, though a feoffment, when made by the tenant in actual possession, passed a wrongful estate of freehold (supposing his title insufficient to give a rightful one), and, when made by a particular tenant for a greater estate than he could lawfully convey, occasioned a forfeiture (or, in the case of tenant in tail, a discontinuance) of the particular estate, and the contingent remainders dependent on that estate were consequently liable to be defeated (*c*),—no such results followed from any conveyance by way of covenant to stand seised, bargain and sale, or lease and release under the statute (*d*). For by the feoffment, there was an actual investiture of the possession, as for an estate

(*a*) 4 Cruise, Dig. 282, 497;
Bringloe v. Goodson, 4 Bing. N. C.
734; see also Sngd. Powers, p. 470
(edit. 1861).

(*b*) 2 Sand. Us. 52.
(*c*) Vide sup. p. 243.
(*d*) 2 Sand. Us. 73.

of freehold; which, as it was held, must take effect either *de jure* or *de facto*; but the other conveyances could, in their nature, pass no more than the grantor might lawfully transfer (*e*). For this reason they received, by way of distinction from a feoffment, (and others now abolished of the like nature,) the appellation of *innocent* conveyances (*f*). But the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, having (as we have seen) provided, that a feoffment made after the 1st October, 1845, shall not have any tortious operation, the whole learning on the subject to which we have here referred, (so far as regards conveyances executed after that date,) has, by the effect of this provision, been swept away.

The reader who reflects attentively on the nature of a conveyance under the Statute of Uses, as we have attempted to explain it in the present chapter, will not fail to be impressed with the importance of the changes which this act of parliament incidentally occasioned. It has been said to have had little other effect than to make a slight alteration in the formal words of a conveyance,—a remark alluding to the practice it has introduced of limiting one use upon another, when the intention is to give a trust estate (*g*). So far indeed as the creation of that species of interest is concerned, such, and such only, was its result, but the remark puts altogether out of sight its operations in regard to the legal estate. We have seen that it enabled the owner to dispose of this, in methods obviously more suitable to the exigencies of social life than the conveyances formerly employed, and exempt from the harsh and inconvenient effects with which these were sometimes at-

(*e*) Fearn, by Butler, 322, 9th ed.; Smith *v.* Clyfford, 1 T. R. 744.

(*f*) Fearn, *ubi sup.*; in Smith *v.* Clyfford, 1 T. R. 744, they are termed *lawful* conveyances. The same property of passing no estate beyond

what the grantor may properly transfer belongs also to a *grant* at common law. (Co. Litt. 332 a; 2 Sand. Us. 49.)

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 336.

tended; and (what is of still greater consequence) that it materially enlarged the power of alienation itself, by affording the owner the means of subjecting his property to a variety of arrangements of which it was before incapable.

In thus affording escape, however, from the rigours of the antient law, the statute would have opened the door (unless closely watched) to inconveniences of a different description. For it would have enabled owners of land, through the medium of springing and shifting uses, and powers of revocation and new appointment, to prescribe the course in which their property should devolve, and prevent its effectual alienation, for any period of time however extended; and therefore to curb this licence, it was found necessary to establish a rigid rule of restriction. In order to explain this, we shall be led into some examination, before we close the chapter, of a subject which now for the first time presents itself, viz., that of *perpetuity* (*h*). In settlements (by which we here mean conveyances by way of provision for a family, whether made in consideration of marriage or otherwise), grantors have always been naturally prone to regulate the succession to an estate at very distant periods:—the earliest known arrangement of this nature having been the creation of an estate tail; which once operated as a sure and perpetual settlement of the property, in the line of the first donee, for the remotest generations. But as all such arrangements, while they continue in force, however long that period may be, tie up the property, (as it is commonly expressed,) or in other words prevent its free alienation; they have been considered in later times with reasonable jealousy and dislike, as tending to embarrass the transactions of mankind,

(*h*) On the subject of perpetuity, see Co. Litt. by Butler, 379 b; 327 a; 1 Sugd. Pow. 491, edit. 1836; 1 Pow. Dev. 388; Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 324; 1 Smith's

Leading Cases, 183; Cadell v. Palmer, 10 Bing. 140; Tollemache v. Lord Coventry, 8 Bligh, N. S. 547; Monypenny v. Dering, 16 Mee. & W. 418.

and to frustrate the purposes for which property was first established (*i*). To these feelings was doubtless in some measure attributable (*h*) the doctrine established by *Taltarum's* case, in the reign of Edward the fourth, by which a common recovery was allowed to have the effect of unfettering an estate tail (*l*); and in the same spirit, when limitations by way of springing and shifting uses, and powers of revocation and new appointment, came into practice, the courts of justice soon began to contemplate with alarm the restrictive tendency of these devices. It was thought necessary, therefore, to fix upon some period as the latest at which an estate limited by way of executory use shall be allowed to vest. Such a period has been accordingly established by a series of judicial decisions; and it is one derived from the state of the law applicable to entails. Even upon the most permanent plan, that of strict settlement, to which we adverted in a former place, the estate entailed could not, after the doctrine established by *Taltarum's* case, be preserved from alienation longer than during the life of the taker of the first estate of freehold, and the nonage of the tenant in tail next in remainder; for on attaining the age of twenty-one, the latter was competent, with the concurrence of the former, to suffer a recovery (*m*). By analogy to this (*n*) it has become the rule that the latest period at which an estate limited by way of executory use can be allowed to vest, is (with one particular exception) the expiration of some life or lives in being, and twenty-one years afterwards (*o*); as if a man be seised in fee of lands, and gives them to the first son of J. S. that shall attain twenty-one, and his heirs,—here the estate vests, at the latest, on the expira-

(*i*) See 2 Bl. Com. 173.

(*h*) See *Taylor v. Horde*, 1 Burr.

60; 5 Cruise, Dig. 328.

(*l*) See as to this case, 5 Cruise, Dig. 422, 423; et sup. p. 248.

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 333.

(*n*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 20 a; note

(5).

(*o*) 2 Bl. Com. 174; *Long v. Blackall*, 7 T. R. 100; *Cadell v. Palmer*, 10 Bing. 140; S. C., 7 Bligh, N. S. 202; *Gilbertson v. Richards*, 5 H. & N. 453.

tion of J. S.'s life and the infancy of such son; and this infancy, generally speaking, cannot expire later than twenty-one years after J. S.'s death; but if the son is born *posthumously* (which brings the case within the exception above alluded to) it will expire later by the addition of the time of gestation *in utero* which follows upon such death (*p*). On the other hand, however, in the case when the period at which the estate is limited to vest comprises no life or lives in being, it is not allowed to exceed twenty-one years from the time when the limitation is created (*q*).

Such being the rule, in these different cases respectively, as to the latest period at which an estate by way of executory use is allowed to vest,—we have now to add that it has been long established as a general principle, and one not applicable to executory uses only, that the law abhors perpetuity (*r*); that is (according to the usual meaning of the term) any limitation, either for legal or equitable interests, and whether by executory use, remainder, or otherwise, of such a nature as to lead to the possibility, if it were allowed, of making a future estate vest at a later period than is warranted by such rule; and that it uniformly annuls every such limitation (*s*). Nor is this prin-

(*p*) 2 Bl. Com. 174; Long v. Blackall, 7 T. R. 100; Wilkinson v. South, *ibid.* 558; Cadell v. Palmer, 10 Bing. 140; S. C., 7 Bligh, N. S. 202; Stuart v. Cockerell, Law Rep., 7 Eq. Ca. 363.

(*q*) Palmer v. Holford, 4 Russ. 403; 1 Jarman on Wills, 2nd ed. p. 205.

(*r*) 2 Bl. Com. 174. It is said in 10 Rep. 113 b, that "perpetuities, "monopolies, and patents of concealment, were born under an unfortunate constellation; for as soon as they have been brought in question, judgment has always been

"given against them, and none at any time given for them."

(*s*) Long v. Blackall, *ubi sup.*; Doe v. Ewart, 7 Ad. & Ell. 648; Cadell v. Palmer, *ubi sup.*; Gilbertson v. Richards, 5 H. & N. 453. To show that the doctrine which annuls a limitation, on the ground of its tending to perpetuity, applies to *remainders*, it is sufficient to cite Fearn, by Butler, 9th ed. 502, which is as follows: "if lands be limited to a person *in esse*, with remainder after his decease to his unborn children, and afterwards to the children of such unborn

iple confined to dispositions of the freehold. It applies also to terms of years and to personal property (*t*).

In connection with the subject of the rule against perpetuity, we may notice here the state of the law with respect to the accumulation of the income of property, whether real or personal, even when the period allowed by that rule is not exceeded. A remarkable instance having occurred, in which, to secure an immense fortune to his distant descendants, a testator had recourse to the expedient of directing the income of his property to be accumulated during the lives of all his children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, who were living at the time of his death, for the benefit of some future descendants to be living at the death of the survivor (thus keeping within the rule as to executory interests above laid down); it was thought expedient to put a check, for the future, on dispositions of this description (*u*). It has been consequently now provided by act of parliament (39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 98), that no such accumulation shall be allowed for a longer term than the life of the grantor, *or* twenty-one years from the death of the grantor or testator, *or* during the minority of any person living or in *ventre sa mère* at the death of such grantor or testator, *or* during the minority only of any person who, under the uses or trusts

"children, this last remainder is "absolutely void." (See also *Challis v. Doe d. Evans*, 18 Q. B. 231, and *Cattlin v. Browne*, 11 Hare, 375.) It is sometimes, however, laid down in the books, that this doctrine does not apply to remainders. But this seems too wide a proposition. No doubt it is inapplicable to some remainders, for example, to one limited on a prior estate tail; for the liability of that to be barred by a recovery is a sufficient protection from perpetuity, and there is no need, therefore, of the doctrine.

But the case is different with regard to a remainder such as mentioned in the above citation from Butler.

(*t*) See *Fearne*, Cont. Rem. 320, 371; *Atkinson v. Hutchinson*, 3 P. Wms. 262.

(*u*) This was the case of Mr. Thellusson's will, as to which see *Fearne*, by Butler, 436, (n.), 9th edit. The property is said to have consisted of landed estates of about £4,000 a year, and personalty of above half a million; and the probable amount of the accumulated fund was estimated at above £19,000,000.

of the instrument directing such accumulations, would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to the income so directed to be accumulated: and, further, that where any accumulation is directed contrary to the Act, such direction shall be void, and the income during the time the property is directed to accumulate contrary to the Act, shall go to such person as would have been entitled thereto, if no such accumulation had been directed (*x*). But the Act does not extend to any provision for payment of debts, or for raising portions for children, or to any direction touching the produce of woods or timber (*y*).

(*x*) On the construction of this statute, see the authorities cited in 1 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 186. See also the following, among other recent cases: *Curtis v. Lukin*, 5 Beav. 147; *Boughton v. James*, 1 Coll. 26; *Scarisbrick v. Skelmersdale*, 17 Sim. 187; *Williams v. Lewis*, *in dom. Proc.*, 28 L. J.

(Ch.) 505; *Macpherson v. Stewart*, *ib.* 177.

(*y*) See *Halford v. Stains*, 16 Sim. 488; *Edwards v. Tuck*, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 40; *Drewett v. Pollard*, 27 Beav. 196; *Cinlow's Trusts*, 28 L. J. (Ch.) 696; *Varlo v. Faden*, 29 L. J. (Ch.) 230; *Matthews v. Keble*, Law Rep., 3 Ch. App. 691.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF CONVEYANCES BY TENANTS IN TAIL, AND MARRIED WOMEN.



THE ordinary conveyances at common law, and also those under the Statute of Uses, are capable of being applied to transfer the interests of tenants in tail and of married women: but as they are not effectual for these purposes, except by virtue of certain acts of parliament distinct from the Statute of Uses, nor without observing the solemnities which those Acts prescribe,—they may therefore properly be considered, when applied to either of these purposes, as constituting a separate class of conveyances by force of the statute law.

Though a tenant in tail has an estate of inheritance, yet by none of the conveyances hitherto examined, if in their simple form, that is, unaccompanied with the solemnities above referred to, can an indefeasible interest be granted by him beyond the period of his own life—except with regard to leases for terms not exceeding *twenty-one years*, and this only under certain limitations and qualifications which have been noticed in a former place (*a*); for whatever estate he grants, must either determine with his life, or at least is liable to be defeated, after his decease, by his issue, or in default of issue, by the remainderman or reversioner. And again, a married woman, or (as she is technically called) a *feme covert*, is not capable by any of these conveyances, in their simple form (*b*), to make alienation of her lands and tenements (except as regards her interest

(*a*) Vide sup. pp. 252, 253.

(*b*) 2 Bl. Com. 292.

in property settled to her separate use), for any estate whatever, or to subject them to any charge (c).

These incapacities result indeed, in the two cases, from very different causes. That of the tenant in tail is by the effect of the Statute *de Donis*, passed to protect the interest of those in succession and expectancy, in the case where land is given to a man and the heirs of his body (d); but the incompetency of the feme covert is a personal one, and imposed upon her by the common law (with other similar disabilities) in consequence of her being subject to the control of her husband, and presumably deprived of her freedom of agency. In both cases, however, notwithstanding the general rule of restriction, the law has long allowed a more ample power of alienation to be exercised through the medium of particular methods of assurance; in former times by *finés* and *recoveries*, which were altogether of a special nature, and now by any of the ordinary conveyances already examined, with the accompaniment only of certain forms or solemnities of a special kind. The mode of alienation, as regards tenant in tail and married women respectively, may be considered therefore as naturally forming one entire or consolidated subject, and has in fact been so treated by the legislature.

This branch of law is now chiefly regulated by the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, the statute for abolishing Fines and Recoveries: by the provisions of which, a tenant in tail is empowered, in such methods as therein mentioned, to *bar* the estate tail (as it is commonly expressed), that is, to grant the land entailed as a fee simple absolute (or for any less estate), indefeasible by his issue, or by any ulterior claimants; and a married woman may also, by such means

(c) The restriction on a feme covert's power of alienation, does not extend however to the case where she conveys in execution of a mere *power* or *authority*; or in performance of a *condition*, as where land is vested in her on condition to con-

vey to others. And such acts as these may be done by her without her husband. Co. Litt. by Harg. 112, n. (6).

(d) 13 Edw. 1, c. 1; vide sup. p. 242.

as are specified in the same Act, dispose, with her husband's concurrence, of any estate which she alone, or he in her right, may have, as fully and effectually as if she were a feme sole (*e*). The modes of proceeding to be adopted for these purposes are (as already stated) new, and by way of substitution for the antient methods of fine and recovery; which being now abolished, and of a character besides peculiarly abstruse and uninviting, we would gladly pass by without further notice (*f*). The learning, however, which they involve, is still so material to the history of existing titles, and even to the correct apprehension of the present system, that they cannot with propriety be left unexamined; and before we attempt to give any further account of the substituted methods, we shall think it expedient to explain the nature of a fine and of a recovery.

Both of these were of the class of conveyances by matter of record; and both consisted of fictitious suits in the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, in which the intended alienee was supposed to recover the estate by process of law. In their origin, indeed, they were actual suits commenced at law for the recovery of the possession of land; but being found competent to confer a title, in cases where the ordinary conveyances would not suffice, they were at length adopted as mere means of transfer between persons not really standing in the relation of adverse litigants (*g*). It will be necessary, however, to consider them successively and in detail.

And, first, of *Fines*.

[Fines were so called, because they put an end, not only to the suit then commenced, but also to all other suits and controversies concerning the same matter (*h*). They are

(*e*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 77.

(*f*) Sect. 2.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 349, 357.

(*h*) See 2 Roll. Abr. 13, where it is said, "*Non in regno Angliæ pro-*

videatur vel sit aliqua securitas major seu solennior per quam aliquis vel aliqua statum certiore habere possit, vel ad statum suum verificandum aliquod solennius tes-

[assurances of equal antiquity with the first rudiments of the law itself; are spoken of by Glanvil and Bracton, in the reigns of Henry the second and Henry the third, as things then well known and long established(*i*); and instances are produced of them even prior to the Norman invasion(*k*). So that the Statute 18 Edw. I., called *Modus levandi Fines*, did not give them original, but only declared and regulated the manner in which they should be levied or carried on.] And that was as follows.

1. The party to whom the land was to be conveyed, or assured, commenced an *action* or *suit* at law against the intended vendor, (generally an action of covenant,) by suing out a writ denominated, from its initial words, a writ of *præcipe quod teneat conventionem*(*l*); the foundation of which was a supposed agreement or covenant that the defendant should convey the lands to the plaintiff: on the breach of which agreement the action was brought. On this writ, there was due to the crown, by antient prerogative, a *primer fine*, or a noble for every five marks of land sued for; that is, one tenth of the annual value(*m*). The suit being thus commenced, then followed,
2. The *licentia concordandi*, or leave to agree the suit(*n*). For as soon as the action was brought, the defendant, knowing himself to be in the wrong, was supposed to make overtures of peace and accommodation to the plaintiff, by whom they were accordingly accepted; but having, upon

timonium producere, quam finem in curiâ domini regis levatum; qui quidem finis sic vocatur, eo quod finis et consummatio omnium placitorum esse debet; et hæc de causâ providebatur."

(*i*) Glan. l. 8, c. 1; Br. l. 5, t. 5, c. 28, s. 7.

(*k*) Plowd. 369.

(*l*) A fine might also be levied on a "writ of mesne," of *warrantia chartæ*, or *de consuetudinibus et servitiis*. (Finch, L. 278.)

(*m*) 2 Inst. 511.

(*n*) It seems doubtful whether this is the true principle on which the licence was required; for it is said that, in the times of strict feudal jurisdiction, if a vassal had commenced a suit in the lord's court, he could not abandon it without leave; lest the lord should be deprived of his perquisites for deciding the cause. (Robertson, Hist. of Charles V., Sect. I.)

suing out the writ, given pledges to prosecute his suit, which he endangered, if he now deserted it without licence, he therefore applied to the court for leave to make the matter up. This leave was readily granted; but, for it, there was also another fine due to the king, called the *king's silver*, or sometimes the *post fine* with respect to the *primer fine* before mentioned. And it was as much as the primer fine and half as much more, or 10s. for every five marks of land; that is, three-twentieths of the supposed annual value (*o*). 3. Next came the *concord*, or agreement itself, after leave obtained from the court; and this was usually an acknowledgment from the deforciant (or those who kept the other out of possession), that the lands in question were the right of the complainant. And from this acknowledgment, or recognition of right, the party levying the fine was called the *cognizor*, and he to whom it was levied the *cognizee*. The acknowledgment was to be made in the Court of Common Pleas—either openly, in the court, or else before one of its judges, or (in the country) before two or more commissioners empowered by a special authority, called a writ of *dedimus potestatem*; and these judges and commissioners were required, by statute 18 Edw. I. st. 4, to take care that the cognizors were of full age, sound memory, and out of prison. And if there were any feme covert among the cognizors, she was privately examined, whether she did it willingly and freely, or by compulsion of her husband. By these acts, all the essential parts of a fine were completed; and if the cognizor died the next moment after the fine was acknowledged, provided it were subsequent to the day on which the writ was made returnable, still the fine was to be carried on in all its remaining parts (*p*). Of these the next was, 4. The *note* of the fine, which was only an abstract of the writ of covenant, and of the con-

(*o*) 5 Rep. 39; 2 Inst. 511; stat. 32 Geo. 2, c. 14. (*p*) Price v. Davies, Comb. 71.

cord; naming the parties, the parcels of land, and the agreement: and, by direction of the statute 5 Hen. IV. c. 14, this was to be enrolled of record in the proper office. 5. The fifth and last part was the *foot* of the fine, or conclusion of it: which included the whole matter; and recited the parties, and the day, year and place when, where and before whom it was acknowledged or levied. Of this conclusion, there were indentures made and engrossed at the chirographer's office, and delivered to the cognizor and the cognizee; usually beginning thus: "*Hæc est finalis concordia*, this is the final agreement," and then reciting the whole proceedings at length. And thus the fine was completely levied at common law.

To render the fine more universally public, and less liable to be levied by fraud or covin, it was directed by 4 Hen. VII. c. 24 (in confirmation of a previous statute), that a fine, after engrossing, should be openly and solemnly read and *proclaimed* in court (during which all pleas should cease), sixteen times; viz., four times in the term in which it was made, and four times in each of the three succeeding terms; and these proclamations were indorsed on the back of the record (*q*).

Fines thus levied were of four kinds:—1. What in our law French was called a fine *sur cognizance de droit come ceo que il ad de son don*; that is, a fine upon acknowledgment of the right of the cognizee, as that which he hath of the gift of the cognizor. This was the best and surest kind of fine; for thereby the deforciant, in order to keep his covenant of conveying to the plaintiff the lands in question, and at the same time to avoid the formality of an

(*q*) The number of proclamations required were, by 31 Eliz. c. 2, reduced to one in each of the three terms. We may here observe, that, in order to avoid the trouble and expense of procuring evidence that

they were actually made, it was declared by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 70, that all fines theretofore levied in the Court of Common Pleas should be *deemed* to have been levied with proclamations.

actual feoffment and livery, acknowledged in court a former feoffment to have been made by him to the plaintiff. This fine was therefore said to be a feoffment of record; the livery, thus acknowledged in court, being equivalent to an actual delivery: so that this assurance was rather a confession of a former conveyance, than a conveyance then originally made; for the deforciant or cognizor acknowledged the right to be in the plaintiff, or cognizee, as that which he had *de son don*, of the proper gift of himself, the cognizor.

2. A fine *sur cognizance de droit tantum*, or upon acknowledgment of the right merely; not with the circumstance of a preceding gift from the cognizor. This was commonly used to pass a *reversionary* interest which was in the cognizor. For of such reversions there could be no feoffment supposed, as the possession during the particular estate belonged to a third person (*r*). It was worded in this manner, “that the cognizor acknowledges the right “to be in the cognizee, and grants for himself and his “heirs, that the reversion, after the particular estate “determines, shall go to the cognizee” (*s*).

3. A fine *sur concessit* was where the cognizor, in order to make an end of disputes, though he acknowledged no precedent right, yet granted to the cognizee an estate *de novo*, usually for life or years, by way of supposed composition. And this might be done, reserving a rent or the like, for it operated as a new grant (*t*).

4. A fine *sur don grant et render* was a double fine, comprehending the fine *sur cognizance de droit come ceo*, &c. and the fine *sur concessit*, and might be used to create particular limitations of estate; whereas the fine *sur cognizance de droit come ceo*, &c., conveyed nothing but an absolute estate, either of inheritance, or at least of freehold (*u*). In this last species of fine, the cog-

(*r*) *Danver's case*, Moore, 629.

(*s*) West. Symb. p. 2, s. 95.

(*t*) West. Symb. p. 2, s. 66. This was commonly used for the creation of smaller estates, as for life or

years, though it might be also used to convey the fee simple. (*Burt. Compend.* 24.)

(*u*) *Hunt v. Bourne*, Salk. 340.

nizee, after the right was acknowledged to be in him, granted back again, or rendered to the cognizor, or perhaps to a stranger, some other estate in the premises. But, in general, the first species of fine *sur cognizance de droit come ceo*, &c. was the most used.

We are next to consider the force and effects of a fine, and these were principally as follows (*x*):

1. Like all other conveyances, it bound the *parties* thereto, and also all "*privies*," that is, persons deriving title under the parties; and this, whether levied with proclamations or not (*y*). But in an important respect, it had a force peculiar to itself; for if one of the parties thereto was a married woman (and consequently incapable of alienation by an ordinary conveyance), she would be bound still by the fine; and (supposing her husband to concur in it) it would effectually pass any estate, or bar any right of dower that she might have in the lands therein comprised (*z*). And this peculiarity was justified by the circumstance that the court would not allow a fine, affecting her interest, to pass without privately examining her as to her voluntary consent; which removed the general suspicion of compulsion by her husband (*a*).

2. A fine with *proclamations* bound not only parties and privies, but even *strangers* (that is, persons not parties or privies), if they failed to put in their claims within the time allowed by law; and if during all that period they were subject to no legal disability sufficient to excuse their acquiescence (*b*). It was in reference to this

(*x*) A fine had several other effects, the enumeration of which will be found in the First Real Property Report, p. 21; and see Co. Litt. by Harg. 121 a, n. (1).

(*y*) 2 Bl. Com. 355; see 5 Cruise, Dig. 133, 159, 202. It did not, however, unless levied with proclamations, bar the issue in tail of their right to bring an action of formedon;

Hunt v. Bourne, Salk. 340; Doe d. Thomas v. Jones, 1 Tyrw. 517.

(*z*) 5 Cruise, Dig. 82, 154, 156.

(*a*) 2 Bl. Com. 355; Cruise, ubi sup. This was by the statute 18 Edw. 1, *de modo levandi fines*.

(*b*) 2 Bl. Com. 354. There were antiently four methods of claiming so as to avoid being concluded by a fine: 1. By action; 2. By entering

property of a fine, (which belonged to it from the remotest period of legal history,) that rights are said in our books to be barred *by fine* and *non-claim* (*c*). The doctrine, indeed, was once abolished by a statute made in 34 Edw. III. c. 16, which admitted persons to claim and falsify the fine at any indefinite distance of time (*d*). But by 1 Richard III. c. 7, and 4 Hen. VII. c. 24, the bar was again restored, though the time of claim was extended (*e*); and after the latter statute, and until the modern abolition of these assurances altogether, the state of the law was as follows,—that by a fine, when duly *proclaimed*, the right of all strangers whatever was bound, unless they made claim by way of action, or lawful entry (not within one year and a day, as at the common law, but) within five years after proclamation made (*f*): but *femes covert*, infants, prisoners, persons beyond the seas, and such as were not of sane mind, had a further space of five years allowed to them and their heirs after the death of their husbands, on their attaining full age, recovering their liberty, returning to England, or being restored to their right mind (*g*). By the statute 4 Anne, c. 16, it was also provided, in cases where the claim was made *by entry*, that it should be of no avail unless an action was brought within one year afterwards, to try the right of the claimant, and unless the same were prosecuted with effect. It is to be observed, however, that, in order to bar by non-claim persons who were not parties or privies, it was necessary that the person levying the fine should be seised of the freehold, either by right or by wrong (*h*): for if he had nothing in the

such claim on the record at the foot of the fine; 3. By entry on the lands; 4. By continual claim. But the second of these was not in force after the statute of Henry 7. The time for making the claim was a year and a day after the fine levied. As to proclamations, vide sup. p. 562.

(*c*) 2 Bl. Com. 354.

(*d*) Ibid.; Litt. s. 441.

(*e*) See Co. Litt. by Harg. 121 a, n. (1).

(*f*) 4 Hen. 7, c. 24; Davies v. Lowndes, 5 Bing. N. C. 172.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 356.

(*h*) Davies v. Lowndes, 5 Bing. N. C. 172.

land, or if his possession were merely as tenant for a term of years or other chattel interest, the fine might be avoided by pleading *partes finis nihil habuerunt* (*i*). And it is further to be remarked, that persons having no estate in possession, but only in remainder or reversion, were not bound to make claim within five years after proclamation made, but within the same period after their right of entry accrued (*k*).

3. A fine levied by tenant in tail, with proclamations, barred the issue in tail. It had indeed been expressly provided by the statute *de Donis*, that a fine should have no such effect (*l*); but by 32 Hen. VIII. c. 36, it was at length enacted, that when levied with proclamations according to 4 Hen. VII. c. 24, by any person of full age, it should be a sufficient bar and discharge for ever against the tenant and his heirs, claiming only by force of the entail (*m*). It did not, however, bar those in remainder or reversion upon the entail; who (upon his death and the failure of his issue) had either a right of entry, or at least a right of action, according to the distinction to be presently stated (*n*).

4. If a tenant in tail of a corporeal hereditament in possession levied a fine "*sur cognizance come ceo, &c.*," with or without proclamations, it was a discontinuance of the entail (*o*); the effect of which was, that the issue in tail,

(*i*) Stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 24; 2 Bl. Com. 356; 1 Saund. by Wms. 319, n. (1); Doe *d.* Thomas v. Jones, 1 Tyrw. 506.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 372 a; 1 Saund. by Wms. 319, n. (1).

(*l*) 2 Bl. Com. 355; Doe v. Jones, 1 Tyrw. 517; Burton, 239.

(*m*) Before the statute of 32 Hen. 8, it had been held that, under the preceding Act of 4 Hen. 7, a fine with proclamations would have the effect of barring the issue in tail; but the doctrine was considered as doubtful, and the 32 Hen. 8, was

passed to remove the doubt; see Co. Litt. by Harg. 121 a, n. (1).

(*n*) See 5 Cruise, Dig. 148.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 327 b; 2 Inst. 335, 336; Odiarne v. Whitehead, Burr. 714; 1 Saund. by Wms. 319 c, n. (1); 1 Saund. by Wms. 258 a, n. (8); Doe v. Finch, 4 Barn. & Adol. 283; Doe *d.* Thomas v. Jones, 1 Tyrw. 506. The principle on which the discontinuance of an estate tail proceeded is explained in Co. Litt. by Butler, 325 a, n. (1), 326 b, n. (1); 2 Inst. 335.

and those in remainder, or reversion, lost that right of entry, which, upon the death of the tenant in tail, would otherwise have accrued to them respectively; but those in remainder or reversion had nevertheless a remedy in a particular form of action called a *formedon*; and so had the issue in tail, unless the fine was levied with proclamations. But a fine levied by a tenant in tail of an incorporeal hereditament, or of an hereditament corporeal in remainder upon an estate of freehold, was no discontinuance (*p*). Such a fine levied in fee only created a base fee; and the estate of those in remainder or reversion (as well as the right of entry or action of the issue in tail, where it was levied without proclamations) remained without disturbance (*q*). A discontinuance (as we have elsewhere had occasion to remark) might also be occasioned by the *feoffment* of tenant in tail (*r*); but the learning relative to discontinuances, however effected, has now become of no account, (so far as *future* transactions are concerned,) not merely in consequence of the abolition of fines, but by the effect of a statute passed a short time previously to the Fine and Recovery Act, viz. the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, which provided (sect. 29) that no discontinuance should thereafter avail to take away a right of entry (*s*).

5. A fine "*sur cognizance come ceo, &c.*" levied by a tenant for life in possession, worked a forfeiture, if for a greater estate than the law entitled him to make; and consequently destroyed the contingent remainders (if any) expectant on his life interest (*t*). The same result as

(*p*) There could be no discontinuance of things lying in grant. (Co. Litt. 332 a; 5 Cruise, Dig. 236).

(*q*) Co. Litt. by Butler, 331, n. (1).

(*r*) Vide sup. p. 464.

(*s*) Moreover by a modern statute, (8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4,) "a feoffment made after 1st October, 1845, shall not have any tortious opera-

"tion." (Vide sup. pp. 464, 465.)

(*t*) Vide sup. p. 332; 2 Bl. Com. 274; 5 Cruise, Dig. 203, 236; 2 Cruise, Dig. 361. It is to be observed, that though a fine *sur cognizance, &c.* generally implied a conveyance in fee, it might be for life only. (Hunt v. Bourne, Salk. 340.)

regards forfeiture also followed, where such fine was levied by a tenant for a term of years (*u*).

Secondly, of *Recoveries*.

A recovery—or a *common* recovery as it was also called, to distinguish it from a real adjudication in an action (*x*)—differed from a fine, in this general point of view, that it supposed a suit not immediately compromised, but carried on through every regular stage of proceeding (*y*). Its nature and progress were as follows.

Let us in the first place suppose Daniel Edwards to have been tenant of the freehold, for example, tenant in tail in possession; and desirous to suffer a common recovery, in order to bar all entails, remainders and reversions, and to convey the same in fee simple to Francis Golding. To effect this, Golding was to bring an action against him for the land; and he accordingly sued out a writ called a *præcipe quod reddat*. In this writ, the demandant Golding alleged that the defendant Edwards (here called the tenant) had no legal title to the land, but that he came into possession of it after one Hugh Hunt had turned the demandant out of it. The subsequent proceedings were made up into a record or recovery roll, in which the writ and complaint of the demandant were first recited; whereupon the tenant appeared, and called upon one Jacob Morland, who was supposed, at the original purchase, to have warranted the title to the tenant. And thereupon he prayed that the said Jacob Morland might be called in to defend the title which he so warranted. This was called the *voucher* (*vocatio*, or calling of Jacob Morland) *to warranty*, and Morland was called *the vouchee*. Upon this, Jacob Morland, the vouchee, appeared, was impleaded, and defended the title. Whereupon Golding, the demandant, desired leave of the court

(*u*) Burt. Compend. 318.

(*y*) 2 Bl. Com. 357.

(*x*) 5 Cruise, Dig. 269.

to *imparl*, or confer with the vouchee in private, which was usually allowed him as a matter of course. And soon afterwards the demandant Golding returned to court, but Morland, the vouchee, disappeared or made default. Whereupon judgment was given for the demandant Golding (thenceforth called the *recoveror*) to recover the land in question against the tenant Edwards, who was then the *recoveree*; and Edwards had judgment to recover of Jacob Morland land of equal value, in recompense for the land so warranted by him, and lost by his default; which was agreeable to the doctrine of warranty we have before mentioned (z). This was called the recompense, or *recovery in value*. But Jacob Morland having no land of his own, being usually the crier of the court (who from being thus frequently vouched was called the *common vouchee*), it was plain that Edwards had only a nominal recompense for the land so recovered against him by Golding; which land was then absolutely vested in the said recoveror, by judgment of law, and seisin thereof was delivered to him by the sheriff of the county. So that this collusive recovery operated merely in the nature of a conveyance in fee simple from Edwards the tenant in tail, to Golding the purchaser. The recovery above described was with a single voucher only, but sometimes it was with *double, treble*, or further voucher, as the exigency of the case might require. And indeed, in modern times, it was usual always to have a recovery with double voucher at the least, by first conveying, where the person whose estate tail was intended to be barred was *immediate* tenant in tail, an estate of freehold to any indifferent person against whom the *præcipe* was brought, (which was called making a tenant to the *præcipe*); and then the tenant to the *præcipe* vouched the tenant in tail, who vouched over the common vouchee. For if a recovery was had immediately against a tenant in tail, it barred only such estate in the

(z) Vide sup. p. 488.

premises of which he was then actually seised; whereas, if the recovery were had against another person, and the tenant in tail were vouchee, it barred every latent right and interest which he might have in the land recovered (*a*). But where there was already a tenant for life in possession, with remainder over in tail, of course no other tenant to the *præcipe* was required to be made, in order to effect a voucher of the tenant in tail. If Edwards, therefore, were tenant of the freehold in possession, and John Barker were tenant in tail in remainder; here Edwards first vouched Barker, and then Barker vouched Jacob Morland, the common vouchee; who was always the last person vouched, and always made default: whereby the demandant Golding recovered the land against the tenant Edwards, and Edwards recovered a recompense of equal value against Barker, the first vouchee; who recovered the like against Morland, the common vouchee, against whom such ideal recovery in value was always ultimately awarded.

In all recoveries it was necessary that the recoveree should be seised of the freehold in possession, else the recovery was void (*b*). For all actions to *recover the seisin* of land were required to be brought against the actual tenant of the freehold; otherwise the suit would lose its effect, since the freehold could not be recovered of him who had it not (*c*). And though these recoveries were in themselves fabulous and fictitious, yet it was necessary that there should be *actores fabulæ*, and that these should be properly qualified.

(*a*) Bro. Ab. tit. Taile, 32; Plowd. Manxel's case [8].

(*b*) Pigot, 28.

(*c*) This requirement, it will be observed, applies only to actions "to recover the seisin;" that is, *real* actions, to which class the action, on which the recovery was founded, belonged. And (as will be seen hereafter) almost the whole of the real

actions were abolished by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. It may further be remarked that an *ejectment* (which has long been the ordinary action for the recovery of land) has never, in its form, been brought to recover the *seisin*; and accordingly it has always been brought against a tenant, whether seised of the freehold or not.

From this doctrine resulted two important corollaries ; first, that where the object was to vouch a tenant in tail in possession, instead of bringing the *præcipe* against him, it became necessary that he should previously make a tenant to the *præcipe* in manner already explained,—that is, convey a freehold estate in possession in the land to some other person, so as to qualify the latter to sustain the character of tenant in the action (*d*).

The second consequence was, that a tenant in tail *in remainder*, expectant on an estate of freehold, could not resort to a recovery to bar the entail, without the concurrence of the person in whom that precedent estate was vested ; for unless the latter joined in the proceedings, there could be no sufficient tenant to the *præcipe*, he alone possessing the necessary qualification. But the nicety once thought to be requisite in conveying the legal freehold, in order to make a good tenant to the *præcipe*, was lessened by the provision of 14 Geo. II. c. 20 (*e*) ; which enacted, with a retrospect and conformity to the antient rule of law, that though the legal freehold were vested in lessees, yet those who were entitled to the next freehold estate in remainder or reversion might make a good tenant to the *præcipe* ; that though the deed or fine which created such tenant were subsequent to the judgment of recovery, yet if it were in the same *term*, the recovery should be valid in law ;—and that though the recovery itself did not appear to be entered, or were not regularly entered on record, yet the deed to make a tenant to the *præcipe*, and declare the uses of the recovery, should after a possession of twenty years, be sufficient evidence on behalf of a purchaser for valuable consideration, that such recovery was duly suffered. In addition to which, provision was at a later period made by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, establishing the validity of recoveries that had been suffered, in several

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 569.

&c.; 1 Prest. Convey. p. 61 et seq.;

(*e*) As to this Act, see Pigot, 41,

Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 115.

other cases where they were before subject to fatal objection (*f*).

As to the force and effect of recoveries, supposing them to be suffered in due form, they operated,

1st. To pass to the recoveror an estate in fee simple absolute; and thereby to bar not only the estate tail itself, but all remainders and reversions expectant thereon, and all executory limitations and conditions whatever, to which it had been subject (*g*). This was not by virtue of any legislative enactment, but by construction of the courts of law, as explained more at large in a former chapter (*h*). The reasons, which really swayed the judges in allowing this effect to a common recovery, have been also before stated (*i*); but the ground on which they attempted to justify the doctrine was the supposed recompense in value awarded, in the result of this proceeding, to the tenant in tail. For it was said, that any lands which he might obtain from the common vouchee would supply the place of those which he lost by the recovery, and would descend to the issue in tail (*k*). Yet it is obvious that this recompense was merely ideal; and even if realized, it was held that it would not extend to reversioners, nor (in some cases) to those in remainder (*l*); and on the whole, therefore, it is impossible not to concur in the opinion expressed by a learned judge, that it is futile to endeavour to vindicate the principle of a common recovery (*m*). There were some cases, it is to be observed, in which this proceeding would not avail to the purpose above described: for by statute 11 Henry VII. c. 20, no woman, after her husband's death, unless with the concurrence of those in reversion, could suffer a recovery of lands entailed on her by her

(*f*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 8, 9, 10. See also 5 & 6 Vict. c. 32, in reference to the validity of certain recoveries and fines suffered and levied in the abolished Courts of Sessions, in Wales and Chester.

(*g*) See 2 Bl. Com. 361.

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 248.

(*i*) Ibid.

(*k*) 2 Bl. Com. 360.

(*l*) *Lacy v. Williams*, 2 Salk. 569; 2 Bl. Com. 360.

(*m*) 1 Wils. 73. See 2 Bl. Com. 360, n. by Christian.

husband, or on her and her husband by any of his ancestors; which was called an estate tail *ex provisione viri* (n). And it was also provided by 34 & 35 Henry VIII. c. 20, that no recovery had against tenant in tail of the king's gift, whereof the remainder or reversion was in the king, should bar such estate tail, or the remainder or reversion of the crown (o).

2. A recovery, like a fine, would bind a married woman when she became a party to it with her husband's concurrence; and, as in the case of fine, she was privately examined by the court in such cases, to ascertain that she acted without compulsion (p).

3. And lastly, a recovery suffered by a tenant for life worked a forfeiture of the particular estate, and by consequence destroyed all contingent remainders expectant thereon (q). It was, however, expressly provided by 14 Eliz. c. 8, that a recovery so suffered, without consent of the persons in reversion or *vested* remainder, should as against such persons be utterly void (r).

Having now considered fines and recoveries in a separate point of view, it will be necessary to direct our attention shortly to an incident common to both species of assurance, viz., the deed to *lead* or to *declare* their *uses*. For as the most usual fine *sur cognizance de droit come ceo*, &c., conveyed an absolute estate without any limitations to the cognizee; and as common recoveries did the same to the recoveror; these assurances could not in themselves be made to answer the purposes of family settlements, wherein a variety of designation and arrange-

(n) As to this statute, see 5 Cruise's Dig. 399; Kirkman v. Thompson, Cro. Jac. 474; et post, p. 583, n. (f).

(o) See Co. Litt. 372; Perkins v. Sewell, 1 Bl. Rep. 654; Duke of Grafton v. Birmingham Railway Company, 5 Bing. N. C. 27; et post,

p. 583.

(p) 5 Cruise, Dig. 392.

(q) Doe d. Davies v. Gatacre, 5 Bing. N. C. 609.

(r) Besides those noticed in the text, a recovery had other effects; as to which, see the First Real Property Report, p. 22.

ment is often expedient. The fine or recovery itself, like a power once gained in mechanics, was applied, therefore, through the medium of *uses*, to give efficacy to an infinite variety of movements, in the vast and intricate machine of a voluminous family settlement(*s*). And if these deeds were made previous to the fine or recovery, they were called deeds to *lead* the uses; if subsequent, deeds to *declare* them. As, if A. (tenant in tail, with reversion to himself in fee) wished to settle his estate on B. for life, remainder to C. in tail, remainder to D. in fee,—he had no power of doing so effectually, while his own estate tail was in being. He therefore usually, after making the settlement proposed, covenanted to levy a fine to (or if there were any intermediate remainders, to suffer a recovery in favour of) E., and directed that the same should enure to the uses in such settlement mentioned. This, then, was a deed to *lead* the uses of the fine or recovery; and the fine when levied, or the recovery when suffered, would enure to the uses so specified, and no other. For though E., the cognizee or recoveror, had a fee simple vested in himself by the fine or recovery, yet, by the operation of this deed, he became a mere instrument or conduit-pipe, seised only to *the use* of B., C. and D. in successive order; which use was executed immediately by force of the Statute of Uses(*t*). Or, if a fine or recovery were had without any previous settlement, and a deed were afterwards made between the parties, *declaring* the uses to which the same should be applied; this would be equally good as if it had been expressly levied or suffered in consequence of a deed directing its operation to those particular uses. For by statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, indentures to declare the uses of fines and recoveries, made *after* the fines and recoveries had and suffered, were made good and effectual in law; and the fine and recovery were to enure to such uses, and be esteemed to be only in trust, notwithstanding any doubts to the

(*s*) 2 Bl. Com. 363.(*t*) Bl. Com. ubi sup.

contrary that had arisen on the Statute of Frauds, passed in the reign of Charles the second (*u*).

The cumbrous fictions, of which a slender abstract only has been here given, constituted, in actual practice, a branch of conveyancing of the most subtle, intricate, and costly character (*x*). After being allowed for centuries to deform our jurisprudence, their inconvenience at length began to excite attention. With respect to recoveries, in particular, it was suggested long ago that they might be advantageously abolished; and the tenant empowered to bar his estate tail, by the more simple expedient of a solemn deed to be enrolled in some court of record (*y*). It was not, however, until a comparatively recent period, that this great improvement was carried into effect; and for its realization the public is indebted to the commission appointed in the ninth year of King George the fourth, to revise the laws relating to real property. At the suggestion of that body, and early in the succeeding reign, the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, was passed "For the abolition of Fines and Recoveries, and for the substitution of more simple modes of Assurance." This statute—to which we had before occasion briefly to advert (*z*)—in the first place enacts, that after the 31st December, 1833, no fine should be levied or recovery suffered of lands of any tenure, with the exception of such as should then be in actual progress (*a*); and then proceeds to provide new methods for effectuating, in future, such of the results of these assurances as it was deemed right to preserve, viz., the barring of estates tail, and the

(*u*) 29 Car. 2, c. 3.

(*x*) It has been suggested that our English lawyers borrowed these expedients from the *cessio in jure* of the Roman law—wherein the plaintiff claimed the subject of the proceeding in the ordinary forms of a litigation; the defendant made

default; and the thing in suit was then as a matter of course adjudged to the plaintiff. See Maine on Antient Law, p. 289.

(*y*) 2 Bl. Com. 360.

(*z*) Vide sup. p. 250.

(*a*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 2.

passing or binding of the estates or interests of married women: while, on the other hand, it purposely omits to appoint any substitute for them, so far as regards their effect in working a forfeiture,—or the bar by non-claim, or discontinuance, in the case of fine.

I. In reference to the first of the results perpetuated (the barring of estates tail), the enactment is in substance as follows (*y*): that every actual tenant in tail (*z*), whether in possession, remainder, contingency, or otherwise, shall have full power (subject to the provisions hereinafter mentioned as to *protectorship*) to dispose of the lands entailed (*a*), for an estate in fee simple absolute, or any less estate, as against all persons claiming under the estate tail, or in respect of any ulterior estate (*b*). And in lieu of a fine and recovery, it directs that such disposition may be made by any of the assurances (a will excepted) which would have sufficed for the purpose, supposing the estate to have been one in fee simple absolute; so that the disposition be an actual conveyance, and not one resting in contract only, and so that it be by deed, and inrolled in the High Court of Chancery within six calendar months after the execution (*c*). An estate tail in lands of freehold tenure—for copyholds are not to our present purpose (*d*)—may now consequently be barred as

(*y*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 15.

(*z*) The definition of “actual tenant in tail,” (as the term is used in this Act,) is thus given, “the tenant of an estate tail which shall not have been barred” (sect. 1).

(*a*) The word *lands* when used generally in this Act extends to all hereditaments (except copyhold), and whether of the corporeal or incorporeal class. It extends also to copyhold, where accompanied by expressions denoting that tenure. (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 1.)

(*b*) In this provision, the *crown* is expressly included (sect. 15).

(*c*) Sects. 40, 73. And (by sect. 41) if the assurance be a bargain and sale, it will, if inrolled in due time in the Court of Chancery according to this Act, be as valid as if it had been duly inrolled within the time prescribed by the statute 27 Henry 8; as to which vide sup. p. 535.

(*d*) As to copyholds, vide post, bk. II. pt. I. c. XXII.

against the grantor himself, the issue in tail, and all others in remainder, reversion, or other expectancy (subject to the provisions as to protectorship before referred to), by any of the conveyances (whether at common law or under the Statute of Uses) which have been discussed in former chapters; always supposing such conveyance to be by deed, and by deed duly inrolled. The inrolment, indeed, is not essential in every case, it being dispensed with (as we mentioned in a former place), where the disposition is by way of *lease* not exceeding twenty-one years, to commence from the date thereof, or within twelve calendar months from the date; and reserving thereby a rack-rent, or not less than five-sixths of a rack-rent (*e*). Supposing the inrolment (when required) to be made in due time (*f*), the deed takes effect from the execution (*g*); but a subsequent deed, if first inrolled, will be entitled to priority (*h*).

To understand the provisions as to protectorship, we must recollect, that though, by a fine, the issue might always be barred at pleasure, a common recovery (which alone had any effect as regarded those in remainder or reversion) was ineffectual when suffered by a tenant in tail not having an estate of freehold in possession, unless he obtained the concurrence of the person in whom the immediate freehold was vested (*i*). Now this check would have been entirely taken off, if the new statute, in abolishing recoveries, had proceeded simply to provide that the tenant in tail might, in future, bar all parties, through the medium of a deed inrolled. But it was not the design of the legislature to go so far. The restraint in question was merely the accidental consequence, it is true, of the fiction on which a recovery was built, and its general tendencies were useless and injurious; but it happened, on the other hand, to secure one important object, that of affording protection to family settlements. For in these,

(*e*) Vide sup. p. 252.

(*h*) Ibid.

(*f*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 41.

(*i*) Vide sup. p. 570.

(*g*) Sect. 74.

it is usual to vest in the parent a life estate and to limit estates in remainder to the sons successively in tail, expectant on the determination of such life estate: and the doctrine, which required the concurrence of the immediate tenant of the freehold, put it out of the power of the eldest son (the first tenant in tail) to defeat the settlement, at his own pleasure, by a recovery; which he would otherwise have always been in a condition to do, as soon as he attained the age of twenty-one. So far, therefore, as this object is concerned, it was deemed expedient that the substitute provided by the Act in question (when used for the purpose of a common recovery, and not merely the purpose of a fine,) should be subjected to a check of the same description as the recovery itself; though, in other cases, the necessity for the concurrence of the person seised of the immediate estate of freehold was not retained. The specific provision to which we here refer is to the following effect (*k*): that no disposition, by a person who is tenant in tail under a settlement, shall be effectual under the Act to bar any person but those claiming by force of the entail, unless it be made with consent of the person who (within the meaning of the Act) is “owner” of the first estate of freehold, (or for years determinable on life or lives,) prior to the estate tail (*l*): and the person, whose consent is thus required, receives accordingly the appellation of *protector of the settlement*. This provision, however, it is material to remark, is expressly confined to the case where the prior estate is created *by the same settlement* as the entail: for where it is constituted by a different assurance, the reason on which the protectorship is founded fails; and the Act consequently leaves the tenant in tail to the free exercise of his power of disposition (*m*).

(*k*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 34.

(*l*) Sect. 22. The words of the Act are, “any estate for years determinable on the dropping of a life or lives, or any greater estate, not

“being an estate for years, prior to the estate tail.”

(*m*) It is to be observed; that an estate created by appointment, under a power in the settlement (3 & 4

Where an assurance is executed by a tenant in tail, in such form and with such attendant ceremonies as the statute requires, it passes an indefeasible estate in fee simple absolute for life, or years, or otherwise, according to the nature of the limitation. But if it be executed without consent of the protector, in a case where a protector exists, its effect is to bar the grantor and his issue in tail only, and the rights of other persons claiming in expectancy on the estate tail are not affected (*n*). An assurance purporting to be in fee simple absolute, will therefore in such case convey no more than a base fee determinable on the failure of issue (*o*): though it is in the power of the grantor, by afterwards obtaining the consent of the protector, and making a new disposition thereon, to enlarge such base fee into a fee simple absolute (*p*). And in the particular case, when, for want of the protector's consent, such base fee is created, and the immediate remainder or reversion in fee happens also to become united in the same person with the base fee,—the latter will *ipso facto*, and without any such consent or new disposition, enlarge into a fee simple absolute (*q*). But whether the bar effected be general or partial only in its nature, it is to be understood that in all cases it operates without prejudice to the interests of other parties not claiming by force of, or in expectancy upon, the entail. It consequently leaves all estates prior to the estate tail undisturbed (*r*).

Although, in general, the Act provides that the “owner” of the first prior estate (being of the kind already described) shall be the protector of the settlement, yet we may remark, that there are many cases in which the

Will. 4, c. 74, s. 1), an estate confirmed or restored by the settlement (sect. 25), an estate resulting to the settlor (sect. 22), and an estate by the curtesy, in respect of the estate tail, or of any prior estate created by the same settlement (sect. 22),—are,

respectively, to be considered as “created by the settlement.”

(*n*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 15, 34.

(*o*) Sect. 1.

(*p*) Sects. 19, 35.

(*q*) Sect. 39.

(*r*) Sects. 15, 19.

qualification for the protectorship is subject to more specific provision. For first, in certain cases arising before 31st December, 1833 (the date from which fines and recoveries are abolished), the person, who, under the old law, would have been the proper party to make a tenant to the *præcipe*, is now, without regard to any other rule of qualification, to be the protector (*l*). The Act also provides that the first prior estate of freehold or of years determinable on life or lives, shall not avail to confer the protectorship on any person, who takes that estate as lessee at a rent; or as doweress, bare trustee, heir, executor, administrator, or assign (*m*)—with the exception, however, as to bare trustees, of such as, under any settlement made before the Act, would have been the proper parties to make a tenant to the *præcipe* (*n*)—the office being, in every case of exclusion, cast upon the owner of the *next* estate (if any) qualified to constitute a protectorship (*o*). Nor is the creation of the office always by the mere act of law. For the settlor himself is entitled, in the settlement creating the entail, to appoint any person or persons *in esse* (not exceeding three in number, and not being aliens,) to act in this capacity (the tenant of the prior estate being included in the number or not, at the pleasure of the settlor); and also to insert in the deed a power for the substitution of others, in the event of the death or retirement of those originally nominated (*p*).

The office is intended to be in every case a *personal* one; and therefore a protector does not lose his right to act in that capacity by a transfer of the estate in virtue of which it was acquired; whether that transfer takes

(*l*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 29, 30, 31.

(*m*) Sects. 26, 27.

(*n*) Sect. 31.

(*o*) Sect. 28.

(*p*) Sect. 32. At the date of this enactment an alien was not capable of holding in England any real estate.

But the clause in the Naturalization Act, 1870, which removes this incapacity (33 Vict. c. 14, s. 2), would seem by implication to repeal *quoad hoc* the above exception as to the qualification of a protector of a settlement.

place by his own alienation, or by his other act or default (*q*). But when the person who would otherwise be protector is incompetent by reason of insanity, the Lord Chancellor (or other person deputed to exercise the royal functions with respect to idiots and lunatics) is to become protector in his stead: and where he, who would otherwise be protector, is disabled by treason or felony, the office is vested in the Court of Chancery; to which latter jurisdiction it is also confided in some other particular cases (*r*). A married woman, however, is competent to be protector; and if the prior estate, in respect of which she becomes so, is settled to her separate use, she is to hold the office independently of her husband, but, where not so settled, in conjunction with him only (*s*). We may remark, too, that the office is in every case of a purely discretionary character; so that the protector is absolutely free from all control in its exercise, and cannot, even by his own previous agreement, fetter his free agency on this subject (*t*). And lastly, that as to the consent which it is thus absolutely in his power to grant or to withhold,—it may either be given by the same instrument which makes the disposition, or by a separate one to be executed on or before the same day with the other, and to be duly inrolled; but when once given, the consent is incapable of being revoked (*u*).

It is not only on *legal* estates that an assurance under the statute in question will operate, nor in respect of these only that its operation was required. It is indeed generally true, that an *equitable* estate will pass by any instrument sufficient to indicate the intention of the grantor (*x*); but such estates when entailed are exceptions to the rule, and cannot be transferred by an ordinary conveyance. It was consequently the practice, before the statute passed, to

(*q*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 22.

(*t*) Sects. 36, 37.

(*r*) Sects. 33, 48. See *In re*

(*u*) Sects. 42, 44, 46.

Wainwright, 13 Sim. (Ch.) 260.

(*x*) *Vide sup.* p. 384.

(*s*) Sects. 24, 45, 79.

convey entailed equitable interests through the medium of fines and recoveries (*z*); which, though always transacted in a common law court (*viz.* the Common Pleas), were considered in equity as legitimate assurances for the purpose. Thus, if lands were given to the use of A. in fee, in trust for B. in tail, with remainder over,—a fine levied or recovery suffered by B. in the Common Pleas, was recognized in the courts of equity, as a bar to his equitable estate: that is, a bar to the extent to which the same assurance would have operated on a legal estate of the same description (*a*). By the Act for abolishing fines and recoveries, a similar effect now belongs to the substituted assurance; the word “estate” being used throughout its provisions, “to express an estate in equity, as well as at law” (*b*). The statute is also framed to take effect not only on actual entails, but upon money or land liable to be converted into entailed estate. This happens in the case where trustees have been directed to invest money in land, which, when purchased, is to be settled in tail for the benefit of a certain party; or to sell land and to invest the produce in like manner. With respect to trusts of this description, the statute provides, that all the clauses it contains shall be applicable (so far as circumstances will permit) to the monies or lands so to be invested, in the same manner as they would apply to the lands to be purchased, supposing the same to be actually purchased and settled conformably to the trust. But when the trust fund consists of leasehold estate, or of money, it is to be considered (as to the person in whose favour or for whose benefit the disposition is to be made) as *personal* estate; and any disposition of it by the intended tenant in tail must be made, not by a conveyance appropriate to the passing of the realty, but by a mere deed of assignment inrolled in the High Court of Chancery within six calendar months after the execution (*c*).

(*z*) 5 Cruise, Dig. 301, 461; *Boteler v. Allington*, 1 Bro. C. C. 72.

(*a*) See *Doe v. Cadogan v. Ewart*,

7 Ad. & El. 636.

(*b*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 1.

(*c*) Sect. 71.

As the power of disposition given by the Fine and Recovery Act applies both to legal and equitable interests, so it extends to almost every species of entailed estate. The only exceptions appear to be the case of tenant in tail *after possibility of issue extinct* (*d*); and of those who by the 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 20 (*e*), or any other statute, are restrained from barring their estates tail (*f*).

II. With regard to the second object comprised in the Fine and Recovery Act, viz. the passing or binding of the estate or interests of married women (*g*), the statute contains a general provision that a feme covert shall be as competent as if she were a feme sole, to dispose by deed of lands of any tenure, or of money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands—and also to extinguish any estate which she, (or she and her husband in her right,) may have, or any power, which may be vested in her, in regard to lands or to money of that description;—provided only that her husband shall concur in the deed (*h*); and provided also that upon execution thereof, or at some time afterwards, she shall produce the same and acknowledge it before the proper authorities (*i*). The acknowledg-

(*d*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 18. As to this estate, vide sup. p. 262. By 14 Eliz. c. 8, a recovery suffered by a tenant in tail of this description was made void as against those in reversion and remainder, if suffered without their consent.

(*e*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 18. It may be remarked here, that estates tail within the restriction of 34 & 35 Hen. 8 (as to which vide sup. p. 590), are excepted also from the operation of the powers given to the Court of Chancery as to settled estates by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120. (See sect. 42 of that Act.)

(*f*) Among these statutes, the 11 Hen. 7, c. 20, as to estates tail *ex provisione viri* (as to which vide

sup. p. 573), is not included. For, as to future settlements of this description, that Act is repealed; and as to existing settlements, the power of disposition is conferred on the tenants of such estates, subject to their obtaining such assent as would have been required under that Act, to render valid a fine or recovery. (See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73, ss. 16, 17.)

(*g*) As to the general state of the law, with respect to purchases and conveyances of land by married women, vide sup. p. 476.

(*h*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 77. See *Cross v. Middleton*, 25 L. J. (Ch.) 513.

(*i*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 79.

ment may be taken either before a judge of one of the superior courts at Westminster, or before two of the commissioners appointed for that purpose (*k*), or (by a more recent enactment) before a judge of a county court (*l*); and such authorities are directed, before they receive the acknowledgment of the feme covert, to examine her apart from her husband, in order to ascertain her free and voluntary consent; in the absence of which, the acknowledgment is to be rejected, and the deed becomes void, as far as relates to her execution (*m*). Supposing the acknowledgment on the other hand to be received, an official memorandum of the fact is to be written on the foot or margin of the deed; and a certificate thereof is to be also drawn up and signed on a separate piece of parchment, and verified by affidavit; and the certificate and affidavit are then to be filed of record, in the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster. Until so recorded, the deed will have no effect as regards the party under coverture (*n*); but, when the record is complete, it will operate to affect her interest, (by relation,) as from the time when it was acknowledged. When the object of the disposition is to bar the estate *tail* of a married woman, the same course of proceeding is to be observed as in the case of other tenants in tail; and the ceremony of acknowledgment (with all its attendant forms) is to be superadded (*o*).

The proceedings relative to acknowledgment are made subject, as to some of their details, to the regulation of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster (*p*); which

(*k*) See *Ex parte J. Menhennet*, Law Rep., 5 C. P. 16.

(*l*) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 73.

(*m*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 80.

(*n*) See *Jolly v. Handcock*, 7 Exch. 820.

(*o*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 40, 79.

(*p*) Sect. 89. The Rules of the Court of Common Pleas under this Act (which under peculiar circum-

stances will be relaxed, see *Re Hannah Packer*, Law Rep., 5 C. P. 424), are of Hilary and Trinity Terms, 1834. (10 Bing. 458; 1 Bing. N. C. 242.) See also Reg. Gen. T. T. 4 Will. 4, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 96; and Reg. Gen. 24 Nov. 1862 (13 C. B., N. S. 1); 13 January, 1863 (Ib. 405). By 17 & 18 Vict. c. 75 (passed to remove some doubts which had arisen on the point), no

tribunal is also empowered by order, in a summary way, upon the application of the wife, and upon such evidence as to the court shall seem meet, to dispense (in every case where it shall appear reasonable to do so) with the concurrence of the husband in her acts, whether in barring an estate tail, or executing a deed for any other purpose (*q*). The latter provision, however, is made with an express saving of such rights as the husband may possess independently of the Act (*r*).

Such are the substitutes now provided by the legislature, in lieu of fine and recovery. The superiority of the new methods is manifest at the first glance; but, in order to obtain a clear idea of the extent and nature of the reform which has been effected, it will be useful to advert to some of the specific points of difference between the present and the former system.

The most obvious improvement is, that, instead of applying modes of assurance altogether peculiar and anomalous, to the case where a tenant in tail or a married woman is the conveying party, the law now enables them to pass their interests, by an instrument of the same description (in general) as is used in other alienations of real estate; and thus establishes a greater uniformity in the methods of conveyance. Nor is this a benefit of small amount; for all deviations from general rule engender difficulties, render the practice of the law less certain, and powerfully promote the purposes of chicanery. The forms now intro-

deed acknowledged before a judge or commissioner shall be impeached, after certificate filed, by reason only that such judge or commissioner was personally interested in the transaction.

(*q*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 91. See *Re Dixon*, 4 C. B. 631; *Ex parte Taylor*, 7 C. B. 1; *Re Eden*, 28 L. J., C. P. 4; *Ex parte Haigh*,

2 C. B., N. S. 198; *Ex parte Anderson*, ib. 118; *Ex parte Fish*, 9 C. B., N. S. 715; *Re Sarah Price*, 13 C. B., N. S. 286; *Re Alice Rogers*, Law Rep., 1 C. P. 47. The court has power, under this section, to authorize her to dispose of *copyhold*. (*Ex parte Shirley*, 1 Arnold, 484.)

(*r*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 91.

duced possess also the advantage of being incomparably clearer and simpler than those which they superseded. Considerable subtlety indeed attends a conveyance under the Statute of Uses; but it is to be recollected that fines and recoveries (when taken in connection with their appendages, the deeds to lead or declare the uses) themselves operated as conveyances under the statute; while at the same time they involved a fiction of the most intricate and artificial description, from which the substituted assurances are exempt. To this it may be added (and the point is by no means of subordinate importance), that the substitutes are considerably less expensive than their predecessors; the charges connected with a fine or recovery (particularly the latter) having been so high as to form one of the most prominent reasons for their abolition. To pass from general to particular considerations, the former system was objectionable, from the necessity which it frequently occasioned of creating a *tenant to the præcipe*; for, besides the inconvenience of being obliged to make an actual transfer of the freehold, for this purpose, to a stranger, it frequently happened that parties, without whose concurrence the freehold could not be effectually conveyed, were by some mistake not joined in the proceedings, or refused to join in them, or could not be discovered (*s*). But, under the new system, all these annoyances are, by a neat and simple arrangement, avoided; while the only real benefit resulting from the antient practice, is at the same time effectually secured. For as the protector is always constituted by the same settlement as the tenant in tail, there can rarely be any difficulty in finding him out; and supposing the relation of parent and child to exist between them (as will usually be the case), there can be no reason to fear that compliance will be refused from an unworthy motive; nor, in case of compliance, will any conveyance to a stranger be neces-

(s) See the First Real Property Report, p. 24.

sary, the mere consent of the protector (given in due form) being all that the statute requires. It ought, lastly, to be mentioned, as a further recommendation of the modern assurances, that they are capable of being executed at any time that convenience may suggest; in which respect they differ materially from the former methods, particularly that of recovery, which could not be transacted, except during the *law terms*; for, as it was at those stated times only that the Court of Common Pleas was open, some of the proceedings in the fictitious suit were necessarily confined to the same periods; from which circumstance it frequently resulted that the death of parties would intervene to prevent the intended recovery, and defeat for ever the purposes which it was designed to effectuate (*t*).

(*t*) The reader desirous of further information with respect to the Fine and Recovery Act, will find an ample and luminous disquisition upon it in the first volume of Mr. Hayes's Introduction to Conveyancing.

CHAPTER XX.

OF THE CONVEYANCE BY DEVISE.

THE modes of assurance hitherto examined, all operate or come into force from the time of the execution of the instrument (*a*): but there is another (and it is the last conveyance of an ordinary kind, to which we shall have occasion to refer), which is founded on a different principle; and this is a devise by last will and testament (*b*). For a will is of no force until after the death of the disposing party, but during his life is (in the language of the law) merely *ambulatory*, that is, of an unsettled and fluctuating character. "*Omne testamentum morte consummatum est, et voluntas testatoris est ambulatoria usque ad mortem*" (*c*).

A *will* or *testament* are terms generally used without distinction, to express the instrument by which a man makes voluntary disposition of his property, after his death; and we are told by the old Roman lawyers that it is "*voluntatis nostræ justa sententia, de eo quod quis post mortem suam fieri velit*," the legal declaration of a man's intentions, which he wills to be performed after his death (*d*). It is called *sententia* to denote the circum-

(*a*) Shelford on Wills, 5.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 112.

(*b*) The term *conveyances* is sometimes applied to voluntary alienations *inter vivos* exclusively, and so as not to include wills. But it is also properly used, in the larger sense assigned to it in the present work.

(*d*) Ff. 28, 1, 1. The above is from Modestinus. Ulpian gives the following,—*mentis nostræ justa contestatio, in id solemniter jacta, ut post mortem nostram valeat*. (Reg. 20, 1.)

spection and prudence with which it is supposed to be made; it is *voluntatis nostræ sententia*, because its efficacy depends on its declaring the testator's intention, whence it is emphatically styled his *will* (e); it is *justa sententia*, that is, drawn, attested, and published, with all due solemnities and forms of law; it is *de eo quod quis post mortem suam fieri velit*, because it is of no force until after the death of the testator. While defining a will, we may also take occasion to explain the term *codicil*, which is derived from the Latin *codicillus* (importing a little book or writing), and is an instrument made subsequently to the original will, by which its dispositions are added to, explained or altered. It is subject, in general, to the same remarks as the original instrument itself, of which indeed it is considered as forming a part; so that what may be laid down as law relating to a will, may be taken generally as applicable also to all codicils thereto annexed (f).

[With respect to the principle on which a disposition by will is allowed, we have more than once observed, that when property came to be vested in individuals by the right of occupancy, it became necessary, for the peace of society, that this occupancy should be continued, not only in the present possessor, but in those persons to whom he should think proper to transfer it; which introduced the doctrine and practice of alienation. But these precautions would be very short and imperfect if they were confined to the life of the occupier; for then upon his death all his property would again become common, and create an infinite variety of strife and confusion. The law of very many societies has therefore given to the proprietor a right

(e) As to the *knowledge* of the testator of the contents of the will being essential to its validity as such, see *Hastilow v. Stobie*, Law Rep., 1 P. & D. 64.

(f) 2 Bl. Com. 500. In the new Statute of Wills, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, the term "will" is to be taken as extending to a codicil also (sect. 1).

[of continuing his property, after his death, in such persons as he shall name (*h*).

Testaments are of very great antiquity. We find them in use among the antient Hebrews; though the example usually given of Abraham's complaining that, unless he had some children of his body, his steward Eliezer of Damascus would be his heir (*l*)—will be hardly thought quite conclusive to show that he had made him so by *will*. And indeed a learned writer has adduced this very passage in Genesis to prove that in the patriarchal age, on failure of children or kindred, the servants born under their master's roof succeeded to the inheritance as heirs at law (*m*). But—to omit what Eusebius and others have related of Noah's testament made in *writing*, and witnessed under his *seal*, whereby he disposed of the whole world (*n*)—it is apprehended that a much more authentic instance of the early use of testaments may be found in the sacred writings, wherein Jacob bequeaths to his son Joseph a portion of his inheritance, double to that of his brethren (*o*): which will we find carried into execution many hundred years afterwards, when the posterity of Joseph were divided into two distinct tribes (those of Ephraim and Manasseh), and had two several inheritances assigned them; whereas the descendants of each of the other patriarchs formed only one single tribe, and had only one lot of inheritance. Solon was the first legislator that introduced wills into Athens (*p*), but in many other parts of Greece they were totally discountenanced (*q*). In Rome they were unknown until the laws of the Twelve Tables were compiled, which first gave the right of bequeathing (*r*): and among the Northern nations, particularly

(*h*) Puff. L. N. lib. 4, c. 10.

(*l*) Genesis, c. 15. See Barbeyr. Puff. 4, 10, 4; Godolph. Orph. Leg. 1, 1.

(*m*) Taylor, Elem. Civ. Law, 517.

(*n*) Seld. de Succ. Eb. c. 24.

(*o*) Genesis, c. 48.

(*p*) Plutarch in Vita Solon.

(*q*) Pott. Antiq. l. 4, c. 15; Hermann's Antiq. s. 20.

(*r*) Inst. 2, 22, 1. See Vinn. lib. 2, t. 10.

[among the Germans, testaments were not received into use(*s*). And this variety may serve to evince that the right of making wills and disposing of property after death, is merely a creature of the civil state; which has permitted it in some countries, and denied it in others. And even where it is permitted by law, it is subjected to different formalities and restrictions in almost every nation under heaven(*t*).]

In this country, both real and personal estate have long been capable of transmission by will,—the latter, indeed, from time immemorial; and a modern statute (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26), to which we shall soon have occasion more particularly to refer, has now confirmed and further regulated this power, and placed it, for the future, on a new basis. As regards personal estate, however, and chattels real (which are considered as personalty), and also as relates to copyholds, it would be premature to consider fully, in this place, the law of testamentary disposition(*u*); and we shall confine our present inquiries, for the most part, to the nature of that right as it affects estates of freehold duration and tenure; or, as it is commonly expressed, the law of *devises*.

To obtain a clear idea of this subject, it will be desirable to consider under separate heads:—I. The power of devise itself,—to what person it belongs, and to what estates and interest it applies. II. The solemnities with which the will containing a devise must be executed, and how it may be revoked or revived. III. The rules of construction to which devises are subject. IV. Their operation in conveying or limiting real estate.

I. [As to the power of devising, it seems sufficiently clear that, before the Conquest, lands were devisable by

(*s*) Tacit. de Mor. Germ. 20.

(*t*) Vide sup. p. 163; 2 Bl. Com.
13.

(*u*) As to the title to *personal*

estate by will or administration,
vide post, bk. II. pt. II. c. VII.; and
as to devises of *copyhold*, post, c.
XXII.

[will (*x*). But upon the introduction of the military tenures, a restraint on devising lands naturally took place as a branch of the feudal doctrine of non-alienation without consent of the lord. So that *after* the Conquest, no estate greater than for term of years could be disposed of by testament (*y*),—except only in Kent and in some antient boroughs, and a few particular manors, where their Saxon immunities by special indulgence subsisted (*z*). And though the feudal restraint on alienation by deed vanished very early, yet this on wills continued for some centuries after; from an apprehension of infirmity, and imposition on the testator *in extremis*, which made such devises suspicious (*a*). Besides, in devises there was wanting that general notoriety and public designation of the successor, which, in descents, is apparent to the neighbourhood; and which the simplicity of the common law always required in any transfer and new acquisition of property.

But when ecclesiastical ingenuity had invented the doctrine of uses as a thing distinct from the legal estate, uses began to be devised very frequently (*b*); and the devisee of the use could, in Chancery, compel its execution. For it is observed by Gilbert (*c*), that as the Popish clergy then generally sat in the Court of Chancery, they considered that men are most liberal when they can enjoy their possessions no longer; and therefore at their death would choose to dispose of them to those who, according to the superstition of the times, could intercede for their happiness in another world. But by the effect of the statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10, these uses afterwards became legal estate, which was not then devisable; and this might have occasioned a great revolution in the law

(*x*) Wright's Ten. 172.

(*y*) 2 Inst. 7.

(*z*) Litt. s. 167; Co. Litt. 111.

Vide Rob. Gavel. 235; sup. pp.

163, 212, 213.

(*a*) Glan. lib. 7, c. 1.

(*b*) Plowd. 414.

(*c*) On Devises, 7.

[of devises, had not the *Statute of Wills* been made about five years after—viz. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1 (explained by 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 5),—which enacted, that all persons being seised in fee simple (except feme coverts, infants, idiots, and persons of nonsane memory,) might by will and testament in writing devise to any other person, (except to bodies corporate,) *two-thirds* of their lands, tenements and hereditaments held in chivalry, and the *whole* of those held in socage; which afterwards, through the alteration of tenures by the statute of Charles the second, amounted to the whole of their landed property, except their copyhold (*d*).]

A devise under these statutes took effect, not only upon legal, but also upon equitable estate; which indeed (as already explained) will pass under any form of conveyance applicable to the former species of interest (*e*). The statutes did not, however, apply to the *chattels* of the testator, whether consisting of terms of years in land, or of things personal; for the aid of the legislature was not in the time of Hen. VIII. required as to these; as we shall have occasion to show more particularly in a subsequent part of the work (*f*). And with respect to a freehold interest, a devise under these statutes was inoperative, unless the land belonged to the testator at the time of executing the will. So that lands acquired after execution were incapable of passing under the devise; and if the testator was desirous of including them in his testamentary dispositions, a new will or codicil, or a re-execution of the existing will, was required for the purpose (*g*).

It may also be remarked, as to the persons capable of

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 163, and see Butler and Baker's case, 3 Rep. 25; Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 148; Wyndham v. Chetwynd, Burr. 420.

(*e*) Vide sup. p. 384.

(*f*) Vide post, bk. II. pt. II. c. VII.; 2 Bl. Com. 374.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 378. See Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 148; Langford v. Pitt, 2 P. Wms. 629; Marston v. Roe, 8 Ad. & El. 14. But after-acquired *personal* estate has been always capable of passing under a will already made.

becoming devisees, that the statutes we have referred to made an express exception of corporations, which was done to prevent the extension of gifts in mortmain (*i*); though it was afterwards held, that a devise to a corporation for a charitable use was valid, as operating in the nature of an *appointment*, rather than a bequest (*k*). But we have had occasion in another place to advert to the statute 9 Geo. II. c. 36, by which devises to charitable uses are now generally made void; and which has consequently rendered that decision, and some others of the same tendency, less material (*l*).

Such was the power of devising as it existed at the date of the 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26; and thus it still stands with respect to all wills made before 1st January, 1838: but as to all executed on or after that day, the law must now be looked for in the provisions of that statute, often called, in contradistinction to the Statute of Wills, “The New Will Act.” This enacts, that (with the exceptions presently to be noticed) it shall be lawful for any person to dispose by will of all of his or her real and personal estate (*m*), legal or equitable, to which such person shall be entitled at the time of death, and which, but for such disposition, would pass to the heir at law or to the personal representatives; and the Act expressly extends this power of disposition to an estate held *pur autre vie*; to any contingent, executory, or other future interest; and even to a right of entry upon land, a class of interest previously considered incapable of being devised (*n*). The power is also expressly

(*i*) 2 Bl. Com. 375.

(*k*) Ibid.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 461; 2 Bl. Com. 375.

(*m*) “Real estate” is to be understood in this Act as extending to all hereditaments of whatever tenure, and whether corporeal, incorporeal, or personal, and to every estate, right, or interest therein, other than

a chattel interest; and “personal estate” to all property whatsoever which by law devolves upon the executor or administrator. (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 1.)

(*n*) See *Doe v. Tomkinson*, 2 Man. & Sel. 165; *Roe v. Jones*, 1 H. Bl. 30; 3 T. R. 88; *Goodright v. Forrester*, 8 East, 552.

extended to after-acquired lands, by a provision that all real and personal estate, to which the testator is entitled at the time of his death, shall pass, notwithstanding that he may become entitled to the same subsequently to the execution of his will (*o*). And it is further to be remarked, as to the person capable of taking by devise, that there is no exception in this Act (as under the former statutes) with regard to corporations; so that a devise to a body corporate is now valid; subject to the enactments of the Statutes of Mortmain, by which corporations are required to obtain the crown's licence, to enable them to become the *holders* of land (*p*); and subject also to the prohibition of 9 Geo. II. c. 36, as to a devise to charitable uses. On the other hand, the Act contains an express exception to the power of devising with regard to married women and infants—the first being only allowed to make a valid disposition in cases in which they might have done so before the Act (*q*), and the second being made wholly incompetent (*r*)—and to these we must of course understand the exception to be tacitly added which would be introduced by the general rules of law, in respect of idiots, insane persons, and others labouring under personal incapacity to aliene in any manner (*s*).

II. With respect to solemnities. When the Statute of Wills (32 Hen. VIII. c. 1) had for the first time given

(*o*) Sect. 3. *Marston v. Roe*, 8 Ad. & El. 14.

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 455.

(*q*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 7, 8. Before the Act, a married woman could not in general dispose of land by will; (see *Forse and Hembling's case*, 4 Rep. 60 b;) but might do so under a *power* expressly conferred on her for the purpose. (See *Johns v. Dickinson*, 8 C. B. 934.) And she might dispose of what had been settled to her *separate use*, even

without any express power given to her. (See *Taylor v. Meads*, 34 Law Journ. Rep. p. 203, and 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, s. 1.)

(*r*) As to the precise time when the age of twenty-one is attained and infancy ceases, see *Vin. Abr. Devise* (G.), pl. 20.

(*s*) Vide sup. p. 474. As to the disposing power of a person *partially* insane, see *Smith v. Tebbitt*, Law Rep., 1 P. & M. 398. *Contra*, *Banks v. Goodfellow*, ib. 5 Q. B. 549.

efficacy to devises of the realty, innumerable frauds and perjuries were quickly introduced (*u*); which can excite no surprise when we consider that bare notes, in the handwriting of another person, then became good wills within the statute if only *published* as such; that is, declared by the testator to be intended to operate as his last will and testament (*x*). For except *publication* no other ceremony had been essential to a written will of personalty, before this statute passed (*y*); and the statute, itself, prescribed no particular solemnity in reference to a devise of real estate, except that it required the will to be *in writing*. [To remedy which, the *Statute of Frauds and Perjuries*, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) directed that all devises of lands and tenements should not only be in writing, but signed by the testator, or by some other person for him in his presence and by his express direction (*z*); and should also be subscribed, in his presence, by three credible witnesses (*a*). And a solemnity nearly similar was made requisite for *revoking* a devise by writing (*b*); though the same might be also revoked by the burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating thereof by the devisor, or in his presence, and with his consent, if done *animo revocandi* (*c*): as it might also be, impliedly, by any new modification of the interest of the devisor, in the estate devised (*d*); or by such a great and entire alteration in circumstances as

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 376.

(*x*) Ibid.

(*y*) As to publication, see *Doe v. Sir F. Burdett*, 4 Ad. & El. 14.

(*z*) As to signing by a *mark*, see *Baker v. Denning*, 8 Ad. & El. 94.

(*a*) See *Roberts v. Phillips*, 4 Ell. & Bl. 450.

(*b*) It may be remarked here, that a will is always capable of revocation, though it purport in the strongest words to be irrevocable; for to hold the contrary, says Lord

Bacon, would be for a man to deprive himself of that which of all other things is most incident to human condition; and that is, alteration or repentance. (Bac. Elem. c. 19.)

(*c*) See *Andrew v. Motley*, 12 C. B., N. S. 514.

(*d*) See *Sparrow v. Hardcastle*, 3 Atk. 802; *Williams v. Owens*, 2 Ves. jun. 599; *Langford v. Little*, 8 Ir. Eq. R. 546; see also the 4th Real Prop. Rep. p. 24.

[arose from marriage and the birth of a child (*e*), or, in case of a woman, by marriage only (*f*).] In the construction of the above enactment of the Statute of Frauds, it was settled that the testator's name, written with his own hand at the beginning of his will, as "I John Mills do make this my last will and testament," was a sufficient signing, if intended as such by the testator (*g*). It was also adjudged that though the witnesses must all see the testator sign, or at least acknowledge the signing, yet they might see him do so at different times (*h*); though they must all subscribe their names *in his presence*, lest by any possibility they should mistake the instrument (*i*). And the judges were extremely strict in regard to the credibility, or rather the competency, of the witnesses; for they determined not to allow any legatee, nor, by consequence, a creditor by simple contract, where the legacies and debts were charged on the real estate, to be a competent witness to the devise, as being too deeply concerned in interest not to wish the establishment of the will (*k*). For, if it were established, he gained a security for his legacy (or debt) from the real estate; whereas otherwise, as the law then stood, he had no claim but on the personal assets. [This determination, however, alarmed many purchasers and creditors, and threatened to shake most of the titles in the kingdom, that depended on devises by will. For if the will was attested by a servant to whom wages were due, by the apothecary or

(*e*) See *Re Cadywold*, 1 Swab. & Trist. 34. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 502) observes, that revocation by the birth of a child bears some analogy to the Roman rule, which set aside a testament as *inofficious*, if any child was wholly passed by therein without assigning a sufficient reason. And to this rule he is inclined to attribute the vulgar error as to the necessity of leaving the heir one shilling, or some amount of legacy, in order to

cut him off effectually.

(*f*) *Forse and Hembling's case*, 4 Rep. 60 b.

(*g*) See 2 Bl. Com. by Chitty, 376, n. (6).

(*h*) *Freem*. 486; 2 Ch. Ca. 109; *Pr. Ch.* 185.

(*i*) *Longford v. Eyre*, 1 P. Wms. 740.

(*k*) *Holdfast v. Dowsing*, Stra. 1253. *Contra*, *Wyndham v. Chetwynd*, Burr. 414.

[attorney whose very attendance made them creditors, or by the minister of the parish who had any demand for tithes or ecclesiastical dues (and these are the persons most likely to be present in the testator's last illness), and if, in such case, the testator had charged his real estate with the payment of his debts,—every disposition in the will, so far as it related to real property, would be utterly void. This occasioned the statute 25 Geo. II. c. 6, which restored both the competency and the credit of such legatees, by declaring void all legacies given to witnesses, and thereby removing all possibility of their interest affecting their testimony (*l*). The same statute likewise established the competency of creditors, by directing the testimony of all such creditors to be admitted,—leaving their credit, (like that of all other witnesses,) to be considered on a view of all the circumstances, by the court and jury before whom such will should be contested.]

Such is still the law as to the execution and attestation required for wills made before 1st January, 1838 (*m*); but the provisions previously in force are, by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, repealed as to all wills made *on or after* that date (*n*); and it is now enacted (*o*), that no will (whether operating on real or on personal estate, or on both) shall be valid (*p*), unless it be in writing, and

(*l*) As to the effect of the will being attested by an interested party, see *Cresswell v. Cresswell*, Law Rep., 6 Eq. Ca. 69.

(*m*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 34. By this section, every will re-executed, or re-published or revived by any codicil, shall, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed to have been made at the time when so re-executed, re-published, or revived. (See *Doe v. Walker*, 12 Mee. & W. 591; *Winter v. Winter*, 5 Hare, 306.) The statute extends to wills made before 1st January,

1838, if altered subsequently to that date. (*Croker v. Hertford*, 4 Moore's P. C. Cases, 339.)

(*n*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 2.

(*o*) Sects. 9, 11.

(*p*) With regard, however, to wills of *personalty* made by *soldiers* or *seamen* in actual service, and the distribution of their effects when intestate, see 29 Car. 2, c. 3; 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 20, ss. 11, 12; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, ss. 194—204; 28 & 29 Vict. cc. 72, 111.

signed at the foot or end thereof, by the testator, or some other person, in his presence, and by his direction (*q*); such signature being also made or acknowledged by him, in the presence of *two* or more witnesses present at the same time, and such witnesses attesting and subscribing the will in his presence (*r*). Where these requisites, however, are complied with, no other is now imposed by law; and the statute expressly enacts that no *publication* other than is implied in the execution so attested, shall in future be necessary (*s*).

The former provisions with respect to the competency of witnesses having an interest, are also repealed as to wills taking effect under the new law (*t*); and the new enact-

(*q*) As to the *position* of the signature of the testator, it is (by 15 & 16 Vict. c. 24), made sufficient if it be placed *at* or *after*, or *following*, or *under*, or *beside*, or *opposite* to the end of the will in such manner that it shall be apparent on the face of the will, that the testator intended to give effect, by such signature to the writing signed as his will; but the signature is not sufficient to give effect to any disposition *underneath* or *following* it, or *inserted after the signature is made*. (As to this provision see *Re Peach*, 1 Swab. & Trist. 138; *Trott v. Skidmore*, 2 Swab. & Trist. 12; *Re Williams*, Law Rep., 1 P. & D. 4; *Re Dallow*, ib. 189.) In practice *every sheet of paper* used for the will is signed at the margin by the testator.

(*r*) As to *attestation*, see *Hott v. Genge*, 4 Moore's P. C. Cases, 265; *In re William Frith*, 1 Swab. & Trist. 8; *Charlton v. Hindmarsh*, 8 H. of L. Ca. 160; *Re Drummond*, 2 Swab. & Trist. 8; *Re Wilson*, Law Rep., 1 P. & D. 269. It may be

as follows: "Signed, published and "declared by the said A. B., the "testator, as and for his last will "and testament, in the presence of "us, present at the same time, who "at his request, in his presence, "and the presence of each other, "have hereunto subscribed our "names as witnesses."

(*s*) See also the provisions in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, as to wills of British subjects domiciled abroad at the time of death, so far as relates to *personal estate*. It may be remarked here, that *appointments by will under a power* are to be executed and attested in the same manner with other wills; even where other solemnities have been prescribed by the donor of the power (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 10); a provision parallel to which has been since made by 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 12, as to appointment by *deed* under a power; vide sup. p. 549, n. (*x*).

(*t*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 14, 15, 16, 17.

ments on this subject are, first, that the incompetency of any attesting witness shall not invalidate the will; secondly, that any beneficial gift or appointment by the will to an attesting witness, or to the husband or wife of an attesting witness, (except a charge for payment of debts,) shall be void, and the evidence of the witness admissible; thirdly, that where land is charged by the will with payment of debts, and the creditor (or husband or wife of the creditor) is an attesting witness, such witness shall nevertheless be competent; fourthly, that no person shall be incompetent as a witness, on account of his being an executor of the will. These enactments, however, are now of the less importance, as by the later statutes of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85, and 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, the objection to a witness on the ground of *interest*, (which once applied generally in our law, and not merely in the instance of wills,) is in all cases taken away (*u*).

As to revocation, also, the former law is altered by the New Will Act; and it is provided (sect. 18), that every will taking effect under this statute shall be revoked by *the marriage* alone either of a testator or of a testatrix—unless such will was made in exercise of a power of appointment, and in a case where the estate would not have passed, in default of appointment, to his or her representatives: but that, on the other hand, no will shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention to revoke, raised by any alteration in circumstances or otherwise, except only by marriage as aforesaid (*x*). A revocation may, however, take place by the execution of another will or of a codicil, or of some writing of revocation executed like a will (*y*), or by the burning, tearing, or other destruction

(*u*) There is, however, in both of these statutes, a proviso that this shall not be taken to repeal the enactments of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. above referred to; and consequently a gift or appointment to an attesting witness, or to the husband or

wife of an attesting witness, will still be void.

(*x*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 19. See *De Pontes v. Kendall*, 10 W. R. 69.

(*y*) It may be remarked that, as the general rule, no effect will be

of the original will (*animo revocandi*), by the testator or some person in his presence and by his direction (*z*). But no alienation of the property devised or other act (other than of the class above noticed), subsequent to the execution of the will, shall prevent its taking effect on any estate disposable by the testator at his death (*a*). With respect to obliteration or other alteration made after execution, it is provided that they are to have no effect (where the original meaning can still be deciphered) unless executed with the same ceremonies as the will itself (*b*); though it will be sufficient if the signature of the testator, and the subscription of the witnesses, be made opposite or near the part altered, or at the foot or end of some memorandum written on the will, and referring to the alteration (*c*). And so when a will is once revoked, it is not to be *revived* otherwise than by re-execution of the original, or by a codicil duly executed and showing an intention of revival (*d*).

III. With respect to the construction of devises, they are subject, in a great measure, to the same rules of interpretation as apply to conveyances by deed (*e*); but as in making a will, a party is supposed to be *inops con-*

given by the Court of Probate to any letter of direction or other supplementary paper unless the same has been duly executed as a will. (See *M'Cormick v. Grogan*, Law Rep., 4 App. Ca. 82.)

(*z*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 20. See *Francis v. Grover*, 5 Hare, 39; *Price v. Powell*, 3 H. & N. 341; *Elms v. Elms*, 1 Swab. & Trist. 155; *Eckersley v. Platt*, Law Rep., 1 P. & D. 281.

(*a*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 23. Prior to this Act it had been held that lands devised, and afterwards sold and re-acquired by the testator, would not pass under the

original devise, unless the will was republished or revived.

(*b*) See as to alterations or erasures, *Gann v. Gregory*, 22 L. J. (Ch.) 1059; *Re James*, 1 Swab. & Trist. 238. Et vide sup. p. 497, n. (*y*).

(*c*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 21.

(*d*) Sect. 22. As to revival, see *Andrews v. Turner*, 3 Q. B. 177; In the goods of *William Brown*, 1 Swab. & Trist. 32. As to re-execution, *Dunn v. Dunn*, Law Rep., 1 P. & D. 277.

(*e*) See *Clayton v. Lord Nugent*, 13 Mee. & W. 200. As to these rules of interpretation, vide sup. p. 499.

silii (*f*), there are instances in which the law will carry his intended limitations into effect, though the words used would be insufficient or improper for the purpose in a deed (*g*). Thus it has always been held that a fee might be conveyed by way of devise without legal words of inheritance, and an estate tail without words of procreation (*h*), provided that other words were used sufficient to indicate the design (*i*); though in conveyances by deed, the case, as we have seen, is otherwise (*k*). [So an estate may pass under a will by mere implication, without any express words to direct its course. As where a man devises lands to his heir at law, after the death of his wife. Here though no estate is given to the wife in express terms, yet she shall have an estate for life by implication (*l*); for the intent of the testator is clearly to postpone the heir, until after her death; and if she does not take it, nobody else can. So also where a devise is of Blackacre to A., and of Whiteacre to B. in tail, and if they both die without issue, then to C. in fee:—here A. and B. have *cross-remainders* by implication; and on the failure of either's issue, the other or his issue shall take the whole, and C.'s remainder over shall be postponed till the issue of both shall fail (*m*). But where any implications are allowed, they must be such as are necessary, or at least highly probable, and not merely possible implications (*n*).] There is also this difference between deeds and wills in point of construction, that supposing a will to contain two inconsistent clauses, that which comes last

(*f*) 2 Bl. Com. 172.

(*g*) Co. Litt. by Butler, 272 a, n.
(1); Doe v. Roberts, 7 Mee. & W. 386; Slater v. Dangerfield, 15 Mee. & W. 263. As to the construction of wills in reference to the description of the *devisee*, see Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363; Doe v. Rouse, 5 C. B. 422.

(*h*) Doe v. Bannister, 7 Mee. &

W. 298; Lewis v. Puxley, 16 Mee. & W. 733; vide sup. p. 245.

(*i*) See Lloyd v. Jackson, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. 269.

(*k*) Vide sup. p. 237.

(*l*) H. 13 Hen. 7, 22; 1 Vent. 376.

(*m*) Freem. 484. As to cross-remainders, vide sup. p. 354.

(*n*) Vaugh. 262.

in order shall prevail (*o*); though in a deed (as we have seen) the preference is due to that which comes first (*p*).

A devise also is subject to a less strict rule, than a conveyance by deed, in respect of the description of the thing granted. Thus, if I convey my house by deed, without any specification of land, we have seen that no land can pass, except the orchard, garden and curtilage (*q*); but the question what shall pass by the *devise* of a house (or of a house “with the appurtenances”) is purely a question of intention, to be determined, like other points of construction, by the tenor of the whole will. A devise in either form may, under special circumstances, have the effect of passing adjacent land or buildings (*r*).

There are also some particular points of construction, established by parliamentary enactment, with regard to devises. For the former state of the law upon these points, as settled by judicial decisions, being deemed unsatisfactory, it was thought fit in the New Will Act to regulate them for the future upon different principles. The new statute, however, it must be recollected, does not extend to wills executed before 1st January, 1838, which consequently remain subject, in respect of the same questions, to the *former* rules of interpretation. The points to which we refer are principally as follows.

1. As the dispositions made by a testator cannot take effect, and are not intended to take effect, till after his death, it has often become a question whether in his description of the property devised, or of the persons in whose favour he devises, he shall be considered as refer-

(*o*) There is some contrariety in the books as to this point; but the doctrine as laid down in the text appears to be supported by the better authorities. (See Co. Litt. 112 b; Plowd. 541, *in notis*; Doe *d.* Spencer *v.* Pedley, 1 Mee. & W. 677.)

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 501.

(*q*) Vide sup. p. 486.

(*r*) 2 Saund. by Wms. 401, n. (2). See also the following cases on the construction of wills, in reference to the description of the *thing devised*: Doe *v.* Cranstoun, 7 Mee. & W. 3; Doe *v.* Lightfoot, 8 Mee. & W. 553; Doe *v.* Earles, 15 Mee. & W. 450; Webber *v.* Stanley, 16 C. B., N. S. 698.

ring to the state of things which exists when he executes his will, or to that which may exist at the time of his death. As to bequests of personal estate, the rule has always been, that the will speaks as at the time of death: but in devises of the realty, the opposite construction (as we have seen) formerly obtained; and the will was held to speak, in general, as at the time of its execution (*s*). But the new statute has now assimilated the construction of *devises* upon this point, to that of *personal bequest*; for it provides, “that every will shall be construed, with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will” (*t*).

2. Though (as before observed) an estate in fee was always allowed to pass by devise, without apt words of inheritance, provided there were other expressions to show the testator’s intention to confer a fee, yet, prior to the New Will Act, a long train of judicial decisions had established that a mere devise of house or land would not suffice to indicate that intention, but would confer only an estate for *life(u)*. Thus, if I were seised in fee of a house at A., and devised my house at A. to B. *and his heirs*, or devised it to him with equivalent words, expressive of an intention that he should take my whole estate therein, the house would pass to him, in either case, in fee; but if I devised to him my house at A., without adding *and his heirs*, or using such other equivalent words as above mentioned, he would take an estate in it for his life only (*x*). This rule

(*s*) Vide sup. p. 593. See Lomax v. Holinden, 1 Ves. sen. 295; Pow. Dev. 307, (n.), by Jarman; King v. Bennett, 4 Mee. & W. 36.

(*t*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 24. See O’Toole v. Browne, 3 El. & Bl. 572.

(*u*) Vide sup. pp. 237, 602. See Pickwell v. Spencer, Law Rep., 6

Exch. 190.

(*x*) See Roe v. Blackett, Cowp. 235; Silvey v. Howard, 6 Ad. & El. 253; Doe v. Fawcett, 3 C. B. 274; Lloyd v. Jackson, Law Rep., 1 Q. B. 571. And see acc. per cur. Bolton v. Bolton, Law Rep., 5 Exch. 152, citing Jarman on Wills, vol. ii. p. 247, 3rd ed.

had always given much dissatisfaction, as establishing a construction contrary to that which common sense presumes to be the real intention of the party (*y*); and by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 28, it is accordingly provided, “that where any real estate shall be devised to any person without any words of limitation, such devise shall be construed to pass the fee-simple, or other the whole estate or interest which the testator had power to dispose of by will, in such real estate, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.”

3. In devises to *trustees*, it had been a general rule prior to the New Will Act, that though no words of inheritance were used in the limitation to them, yet they should take such an estate (even to the extent of the whole fee) as might be necessary to enable them to perform the purposes of the trusts; but the question often arose, whether in particular instances they would take the fee, or a less estate, and if the fee, whether it would be determinable or not when the trusts were satisfied (*z*). But by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 30, a rule of construction is laid down, by which the subject is now governed; it being provided, “that where any real estate (other than or not being a presentation to a church) shall be devised to any trustee or executor, such devise shall be construed to pass the fee simple, or other the whole estate or interest which the testator had power to dispose of by will in such real estate; unless a definite term of years, absolute or determinable, or an estate of freehold, shall thereby be given to him expressly, or by implication.” And further (by sect. 31), “that where any real estate shall be devised to a trustee, without any express limitation of the estate to be taken by such trustee; and the beneficial interests in such real estate, or

(*y*) *Denne v. Page*, 11 East, 582; *Barker v. Greenwood*, 4 Mee. 605, n. & W. 429; *Adams v. Adams*, 6

(*z*) See *Doe v. Ewart*, 7 Ad. & Q. B. 860.
El. 666; *Doe v. Edlin*, 4 Ad. & El.

“ in the surplus rents and profits thereof, shall not be
 “ given to any person for life—or such beneficial interest
 “ shall be given to any person for life, but the purposes of
 “ the trust are to continue beyond the life of such person
 “ —such devise shall be construed to vest in such trustee
 “ the fee simple, or other the whole legal estate which the
 “ testator had power to dispose of by will, in such real
 “ estate ; and not an estate determinable when the pur-
 “ poses of the trust shall be satisfied.”

4. If, in the interval between the execution of a will and the death of the testator, one of the objects of his bounty dies, the devise will, by the general rule of law, *lapse*, that is, fail, and take no effect ; and this, though the devise was to the devisee and *his heirs*, or to him and *the heirs of his body* ; and the subject-matter of it will be considered as not disposed of by the will (*a*). This rule, until the New Will Act, applied to all cases without distinction ; but where an *entailed* estate had been given to one who died and left children, it was attended with peculiar hardship ; for if there were a devise to A. and the heirs of his body, and he died before the testator, the gift was void, even though he left issue (*b*). So if a testator gave his property among his own children, and one of them died before him, leaving issue, such issue would take nothing under the will, though the probability was, that this consequence could not have been intended. It is true that a testator had it always in his power to make a new disposition in favour of the children of a deceased devisee ; but either from negligence or ignorance of the law, or from other accidental causes, this was often omitted ; and an alteration of the law itself, as applicable to cases of this description, was therefore thought desirable. The 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 32, accordingly provides, “ that

(*a*) It will be remembered that a gift (whether by devise or by deed) in fee or in tail confers no distinct estate on the *heirs* or *issue* of the

donee (vide sup. p. 334).

(*b*) See the 4th Real Property Report, pp. 73, 74.

“ where any person to whom any real estate shall be devised
 “ for an estate tail, or an estate in *quasi* entail, shall die in
 “ the lifetime of the testator, leaving issue who would be in-
 “ heritable under such entail, and any such issue shall be
 “ living at the time of the death of the testator—such de-
 “ vise shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death
 “ of such person had happened immediately after the death
 “ of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear
 “ by the will.” And further (by sect. 33), “ that where any
 “ person, being a child or other issue of the testator, to whom
 “ any real or personal estate shall be devised or bequeathed,
 “ for any estate or interest not determinable at or before
 “ the death of such person, shall die in the lifetime of the
 “ testator, leaving issue, and any such issue of such person
 “ shall be living at the time of the death of the testator,—
 “ such devise or bequest shall not lapse, but shall take
 “ effect as if the death of such person had happened im-
 “ mediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary
 “ intention shall appear by the will” (c). In addition to
 which enactments, and in connection with the subject of
 lapse, we may notice this further provision (sect. 25), in-
 troductory of a new rule, in cases where a lapse occurs,—
 “ that, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will,
 “ such real estate or interest therein as shall be comprised,
 “ or intended to be comprised, in any devise in such will
 “ contained, which shall fail or be void by reason of the
 “ death of the devisee in the lifetime of the testator, or by
 “ reason of such devise being contrary to law, or other-
 “ wise incapable of taking effect, shall be included in the
 “ *residuary devise* (if any) contained in such will” (d).

5. Under a devise by a testator, having leasehold estate only,—of “ all my lands and tenements,”—a lease

(c) The “issue” left may be the *grandchild* of the devisee or legatee. (See *Re Parker*, 1 Swab. & Trist. 523.)

(d) The rule of law before the

statute passed was different as to real estates, but the same as to personal. (See *Doe v. Underdown*, Willes, 293.)

for years has been always allowed to pass, for there would otherwise be nothing for the will to operate upon. But this being considered as the only reason for such a construction, it was, on the other hand, prior to the New Will Act, a general rule, that if a testator, using such words, had lands in fee, as well as leaseholds, at the time, the lands in fee only would pass (*e*). It is now, however, provided by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 26, “that
 “ a devise of the land of the testator, or of the land of
 “ the testator in any place, or in the occupation of any
 “ person mentioned in his will, or otherwise described
 “ in a general manner, and any other general devise
 “ which would describe a customary copyhold or lease-
 “ hold estate, if the testator had no freehold estate which
 “ could be described by it—shall be construed to in-
 “ clude the customary copyhold and leasehold estates of
 “ the testator or his customary copyhold and leasehold
 “ estates, or any of them, to which such description shall
 “ extend, as the case may be, (as well as freehold estates)
 “ unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will” (*f*).

6. In like manner, where a party, having an *estate* in lands (which he is consequently competent to devise), is also entitled, by virtue of a *power* conferred on him for the purpose, to appoint other lands by his last will and testament, it was the rule, prior to the New Will Act, that a general devise of his lands would operate only on those in which he had the estate, and would not affect those subject to the power; though it was otherwise if he expressly referred to the power, or if it appeared by other circumstances (as by his having no estate for the will to work upon), that he intended the subject of the power to pass (*g*). And

(*e*) See *Rose v. Bartlett*, Cro. Car. 293; *Doe v. Williams*, 1 H. Bl. 25; *Thompson v. Lawley*, 2 Bos. & Pul. 303; *Knight v. Selby*, 3 Man. & Gr. 92; *Parker v. Merchant*, 5 Man. & Gr. 498; *Doe d. Dunning v. Cran-*

stoun, 7 Mee. & W. 1.

(*f*) See *Wilson v. Eden*, 5 Exch. 752.

(*g*) See *Denn v. Roake*, 5 Barn. & Cress. 731.

such is still the rule where the power is special, and to be exercised only in favour of particular individuals or classes of persons; but where it is general, and enables the testator to appoint to any person that he pleases, (which amounts in substance to an ownership,) the law is now altered by the New Will Act; for it is provided by the 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 27, “that a general
“devise of the real estate of the testator, or of the real
“estate of the testator in any place, or in the occupation
“of any person mentioned in his will, or otherwise described in a general manner,—shall be construed to
“include any real estate, or any real estate to which such
“description shall extend (as the case may be), which he
“may have power to appoint in any manner he may think
“proper; and shall operate as an execution of such power,
“unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will” (*h*).

7. By a rule of legal interpretation, at variance with the common apprehension of mankind, and founded upon reasons of a purely technical description, it had long been settled law, that the words *dying without issue*, (as where an estate of freehold or leasehold was devised to A., and *upon his dying without issue*, then over to B.,) in general imported an *indefinite* failure of issue; that is, a failure not merely at the death of the party whose issue were referred to, but at any subsequent period, however remote (*i*). But by the New Will Act, such words were

(*h*) The same section also contains a similar provision as to appointment of *personal* estate. As to the construction of the word “estate” in a devise, see *Sanderson v. Dobson*, 1 Exch. 141.

(*i*) See *Fearne by Butler*, 478, 480, 9th edit.; *Doe v. Taylor*, 10 Q. B. 718; *Gee v. Mayor of Manchester*, 17 Q. B. 737; *Foster v. Hayes*, 4 Ell. & Bl. 717; *Bamford v. Lord*, 14 C. B. 708; *Bliss v. Smith*, 2 H. & N. 105. It is to be

observed, however, that such words received the opposite construction, if accompanied by any other expression tending to limit the failure of issue to the time of the party’s death; and the law admitted such a construction much more readily, in the case of a bequest of a term of years, than in that of a devise of the freehold. (*Fearne by Butler*, 471, 9th edit.; *Doe d. Cadogan v. Ewart*, 7 Ad. & El. 648.)

directed, for the future, to receive a more natural exposition; it being enacted by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 29, “that, in any devise or bequest of real or personal estate, the words ‘die without issue,’ or ‘die without leaving issue,’ or ‘have no issue,’ or any other words which may import either a want or failure of issue of any person in his lifetime or at the time of his death, or an indefinite failure of his issue,—shall be construed to mean a want or failure of issue in the lifetime or at the death of such person, and not an indefinite failure of his issue, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, by reason of such person having a prior estate tail, or of a preceding gift, being (without any implication arising from such words) a limitation of an estate tail to such person or issue, or otherwise.” It is, however, added, that this provision shall not extend “to cases where such words as aforesaid import if no issue described in a preceding gift shall be born, or if there shall be no issue who shall live to attain the age or otherwise answer the description required for obtaining a vested estate by a preceding gift to such issue.”

IV. [As to the operation of devises in conveying and limiting real estate, a will, in regard to its operation on such estate, is considered by the courts of law, not so much in the nature of a testament, as of a *conveyance*, declaring the uses to which the land shall be subject (*l*); with this difference, however, that in other conveyances the *subscription* of the witnesses is not, in all cases, essential to the validity of the deed (*m*), though it is a prudent precaution (and one which in practice is invariably observed), in order to assist their memory when living, and to supply their evidence when dead; but in devises, such subscription is made absolutely necessary by statute, in order to identify a conveyance which

(*l*) Wyndham v. Chetwynd, Burr.

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 496.

[in its nature can never be set up until after the death of the devisor.]

By a devise, estates may be limited with the same effect as by a conveyance operating under the Statute of Uses (*n*). Thus a man may effectually devise not only an estate in possession, (that is, in possession immediately on the death of the testator when the will first takes effect,) or in remainder, but also a freehold *in futuro*, or a fee upon a fee, or any estate in defeasance of a prior estate of freehold,—all which limitations (as we have seen) may be effectually made by way of executory use, though not in a conveyance at the common law (*o*). So a man may devise to his wife—as he may convey to her by way of use,—though his conveyance to her at common law was inoperative (*p*). His devise moreover in all these cases will be effectual though made by direct gift, and without reference to uses (*q*). Yet as a devise is considered to be in the nature of a conveyance declaring uses, so uses are often expressly introduced into them; and it has been the practice to introduce them in the same form as in conveyances under 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10. It has been doubted, however, whether that statute has any effect in the case of a devise (*r*): and though where uses are expressly and formally declared by the will, it may often be inferable that the testator had the statute in view, and intended the conversion of the use into legal estate, according to its known mode of operation; yet it is rather by force of his *intention*, than of the statute itself, that the legal estate, in such cases, would seem to pass.

A devise by which any future estate is thus allowed to be limited contrary to the rules of the common law,

(*n*) 2 Bl. Com. 334; Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 154.

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 545.

(*p*) Vide sup. p. 544.

(*q*) 2 Bl. Com. 334; Co. Litt. by Butler, 272 a, n. (1).

(*r*) Ibid.; 1 Sand. Us. 196.

is called an *executory devise* (*t*). And upon the same principle to which we had before occasion to advert, in the case of a springing or shifting use, it is a rule that no limitation capable of being considered as a remainder, shall ever be construed as an executory devise (*u*). All “executory devises” are also subject, like springing and shifting uses, to the rule against *perpetuity* (*x*). And therefore, until the New Will Act, it was held that if a chattel (real or personal) were bequeathed to A., and upon his *dying without issue*, then to B., the limitation over to B. was void, as being too remote (*y*); for such words imported (as we have seen) an *indefinite* failure of issue (*z*). But in devises of the freehold, similarly worded, the objection of remoteness did not usually arise. For, in general, the law gave effect, in this case, to the limitation over, by considering the estate of the first taker as amounting, by implication, to an estate *tail*; a construction which was not admissible in the former case, by reason of there being no estate tail in a chattel (*a*); and the ulterior estate, by consequence, as a *remainder*: which, as it might always be barred by the recovery of the tenant in tail, did not fall within the rule against perpetuity. By the express provision, however, of the New Will Act, the rule of interpretation as to the words *dying without issue*, on which the whole of these doctrines were founded, is now (as we have seen) itself abolished (*b*).

With respect to the operation of a devise, it remains

(*t*) Fearne by Butl. 386, 9th ed.; 2 Bl. Com. 172.

(*u*) Vide sup. p. 545. See Fearne by Butl. 386, 394, 525, 9th ed.; Doe *d.* Evers *v.* Challis, 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 113.

(*x*) 2 Bl. Com. 173, 334; Fearne by Butl. 430, 9th ed.; Co. Litt. by Butl. 271 b, n. (1), vii. 2. As to perpetuity, vide sup. p. 552. The period allowed for vesting is com-

puted, in the case of a devise, from the death of the testator, not the date of his will. (Ibid.)

(*y*) Fearne by Butl. 460, 9th ed.; Doe *v.* Ewart, 7 Ad. & El. 648; Doe *v.* Duesbury, 8 M. & W. 531.

(*z*) Vide sup. p. 609.

(*a*) 2 Bl. Com. 398; vide sup. p. 282.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 610.

only to remark, that it vests in the devisee an actual freehold by construction of law (*c*) ; being similar in this respect to a conveyance under the Statute of Uses ; but different from a descent, which vests in the heir no complete estate, until he has made entry on the lands descended (*d*).

[We have now adverted to all the ordinary kinds of assurance. Among which, the conveyances under the " Statute of Uses " and devises are by much the most frequent of any ; though, in these, there is certainly one palpable defect, the want of sufficient notoriety ; so that purchasers or creditors cannot know, with any absolute certainty, what the estate, and the title to it, in reality are, upon which they are to lay out or lend their money. In the antient feudal method of conveyance (by giving corporeal seisin of the lands) this notoriety was in some measure answered, as it was by the old Saxon custom of transacting all conveyances at the sheriff's county court, and entering a memorial of them in the chartulary, or leger-book, of some adjacent monastery (*e*).] But since the disuse of both of these methods, our transfers of land have been private ; the inconveniences resulting from which have been strongly felt, and more especially in Yorkshire and Middlesex. In these two counties, accordingly, a guard has been provided against secret deeds, conveyances, wills and other incumbrances by the statutes of 2 & 3 Anne, c. 4 ; 5 Anne, c. 18 ; 6 Anne, c. 35 (*f*) ; 7 Anne, c. 20 ; and 8 Geo. II. c. 6 (*g*). These

(*c*) Co. Litt. 111 a. The devisee may, however, by an express act of dissent, waive the devise, unless he has entered on the land. (*Doe d. Winder v. Lawes*, 7 Ad. & Ell. 212.)

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 430.

(*e*) An antient method of similar character, though only of partial application, is also noticed by Blackstone, viz., " the general register

" established by King Richard the first, for the stars or mortgages made to Jews, in the *Capitula de Judæis*, of which Hoveden has " preserved a copy."

(*f*) See *Chadwick v. Turner*, Law Rep., 1 Ch. App. 310.

(*g*) The provisions in these Acts (of which the 7 Anne, c. 20, relates to Middlesex, and the others to

enact that in those counties a memorial of all deeds, conveyances and devises affecting lands of freehold tenure, (but not including leases at rack rent, or for twenty-one years or under, where the actual possession goes along with them,) may be *registered* in such manner as in the Acts directed; and that every such conveyance shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, unless a memorial thereof shall be registered before the registering of the memorial of the deed under which such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall claim; and that every such devise shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, unless a memorial thereof be registered in such manner as in the Acts directed (*h*). The provisions of these statutes, however, have never been extended to other parts of England; and “it has been doubted by “very competent judges, whether more disputes have not “arisen in those counties by the inattention and omission “of parties, than prevented by the use of registers” (*i*). Other provisions for the protection of purchasers for valuable consideration against insecure titles, have nevertheless been recently made by the legislature; and these apply not to particular counties only, but to the whole of England, and have been attended, in many quarters, with great and favourable expectation. This is not a convenient place for entering more fully into the subject, but it is one to which we shall shortly have occasion to return (*k*).

Yorkshire) as to the *forgery* of registers of deeds, &c. are repealed by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 95, and a more general provision to the same effect is enacted by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 31. It may be remarked, that prior to the statutes referred to in the text a system of registration of conveyances was established for parts of *Bedfordshire*, by 15 Car. 2, c. 17, s. 8; as to which, see *Willis v. Brown*, 10 Sim. 127.

(*h*) See *L'Neve v. L'Neve*, 1 Ves. sen. 64; *Tunstall v. Trappes*, 3 Sim. 301; *Doe v. Allsop*, 5 A. & E. 142; *Sumpter v. Cooper*, 2 B. & Adol. 223; *Queen v. Registrars of Middlesex*, 7 Q. B. 156; *Wollaston v. Hakewell*, 3 Man. & G. 297; *Hall v. Warren* (Dom. Proc.), 10 W. Rep. p. 66. See also *Christian's Blackstone*, vol. ii. p. 343 (n.).

(*i*) 2 Bl. Com. 343.

(*k*) Vide post, ch. xxiv.

CHAPTER XXI.

OF EXTRAORDINARY CONVEYANCES—OR THOSE BY
MATTER OF RECORD.

HAVING now completed our view of all conveyances of the ordinary class, whether founded on common or statute law, we proceed next to the examination of *conveyances by matter of record* (*a*): which, being in use on particular and comparatively rare occasions, may therefore be designated as extraordinary conveyances. These are 1. Private acts of parliament; and 2. Royal grants; both of which, as connected but slightly with the main body of the law, will be treated with brevity; and the rather, because our method will lead us to omit, for the present, any examination of the nature of the parliamentary and royal authorities on which they are respectively founded,—these subjects having both their appropriate place under the division of the work which relates to *public rights*.

I. Private *acts of parliament* (*b*) have been resorted to as a mode of assurance more frequently in modern than in

(*a*) The now abolished conveyances by way of fine and recovery, were also by matter of record; vide sup. p. 559.

(*b*) As to private acts of parliament, vide sup. p. 70. See 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 83, as to the deposit of plans and documents in the case of *private bills*; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 69, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 78, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 27, as to taxation and costs on *private bills*; (as to which see

Swansea Canal Proprietors *v.* Great Western Railway Company, Law Rep., 5 Eq. Ca. 444.) See also 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 7, providing that all statutes passed after that Act shall be *public Acts*, unless the contrary shall be expressly declared therein; and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 78, as to administering oaths before committees of House of Commons on *private bills*.

antient times. [For it may sometimes happen that, by the ingenuity of some, and the blunders of other practitioners, an estate is most grievously entangled by a multitude of resulting trusts, springing uses, executory devises, and the like artificial contrivances (*c*),—a confusion unknown to the simple conveyances of the common law,—so that it is out of the power of either the courts of law or equity to relieve the owner. Or it may sometimes happen, that, by the strictness or omissions of family settlements, the tenant of the estate is abridged of some reasonable power, (as letting leases, making a jointure for a wife, or the like,) which power cannot be given him by the ordinary judges either in common law or equity (*d*). Or it may be necessary, in settling an estate, to secure it against the claims of infants, or other persons under legal disabilities; who are not bound by any judgments or decrees of the ordinary courts of justice. In these, or other cases of the like kind, the transcendent power of parliament is called in, to cut the Gordian knot; and by a particular law, enacted for this very purpose, to unfetter an estate; to give its tenant reasonable powers; or to assure it to a purchaser, against the remote or latent claims of infants or disabled persons, by settling a proper equivalent in proportion to the interest so barred. This practice was carried to a great length in the year succeeding the Restoration, by setting aside many conveyances alleged to have been made by constraint, or in order to screen the estates from being forfeited during the usur-

(*c*) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 344) also enumerates *contingent remainders*; but these *were* known to the common law. "They were probably "considered encroachments on the "common law," say the Real Property Commissioners (Third Rep. p. 23), "but were certainly allowed "by it. They were early attempts

"to meet the contingencies of family settlements, and were introduced long before the Statute of "Uses."

(*d*) Relief against inconveniences of this kind may now, in some cases, be attained (without the aid of a private Act) under the recent provisions of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120.

[pation. And at last it proceeded so far, that, as a noble historian expresses it (*e*), every man had raised an equity in his own imagination, that he thought was entitled to prevail against any descent, testament, or act of law, and to find relief in parliament; which occasioned the king, at the close of the session, to remark, that the good old rules of law are the best security, and to wish that men might not have too much cause to fear that the settlements which they make of their estates shall be too easily unsettled, when they are dead, by the power of parliament (*f*).

Acts of this kind are, however, at present, carried on, in both houses, with great deliberation and caution; particularly in the House of Lords, where they are usually referred to two of the judges, to examine and report on the facts alleged, and to settle all technical forms (*g*). Nothing also is done without the consent, expressly given, of all parties in being, and capable of consent, that have the remotest interest in the matter; unless indeed such consent shall appear to be perversely, and without any reason, withheld. And, as was before hinted, an equivalent in money or other estate is usually settled upon infants, or persons not *in esse*, or not of capacity to act for themselves, who are to be concluded by the Act. And a general saving is constantly added at the close of the bill, of the right and interest of all persons whatsoever, except those whose consent is so given or purchased, and who are therein particularly named; though it hath been holden, that, even if such saving be omitted, the Act shall bind none but the parties (*h*).

(*e*) Lord Clar. Contin. 162.

(*f*) Ibid. 163.

(*g*) Whenever a private bill, in the nature of an estate bill, is brought up from the Commons, it is referred to two of the judges of the superior courts in rotation, not

being lords of parliament. (May's Pr. of Parl. p. 595, 3rd ed.)

(*h*) See 8 Rep. 138 a; Godb. 171; vide *Westby v. Kiernan*, Ambl. 697; *Provost of Eton v. Bishop of Winchester*, 3 Wils. 483; *Chapman v. Brown*, 3 Burr. 1626.

[A law thus made, though it binds all parties to the bill, is yet looked upon rather as a private conveyance than as the solemn act of the legislature. It is not therefore allowed to be a *public*, but a mere *private* statute; it is not printed or published among the other laws of the session; and it hath been relieved against, when obtained by fraudulent suggestions (*i*).] Formerly, too, it was subject in every case to this further distinction, that though all public statutes are noticed by the court *ex officio*, no private one was entitled to judicial notice unless specially set forth and pleaded. And such is still the rule as to those passed up to 4th Feb. 1851, inclusive; but by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 7, it is now provided that every Act passed after that date shall be judicially taken notice of, unless the contrary be expressly provided and declared by the statute itself. And as to all private Acts, without distinction, it is to be observed, that they have in one respect the same notoriety as public ones; namely, that they are always inrolled among the public records of the nation, to be for ever preserved as a perpetual testimony of the conveyance or assurance so made or established.

II. *Royal grants* are also matter of public record (*k*). [For, as St. Germyn says, the excellency of the sovereign is so high in the law, that no freehold may be given to, nor derived from the crown, but by matter of record (*l*). And to this end a variety of offices are erected, communicating in a regular subordination one with another, through which all the royal grants must pass, and be transcribed, and inrolled: that the same may be narrowly inspected by the officers of the crown, who will inform the sovereign if any thing contained therein is improper, or unlawful to be granted. These grants, whether of

(*i*) See *Richardson v. Hamilton*, Canc. 8th January, 1773; *M'Kenzie v. Stuart*, Dom. Proc. 13th March, 1754; *Biddulph v. Biddulph*, 4 Cru.

Dig. 549.

(*k*) Vide post, bk. v. c. xv.

(*l*) Doct. and Stud. b. 1, d. 8.

[lands, honours, liberties, franchises, offices, or aught besides, are contained in charters, or *letters-patent*, that is, open letters, *literæ patentēs*; so called because they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the great seal pendant at the bottom; and are usually directed or addressed by the sovereign to all subjects of the realm. And therein they differ from certain other letters of the sovereign, which are also sealed with the great seal, but are directed to particular persons, and for particular purposes; which, therefore, not being proper for public inspection, are closed up, and sealed on the outside, and are thereupon called writs *close*, *literæ clausæ*, and are recorded in the *close rolls*, in the same manner as the others are in the *patent rolls*.]

The course of proceeding observed till of late with respect to the making out of a grant by letters-patent was in general as follows (*m*):—They were, first, to pass by *bill*; which was prepared by the attorney and solicitor-general, in consequence of a warrant from the crown, and was then signed, (that is, superscribed at the top with the sovereign's own *sign manual*,) and sealed with the *privy signet*, which was always in the custody of the principal secretary of state; and then sometimes it immediately passed under the great seal, in which case the patent was subscribed in these words, "*per ipsam reginam*, by the queen herself" (*n*). Otherwise, the course was to carry an extract of the bill to the keeper of the *privy seal*, who made out a writ or warrant thereupon to the Chancery; so that the sign manual was the warrant to the privy seal, and the privy seal was the warrant to the great seal; and in this last case the patent was subscribed, "*per breve de privato sigillo*, by writ of privy seal" (*o*). But the practice as to grants by patent is now greatly simplified by the statute 14 & 15 Vict. c. 82, which (after repealing a statute of 27 Hen. VIII. c. 11, on the subject) provides,

(*m*) See 2 Bl. Com. 343.

(*o*) Ibid.; 2 Inst. 555.

(*n*) 2 Rep. 17 b.

that, in every case where any gift, grant or writing whatsoever to be passed under the great seal would have before required a bill from the office of the signet or of the privy seal, her Majesty may, by warrant under the royal sign manual, addressed to the lord chancellor, command him to cause letters-patent to be passed under the great seal according to such warrant; and that such warrant shall be prepared by the attorney or solicitor-general, and shall set forth the proposed letters-patent, and shall be countersigned by one of the principal secretaries of state, and sealed with the privy seal; and that it shall be lawful for the lord chancellor from time to time to frame such further regulations with respect to the passing of letters-patent under the great seal as to him shall seem expedient. Such is the general course as now established by this statute (*p*): but as some letters-patent, writs, commissions or other instruments, might, before the statute, be passed under the great seal, by authority of the lord chancellor or otherwise, without passing through the offices of the signet and the privy seal; these are excepted, by an express proviso, from its operation. There are also some grants or appointments which only pass through certain offices, as the admiralty, the home office, or treasury, in consequence of a *sign manual* without the confirmation of either the *signet*, the *great* or the *privy* seal (*q*); and to these of course the statute has no application (*r*).

[The manner of a grant by the crown, (as above set forth,) does not more differ from that by a subject, than the *construction* of such grants when made. For, 1. A grant made by the crown, *at the suit of the grantee*, shall be taken most beneficially for the crown, and against the party: whereas the grant of a subject, is construed most

(*p*) As to a patent for an *invention*, see 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83.

(*q*) By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 82, s. 3, the offices of clerks of the signet

and of the privy seal are abolished.

(*r*) As to commissions in the army, &c., see 25 & 26 Vict. c. 4.

[strongly *against* the grantor (*s*). Wherefore it is usual to insert in the royal grants, that they are made, not at the suit of the grantee, but “*ex speciali gratiâ, certâ scientiâ, et mero motu reginæ (aut regis)*,” and then they have a more liberal construction (*t*), as is also the case where they are made upon a valuable consideration (*u*).

2. A subject’s grant shall be construed to include many things besides what are expressed, if necessary for the operation of the grant (*x*). Therefore in a grant of the profits of land for one year, free ingress, egress and regress, to cut and carry away those profits, are also inclusively granted (*y*); and so, by the antient law, if a feoffment of land was made by a lord to his villein, this operated as a manumission; for he was otherwise unable to hold it (*z*). But the grant of the crown shall not enure to any other intent, than that which is precisely expressed in the grant.

3. When it appears, from the face of the grant, that the crown is mistaken or deceived, either in matter of fact, or matter of law, as in case of false suggestion, misinformation, or misrecital, of former grants; or if the royal title to the thing granted be different from what was supposed; or if the grant be informal; or if an estate be granted contrary to the rules of law;—in any of these cases the grant is absolutely void (*a*). For instance, if the crown grants lands to one and his *heirs male*, this is merely void; for it shall not be an estate tail, because there want words of procreation, to ascertain the body out of which the heirs shall issue; neither is it a fee simple, as in common grants it would be, because it may reasonably be supposed, that the king meant to give no more than an estate tail (*b*); the

(*s*) Vide sup. p. 501.

(*z*) Litt. s. 206.

(*t*) Finch, L. 100; 10 Rep. 112.

(*a*) Freem. 172; Gledstanes v.

(*u*) 6 Rep. 6 a.

Earl of Sandwich, 4 Man. & G.

(*x*) 1 Saund. by Wms. 323 a,

995.

n. (6).

(*b*) Finch, 101, 102.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 56 a.

[grantee is therefore (if anything) nothing more than tenant at will (*e*). And to prevent deceits being practised on the sovereign, with regard to the value of the estate granted, it is particularly provided by the statute, 1 Hen. IV. c. 6, that no grant of the crown shall be good, unless in the grantee's petition for them express mention be made of the real value of the lands (*f*).] As to the mode of proceeding for calling into question the validity of the crown's grant, it is by writ or action of *scire facias* at suit of the crown, issued at the instance, or at least by the sanction, of the attorney or solicitor-general; and any points of law or of fact arising thereon are determinable in the superior courts of common law, where also the judgment is to be given and execution awarded (*g*).

Lastly, we may observe with respect to the *subject-matter* of the royal grants, that—in connection with the provision now usually made by parliament, for support of the royal dignity—restrictions have been placed by legislative enactment on the alienation of the royal domains (*h*); the general effect of which (though subject to a variety of exceptions) is to make such alienation unlawful for any longer period than thirty-one years (*i*). But the private property of the sovereign, that is, any estate purchased by the crown out of the privy purse, or coming to her Majesty, her heirs or successors by descent or otherwise, from persons not being kings or queens of the realm, may be disposed of by her as freely as any estate belonging to a private individual (*k*).

(*e*) Bro. Abr. tit. Estates, 33; tit. Patents, 104; Dyer, 270; Dav. 45.

(*f*) See also 34 Geo. 3, c. 75, s. 8, as to the survey, estimate, and certificate required, before a grant of lands is made by the crown.

(*g*) See on this subject the provisions of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 102, s. 29, &c.

(*h*) See 1 Anne, st. 1, c. 7; 34 Geo. 3, c. 75; 38 Geo. 3, c. 60; 42 Geo. 3, c. 116; 48 Geo. 3, c. 73; 52 Geo. 3, c. 161; 55 Geo. 3, c. 190.

(*i*) See 1 Anne, st. 1, c. 7; 48 Geo. 3, c. 73, s. 3; sup. p. 447.

(*k*) See 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 88 (amended by 47 Geo. 3, st. 2, c. 24); 46 Geo. 3, c. 151; 48 Geo. 3, c. 73;

And thus we have taken a transient view, in this and the four preceding chapters, of a very large and diffusive subject, the doctrine of common assurances as applied to the principal division of things real, viz. *land or corporeal hereditaments of free tenure* (*l*); and this survey concludes our observations on the *title* to them, or the means by which they may be reciprocally lost and acquired (*m*). And we have in previous chapters considered the *estates* which may be had in them; with regard to their duration or quantity of interest, the time of their enjoyment, and the number and connection of the persons entitled to hold them (*n*). What remains, then, of the law relative to the rights of property in things real in general, (exclusive of the wrongs and remedies,) is the learning relative to land of *copyhold* tenure, and to *incorporeal hereditaments*; and to the first of these we shall accordingly proceed in the next chapter.

52 Geo. 3, c. 161; 55 Geo. 3, c. 190.
See also Mr. Thomas's arrangement
of Co. Litt. vol. i. p. 66, vol. ii. p.
606, where the law relative to crown

grants is collected.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 168.

(*m*) Vide sup. p. 172.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 229.

CHAPTER XXII.

OF COPYHOLDS.



OUR attention has been hitherto confined to hereditaments of free tenure; and these we have considered in reference to the estates that may be had in them, and the means by which those estates may be acquired or lost. But the reader will recollect, that lands may also be held by the base tenure of *copyhold*; a distinction of which some general notice has been already taken in a former chapter of this work (*a*). And we are now to examine copyhold lands in reference to the same considerations of estate and title, which have already engaged our attention in the course of the disquisition upon hereditaments of free tenure (*b*). As this, however, is in the nature of a mere variation upon that general scheme of real property, which has been already unfolded as largely as the nature of an elementary work permits, our notice of it may be compressed within proportionably narrow limits. It shall be directed chiefly to the following points: I. The general nature of copyhold estates. II. Certain incidents peculiar to those estates, and not applicable to such as are of free tenure. And in what we shall have occasion to say on this subject, we are to be understood as speaking of copyhold commonly so called; the particular species of antient demesne, and the rest, not requiring in the present work a more particular notice than has already been bestowed upon them (*c*).

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 214.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 229.

(*c*) Vide sup. p. 223.

I. As to the general nature of these estates, and referring to what we before said of copyhold, we may collect from it, first, that it is in *manors* only that they are to be found; all copyholds being, from their nature, necessarily parcel of a district of that description. Secondly, that it is by the immemorial custom of the particular manor, that the nature of the copyholder's interest must always be regulated. In some manors, where the custom hath been to permit the heir to succeed the ancestor, the estates are called copyholds of inheritance; in other, where the lords have been more vigilant to maintain their rights, they remain copyholds for life or years only (*d*); but though the interest of the copyholder may be thus in fee or for life, and consequently may partake of the nature of freehold, in respect of the *quantity of estate*, it is nevertheless, for want of the remaining ingredient, (*viz.* that of free tenure,) no *freehold* (*e*). Indeed, in every case of copyhold, the law still distinguishes between the strictly legal, and the customary, estate; for as regards the former, it supposes the seisin and freehold of the land to be vested in the lord, of whose *demesnes* it is properly parcel; and the copyholder to be mere tenant at will (*f*); but as he is tenant at will *according to the custom*, that is, to hold in fee, or for life, or years, (as the case may be,) it considers him as having a customary estate to that extent (*g*); and one that is fixed and permanent in its nature, such as it is out of the power of the lord to defeat or encroach

(*d*) 2 Bl. C. 97; 3 Real P. R. 14. It is to be observed, that if the custom has been to grant copyholds of inheritance, the lord may also grant a less estate; for, *omne majus in se continet minus*. (Co. Litt. 52 b.)

(*e*) Vide sup. p. 231.

(*f*) See *Dearden v. Evans*, 5 Mee. & W. 11; *Duke of Portland v. Hill*, Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 765.

(*g*) Accordingly an estate of sufficient value, now, confers a right of voting at the election of members of parliament, whether the qualification consists in copyhold or freehold lands (2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 19); and copyholders are equally liable with freeholders to serve on juries (6 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 1).

upon (*h*). In consonance with the latter view, which assigns to the copyholder the character of a permanent tenant, he is deemed to owe fealty to his lord; which, as we have seen in a former place, is an obligation from which a mere tenant at will is always exempt (*i*). This complicated kind of interest, according to which the same man shall, with regard to the same land, be at one and the same time tenant in fee simple, and also tenant at the lord's will, seems to have arisen, in the manner formerly explained, from the nature of villenage tenure (*h*).

In the enumeration of the estates of which a copyhold may consist, it will be observed, that we have not included estates *tail*; it being only by particular custom that copyholds are capable of being entailed (*l*). For the statute *De donis* is held not to extend to lands of that tenure: from which it follows that a limitation to a man and "the heirs of his body," in a copyhold, will ordinarily create not an estate tail, but a fee simple conditional at common law (*m*).

Not only in regard to the quantity of interest, (as being in fee, for life, or for years,) but in regard also to the various modifications to which that interest may be sub-

(*h*) Brown's case, 4 Rep. 21; Co. Cop. 5, 58; Litt. s. 92, Trespass. By these authorities it appears that copyholders were formerly ousted by their lords at pleasure. The reformation of this was, in the opinion of Chief Baron Gilbert, "by some positive law;" (Gilb. Ten. 156, 161;) but it is generally supposed to have been gradual. Upon the whole, the origin and progress of this tenure are involved in singular obscurity; but the following notices of a very diligent investigator of the Year Books, deserve attention. As early as the fourth

year of Edward the first, we find mention of *customarii tenentes*. Towards the latter end of the reign of Edward the third, we find tenements per roll *solonque la volonte de seignieur*; and in the reign of Henry the fifth, the term of *copyholders* occurs. (Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. iii. p. 312.)

(*i*) Vide sup. p. 296, n. (*s*).

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 214.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 60 b; 2 Bl. Com. 118.

(*m*) Doe v. Clark, 5 B. & Ald. 458; vide sup. p. 239.

ject, the nature of a copyholder's estate in general resembles that of an estate held in free tenure (*n*). But as to this, there are some exceptions. Thus,—as to estates in dower and by the curtesy,—it is laid down that copyholds are not, of common right, subject to either of these incidents (*o*); though they may each obtain, and in fact do very frequently obtain (the former under the name of *free-bench*), by the special custom of particular manors (*p*). And to this we may add, that as the mode in which copyholds are conveyed—of which we shall speak hereafter (*q*)—differs from any of those which are applicable to freeholds; so the limitation of an estate, in the former, is free from some of the restraints imposed by the ordinary rule of the common law, in the case of the latter. Thus in a conveyance of a copyhold estate *inter vivos*, though no assistance can be here derived from the Statute of Uses (*r*),—yet an estate in fee or for life may be limited *in futuro*; or a fee may be limited upon a fee; or a man may convey to himself, or to his wife (*s*). And a copyhold has been always capable, in the manner hereafter mentioned, of alienation by will; in which all the above modes of limitation are allowed with as much freedom as in the case of a devise of freehold.

II. Next, as to the incidents of a copyhold estate, in which it differs from one of free tenure; and these regard, first, the estate itself, and, secondly, its title or manner of acquisition.

(*n*) Co. Cop. 110; Gilb. Ten. 258; 2 B. & Ad. 440.

(*o*) As to *dower*, vide sup. p. 266; as to *curtesy*, sup. p. 263. See 4 Rep. 22 a, where Sir E. Coke gives as a reason, that copyhold lands, though *descendible* by custom, nevertheless do not possess all the other collateral qualities of estates of inheritance *simpliciter*.

(*p*) Co. Cop. 110, 111; Gilb. Ten. 161.

(*q*) Vide post, p. 632.

(*r*) Ibid.

(*s*) Boddington v. Abernethy, 5 B. & C. 782; Co. Cop. 81. As to the rules on these points in respect of *freeholds*, vide sup. pp. 542, 544, 545.

First. As to the estate itself, a copyholder, even where his interest is in fee, has no right (except in particular manors where it may be warranted by a special custom) to commit *waste*,—for example, to cut down timber unless for reasonable botes or estovers (*u*), or to dig for minerals (*x*);—for the law considers him, in these respects, in the light of a tenant at will. And yet this restriction is attended with no corresponding benefit to the lord; for the law does not allow him (unless there be a special custom for the purpose) to enter on the land to take the timber or minerals to his own use, without the consent of the copyholder; whose possession, though in strictness a tenancy at will, is nevertheless protected from all invasion (*y*). By such waste, and by many other acts of a wrongful kind,—such as an alienation in fee, or for life, by a common law mode of conveyance proper to freehold, and not applicable to a base tenure—a demise for more than one year, without the lord's licence—a refusal to perform the proper services,—or a disclaimer of his tenancy in open court,—the copyholder forfeits his estate to the lord (*z*).

Moreover the copyholder is ordinarily subject to *quit rents* and *fin*es, and, sometimes, to *heriots*. The nature of a “quit rent” will be noticed in the following chapter, when we shall have occasion to consider the subject of *rent* in general (*a*). “Fines” are (as formerly explained) payments due, by the custom of most manors, to the lord, upon every descent or alienation of a copyhold tenement (*b*);

(*u*) As to these, vide sup. p. 256.

(*x*) See *Doe v. Wilson*, 11 East, 56; *Gilb. Ten.* 235; *Duke of Portland v. Hill*, Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 765.

(*y*) *Whitechurch v. Holworthy*, 4 Mau. & Sel. 340; *Lewis v. Brentwate*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 438; *Phillips v. Hudson*, Law Rep., 2 Ch. 243.

(*z*) 1 Watk. Cop. 326; 2 Bl. Com.

284; where a variety of acts which occasion a forfeiture are enumerated. And see *Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Company*, 9 Q. B. 469.

(*a*) Vide post, p. 672.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 222. As to fines formerly payable on alienation, &c. by tenant of lands of *free tenure*, vide sup. pp. 178, 190, 199, 207.

and they accrue by force of the *admittance* to which we are about presently to refer more at large; but are not in general allowed to a larger amount than two years' improved value of the land, after deducting the quit rent (*c*). This fine is paid by "tenants in common" apportionably—that is, each pays a separate fine according to his share (*d*); but "joint tenants" and "co-parceners" pay a single fine for all (*e*). And the case of joint tenants is an exception to the general rule as to amount; for, on their admittance, the course is to allow two years' value for the first life, half of that on the second, and half of that last sum on the third; and so according to this descending series, whatever may be the number of tenants (*f*). For as such tenants are entitled to succeed each other by mere survivorship, and without a new admittance, (without which, no new fine could be due,) the application of the general rule to this case would operate unfairly on the lord. With respect to "heriots" (of which we have also already taken some notice) they also are a tribute to the lord of whom a tenement is held; and they are usually divided into two sorts, heriot service, and heriot custom (*g*). The former are such as are due upon a special reservation in a grant or lease of lands; but they do not usually occur, except where they form part of the services by which some *particular* tenement within the manor has been held from

(*c*) Vide. sup. p. 222. As to the liability of *remainder-men* to pay fines, see *Dean of Ely v. Caldecot*, 8 Bing. 439; *Phypers v. Eburn*, 3 Bing. N. C. 250; *Garland v. Aston*, 3 H. & N. 390. As to fines and fees payable by a person admitted under *several titles*, *Traherne v. Gardner*, 5 Ell. & Bl. 913. As to fees payable to stewards of manors on *compulsory alienations*, *Cooper v. The Norfolk Railway Company*, 3 Exch. 546. As to *double* fines, see *Paterson v.*

Paterson, Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 31.

(*d*) See *Queen v. Manor of Everdon*, 16 L. J. (Q. B.) 18; *Queen v. Eton College*, 8 Q. B. 526.

(*e*) *Burt. Compend.* 433; *R. v. Manor of Bonsall*, 3 B. & Cress. 175. See *Douglas v. Earl of Dysart*, 10 C. B., N. S. 695.

(*f*) *Wilson v. Hoare*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 350; S. C., 10 Ad. & El. 236; *Sheppard v. Woodford*, 5 Mee. & W. 608.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 422.

time immemorial, and which may therefore be supposed to have been reserved by the grant of it originally made. The latter arise upon no special reservation whatsoever, but depend merely upon custom; being founded on a *general* usage within some manor, from time immemorial; as that every tenement within the manor has always paid, under certain circumstances, a heriot to the lord (*h*). A heriot may be due either from the free (*i*) or from the copyhold tenant of a manor (*k*); and it may accrue either in respect of the death or alienation of the tenant; but it is claimed more ordinarily in respect of the death (*l*). [It is sometimes the best live beast, *averium*, of which the tenant dies possessed (*m*), sometimes the best inanimate good, under which a jewel or piece of plate may be included; but it is always a personal chattel, which immediately upon the death of the tenant who was the owner of it, being ascertained by the option of the lord, becomes vested in him as his property; and is no charge upon the lands, but merely on the goods and chattels. The tenant

(*h*) Vide sup. p. 221. Heriots are of great antiquity, being mentioned in England as early as the time of Edgar. (Hallam's *Mid. Ages*, vol. ii. p. 416, cites Selden's *Works*, vol. ii. p. 1620.) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 423) observes, that we find in the laws of Canute, c. 69, the several *heregeates* specified which were then exacted by the king, from the highest *eorle* down to the most inferior *theygne* or landholder; and that these consisted for the most part in arms, horses, and habiliments of war, which the word itself, according to Spelman, signifies. But the heriot of the villein, unlike that of the military tenant, was generally some beast used for the purposes of agriculture. (See Wilkins's *Leges Anglo-Sax.* li.

Gul. Conq. 29.)

(*i*) By 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, s. 7, either the lord or the tenant is now enabled to cause a heriot, payable by a freeholder (or customary freeholder) of the manor, to be extinguished, and the lands, subject thereto, enfranchised. As to heriots payable by the freeholders of a manor, see *Damerell v. Protheroe*, 10 Q. B. 20.

(*k*) 2 Bl. Com. 423.

(*l*) 2 Watk. Cop. 135, 145.

(*m*) See Bract. l. ii. c. 36, s. 9. According to Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 424), the gift was in its origin only *voluntary*; and he relies on Bracton, and also on the opinion of Fleta and Britton. The expression of Bracton is, "*magis fit de gratia quam de jure.*"

[must be the owner of it, else it cannot be due; and therefore on the death of a *feme covert*, no heriot can be taken; for she can have no ownership in things personal (*n*). In some places there is a customary composition in money,—as ten or twenty shillings,—in lieu of a heriot; by which the lord and tenant are both bound, if it be an indisputably antient custom; but a new composition of this sort will not bind the representatives of either party (*o*).] And it is further to be remarked, that if the tenement should happen to be at any time divided into distinct shares, either by becoming vested in tenants in common, or by alienation of parcel, in severalty, the heriot is *multiplied* accordingly (*p*); though upon the subsequent re-union of the parts in a single owner, the multiplication (at least in the case of a tenancy in common) ceases (*q*).

A copyhold estate, while subject to particular burthens, enjoyed on the other hand, until a recent period, some improper immunities. For it was not assets in the hands of the heir or devisee; and was consequently exempt, after the tenant's death, from the claims of his creditors (*r*); nor could any part of it be taken, even during his life, upon an *elegit* (*s*). But this abuse is now substantially rectified; for by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104, a man's copyhold or customaryhold estate (not charged with or devised subject to the payment of his debts) is made, equally with his freeholds, *assets in equity* in the hands of his personal representatives (*t*); and by 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 11,

(*n*) Hob. 60.

(*o*) Co. Cop. s. 31; *Parkin v. Radcliffe*, 1 Bos. & Pul. 282; *Croome v. Guise*, 4 Bing. N. C. 148.

(*p*) 2 Watk. Cop. 149, 159; see *Garland v. Jekyll*, 2 Bing. 273.

(*q*) See *Attree v. Scutt*, 6 East, 476; *Garland v. Jekyll*, 2 Bing. 273; *Holloway v. Berkeley*, 6 Barn. & C. 2; *Queen v. Manor of Everdon*, 16

L. J. (Q. B.) 18. On alienation by several *joint tenants*, a single heriot only is due; see *Padwick v. Tyndale*, 1 E. & E. 184.

(*r*) 4 Rep. 22 a; 1 Watk. Cop. 224. As to assets, vide sup. p. 432.

(*s*) 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 226, pl. 6; 1 Watk. Cop. 224. As to *elegit*, vide sup. p. 310; post, bk. v. c. x.

(*t*) Vide sup. p. 434.

equally with them liable to be seized in execution, under an *elegit* (*u*).

In order to complete our general view of copyhold estate, we must also recollect that it is capable, as we have elsewhere noticed, of *enfranchisement*, or conversion of the base tenure into free (*x*); and that either by a conveyance by the lord to the tenant of the freehold estate in the copyhold premises, or by a release of the seignorial rights (*y*); the effect in either case being, that the tenant thereafter no longer holds of the lord of the manor, but of him of whom that lord held, and by the same free tenure (*z*): from which this consequence also follows, that the tenement is discharged from all copyhold burthens to which it was before subject; and divested of all copyhold rights (for example, that of common) to which it was before entitled (*a*).

Secondly. The incidents of copyhold in regard to its title or manner of acquisition, are in some respects the same with those of freehold; and particularly as regards the mode of descent: though this is much varied by the special custom of particular manors (*b*). There are, however, many incidents of a peculiar kind; and these, in general, result from the fundamental idea before remarked upon, that the interest of the copyholder is in strictness no more than a tenancy at will. Considered as such, it would be wholly incapable of direct alienation, for that would be a determination of the will (*c*); and therefore to this day, the attempt to transfer a copyhold, either for an estate of inheritance or for life, by any of those direct methods which are applicable to a freehold

(*u*) Vide sup. p. 310, and see the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 22).

(*x*) Vide sup. p. 220.

(*y*) 1 Watk. Cop. 362.

(*z*) Ibid. 367.

(*a*) 3 Real P. R. 17; 1 Watk. Cop. 368.

(*b*) Vide sup. p. 221.

(*c*) Vide sup. p. 289.

estate, is (as already remarked) in general attended with no other effect but to occasion a forfeiture to the lord (*d*). Yet, by the lord's *licence*, the copyholder may demise for a term of years (*e*); and, even without his licence, for a single year; and custom and the indulgence of the law, which favours liberty, also allow him to exercise a substantial, though indirect, right of alienation to any extent whatever, whether in fee, for life, or for years, under colour of a *surrender* of his interest to the lord, and an *admittance* or grant by the latter, *de novo*, to the tenant's nominee; such admittance being attended with those ceremonies of investiture, which marked in former days the original donation of a fief (*f*).

The nature of a surrender and admittance is, in a general point of view, and according to the custom of most manors, as follows: [the tenant comes to the steward of the manor, either in court (*g*), or, if the custom permits, out of court, or else to two customary tenants of the same manor, or to a single tenant provided there be also a custom to warrant it (*h*),—and then by delivering up a rod, a glove, or other symbol, as the custom directs, resigns into the hands of the lord, by the hands and acceptance of his said steward, or of the said two tenants, or tenant, all his interest and title to the estate; in order that the same may be again granted out by the lord to such persons and for such uses as are named in the surrender, and the custom of the manor will warrant (*i*). Upon such surrender, the lord, by his

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 628.

(*e*) 1 Watk. Cop. 302. But he cannot convey, by an ordinary deed, in fee, or demise for *life*, even by licence. (2 Watk. Cop. 119.) It may here be remarked, that the facilities for making leases of "settled" estates of lands of free tenure already referred to (sup. pp. 252, 257, 266, 279), are now, by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 77, s. 3, extended to settled

estates of copyhold or customary tenure. As to the proper *stamp* on a licence to demise, see 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97, *in sched.*

(*f*) Vide sup. p. 189.

(*g*) As to the customary court here referred to, vide sup. p. 218.

(*h*) 1 Watk. Cop. 78.

(*i*) Such uses are not affected by the *Statute of Uses* (vide sup. p. 366), which Act has no application

[steward, accordingly grants the same land again to the surrenderor's nominee, who is sometimes, though rather improperly, called the surrenderee, to hold by the antient rents and customary services ; and thereupon admits him tenant to the copyhold according to the form and effect of the surrender, which must be exactly pursued. And this is done by delivering up to the same tenant the rod, or glove, or the like, in the name and as the symbol of corporeal seisin of the lands and tenements ; upon which admission he pays a fine to the lord, according to the custom of the manor, and takes the oath of fealty (*h*).]

In order the more clearly to apprehend the nature of this peculiar assurance, let us take a separate view of its several parts, the surrender and the admittance : considered in reference, not to their form (for of that enough has been said), but to the doctrine and principles to which they are respectively subject.

1. [A "surrender" is rather a manifestation of the alienor's intention, than a transfer of any interest in possession (*l*). For until admittance of the surrenderee, the lord taketh notice of the surrenderor, as his tenant ; and the surrenderor still receives the profit of the land to his own use, and shall discharge all services due to the lord (*m*). Yet the interest remains in him not absolutely, but *sub modo* ; for he cannot pass away the land to any other, or make it subject to any other incumbrance than it was subject to at the time of the surrender ;] and he is considered as trustee for the surrenderee, who has an

except to freeholds. (1 Watk. Cop. 100, 212; Rowden v. Maltster, Cro. Car. 42; Rigden v. Vallier, 2 Ves. 257.)

(*h*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 365. As to the stamp duty on surrender, see 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97, *in sched.* As to the costs of admittance, see Cole v. Jealous, 5 Hare, 51.

(*l*) In the absence of special cus-

tom the lord is not bound to accept a surrender by a deed burthened with trusts. (Flack v. The Master of Downing College, 13 C. B. 945.)

(*m*) Hence before admittance the lord can maintain no action, for the fine due in respect thereof, against the surrenderee. (Lord Wellesley v. Withers, 4 Ell. & Bl. 750.)

equitable interest capable of being devised or otherwise assigned (*n*). The latter also has a right to call upon the lord to admit him, and in the event of his refusal may compel him to do so by proceedings in Chancery, or by a mandamus from the Queen's Bench (*o*). But no estate whatever is vested in the surrenderee as *copyhold tenant*, before admittance. [If he enters, he is a trespasser, and punishable in an action of trespass; and if he surrenders to the use of another, such surrender is merely void, and by no matter *ex post facto* can be confirmed (*p*). For though he be admitted in pursuance of the original surrender, and thereby acquire afterwards a sufficient and plenary interest as absolute owner, yet his surrender to another previous to his own admittance is absolutely void *ab initio*; because, at the time of such surrender, he had but a possibility of an interest, and could therefore transfer nothing; and no subsequent admittance can make an act good which was *ab initio* void.

2. "Admittance" is the last stage or perfection of copyhold assurances; and considered in that light, it may either be an admittance upon surrender by the former tenant, or an admittance upon a descent from the ancestor. In both these the lord is used as a mere instrument: and as no manner of interest passes into him by the surrender or death of his tenant, so no interest passes out of him by the act of admittance; and the claim of the tenant who is admitted is solely under him that made the surrender, or under the ancestor (*q*). And, therefore, neither in the one case nor the other is any respect had to the quality or quantity of the lord's estate in the manor. For it is immaterial whether he be tenant in

(*n*) 1 Watk. Cop. 102.

(*o*) See 2 Bl. Com. 369; R. v. Manor of Bonsall, 3 Barn. & Cress. 175; The Queen v. Powell, 1 Q. B. 352; Doe v. Harrison, 6 Q. B. 631; Queen v. Denby, 22 L. J. (Q. B.) 39; Queen v. Lord Wellesley, 2 Ell. &

Bl. 924.

(*p*) Doe v. Tofield, 11 East, 246, 251. As to a devise by the surrenderee, before admittance, see Matthew v. Osborne, 13 C. B. 919.

(*q*) 2 Bl. Com. 370, cites 4 Rep. 27; Co. Litt. 59.

[fee or for years, whether he be in possession by right or by wrong ; since the admittances made by him shall not be impeached on account of his title, because they are judicial, or rather ministerial acts, which every lord in possession is bound to perform (*r*).

Admittances, however, upon surrender differ from admittances upon descent, in this, that, by surrender, nothing beyond an equitable interest is vested in the surrenderee, before admittance ; but, upon descent, the heir is tenant by copy immediately upon the death of his ancestor : not indeed to all intents and purposes, for he cannot be sworn on the *homage*, that is, as one of the tenants present at the lord's court ; nor maintain an action in the lord's court, as tenant ; but to most intents the law taketh notice of him as of a perfect tenant of the land, instantly upon the death of his ancestor (*s*). He may enter into the lands before admittance ; may take the profits ; may punish any trespass done upon the ground (*t*) ; may devise the land descended on him (*u*) ; nay, upon satisfying the lord for his *fine* (*x*) due upon the descent, may surrender into the hands of the lord to whatever use he pleases. For which reasons we may conclude, that the admittance of an heir is principally for the benefit of the lord, to entitle him to his fine ; and not so much necessary for the strengthening and completing the heir's title. Hence, indeed, an observation might arise, that, if the benefit which the heir is to receive by the admittance is not equal to the charge of the fine, he will never come in and be admitted to his copyhold in court ; and so the lord may be deprived of his fine. But to this we may reply in the words of Sir E. Coke (*y*)—"I assure myself, if it
" were in the election of the heir to be admitted, or not to

(*r*) 4 Rep. 27 ; 1 Rep. 140.

(*s*) As to the admittance of a devisee, vide post, p. 639.

(*t*) 4 Rep. 23.

(*u*) Right v. Banks, 3 Barn. &

Adol. 644 ; Doe v. Wilson, 5 Ad. & El. 321 ; 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3.

(*x*) Vide sup. p. 628.

(*y*) Co. Cop. s. 41.

[“ be admitted, he would be best contented without admittance ; but the custom in every manor is in this point compulsory. For either upon pain of forfeiture of the copyhold, or of incurring some great penalty, the heirs of copyholders are enforced in every manor to come into court and be admitted according to the custom, within a short time after notice given of their ancestor’s decease.”] Accordingly (by the custom of most manors) if no person come in to be admitted in the place of a deceased tenant, the lord of the manor, after making due proclamation at three consecutive courts, may seize the land into his own hands *quousque*, that is, until some person claims to be admitted (z).

But though, in the case of an admittance upon surrender, no copyhold estate is vested in the surrenderee until he is admitted, and it is distinguishable in this respect from an admittance upon descent ; yet it is material to observe, that even an admittance upon surrender, when made, has a retrospective relation, in point of time, to the surrender itself. And therefore if the surrenderor dies after the surrender, and before admittance, though his heir will take by descent in the interim, yet on the admittance of the surrenderee, the heir’s estate will be defeated (a).

Such is, in general, the nature of a surrender and admittance, in the simplest form ; and the only variations upon the proceeding, which we deem it material at present to notice, relate to a conveyance by way of mortgage. Here the surrender is made upon *condition* that the money remains unpaid at the time appointed ; but in the mean-

(z) 1 Watk. Cop. 290. See for example the case of *Walters v. Webb*, Law Rep., 9 Eq. Ca. 83; ib. 5 Ch. App. 531. As to the admittance of *infants, femes covert, and lunatics*, see 9 Geo. 1, c. 29; 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 65; *Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal*, 9 Q. B. 469.

(a) 1 Watk. Cop. 103; and see *Doe v. Hall*, 16 East, 208. In the case of the death of the surrenderee before admittance, his devisee must pay two fines to the lord. (*Londesborough v. Foster*, 3 B. & Smith, 805.)

time no admittance takes place ; and if the money be then paid, the surrender not having been perfected by admittance, is void without further ceremony (*b*). Nor is it the usual course to complete the copyhold estate by admittance, even supposing the money to remain unpaid, unless the mortgagee wishes to take possession ; but the conditional surrender constitutes the only security, and continues to do so, until the mortgage be satisfied, and entry of such satisfaction made on the court roll ; after which, the original title of the mortgagor is considered as remaining in full force (*c*).

The admittances of which we have hitherto spoken are those used to complete an inchoate title by surrender or descent. It is to be observed, however, that there is another kind of admittance, viz., that which is connected with an original voluntary grant from the lord himself, and not with any preceding surrender or descent (*d*). This occurs chiefly in the case where the lord has himself acquired the copyhold interest, in consequence of some escheat, forfeiture, descent, surrender to his own use, or other circumstance, so that the freehold and copyhold interest are united in his person (*e*) ; which produces an *extinguishment* of the copyhold (*f*). In such cases the lord may, if he thinks proper, notwithstanding the extinguishment of the former copyhold estate, grant the lands out *de novo* to hold by copy (*g*) ; but if he does this he is bound to observe the antient custom precisely in every point, and can neither in tenure nor estate introduce any kind of alteration ; for that were to create a new copyhold, which, as this tenure depends on immemorial usage, cannot be done. Thus, if a copyhold for life falls into the lord's hands and he grants it out again by copy, he can neither add to nor diminish the antient rent, nor

(*b*) As to mortgages in general, vide sup. p. 304.

(*c*) 1 Watk. Cop. 116, 117; Burt. Compend. 420.

(*d*) 2 Bl. Com. 370.

(*e*) 1 Watk. Cop. 36, 39.

(*f*) Ib. 359, 361, 423.

(*g*) Ib. 93, 361.

make any the minutest variation in other respects (*h*); nor can he charge or encumber, in any way, the tenant's estate so granted (*i*).

The lord may also, where there is a special custom in the manor to that effect, make grants of portions of the *waste*, to be held for the first time by copy of court roll (*h*): but a custom to grant out every part of the waste without restriction, would be illegal, as trenching too much upon the general common right of the tenants (*l*); and to the validity of the grant of any portion, the assent of the *homage* is, by the custom of some manors, essential (*m*).

Again, admittance may also take place in the case of a devise; for a copyhold estate is now as devisable by will as a freehold. Formerly copyholds were not directly devisable even when lands of freehold tenure had become so by virtue of the statutes of Hen. VIII. before mentioned (*n*). But when a man wished to devise a copyhold, the object was effected by the devisor, in his lifetime, making a surrender *to the use of his will*; which, upon his death, entitled the person, designated in such will as devisee, to be admitted (*o*); and, except by special custom, a devise without previous surrender of this kind was inoperative (*p*). However by 55 Geo. III. c. 192 (passed 12th July, 1815), every disposition made by will, by a person dying after the passing of that Act, was made as effectual *without* surrender to the use of his will, as it would have been if such surrender had taken place (*q*).

(*h*) Co. Cop. s. 41.

(*i*) 8 Rep. 63.

(*h*) As to "the lord's waste" in a manor, vide sup. p. 215. As to *approving*, vide post, p. 655.

(*l*) 1 Watk. Cop. 35; see Lord Northwick v. Stanway, 3 Bos. & Pul. 346; The King v. Wilby, 2 M. & S. 509; Badger v. Ford, 3 B. & Ald. 153.

(*m*) As to this assent, see 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 9.

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 593.

(*o*) Co. Cop. s. 36.

(*p*) 1 Watk. Cop. 122; see Doe v. Bartle, 5 Barn. & Ald. 492; Cuthbert v. Lempriere, 3 M. & S. 158.

(*q*) See Doe v. Thompson, 7 Q. B. 897; Glasse v. Richardson, 2 De G., M'N. & G. 659; Traherne v. Gardner, 5 Ell. & Bl. 913.

And so by the New Will Act, (repealing 55 Geo. III. c. 192, except as to wills made before 1st January, 1838,) it is provided, that all the *real estate* of the testator may be devised; and under that description, all his copyholds, though he should not have surrendered them to the use of his will, nor have even been admitted to them himself, are expressly included (*r*). It is, however, incumbent on the devisee to be admitted (as in the case of a descent) and pay his fine to the lord.

A copyhold may moreover pass by a conveyance under the Act for abolishing fines and recoveries, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74(*s*). In some manors, an estate limited to a man "and the heirs of his body," might (prior to that statute) have been barred by a customary recovery, founded on a fictitious action in the lord's court, according to the analogy of a common recovery in the Court of Common Pleas (*t*); in others, such customary estate tail was capable of being barred by surrender (*u*). But now by the statute in question it is enacted, that a disposition by tenant in tail of the legal estate in a copyhold, shall be in every case by surrender (*x*); subject to provisions as to the consent of the protector (where there is one); analogous to those which the statute introduces in relation to the disentailing of freehold (*y*): but it is provided that such surrender (dif-

(*r*) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3. (See *Garland v. Mead*, Law Rep., 6 Q. B. 441.) This power of devise extends to a copyhold held *pur autre vie* (vide sup. p. 451).

(*s*) The provisions of this Act as to land held by copy of court roll, do not (it would seem) extend to land held as *customary freehold*. (*R. v. Ingleton*, 8 Dowl. P. C. 693.)

(*t*) *Doe v. Dauncey*, 7 Taunt. 674; 1 Watk. Cop. 161. As to a common recovery, vide sup. p. 568. If a fine or recovery of land held in ancient demesne was had in the Court of Common Pleas (as if it

were freehold), it might be reversed by a particular form of action brought by the lord, called a *writ of disceit*; and the land consequently restored to its former state of copyhold: but if the fine or recovery were not duly reversed, the tenure of the land would be thereby altered, and converted into *frank fee* or freehold. (2 Bl. Com. 368; and see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 5.)

(*u*) *Doe v. Dauncey*, 7 Taunt. 678; 1 Watk. Cop. 178.

(*x*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 50.

(*y*) *Ibid.* ss. 40, 51, 52, 90.

fering in this respect from a disentailing deed of freehold) shall require no enrolment, otherwise than by entry on the court rolls (*z*). It is also enacted by the same Act, with respect to the copyhold of a *married woman* when not tenant in tail—for when she is so, her estate is to pass by surrender as before the statute, i. e. by the surrender of herself and husband, she being at the same time examined apart by the steward (*a*)—that she may by deed, acknowledged in such manner as therein directed, and executed with the concurrence of her husband, convey her estate, or extinguish any interest or power vested in her, as effectually as if she were a *feme sole*; though this enactment is expressly declared not to extend to her legal estate in any case in which the object of that provision could, before the passing of the Act, have been effected by a surrender (*b*).

The preceding remarks relate, it will be observed, to the manner of conveying the *legal* estate in copyhold. With respect to *equitable* interests in lands of this tenure, they do not in general pass by surrender, for none but the owner of the legal estate is tenant to the lord, nor consequently entitled to surrender (*c*); but by any ordinary mode of conveyance sufficient to pass an equitable interest in other cases: and a mere instrument in writing, signed as directed by the Statute of Frauds, will suffice (*d*). But as to equitable *estates tail*, and the equitable estates of *married women not tenants in tail*, it is provided by the Fine and Recovery Act, that they shall pass either by surrender or by a disentailing or other deed, attended with the same formalities in general which are prescribed by that statute in reference to a transaction affecting legal estate (*e*).

(*z*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 54.

(*a*) See 1 Watk. Cop. 63; Kewley v. Ryan, 2 H. Bl. 344; Driver v. Thompson, 4 Taunt. 294.

(*b*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 77.

(*c*) 1 Watk. Cop. 60.

(*d*) Ibid. Vide sup. p. 380.

(*e*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 50, 53, 77, 90.

We have thus endeavoured to trace the principal features of the law of copyhold; one of the most unsatisfactory divisions (it must be owned) of the general fabric of our jurisprudence(*f*). It is open, at first sight, to the censure of being an unnecessary and embarrassing variation upon the fundamental scheme of tenure; and it was justly remarked by the commissioners appointed in the ninth year of George the fourth to revise the law of real property, that where the complexity which must always belong to the legal institutions of a civilized country “is “wantonly aggravated by the admission of several con- “curring systems, serious mischiefs are likely to arise “from the ignorance or forgetfulness of practitioners; and “even of judges, however carefully selected.” Many inconveniences, are also pointed out by the same learned persons, as incident to the nature of copyhold tenure, individually considered: of which the principal appear to be, the multiplicity and uncertainty of the different manorial customs on which it depends,—the check to agricultural improvement occasioned by the state of the law with respect to timber and minerals,—the liability to fines,—the numerous payments due to stewards on account of fees,—and the vexatious and oppressive character of heriots. The efforts of legislative reform have therefore been assiduously directed towards this branch of the law; and have resulted in certain statutes, viz., the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 23, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 55, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, by which new regulations of great importance are introduced(*g*). These Acts apply them-

(*f*) The Select Committee of the House of Commons, appointed to consider as to the enfranchisement of copyholds, express an opinion in their Report of 13th August, 1838, that this tenure is “a blot on the “juridical system of the country;” and they cite the remark of Roger North in his Life of Lord Keeper

Guildford, that “it was somewhat “unequal, when the parliament took “away the royal tenures *in capite*, “that the lesser tenures of the gentry “were left exposed to as grievous “abuses as the former.”

(*g*) By 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, the Copyhold Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 57), is repealed; and by 23 & 24 Vict.

selves to the following objects: first, to give effect to agreements for commutation of manorial burthens and restrictions, and to improve, in some other respects, the tenure itself; secondly, to facilitate the conversion of that tenure into freehold.

In promotion of these views they establish a Board of "Copyhold Commissioners" (*h*); and then proceed to enact, that the future rents, fines, and heriots, and the lord's right in timber, and also (if so expressed) in mines and minerals, may in all cases be *commuted* by an agreement, which shall be compulsory on all parties interested in the manor, or in the lands held of the manor; provided the parties to such agreement be respectively interested in such manor and lands to the extent of three-fourths at least in value, and the number of the tenants be at least three-fourths of the whole: and also provided that all ecclesiastical and other corporations and patrons of livings, interested in such manner as mentioned in the Acts, be parties to the agreement; and that it be afterwards confirmed by the Copyhold Commissioners (*i*). The Acts also authorize commutation to be, in like manner, made between the lord of the manor and any one or more of his tenants, whatever may be the amount of their respective interests; so as to be binding (after confirmation by the commissioners) on those parties, and on all other persons connected with them in title: though, both in this case and the former, notice is to be given to the persons next in remainder, reversion, or expectancy, of any estate of inheritance in the rights to be commuted,—not being parties to the agreement,—and such persons are permitted to urge before the commissioners

c. 59, s. 4, some of the enactments referred to in the text, are amended as to estates vested in the *universities*.

(*h*) 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 2. With this board, the Tithe Commissioners and the Inclosure Commissioners are now consolidated (see 14 & 15

Vict. c. 53; 30 & 31 Vict. c. 143; 31 & 32 Vict. c. 89; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 75); and to this board is also entrusted the execution of the Improvement of Lands Act, 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 114).

(*i*) 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, ss. 13, 22, 23.

any objection to the proposed arrangement (*l*). And after a commutation duly effected, the lands, although still remaining copyhold for most purposes, cease to be subject to any customary mode of descent; or to any custom relating to dower, freebench, or tenancy by curtesy, except as to persons married before the commutation took place: and become liable, in all that regards those matters, to the same law as lands held in free and common socage (*m*).

Besides these facilities for commutation, certain improvements of copyhold tenure are introduced into the above Acts. Thus, to remove doubts before existing on the subject, it is provided, that it shall be lawful for courts of equity to make partition of copyhold lands, as well as of lands of freehold tenure (*n*). And to obviate certain inconveniences before attaching to the practice of surrenders, admittances and grants, it is enacted, that lords of manors, (or their stewards, or deputy stewards,) may hold customary courts, though there should be no copyhold tenant at the time, or none should be present; and may grant lands to be held by copy, and also admit to lands to be held by copy, at any time or place (whether within or without the manor), and without holding a court (*o*). And whereas before these statutes it was in many cases necessary that a surrender, or other act *out* of court, should be afterwards *presented* in court by the homage, or tenants of the manor there assembled (*p*),—it is provided that every copy of a surrender, will or codicil delivered to the lord, steward or deputy, and every grant and admission, shall be forthwith entered on the court rolls of the manor; and that such entry shall be taken to be an entry in pursuance of a presentment: and that it shall not be essential in any

(*l*) 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 52.

(*m*) Sect. 79. Lands in Kent held on *gavelkind* are, however, excepted from the operation of the Copyhold Acts. (Sect. 80; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, s. 34.)

(*n*) 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 75.

(*o*) Before the Act, a customary court could not be held unless two copyholders at the least were present. (3 Real Property Rep. 20.)

(*p*) 1 Watk. Cop. 79, 80.

case to the validity of an admission, that a presentment should be made of the surrender, or other matter in consequence of which the admission was granted; with this proviso, however, that when, by the custom of any manor, the lord is authorized, by consent of the homage, to grant parcel of the waste to be held by copy, the consent of the homage assembled at a customary court, duly summoned and held according to custom, shall still be necessary. And whereas by the custom of some manors, a licence from the lord to aliene is required, and in some of these cases lords were restrained, by the custom, from granting licences to their tenants to aliene their antient tenements, otherwise than by *entireties*,—it is enacted that licences to aliene parcels may now be granted, and such alienation made accordingly (*q*).

Lastly, with the view of facilitating the conversion of copyhold into freehold (or *enfranchisement*), the Copyhold Acts provide, in substance (for no minute detail of their provisions can be attempted in this place), that (with consent of the commissioners) it shall be lawful for the lord of any manor, whatever may be his interest therein, to enfranchise all or any of the lands holden of his manor; and that it shall be lawful for any tenant (whatever his interest), with the like consent, to accept such enfranchisement. And that even independently and in the absence of any mutual agreement upon the subject, it shall be lawful for any copyhold tenant—other than one who holds only for life or lives or years, without right of renewal—for any copyhold lord, to *require* and *compel* enfranchisement,—the amount, nature and particulars of the compensation for the manorial rights being ascertained and *awarded* (unless the parties can agree), under the direction of the copyhold commissioners (*r*). It is also provided, that the expense of a compulsory enfranchisement shall be

(*q*) 1 Watk. Cop. 287, n. (*x*), 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, s. 6. See Ling-322; 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 92. wood v. Gyde, Law Rep., 2 C. P.

(*r*) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, ss. 1, 7; 72.

borne by that party (whether the lord or the tenant) who shall have required the same (*s*); that upon every enfranchisement (whether compulsory or voluntary) the land shall become in all respects of freehold tenure (*t*), and cease to be subject to any particular custom whatever (*u*); but that, on the other hand, no compulsory enfranchisement shall compulsorily affect any right to or in respect of mines or minerals; or any right of fair or market, or in respect of game, fish, or fowl (*x*).

(*s*) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, s. 30.
Such expenses may be charged on the manor or on the land enfranchised. (21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, s. 24.)

(*t*) See *Brabant v. Wilson*, Law

Rep., 1 Q. B. 44.

(*u*) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, s. 34.
But as to gavelkind land in *Kent*,
vide sup. p. 644, n. (*m*).

(*x*) Sect. 48.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.

AN incorporeal hereditament, which, according to the arrangement formerly laid down, now presents itself in its turn for consideration, is in its wider sense any possession or subject of property, whether real or personal, capable of being transmitted to heirs, and not the object of the bodily senses (*a*). But as there is scarcely any instance of a subject of this description in the class of things personal (*b*),—which almost invariably devolve to the executor or administrator and not to the heir,—the term of incorporeal hereditament is, in effect, exclusively applied to the class of things *real*; and may in such case be defined as a right annexed to, or issuing out of, or exercisable within, an hereditament corporeal of that class (*c*). Thus a man may have a right of common of pasture for his cattle, or a right of way (both of which are incorporeal hereditaments) to be exercised over the land (which is corporeal) of another person. [As the logicians speak, corporeal

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 170. Its definition in Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 20) is “a right issuing out of a thing corporate (whether real or personal) or concerning, or annexed to or exercisable within the same.”

(*b*) An annuity descendible to a man's heirs, is, however, an instance that occurs. (Co. Litt. 20 a.)

(*c*) Co. Litt. 6 a, 20 b; Plowd. 170. The term “incorporeal here-

ditament” has been also applied so as to include *remainders and reversions* (as distinct from *estates in possession*) in corporeal hereditaments (Hale, Anal.; 2 Sand. Us. 39); but the more convenient and juster arrangement is that adopted by Blackstone and followed in the text. The other use of the term confounds the estate which may be had in the subject of property, with the subject of property itself.

[hereditaments are the substance, which may be always seen, always handled; incorporeal hereditaments are but a sort of accidents, which inhere in and are supported by that substance; and may belong or not belong to it, without any visible alteration therein. Their existence is merely in idea and abstracted contemplation; though their effects and profits may be frequently objects of our bodily senses. And indeed if we would fix a clear notion of an incorporeal hereditament, we must be careful not to confound together the profits produced, and the thing or hereditament which produces them. Thus if we take the example of the right of feeding cattle in another's land, the grass, which is the fruit or product of the right, is doubtless of a corporeal nature; yet the right itself is a thing invisible—has only a mental existence, and cannot be delivered over from hand to hand.] Incorporeal hereditaments seem never to have been reduced to any regular system of division, nor is even a complete enumeration of them to be discovered in our books. But they consist for the most part—though, as we shall see hereafter, not exclusively—of rights *in alieno solo*; and these are generally distributable either into *profits*, such as the right to feed cattle, or to take fish; or *easements*, tending rather to the convenience than the profit of the claimant, such as a right of way (*e*).

Incorporeal hereditaments include (amongst other species not requiring specific notice) *advowsons*, *tithes*, *commons*, *ways*, *watercourses*, *lights*, *offices*, *dignities*, *franchises*, *corodies*, *pensions*, *annuities*, and *rents* (*f*). But for the

(*e*) As to this distinction, see 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71; *Robins v. Barnes*, Hob. 131; *Peers v. Lucy*, 4 Mod. 365; Jac. Dict. "Easement," "Prescription;" *Manning v. Wasdale*, 5 Ad. & El. 758, 413; *Bailey v. Appleyard*, 8 Ad. & El. 167; *Race v. Ward*, 4 Ell. & Bl. 702. In the case last cited it was held, that the

right of drawing off water from a well or spring *in alieno solo* is in the nature of an easement, and not a profit.

(*f*) 2 Bl. Com. 21. The enumeration in Hale's Analysis (p. 48), is as follows:—"Rents, services, tithes, commons, and other profits *in alieno solo*; pensions, offices,

discussion of many of these subjects, places more distinctly appropriate will be found hereafter; and therefore in the present chapter we shall direct the reader's attention to the following heads only;—*commons, ways, watercourses, lights, franchises, and rents (g).*

I. *Common* (or right of common) is a profit which a man hath in the land of another, as to pasture beasts therein, to catch fish, to dig turf, to cut wood, or the like (*h*). And the right derives its name from the community of interest which thence arises between the claimant and the owner of the soil, or between the claimant and other commoners entitled to the same right; all which parties are entitled to bring actions for injuries done to their respective interests—and that both as against strangers and against each other (*i*). There are five sorts of common—common of pasture, common of piscary, common of turbary, and common in the soil.

1. Common of pasture. This is the principal and most frequent sort, being the right which a man has to feed his beasts in another's land; and it is either *appendant, appurtenant, because of vicinage, or in gross (k).*

franchises, liberties, villeins, dignities."

(*g*) *Advowsons* and *tithes* will be more conveniently discussed as part of the general law relating to the church (vide post, bk. IV. pt. II. c. III.); *offices* and *dignities* (which indeed have in most instances no connection with the realty) will be more properly considered in that part of the work relating to the State or Government (vide post, bk. IV. pt. I. cc. IX. X.). Such notice as is due to *annuities* will be most advantageously bestowed upon them in connection with rents (vide post, p. 675): and with respect to

corodies and *pensions* it will be sufficient briefly to state here that they were both, at the common law, species of allowances in money or food, payable by religious houses to the king, their founder, for the sustenance of his servants. (See Cowell's Inter. in tit.; F. N. B. f. 230, 233; 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 16.)

(*h*) 2 Bl. Com. p. 32. As to this definition, see *Lloyd v. Earl Powis*, 4 Ell. & Bl. 485.

(*i*) For the law on this subject, see *Robert Marys's case*, 9 Rep. 113; 1 Saund. by Wms. 346.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 122.

Common of pasture *appendant* is the privilege belonging to the owners or occupiers of arable land holden of a manor, to put upon the wastes of the manor (thence called *commons*) their commonable beasts (*l*); that is, such beasts as are necessary either for the ploughing of land or for its manuring, viz., horses and oxen, cows and sheep (*m*). This is a matter of universal right (*n*); and it originally arose in this manner, that where a lord having a certain extent of waste ground, enfeoffed any one of a parcel of arable land to hold of his manor in socage, for services to be rendered, it was found necessary to allow the feoffee to have common of pasture in the waste ground, as incident to his tenancy: for he could not plough or manure his own land without beasts, nor could he on the other hand sustain the beasts upon it, while it was sown with corn (*o*). From this of course it follows, that it is only in respect of arable land that common appendant can be claimed (*p*); though it may be claimed by that name, as appendant to a farm in fact containing pasture at the present day; for the land shall be presumed (where there is usage to sustain the claim) to have been all originally arable (*q*). It follows, also, that common appendant is incapable of being created at the present day (*r*); for all manorial tenure must have had existence before the passing

(*l*) As to the waste of a manor, vide sup. p. 215.

(*m*) 37 Hen. 7, 34 (Year Book); F. N. B. 180; 4 Vin. Ab. in tit. Com. (F). It is laid down in the books, that swine, goats, geese, and the like, are not commonable animals, as "not being necessary to "plough or compost the soil."—(Bro. Ab. tit. Com. 13; Fin. Law, 56; Co. Litt. 122 a.)

(*n*) 1 Rol. Ab. 396, l. 44; Co. Litt. 122 a. It is said by Black-

stone (vol. ii. p. 33) to obtain in Sweden and the other northern kingdoms, much in the same manner as in England. And he cites Stiernh. de Jure Suevor. l. 2, c. 6.

(*o*) Tyringham's case, 4 Rep. 37 a; Co. Litt. 122 a; Bennett v. Reeve, Willes, 231; Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. i. p. 262.

(*p*) 1 Rol. Ab. 397, l. 28, 29.

(*q*) Bac. Ab. Common, (A. 1).

(*r*) 1 Rol. Ab. 396, l. 42; 26 Hen. 8, 4 a.

of the statute of *Quia emptores*, in the eighteenth year of Edward the first (*s*).

Common *appurtenant*, which is said to be frequently confounded with common appendant (*t*), ariseth from no connection of tenure, nor from any absolute necessity; but may be annexed to lands in other lordships, or extend to other beasts besides such as are generally commonable (*u*); as to hogs, goats, geese or the like (*x*). This, not arising from any natural propriety or necessity, like common appendant, is not therefore of general right, but can only be claimed by grant, or by the long usage of particular persons to enjoy the same (*y*); which latter title is commonly called a title by prescription; and is supposed by the law to be founded on a special grant or agreement originally made for this purpose.

[Common *because of vicinage*, or neighbourhood, is where the inhabitants of two townships, which lie contiguous to each other, have usually intercommoned with one another; the beasts of the one straying naturally into the other's fields, without any molestation from either. This, indeed, is only a permissive right, intended to excuse what in strictness is a trespass in both, and to prevent a multiplicity of suits; and therefore either township may inclose and bar out the other, though they have intercommoned time out of mind. Neither hath any person of one town a right to put his beasts originally into the other's common; but if they escape and stray thither of themselves, the law winks at the trespass (*z*).] In close connection with this, and substantially of the same kind, is the right described in the books as *common*

(*s*) Vide sup. p. 234.

(*t*) *Bennett v. Reeve*, Willes, 232.

(*u*) *Sacheverill v. Porter*, Cro. Car. 482; 1 W. Jones, 397, S. C.

(*x*) Vide sup. p. 650, *u.* (*m*).

(*y*) *Tyringham's case*, 4 Rep.

36 b; *Cowlan v. Slack*, 15 East, 108; as to title by prescription, vide post, p. 683, where it will be explained *what* length of usage is sufficient to create a prescription.

(*z*) Co. Litt. 122 a. As to com-

of *shack*—or the right of persons occupying lands, lying together in the same common field, to turn out their cattle after harvest to feed promiscuously in that field (*a*). Indeed, this kind of common, which in the beginning was but in the nature of a pasture “because of vicinage,” and founded on the same reason (*b*), has now long since in many parts of the country insensibly changed its nature; and become, by the force of custom, a right so fixed, that even though the owner of any particular parcel should assume, merely on his own authority, to inclose his land in severalty, it would still continue subject to the antient rights of the intercommoners (*c*). In a case like this (which is of familiar occurrence in parts of the country where the land still lies in open field), the right would seem to be properly classed under the head of *common appurtenant* (*d*).

Common *in gross*, or at large, is such as is neither appendant nor appurtenant to land, but is annexed to a man’s person, being granted to him and his heirs by deed; or it may be claimed by prescriptive right,—as by a parson of a church, or the like corporation sole (*e*). This is a separate inheritance, entirely distinct from any other landed property vested in the person to whom the common right belongs.

Common of pasture, of whatever kind, may, in respect of time, be either limited or unlimited; that is, may either be confined to particular seasons of the year, or last all the year round (*f*). As to the number of beasts to be turned on, the right is in general subject to restriction; for all commons (except those in gross) must be either

mon *pur cause de vicinage*, see *Heath v. Elliott*, 4 Bing. N. C. 388; and *Jones v. Robin*, 10 Q. B. 581.

(*a*) *Corbet’s case*, 7 Rep. 5; *Cheesman v. Hardham*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 710.

(*b*) *Corbet’s case*, *ubi sup.*

(*c*) *Ibid.*,

(*d*) Lord Coke says, “it is by custom altered into the nature of common appendant or appurtenant.” (*Corbet’s case*, *ubi sup.*)

(*e*) 2 Bl. Com. 34.

(*f*) Bl. Com., *ubi sup.*

claimed in respect of some number in particular, or at least in such manner as tends to limit the number, or for all cattle *levant* and *couchant* on the land to which the common is appendant or appurtenant; that is, for so many as the land is capable of maintaining during the winter. And a claim subject to no limitation of either kind, (except perhaps in the case where an express grant to that effect could be shown,) would be void (*g*). But with respect to a common in gross, it would seem that it may be either limited to a particular number, or be absolutely unlimited; which is called a common *without stint*, or *sans nombre* (*h*).

2, 3. Common of *piscary* is a liberty of fishing in another man's water—as common of *turbary* is a liberty of digging turf upon another man's ground (*i*). And with respect to common of turbary, in particular, it may be remarked that, like common of pasture, it may be either by grant or prescription; and may be either appurtenant or in gross; but it is usually claimed as appurtenant, and by prescription; and as to a common of turbary of this kind, we may notice that it cannot be claimed as appurtenant to land, but only to a house (*j*); and it authorizes not the taking of turf except for the purpose of using the same as fuel in the particular house to which the right is annexed (*k*).

(*g*) 1 Saund. by Wms. 28 b, n. (4); Bennett *v.* Reeve, Willes, 231; Benson *v.* Chester, 8 T. R. 396; Cheesman *v.* Hardham, 1 Barn. & Ald. 711. As to the number of beasts which may be turned on because of vicinage, see Corbet's case, 7 Rep. 5.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 122 a; How *v.* Strode, 2 Wils. 274; 3 Bl. C. 237, 239. It has been denied that even a common in gross can be *sans nombre*, 1 Saund. 346. But see Co. Litt. by Harg. ubi sup. n. (5). We may

observe here, that the term *sans nombre* is sometimes applied to the case of common for cattle *levant* and *couchant*, 1 Saund. by Wms. 28 b, n. (4). But this is not the sense in which it is used by Lord Coke.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 122; Wilson *v.* Willes, 7 East, 121. See Peardon *v.* Underhill and others, 20 L. J., (Q. B.) 133.

(*j*) Tyringham's case, 4 Rep. 37 a.

(*k*) Valentine *v.* Penny, Noy, 145.

4. [Common of *estovers* or *estouviers* (from *estoffer*, to furnish), is a liberty of taking *necessary* wood for the use or furniture of a house or farm from off another's estate (*l*); and it may be claimed, like common of pasture, either by grant or prescription.

These several species of common, when originally established in our law, had all reference, no doubt, to the same object as common of pasture, viz. the maintenance and carrying on of husbandry; common of piscary being given for the sustenance of the tenant's family; common of turbary for his fuel; and common of estovers for repairing his house, his instruments of tillage, and the necessary fences of his grounds.

5. In addition to the above-mentioned rights of common, there is also common *in the soil*; which consists of the right of digging for coals, minerals, stones and the like (*m*); and this last species, and common of turbary, bear a resemblance to common of *pasture* in many respects, though in one point they go much further: common of pasture being only a right of feeding on the herbage and vesture of the soil, which renews annually, while common of turbary, and of digging for coals, and the like, are a right of carrying away the very soil itself.

By the Statute of Merton (20 Hen. III. c. 4), the lord of a manor may inclose against common *of pasture* (*n*), though not in general against common of estovers or of turbary (*o*), so much of the waste as he pleases, for tillage or wood ground—provided he leaves common sufficient for such as are entitled thereto (*p*). This enclosure,

(*l*) As to *estovers*, vide sup. p. 256.

(*m*) Co. Litt. 41 b, 122 a; and see Cooke on the Law of Rights of Commons, pp. 8, 37 (2nd edit.).

(*n*) And see 13 Edw. 1, c. 46; 29 Geo. 2, c. 36; 31 Geo. 2, c. 41; 10 Geo. 3, c. 42; see also 13 Geo. 3, c. 81, for regulation, by the com-

moners, of the mode of enjoying their common rights.

(*o*) 2 Inst. 87; Bateson v. Green, 5 T. R. 416; 1 Saund. by Wms. & Pat. 353 b, n. (*b*); Arlett v. Ellis, 7 Barn. & Cress. 369.

(*p*) Arlett v. Ellis, ubi sup.; see Patrick v. Stubbs, 9 Mee. & W. 833; Lake v. Plaxton, 10 Exch. 196;

[when justifiable, is called in law “approving,” an antient expression, signifying the same as “improving” (*q*).] And this right is considered as applying equally to any owner of the waste, though he may not fall within the description of lord of the manor (*r*).

But the inclosure of common fields and waste lands, and the consequent extinction of common rights therein, are objects of so much importance to agricultural improvement, that they have not been left in modern times to depend on this antient statute; but have been extended very generally, throughout entire manors and parishes in almost every part of the kingdom, by force of local acts of parliament, passed from time to time for the purpose. And in aid of this practice was passed the statute 41 Geo. III. c. 109, which consolidated a number of regulations, and made them applicable to every case of local inclosure, so far as the particular Act, under which the proceeding took place, contained no provision to the contrary (*s*).

It is not, however, by force of local Acts, or of the regulations contained in 41 Geo. III. c. 109, thus connected with them, that an improvement of this description is now effected; but they are carried on under general provisions for facilitating inclosure which have been lately introduced by the legislature, to enable parties to avoid the expense and delay of obtaining a local Act for the purpose of each particular case. The chief statute now in force on this subject is the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118 (*t*); by which—after reciting

Smith *v.* Brownlow, Law Rep., 9 Eq. Ca. 241; Warrick *v.* Queen’s Coll. Oxford, ib. 10 Eq. Ca. 105.

(*q*) 2 Inst. 474.

(*r*) Glover *v.* Lane, 3 T. R. 445.

(*s*) As to the construction of this statute (often spoken of as The General Inclosure Act), see Doe *v.* Spencer, 2 Exch. 692.

(*t*) This Act (known as the Inclosure Commission Act) has been

amended by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 70; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 111; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 99; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 83; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 53; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 79; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 97; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 31; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 43. The Inclosure Commission Act was in substitution of a prior statute, the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 115, as to which see Cooke on Inclosures, p. 76.

that “it is expedient to facilitate the inclosure and improvement of commons and other lands, subject to rights of property which obstruct cultivation and the productive employment of labour; and to facilitate such exchanges of lands, and such divisions of lands intermixed or divided into inconvenient parcels, as may be beneficial to the respective owners; and to provide remedies for the defective or incomplete execution, and for the non-execution, of powers created by general and local Acts of inclosure, and to authorize the revival of such powers in certain cases”—an extensive and elaborate system of regulations is accordingly laid down in reference to these several purposes (*u*). We can attempt no more, however, in this place, than to give a summary statement of its general principle; which is to establish a board of commissioners, under the denomination of “The Inclosure Commissioners for England and Wales” (*x*), who are empowered—on the application of persons interested to the amount of one-third of the value of the lands subject to be inclosed (*y*), and

(*u*) As to *exchanges* and *partitions* of lands under the provisions of the Inclosure Acts, see 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, s. 147; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 70, s. 9; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 99, ss. 13, 14; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 83, s. 7; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 97, ss. 2, 3; and 20 & 21 Vict. c. 31, ss. 4–11. It is to be observed that both an exchange and a partition may now, under these Acts, take place on the application of parties interested, even in cases where no proceedings for an *inclosure* are pending, or where the lands are not subject to be inclosed. On the construction of the provisions of these Acts relative to *exchanges*, see *Minet v. Leman*, 24 L. J., Ch. 545.

(*x*) As to the board of which these commissioners form part, vide *sup.* p. 643, n. (*h*).

(*y*) As to the persons deemed “*interested*” within the meaning of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, see sect. 16 of that Act. As to the description of lands *subject to be inclosed* it is given in the 11th section as follows:—“All lands subject to any right of common whatever, and whether such rights may be exercised at all times, or only at limited times and seasons; or subject to any suspensions or restrictions in respect of the time of enjoyment: all gated and stinted pastures in which the property of the soil either is or is not in the owners of the cattle or other gates or stints; all land held, occupied or used in common, either at all times or during any time or season, or periodically, and either for all purposes or for any limited purpose, and whether the separate parcels of the

provided the consent of persons interested to the amount of two-thirds of the value of the land, and of the lord of the manor (in case the lands be waste of a manor), be ultimately obtained,—to inquire into the case, and to report for the information of parliament in reference to the expediency of making such inclosure. And if thereon an Act be passed to the effect that such inclosure be proceeded with, the allotment and inclosure of the lands take place accordingly, —the proceedings being conducted by the aid of a *valuer* appointed for the purpose, and under the superintendence of the inclosure commissioners (z).

The 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, further declares, that immediately after such allotment and inclosure of the lands shall have been made, or from such other time as shall be fixed after proper notice, the common or other rights, which it is the object of the inclosure to commute, shall be *extinguished* accordingly; and it directs that copies of the award (which is under the seal of the inclosure commissioners) shall be deposited with the clerk of the peace for the county, and also with the churchwardens of the parish, so that recourse thereto may be freely had by any person interested in the premises (a).

several owners of the soil shall or shall not be known by metes or bounds, or be otherwise distinguishable; all land in which the property or right to the vesture or herbage, or any part thereof, during the whole or any part of the year, or to the wood or underwood growing thereon, is separated from the property of the soil; and all lot meadows and other lands, the occupation or enjoyment of the separate lots or parcels of which is subject to interchange among the respective owners in any known course of rotation or otherwise." Moreover, by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 99, s. 1, a party interested in any land not otherwise subject to a pro-

posed inclosure, may nevertheless submit it, upon terms, to the operation of such inclosure; which shall be extended to it accordingly, if the commissioners think that course beneficial. And by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 97, s. 3, the word "land" in the Inclosure Acts shall extend to incorporeal as well as corporeal hereditaments, and any undivided share thereof.

(z) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, ss. 32, 33; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 79, s. 1. For the form of an Act, upon the general *annual* report of the commissioners or upon a *special* report, see 25 & 26 Vict. cc. 47, 94.

(a) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, s. 146.

II. A second species of incorporeal hereditaments is that of *ways*, or the right of going over another man's ground. We speak not here of *highways*, which are common to the public, and which consequently belong to the division of public and not of private rights (*b*); but of *private ways*, in which one man may have an interest and a right, though another be owner of the soil. Such ways may be grounded on actual grant; as when the owner of land grants, by deed, to another man the liberty of passing over it to go to church, to market, or the like (*c*): or they may be by prescription; as if all the owners and occupiers of such a farm have long used to cross such a ground for such a particular purpose (*d*): or by custom; as if a similar practice has obtained with respect to all the inhabitants of a certain hamlet (*e*); for this antient usage supposes an original grant, whereby a right of way was originally created. And upon whichever of these titles the right may stand, it is capable, like that of common, of being either *appurtenant* to some particular house or land, or *in gross*, and annexed to the person of the grantee. A right of way may also arise by necessity. Thus if a man grants me a piece of ground in the middle of his field, he at the same time tacitly and impliedly gives me a way to come at it (*f*); for that is necessary to its enjoyment (*g*); and I may cross his land for that purpose, without trespass (*h*). In like manner a tenant at will shall, after

(*b*) As to highways, vide bk. VI. pt. III.

(*c*) Unless the grant be by deed, it would be a mere revocable permission. (See *Wood v. Leadbitter*, 13 Mee. & W. 838.)

(*d*) As to title by prescription, vide post, p. 684.

(*e*) 2 Bl. Com. 35.

(*f*) See *Clark v. Cogge*, Cro. Jac. 170; *Dutton v. Tayler*, 2 Lutw. 1487; *Howton v. Frearson*, 8 T. R.

50; *Morris v. Edgington*, 3 Taunt. 24; *Bullard v. Harrison*, 4 Mau. & Sel. 392; *Hinchliffe v. Lord Kinnoul*, 5 Bing. N. C. 24, 25; *Allan v. Gomme*, 11 A. & E. 759; *Henning v. Burnet*, 8 Exch. 187; *Skull v. Glenister*, 16 C. B., N. S. 81.

(*g*) See *Pomfret v. Ricroft*, 1 Wms. Saund. 321, n. 6; *Gayford v. Moffatt*, Law Rep., 4 Ch. App. 133.

(*h*) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 36) adds that "by the Law of the Twelve

the determination of his interest by the lessor, have free entry, egress and regress into the land, in order to cut and carry away the emblements; for when the law gives a right, it gives everything necessary to its exercise (*i*).

III. *Watercourses* are also a species of incorporeal hereditament. A watercourse may be defined, generally, as the right which a man may have to the benefit of the flow of a river or stream; and such right most commonly refers to a stream passing through his own land the banks of which belong either to himself on both sides, or to himself on one side, and to his neighbour on the other (*h*): in which latter case,—unless the stream be navigable, for then the bed of it, so far at least as the tide of the sea flows, presumably belongs to the crown (*l*),—the proprietor of each bank is considered as *primâ facie* the proprietor also of half the land covered by the stream; that is, *usque flum aquæ* (*m*). In either case, however, we are to remark, that a watercourse is distinguishable from the right of merely using the water upon the soil, which is incident as of course to the property in the soil itself. For it consists in having the course of the stream kept free from any interruption or disturbance to the prejudice of the proprietor, by the acts of persons from without and in parts not within his own territory,—whether owing to a diversion of the water, or its obstruction, or pollution by offensive commixture. This right belongs *primâ facie* to

“Tables at Rome, where a man had the right of way over another’s land and the road was out of repair, he who had the right of way might go over any part of the land he pleased, which was the established rule in public as well as private ways. And the law of England in both cases seems to correspond with the Roman.” But see *Taylor v. Whitehead*, Doug. 745.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 55 a, 56 a. As to emblements, vide sup. pp. 258, 288.

(*h*) See *Wright v. Williams*, 1 Tyr. & Gran. 398; *Wood v. Waud*, 3 Exch. 748.

(*l*) *Williams v. Wilcox*, 8 Ad. & El. 333.

(*m*) Hale, de Jure Maris, part i. c. 1; *Wright v. Howard*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 190; 2 Rol. Ab. 170.

every occupier of land over which a stream passes (*n*); for though running water, air and light are all *publici juris*, yet to a certain extent they are subject (as before shown) to appropriation by force of an actual occupancy (*o*); and he who is in possession of any soil, is *primâ facie* in possession also of the free course of the streams which flow over its surface (*p*). But the right may be divested by express agreement between the parties interested; or by long usage, which is evidence of some antient agreement of that description. And therefore my general claim to have the water of such a stream flowing freely and without disturbance over my land, may be successfully opposed by my neighbour, if he can prove that, by some grant of mine or of my ancestors, he is authorized to keep up a mill or the like, and thereby to cause an obstruction of the stream—or if he can establish a title by long usage to do so. He has then by grant or by prescription (*q*) a water-course for such special purpose; to which the general right I might otherwise have had by occupancy has become subordinate (*r*).

IV. *Lights* also are a species of incorporeal hereditaments (*s*); the term being used to express a man's right to

(*n*) *Shury v. Piggott*, 3 Bulst. 340. See *Embrey v. Owen*, 6 Exch. 369.

(*o*) *Canham v. Fisk*, 2 Tyr. 166; vide sup. p. 155.

(*p*) It is to be observed, that the doctrines laid down in the text as to watercourses apply only to *surface* streams or rivers. As to wells, or springs beneath the ground, see *Wood v. Wand*, 3 Exch. 748; *Race v. Ward*, 4 Ell. & Bl. 702; *Chase-more v. Richards*, 2 H. & N. 168.

(*q*) As to the title by prescription, vide post, p. 684.

(*r*) See *Mason v. Hill*, 3 Barn. & Adol. 304; 3 Barn. & Adol. 1, and the cases there cited, where (it is

conceived) sufficient authority for the positions in the text on this somewhat obscure subject will be found. See also *Sampson v. Hoddinott*, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 590.

(*s*) As to "lights," see *Aldred's* case, 9 Rep. 58 b; *Cross v. Lewis*, 2 Barn. & Cress. 686; *Moore v. Rawson*, 3 Barn. & Cress. 332; *Garrit v. Sharp*, 3 Ad. & El. 325; *Hutchinson v. Copestake*, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 102; 9 C. B. (N. S.) 863; *Jones v. Tapling*, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 283; 12 C. B. (N. S.) 826; *Clarke v. Clark*, Law Rep., 1 Ch. Ap. 16; *Yates v. Jack*, ib. p. 295; *Dent v. Auction Mart*, ib. 2 Eq. Ca. 238; *Lanfranchi v. Mackenzie*,

have the access of the sun's rays to his windows, free from any obstruction by the occupier of adjoining land. The element of light, like that of water, is capable to a certain extent of appropriation by mere occupancy—for a man on his own land has a right to all the light which will come to him; and may erect a house (even at the boundary line of his property, and so as to overlook his neighbour) with as many windows as he pleases (*t*). And by force of a grant, or prescription, he may become entitled to maintain these windows in freedom from all obstruction (*u*). But on the other hand, in the absence of any grant, and before the period has elapsed which suffices for the establishment of a prescriptive claim, it is competent to the owner of the adjoining land in his turn to construct a wall or house on it, so near to the building erected by his neighbour, as to intercept the light, which it would otherwise have received; for his right to erect edifices on any part of his own soil, is as clear as that of the first builder (*x*).

V. [*Franchises* are a fifth species of incorporeal hereditaments. Franchise and liberty are used as synonymous terms; and their definition is a royal privilege, or branch of the crown's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of the subject (*y*). Being therefore derived from the

Law Rep., 4 Eq. Ca. 421; Heath v. Bucknall, ib. 8 Eq. Ca. 1; Courtauld v. Legh, ib. 4 Exch. 126. See also as to the former custom of *London* with respect to lights, Shadwell v. Hutchinson, 2 Barn. & Adol. 97; Wynstanly v. Lee, 2 Swanst. 333; Salters' Company v. Jay, 3 Q. B. 109; Cooper v. Hubbock, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 456; Yates v. Jack, ubi sup.

(*t*) Per Bayley and Holroyd, Js., Cross v. Lewis, 2 Barn. & Cress. 689; 691; per Littledale, J., Moore v. Rawson, 3 Barn. & Cress. 340; and

see Chandler v. Thompson, 3 Camp. 82.

(*u*) Blanchard v. Bridges, 4 Ad. & El. 195; Swansborough v. Coventry, 9 Bing. 305. As to the title by prescription in the case of lights, and the length of time which suffices for its establishment, vide post, p. 691.

(*x*) Blanchard v. Bridges, ubi sup. Per Littledale, J., Moore v. Rawson, ubi sup.

(*y*) Finch, L. 164. The definition by Finch can only be said to

[crown, they must arise from royal grant; or in some cases may be held by prescription, which, as has been frequently said, presupposes a grant (*z*). The kinds of them are various and almost infinite; we will here mention some of the principal, premising only that they may be vested in either natural persons or bodies politic; in one man or in many; but the same identical franchise that has before been granted to one, cannot be bestowed on another, for that would prejudice a former grant (*a*).

To be a county palatine is a franchise vested in a number of persons (*b*). It is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be incorporated, and subsist as a body politic, with a power to maintain perpetual succession, and do other corporate acts; and each individual member of such corporation is also said to have a franchise or freedom.] So there may be a franchise to have a bailiwick or liberty exempt from the sheriff of the county, wherein the grantee only and his officers are to execute all process (*c*): and other franchises there are which are frequently annexed to *manors* (*d*); as for a man to hold a court leet, in certain cases, among the tenants and residents of his manor (*e*). So there may be a franchise to have waifs, wrecks, estrays, treasure-trove, royal fish, and forfeitures (*f*); the nature of which will more particularly appear when we come to speak of the crown's prerogative (*g*): to have a fair, market, ferry, or the like,—with

apply to such franchises as are connected with the *realty*. The word is used also in a different sense, as in the expression "parliamentary franchise," where it imports only the right to vote at the election of a member of parliament.

(*z*) Co. Litt. 114 a.

(*a*) 2 Roll. Ab. 191; Keilw. 196.

(*b*) As to counties palatine, vide sup. p. 129.

(*c*) See 13 & 14 Vict. c. 105, for facilitating the union of liberties

with the counties in which they are situate; and 21 Vict. c. 22, abolishing certain franchise prisons.

(*d*) As to manors, vide sup. p. 214.

(*e*) As to a court leet, vide post, bk. VI. c. XIV.

(*f*) Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 37) adds "deodands" to these instances of franchises; but by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 62, deodands are abolished. As to their nature, vide post, bk. IV. pt. I. c. VII.

(*g*) Vide post, bk. IV. pt. I. c. VI.

the right of taking toll there (*h*): or to have forest, chase, park, warren, or fishery. Among these there are many which belong, in point of arrangement, to other parts of the present treatise; but to others more particular notice is due in this place.

1. And, first, as to fairs, markets, and ferries. A man may have a right to hold a fair or market, or to keep a boat for the ferrying of passengers; and this either by act of parliament, royal grant, or by prescription (*i*). But no other title than these will suffice; for no fair, market or ferry can be lawfully set up without licence from the crown (*h*). On the other hand, a man may, under such titles, lawfully claim to be lord of a fair or market, though he be not the owner of the soil on which it is held (*l*); or to be the proprietor of a ferry (*m*), though he be not the owner either of the water over which it is exercised (*n*), or of the soil on either side of the river (*o*); but, in such cases, he must possess over the soil such rights, at least, as

(*h*) As to the tolls or fairs or markets belonging to the *crown*, see 15 & 16 Vict. c. 62, s. 6.

(*i*) 2 Inst. 220; *Trotter v. Harris*, 2 Y. & J. 285. Fairs and markets are often regulated by act of parliament; and see 10 & 11 Vict. c. 14 (called "The Markets and Fairs Clauses Act, 1847"), consolidating into one statute certain provisions usually inserted in such acts of regulation. As to days of holding fairs and markets, see 27 Hen. 6, c. 5; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 23, and 36 & 37 Vict. c. 37. As to Greenwich market, see 12 & 13 Vict. c. 28. As to a metropolitan market in lieu of Smithfield, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 61. As to preventing unlawful fairs in the metropolitan police district, see 31 & 32 Vict. c. 106. It may be here remarked that by a recent act of parliament (34 & 35 Vict. c. 12),

the Secretary of State may on the representation of the magistrates of the district, and with the previous consent in writing of the owner of the fair for the time being, order that any particular fair shall be abolished.

(*h*) 2 Inst. 220; *R. v. Marsden*, 3 Burr. 1812; Willes, 512, (n.); Com. Dig. Piscary, B.; Hale, *de Jure Maris*, part i. c. 2.

(*l*) Bac. Ab. Fairs, &c. D. n. (*a*); *Mayor of Northampton v. Ward*, 2 Stra. 1238; 1 Wils. 107; but see per Littledale, J., *R. v. Starkey*, 7 Ad. & E. 106.

(*m*) See *Newton v. Cubitt*, 12 C. B., N. S. 32. As to antient ferries, see also *Letton v. Goodden*, Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 123.

(*n*) Com. Dig. in tit. Piscary, B.

(*o*) *Peter v. Kendal*, 6 B. & C. 703.

will authorize him to embark and disembark his passengers thereon (*p*). The right to take toll, also, from the customers, is usually—though in the case of a fair or market not necessarily—a part of the privilege (*q*); and the tolls of a fair or market are due either in respect of goods sold there (that is, from the seller, not the buyer), or for stallage or pickage, or the like, in respect of stalls or poles fixed in the soil (*r*). But the right of the crown to authorize the collection of tolls is viewed by the law with a salutary jealousy; so that no burthen of that kind can be imposed on the public, unless it have (in the language of the books) a reasonable commencement (*s*); that is, unless it be founded on an adequate consideration as between the public and the grantee: which consideration, in the case of a fair or market, is the duty incumbent on the grantee to provide ground for the purpose, and to regulate the proceedings; in that of a ferry, to keep up a boat for the passage over a stream not otherwise fordable (*t*). And it is also essential that the burthen be reasonable in its amount (*u*); for where the tolls granted are outrageous, the franchise is illegal and void (*x*). It is however to be remarked, that, when any of the privileges in question can be shown to exist, the party entitled to it has a right of action, not only against those who refuse or evade payment of toll where it is due, but against those also who disturb his franchise by setting up a new fair, market or ferry, so near to his as to diminish his custom (*y*);

(*p*) *Peter v. Kendal*, 6 B. & C. 703.

(*q*) *Heddy v. Wheelhouse*, Cro. Eliz. 558, 592; *Lord Egremont v. Saul*, 6 Ad. & El. 924; *R. v. Starkey*, 7 Ad. & El. 106.

(*r*) 2 Inst. 219.

(*s*) 2 Bl. Com. 37; *Mayor of Nottingham v. Lambert*, Willes, 116.

(*t*) *Heddy v. Wheelhouse*, ubi sup.

(*u*) *Ibid.*; 2 Inst. 219.

(*x*) Stat. 1 Westm. c. 31; 2 Inst. 219; Cro. Eliz. ubi sup.; 2 Bl. Com. 37; Willes, ubi sup.

(*y*) 2 Roll. Ab. 140; Com. Dig. Action on the Case for a Nuisance, (A); *Blisset v. Hart*, Willes, 503; *De Rutzen v. Lloyd*, 5 Ad. & El. 456; *Bridgland v. Shapter*, 5 Mee. & W. 375; *Pim v. Curell*, 6 Mee. & W. 234.

while on the other hand he is himself liable to be criminally indicted, if by his wilful act, or even by his neglect of duty, the subjects of the realm are obstructed in its lawful use (*z*).

2. As to the franchises of forest, chase, park, warren, and fishery.

A *forest* (in the legal sense) is the right of keeping, for the purpose of venary and hunting, the wild beasts and fowls of forest, chase, park, and warren, (which means in effect all animals pursued in field sports,) in a certain territory or precinct of woody ground or pasture set apart for the purpose; with laws and officers of its own, established for protection of the game (*a*). It is a principle of our law, that will be noticed more fully in its proper place that in general no man can make title to animals *feræ naturæ*—for these, while they remain wild, are accounted *nullius in bonis*, or (what amounts to the same thing) as the common property of mankind. From this it results, that, though a man may take or kill on his own lands any particular animals *feræ naturæ*, that may happen to be found there (subject to the restrictions imposed by the Game Acts), and so that he invade not any exclusive franchise of sporting, which another person may possess over the same territory (*b*),—yet he is not at liberty to

(*z*) Willes, 512, (n.); *Payne v. Partridge*, 1 Show. 231.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 233 a; Manwood, *Forest Laws*, 41, 52, edit. 1665.

(*b*) *Case of Monopolies*, 11 Rep. 87 b. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 415) supposed that the Norman race of kings introduced the doctrine, that the right of pursuing and taking beasts of venary belongs in every case to the sovereign only, or those by him authorized; and he considered this as a still existing doctrine of our law, and held that (however common the contrary sup-

position might be) no private person was entitled at common law to kill game, unless he could show a right of freewarren. But Blackstone's views on this subject have been with reason controverted; and the true rule seems always to have been that which is stated by himself, as allowed among the Saxons, viz., that in general every man has a right to hunt, &c. on his own grounds (see Wilk. Leg. Angl. Sax. LL. Can. c. 77)—a right, however, that is subject to such modification as mentioned in the text. See Chit.

confine beasts of venary in a wild state within a particular precinct, for the mere purpose of diversion (even though on his own soil); for this is in some sense to appropriate what belongs equally to others, and is in the nature of an unlawful monopoly (*e*). Such at least was the principle of the antient law, which appears in this particular to remain unaltered; though by a distinction introduced in comparatively modern times, some kinds of animals *feræ naturæ*, such as deer, rabbits, and the like, may be lawfully kept by any person in an enclosed place, if preserved as *property*, and not merely for the purpose of the chase (*f*). But the right to keep up animals in a wild state for mere diversion, though forbidden to the subject, has been at all times claimed, as a matter of prerogative, by the sovereign. [For we find, that even among the Saxons there were woody and desert tracts called the forests, which, having never been disposed of in the first distribution of lands, were held therefore to belong to the crown; and that these were filled with great plenty of game, which our royal sportsmen reserved for their own diversion, on pain of a pecuniary forfeiture for such as interfered with their sovereign. But every freeholder had the full liberty of sporting upon his own territories, provided he abstained from the king's forests, as is fully explained in the laws of Canute (*g*); which indeed was the antient law of the Scandinavian continent (*h*), from whence Canute probably derived it (*i*).] Afterwards,

Game Laws, 3; 11 Rep. 87 b; Ld. Raym. 251; Salk. 555; Lord Dacre v. Tebb, 2 Bl. Rep. 1151; et post, bk. II. pt. II. c. II.

(*e*) None can make a park, chase, or warren, without the king's licence: for that is, *quodammodo*, to appropriate those creatures which are *feræ naturæ*, and *nullius in bonis*, and to restrain them of their natural liberty; Case of Monopolies, 11 Rep. 87 b; and see *ibid.* 86 a;

2 Rol. Ab. 33, 812; 2 Inst. 199; Com. Dig. Chase, (D).

(*f*) See *Davies v. Powell*, Willes, 48; *Morgan v. Abergavenny*, 8 C. B. 768.

(*g*) Wilk. Leg. Angl. Sax. LL. Can. c. 77.

(*h*) "*Cuique in proprio fundo quamlibet feram quoquo modo venari permissum.*"—Stiernhook, de Jure Sueon. l. 2, c. 8.

(*i*) 2 Bl. Com. 415.

upon the Conquest, the Norman race of sovereigns exceeded even their predecessors in the eager enjoyment of this branch of the prerogative; for not only did they extend the limits of the antient forests, by encroachment on the lands of their subjects, and lay out new ones at their pleasure, without regard to the rights of private property (*h*); but they established a particular system of *forest law* (*l*), under colour of which the most horrid tyrannies and oppressions were exercised (*m*): so that our ancestors at length became as zealous for its reformation, as for the relaxation of the feudal rigours and other exactions introduced by the Norman family; and struggled for the *Charta de Forestâ*, as strenuously as for the Great Charter itself (*n*). By this forest charter, confirmed in parliament in the ninth year of Henry the third (*o*), many forests unlawfully made (or at least many precincts added by unlawful encroachment to the antient ones) were *disafforested*, so as to remit to the former owners their rights (*p*),—though in the case of such precincts, called thenceforward *purlieus*, the crown still continued to exercise some of its privileges (*q*),—while in the forests that remained entire many abuses were reformed or mitigated. And owing to the variety of statutes afterwards made for amelioration of the forest laws, and above all to the entire

(*h*) Manw. 319; 4 Inst. 300, 301.

(*l*) 1 Hist. Eng. Law, by Reeves, 206.

(*m*) "The penalty for killing a stag or boar was loss of eyes—for William loved the great game," says the Saxon Chronicles, "as if he had been their father."—Hallam's Mid. Ages, vol. ii. p. 426, 7th edit.

(*n*) 2 Bl. Com. 416.

(*o*) Its clauses had been previously incorporated in the Great Charter of John, granted at Runny-

mede. Hallam's Mid. Ages, vol. iii. p. 222, n., 7th edit.

(*p*) Hist. of Eng. Law, by Reeves, vol. i. p. 254. This charter is considered by Lord Coke as only a declaratory law; and he holds that the king could never make forests in the land of his subjects, without their consent. (4 Inst. 300.)

(*q*) 4 Inst. 303, 304; Com. Dig. Chase, 1. Purlieu is variously derived from *pur lieu* (exempt place), 4 Inst. ubi sup.; or *pourallée*, perambulation, Com. Dig. Chase, (I. 1).

disuse of them for centuries past by our sovereigns (*r*), this branch of the prerogative has long ceased to be a grievance to the subject (*s*). Some of the royal forests however still exist (*t*); and with some few exceptions, such as the New Forest in Hampshire, founded by the Conqueror, that of Windsor by Henry the eighth, and that of Richmond by Charles the first (*u*), are of such remote antiquity, that no trace is said to remain in history of their first creation (*x*).

Though a forest is in general a royal possession, we are nevertheless to observe that it is capable of being vested in a subject (*y*); for if the sovereign grant a forest to a private person, with words expressly authorizing the administration of forest law there, the grantee will have that franchise to its full extent, with all the appropriate courts

(*r*) An attempt to revive them was made by Charles the first, and courts were held by the chief justice in cyre, for recovery of the king's forestal's rights (Hallam's Const. Hist. vol. ii. p. 13); but by 16 Car. 1, c. 16, the extent of the royal forests is now fixed according to their boundaries in the twentieth year of James the first; and no place is to be hereafter accounted forest, where forest courts had not been held within sixty years before the first year of the reign of Charles the first.

(*s*) 2 Bl. Com. 416.

(*t*) See 12 & 13 Vict. c. 81 (amended by 34 & 35 Vict. c. 93, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 95, and 36 Vict. c. 5), authorizing a commission to inquire into rights or claims over the New Forest and Waltham (Epping) Forest; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 43, for disafforesting the forest of Hainault; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 76, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 19, and 17 & 18 Vict.

c. 49, as to her Majesty's rights in the New Forest; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 36, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 32, as to disafforesting the forest of Whichwood; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 42, as to disafforesting the forest of Whittlewood; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 46, as to disafforesting the forest of Woolmer; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 13, for management of lands of her Majesty within the late forest of Delamere; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 37, as to commonable lands within the forest of Hainault; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 40, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 70, and 34 & 35 Vict. c. 85, as to the forest of Dean and the mines and quarries therein.

(*u*) As to Richmond Park, see Hallam's Const. Hist. vol. ii. p. 14, n., 3rd edit.

(*x*) See 4 Inst. 319, where it is said that the forests in England are in number sixty-nine; see also as to the antiquity of the forests, 4 Inst. 293, 294.

(*y*) Co. Litt. 233 a.

and officers (*z*). It is also to be remarked, that a forest is a right which the owner thereof (whether sovereign or subject) may have either in his own lands or the lands of another (*a*): and in this respect it differs from a right of common, and the other incorporeal hereditaments above described; for these, as they issue out of the soil, cannot exist in the same man who is general owner of the soil itself, (the latter title superseding all inferior claims like these,) and are consequently rights which a man can claim to exercise only *in alieno solo* (*b*); but a forest, and indeed all franchises in general, are inheritances collateral to the ownership of the land (*c*), and may be claimed by a man either *in proprio solo* or *in alieno* (*d*). The owner of a forest is also considered (notwithstanding the general rule that title cannot be made to things *feræ naturæ*) as having a qualified property in the wild animals of chase and venary there found, so long as they continue therein; and no other person can lawfully take them within those precincts, or chase them from thence and take them in other ground (*e*). But if a wild animal strays from the forest, it ceases to be the property of the owner of the franchise, and will belong to the first taker (*f*).

A *chase* is a franchise granted by the crown to a subject, empowering the latter to keep for his diversion, within a certain precinct so called, the wild animals of chase, which in a legal sense are the same with those to which the right of forest extends (*g*); but the franchise does not authorize the establishment of forest law within such precinct (*h*).

(*z*) Case of Leicester Forest, Cro. Jac. 155; see Coleridge's Blackstone, vol. ii. p. 38, n. (19).

(*a*) 4 Inst. 301, 318; Lord Dacre v. Tebb, 2 Bl. Rep. 1151; Sutton v. Moody, Ld. Raym. 251.

(*b*) See Lloyd v. Earl Powis, 4 El. & Bl. 485.

(*c*) 4 Inst. 318.

(*d*) 2 Bl. Com. 38.

(*e*) Sutton v. Moody, Ld. Raym. 251; 2 Bl. 394, 395, 419.

(*f*) 12 Hen. 8, f. 10, cited 2 Christian's Black. 419, n.; and see Keilw. 30; Sutton v. Moody, ubi sup.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 233 a.

(*h*) Manw. 52; see also 2 Bl.

A *park* properly signifies an inclosure, and is popularly applied to any ground which a gentleman chooses to surround with a wall or paling, and to stock with a herd of deer; but in the technical sense in which we now use the term, a park is nearly equivalent to a chase, being in effect no other than a chase *inclosed* (*i*).

A *free-warren* (*h*) is a similar franchise, granted by the crown to a subject, for preservation or custody, as the word signifies, of beasts and fowls *of warren*; which, according to Lord Coke, are "hare, coney, roe," "partridge, quail, rail, &c.," "pheasant, woodcock, &c.," "mallard, heron, &c." (*l*). To this, as well as to chase and park, apply generally the principles which have been before noticed in respect of a forest; with this exception, however, as to a park, that it is incapable of being claimed *in alieno solo*, and can exist only in land belonging to the owner of the franchise himself (*m*).

A *free fishery* (*n*), or exclusive right of fishing in a

Com. 415, where a chase or a park is described as "a smaller forest in the hands of a subject, but not governed by the forest laws."

(*i*) Manw. 52; 2 Bl. Com. 38.

(*h*) See Bro. Ab. tit. Warren; Dyer, 30 b; Co. Litt. 2 a, 114 b; Keilw. 148, n.; Boulston v. Hardy, Cro. Eliz. 548; Wadhurst v. Damme, Cro. Jac. 45; Case of Leicester Forest, ibid. 155; 1 Saund. 84, n. (3); Attorney-General v. Parsons, 2 Tyrw. 223; Vere v. Lord Cawdor, 11 East, 568; Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442; Lord Dacre v. Tebb, 2 Bl. Rep. 1151; Patrick v. Greenway, 1 Saund. 346; Pannell v. Mill, 3 C. B. 625.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 233 a; where these &c.'s are left without explanation. Manwood, on the other hand, says, "There are only two beasts of warren, the hare and the coney,

"and but two fowls of warren, the pheasant and the partridge."—Manw. 95; and see Barrington's case, 8 Rep. 138 b. Grouse are not birds of warren. (Duke of Devonshire v. Lodge, 7 B. & C. 36.)

(*m*) 2 Bl. Com. 38. Blackstone remarks on the other hand (p. 39), that freewarren *may* be claimed *in alieno solo*; and accounts for it by the fact, that antiently keen sportsmen, on selling their lands, often reserved to themselves and their heirs the freewarren that they had in them.

(*n*) See Hale, de Jure Maris, part i. c. 4; Lord Fitzwalter's case, 1 Mod. 105; Warren v. Matthews, 1 Salk. 357; Smith v. Kemp, 2 Salk. 637; Carter v. Mercot, 4 Burr. 2162; Case of River Banne, Davies, 55.

public river, is also a royal franchise (*o*). In private rivers (*viz.* in those not navigable), as the bed or soil, so the right of fishing presumably belongs to the owners of the land on either side, and to them only (*p*). But in those which are public,—that is, navigable (*q*),—the bed (so far at least as the tide flows) appertains *primâ facie* to the crown—the right of fishing to the public at large (*r*). But in either one or the other, there may be a particular title in some individual, by which such general or presumptive right may be controlled (*s*); and this may take place, in a public river, by force of some royal grant or prescription entitling a private person and his heirs to the exclusive right of fishing therein: a privilege called in the books a “free fishery” (*t*). Grants of this description can no longer be made by the crown (*u*); being prohibited

(*o*) Blackstone adds, (vol. ii. p. 39,) that it “is considered as such “in all countries where the feudal “polity has prevailed,” and he cites Seld. Mar. Claus. i. 24; Dufresne, v. 503; Craig, de Jure Feod. II. 8, 15. See also Mannall *v.* Fisher, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 856.

(*p*) Hale, de Jure Maris, pt. i. c. 4; vide sup. p. 453.

(*q*) Hale, ubi sup. cc. 1, 2.

(*r*) Hale, ubi sup. c. 4; Ward *v.* Cresswell, Willes, 265; Mayor, &c. of Orford *v.* Richardson, 4 T. R. 437; 2 H. Bla. 182, S. C.; Bagott *v.* Orr, 2 Bos. & Pul. 472; Blundell *v.* Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268; Williams *v.* Wilcox, 8 Ad. & E. 333; The Free Fishers of Whitstable *v.* Gann, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 853.

(*s*) Hale, de Jure Maris, ubi sup. cc. 1, 4.

(*t*) 2 Bl. Com. 39. There are in law, the three different terms of *free fishery*, *several fishery*, and *common of fishery* or *piscary* (Smith *v.*

Kemp, Salk. 637); and it is remarked by Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 40) that “they are very much confounded in “our law books;” and a doubt is expressed in Co. Litt. by Harg. 122 a, n. (7), whether Blackstone’s own use of the term free fishery is quite correct, and whether it does not apply to all streams, whether public or private. As to a “several fishery,” see Holford *v.* Bailey, 8 Q. B. 1000; Marshall *v.* Ulleswater Steam Navigation Company, 3 B. & Smith, 732; Carlisle *v.* Graham, Law Rep., 4 Exch. 361. Much information as to the antient law of fisheries will be found in some of the recent cases arising under the Salmon Fisheries Acts: such, for example, as Rolle *v.* White, Law Rep., 3 Q. B. 286; and Leconfield *v.* Lonsdale, ib. 5 C. P. 657.

(*u*) 2 Bl. Com. 39; Duke of Somerset *v.* Fogwell, 5 B. & Cress. 875. As to the re-grant of a former franchise of free fishery, when forfeited to the crown, see The Mayor

by King John's great charter (*x*), and the second and third confirmations of it in the reign of his successor; but the right of conferring them was considered, (prior to these charters,) as one of the flowers of the prerogative (*y*); and it is from this origin that the validity of a free fishery at the present day must in every case be derived. The privilege materially differs, it will be observed, from the right of *common of piscary* formerly mentioned, that being not exclusive in its nature, nor a franchise, but referable to private rivers, and capable of being created by the grant of a subject (*z*). In further illustration of the difference between them, we may add that, in a free fishery a man has a qualified property in the fish before they are caught; in a common of piscary, he has no property till afterwards (*a*).

VI. *Rents* are the last species of incorporeal hereditaments that we propose to notice. The word rent, *reditus*, signifies a compensation or return yielded periodically, to a certain amount, out of the profits of some corporeal hereditament, by the tenant thereof. To obtain a clear idea of rent, it may be useful to dwell a little upon some of the points of this definition. First, then, it is yielded, that is, paid as a thing due. And therefore it is said, by the antient lawyers, to *lie in render*, in contradistinction to those incorporeal hereditaments, (as common or the like,) which the party entitled to, is to take for himself, and which are, consequently, said to *lie in prendre* (*b*). It must also be of certain amount, or that which may be reduced to certainty, by either party; for *certum est, quod*

of *Colchester v. Brooke*, 7 Q. B. 385.

(*x*) Cap. 47, edit. Oxon.

(*y*) The right was also exercised by the crown, and granted out to subjects, of making *weirs* on our public rivers; but this was in like

manner restrained by *Magna Charta* and subsequent statutes; see *Williams v. Wilcox*, 8 Ad. & E. 314.

(*z*) Vide sup. p. 653.

(*a*) 2 Bl. Com. 40; F. N. B. 88; *Smith v. Kemp*, 2 Salk. 637.

(*b*) *Burton*, Compend. 375.

certum reddi potest (*c*). It must besides be payable periodically; as yearly, or in every second, third or fourth year, or the like (*d*). Again, it is considered as payable out of the profits of the land, and must consequently not be part of the land itself (*e*); wherein it differs from an exception in a grant, which is always part of the thing granted (*f*). Thus there cannot be reserved, by way of rent, the vesture or herbage of the land demised (*g*); though there is no occasion for rent to be, (as it usually is,) a sum of money; for spurs, capons, horses, corn and other matters may be rendered by way of rent (*h*). Moreover, it must issue out of hereditaments *corporeal*. Therefore a rent cannot be reserved out of a common, a franchise, or the like (*i*). And, lastly, the person from whom it is due must be the tenant of the land. But his tenancy may be either in possession, remainder or reversion; for a rent may be as well reserved upon the grant of a reversion or remainder, as on the conveyance of an estate in possession (*h*).

There are, at common law, three manner of rents,—rent-service, rent-charge, and rent-seck (*l*). *Rent service* is where the rent accrues in connection with a tenure, attended (as tenure almost invariably is) by fealty or by fealty and other services (*m*); and this, whether the party to whom the rent is due be entitled to fealty, as having the reversion of the land out of which it issues, or as

(*c*) Co. Litt. 142 a.

(*d*) Ibid. 47 a.

(*e*) Ibid. 141 b, 142.

(*f*) Plowd. 13; 8 Rep. 71; Co. Litt. 142 a.

(*g*) Co. Litt. 142 a.

(*h*) Ibid.; see *Doe v. Benham*, 7 Q. B. 982.

(*i*) Co. Litt. 142 a, 144 a, 47 a; Gilb. Rents, 20. The sovereign, however, by prerogative, and in some cases a subject, by statute,

may have a rent issuing out of an incorporeal hereditament. (Gilb. Rents, 22.) And, in every case, the reservation of rent upon an incorporeal inheritance will be binding on the lessee, as a contract to pay so much money. (Crnise, Dig. Rents.)

(*h*) Co. Litt. 47 a, 142 a; Bac. Ab. Rent, B.; vide sup. p. 524.

(*l*) Litt. s. 213.

(*m*) Ibid.; Co. Litt. 122 a.

having the mere seigniory (*n*). Thus if A., seised in fee, make a gift of land to B. in tail,—or demise to him for life, or years,—reserving a rent; or if B. be seised in fee of a tenement holden of A. as lord of a certain manor, at a certain antient rent; such rent is, in either case, rent-service: for it is due as from a tenant owing fealty to his lord (*o*). To rent of this description the common law attached, as of common right,—and independently of any express provision for that purpose between the parties (*p*),—the power of *distress* (*q*); that is, the lord was entitled, in the event of the rent's falling into arrear, to enforce payment without legal process, by entering the land, and seizing the goods and chattels found thereon. The other two species of rent differ from rent service, in having no connection with fealty. But more particularly—a *rent-charge* is where the owner of the rent has neither seigniory nor reversion, and can consequently claim no fealty, but is entitled to distrain, nevertheless, by force of an express contract; as where a man by deed maketh over to others his *whole* estate in fee simple, with a certain rent payable thereout, and adds to the deed a covenant or clause of distress; viz.—that, if the rent be in arrear, it shall be lawful to distrain for the same (*r*); or where a man by deed grants out of the land whereof he is seised,

(*n*) Vide sup. p. 246.

(*o*) If a man holds as tenant at will only, though subject to a rent, yet it is not rent service, for there is no fealty; (vide sup. p. 289). The lessor, however, may distrain of common right. (Co. Litt. 57 b.)

(*p*) Litt. s. 214.

(*q*) Lord Chief Baron Gilbert (On Rents, pp. 3, 5) remarks, that “antiently the not paying attendance on the lord's courts, or not doing the feudal service, was punished with the forfeiture of the estate; but these feudal for-

feitures were afterwards turned into distresses, according to the pignorary method of the civil law.” And this, he adds, “may easily account why the power of distraining always attended the fealty; because the power of seizure (for forfeiture) could only belong to him in whose homage the tenant was, and to whom the lands must return when the feudal donation to the tenant was spent.” See further as to *distress for rent*, post, bk. v. c. i.

(*r*) 2 Bl. Com. 42; Litt. s. 217.

a certain rent payable to another, with a like clause of distress(*s*). In either of these cases the land is liable to the distress, not of common right, but by virtue of the clause in the deed; and therefore it is called a rent-charge, because in this manner the land is *charged* with a distress for the payment of it(*t*). As for a *rent seck* (*reditus siccus*) it is where the owner of the rent has neither seigniority nor reversion, nor any such express power of distress as above described. Thus, in either of the cases of rent-charge we have just mentioned, if no clause of distress were inserted in the deed, the rent would be rent seck(*u*).

We must be careful, however, to distinguish here between the two kinds of rent last above described and an *annuity*, which (unless charged upon some real estate) is a yearly sum chargeable only upon the *person* of the grantor(*x*). Therefore if a man by deed grant to another the sum of 20*l.* per annum, without expressing out of what lands it shall issue, no land at all shall be charged with it, but it is a mere personal annuity(*y*) and does not belong to the class of things real; though, (by an anomaly which has sometimes led to confusion,) a man may have an estate of inheritance in it; that is, it may be made descendible

(*s*) Litt. s. 218.

(*t*) Ibid. s. 217. By 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, ss. 12, 14, any annuity or rent-charge granted after the passing of that Act (26th April, 1855), *otherwise than by marriage settlement or will*, for a life or lives, or for any estate determinable on a life or lives,—shall not affect any lands, tenements or hereditaments as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, until a memorandum thereof, such as the Act describes, shall be registered in the Court of Common Pleas. By 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 10, a release from a rent-charge of part of the hereditaments charged therewith shall not extinguish the whole

rent-charge; but shall only bar the right to recover any part of it out of the hereditaments released. Before this Act a rent-charge was in effect extinguished by a release of part of the hereditaments charged. (See Co. Litt. 147 b.)

(*u*) Litt. ss. 217, 218.

(*x*) Co. Litt. 144, 20 a, and n. (4), by Harg. As to the manner of recovering the arrears of an annuity charged on real estate, see *Sollory v. Leaver*, Law Rep., 9 Eq. Ca. 22.

(*y*) 2 Bl. Com. 40. As to the cases in which a grant of this kind shall be construed as a rent-charge, see Co. Litt. 147 a.

to his heirs, while personalty in general can devolve only to the executors or administrators (a).

There are also other species of rents mentioned in the books; which are, however, when examined, reducible to the three above enumerated. *Rents of assize* are rents at which the freeholders or copyholders of a manor have held under the lord from time immemorial (b); [and they cannot be departed from or varied; those of the freeholders being frequently distinguished as *chief rents* (*reditus capitales*), and both sorts being indifferently denominated *quit rents* (*quieti reditus*), because thereby the tenant was quit and free of all other services. When these payments were received in silver or white money, they were antiently called white rents, *reditus albi*, in contradistinction to rents reserved in grain or baser money, which were called *reditus nigri*, or black mail (c).] Quit rents, being connected with a tenure by fealty, are consequently rent service; from which it follows that the lord is entitled, as of common right, to distrain for them when they fall into arrear (d). *Rack rent* is a term expressive only of the proportion a rent bears to the value of the tenement on which it is charged (e): the rent being so termed when it is of the full value of the tenement or near it. A *fee farm rent* is where an estate in fee is granted subject to a rent in fee, of at least one-fourth of the value of the lands at the time of its reservation (f); and such rent appears to be called fee farm, because a grant of lands reserving so

(a) Co. Litt. 2 a. According to Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 40), "a man may have a real estate in it." But it seems clear that this can only be in the sense of an estate of inheritance, and that an annuity savours in no other respect of the realty; see Co. Litt. 20 a; *Aubin v. Daly*, 4 B. & Ald. 59.

(b) 2 Inst. 19.

(c) Ibid.

(d) 2 Watk. Cop. 191; vide stat. Hen. 8.

(e) 2 Bl. Com. p. 43.

(f) Co. Litt. 143 b. Blackstone (ubi sup.) defines a fee farm rent as a *rent-charge* issuing out of an estate in fee of at least one-fourth, &c., but apparently by a misconception of Lord Coke's meaning: See Co. Litt. by Harg. 144 a, n. (5); and in Doug. 627.

considerable a rent, is indeed only letting lands to farm in fee simple, instead of the usual method for life or years. It results from former explanations, that such a rent, if created by a subject since the statute of *Quia emptores*, can never be a rent service, for no fealty can be due to the grantor (*g*); but it may be either a rent-seck or a rent-charge (*h*).

These are the general divisions of rent; but though their correct apprehension is still of importance, the difference which formerly existed as to the remedies to be pursued in case of their non-payment, is, for practical purposes, nearly at an end. For it was provided by stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, that every person,—in cases of rent-seck, rents of assize, and chief rents, which had been duly answered or paid for the space of three years within twenty years before the first day of the session of parliament in which that Act was passed, or which should at any time thereafter be created,—should have the like remedy by distress as he would have had in the case of rent reserved upon lease (*i*).

With respect to the manner of creating rents, it may be observed generally, that the methods are two—for the owner of land may either grant a rent out of it, or he may grant the land itself, subject to a rent (*k*). Rent-charge or rent-seck may be constituted in either of these ways; rent service in the latter only (*l*).

[Rent is due and payable upon the land from which it issues,—that is, if no particular place is mentioned in the reservation (*m*). But in the case of the sovereign, the payment must be either to the crown officers at the Ex-

(*g*) Vide sup. p. 199. According to Mr. Hargrave, a fee farm rent *cannot* be created by a subject since this statute; it being in his opinion essential to the definition of a fee farm rent, that it should be a rent-service; Co. Litt. by Harg. 144 a, n. (§).

(*h*) Doug. 627, note (1); and see Litt. 217.

(*i*) See *Musgrave v. Emmerson*, 16 L. J. (Q. B.) 174.

(*k*) *Anon. v. Cooper*, 2 Wils. 375.

(*l*) See Litt. ss. 217, 218.

(*m*) Co. Litt. 201 b.

[chequer, or a receiver in the country (*n*). And, strictly, rent is demandable and payable before the time of sunset of the day whereon it is reserved (*o*), though perhaps not absolutely due till midnight (*p*).]

By the common law, if the estate or interest of the person entitled to rent, determined in the interval between one of the days of payment and another (as by death, supposing him to be tenant for life,) the periodical sum then accruing was entirely lost to him and his representative (*q*); and supposing the rent itself not to determine, but to continue payable to some person in remainder or reversion, the whole sum accruing in respect of such interval would belong to that person, though the greater portion of such period should have elapsed in the time of his predecessor. But, in extension of some previous enactments, with the same object of amending the rule of the common law on this head, it has now been provided by "The Apportionment Act, 1870" (33 & 34 Vict. c. 35), that after the passing of that Act, all rents and other periodical payments in the nature of income, (whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing or otherwise,) shall be considered as accruing from day to day, and shall be *apportionable* in respect of time accordingly (*r*); and that the apportioned part of the same shall be payable, in the case of a continuing rent, annuity, or other such payment; when the entire portion of which it forms part shall become due, and not before; and in the case of a rent, annuity, or other such payment, determined by re-entry, death, or otherwise, when the next entire

(*n*) 4 Rep. 73.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 202 a; 1 Anders. 253. See *Acocks v. Phillips*, 5 H. & N. 114, and *Tutton v. Darke*, ib. 647.

(*p*) 1 Saund. 287; Prec. Chanc. 555; Salk. 578; Lord Rockingham v. Penrice, 1 P. Wms. 178.

(*q*) See *Jenner v. Morgan*, 1 P.

Wms. 392.

(*r*) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35, s. 2. This Act refers in its preamble to the previous enactments on this subject contained in 11 Geo. 2, c. 19; 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 154.

portion would have been payable, and not before (*s*); and that all persons and their respective representatives, and the representatives of persons whose interests determine with their own deaths, may recover such apportioned part as they might have done the entire portions, if entitled thereto respectively. The Act, however, contains a proviso, that the entire or continuing rent, including such apportioned part, shall be recovered by the heir or other person who, had the rent not been apportionable, would have been entitled to the entire portion; and such apportioned part shall be recoverable from such heir or other person, by the executors or other persons entitled under this Act to the same, by action at law or suit in equity (*t*).

There is also another kind of apportionment, as where the tenant under a lease has been evicted of part of the land out of which the rent issues, by a person having title paramount to that of the lessor; or where part of it has been surrendered by the tenant to the lessor; or where the lessor has aliened the reversion as to part. In all these cases the rent must be apportioned (*u*); and so much of it only shall be payable to the lessor, as corresponds with the value of what is still held by the tenant under him; though where the tenant has been tortiously expelled by the act of the landlord himself even from a part of the premises only, there shall be no apportionment, but the whole rent will be suspended so long as the expulsion continues (*x*). The doctrine of apportionment, however, is not confined to rent, but applies to some other kinds of incorporeal hereditaments (*y*). For if a man, seised of forty acres of land, to which common of pasture is appur-

(*s*) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35, s. 3.

(*t*) Ibid. s. 4. The Act has no application to annual sums made payable by any policy of assurance; nor to any case in which an express stipulation has been made that no apportionment shall take place. (Sects. 6, 7.)

(*u*) Co. Litt. 148 a; Bliss v. Collins, 5 Barn. & Ald. 876.

(*x*) Gilb. Rents, 178; Neale v. Mackenzie, 1 Mee. & W. 747.

(*y*) As to apportionment of rent on fine, on lands required under the Church Building Acts, see 17 & 18 Vict. c. 32.

tenant, alienes five acres of it to another, the alienee will be entitled to common *pro tanto*; that is, for all his commonable cattle *levant* and *couchant* on the five acres (*y*).

With regard to the remedies for the recovery of rent, including the doctrine of distress—these belong properly to a subsequent part of these Commentaries; which treats of civil injuries, and the means by which redress for them may be obtained (*z*).

Having now taken notice of such particular incorporeal hereditaments as appeared to be fit for the present to engage our attention, we shall advert in conclusion to some of the principal points of learning relative to this division of things real, when considered in a general view; and without reference to the individual species of which they are composed.

In the first place then we may remark, that many incorporeal hereditaments are capable of being either annexed as an accessory to some hereditament corporeal, or of existing independently, and *per se*; being described, in the former case, as *appendant* or *appurtenant*, in the latter, as *in gross* (*a*). But to be connected as principal and accessory, things must of course be of a nature suitable to that relation; and therefore corporeal hereditaments cannot be *appendant* or *appurtenant* to such as are corporeal, nor incorporeal (generally speaking) to incorporeal (*b*). Where the connection exists, the effect is that the thing *appendant* or *appurtenant* will pass (without any particular mention of it) by any conveyance or alienation of the land to which it is annexed; and this whether the land be conveyed ex-

(*y*) Wyat Wild's case, 8 Rep. 78 b.

(*z*) Vide post, bk. v. c. i.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 121 b, 122 a. The *accessorium* of the civil law is that which answers best to our terms of *appendant* or *appurtenant*. Co. Litt. by Harg. 121 b, n. (6). As to the difference between these terms, Lord Coke remarks, "that *appen-*

dants are ever by prescription, "but *appurtenants* may be created, "in some cases, at this day."—Co. Litt. 121 b.

(*b*) Co. Litt. by Harg. 121 b, n. (7); Potter v. North, 1 Vent. 386; Plowd. 85, 168, 170; Capel v. Buszard, 6 Bing. 161.

pressly “with its appurtenances” or not (*c*). But if the principal be conveyed without the accessory, or the accessory without the principal—as in some instances may be done—the accessory becomes thereafter, in either case, a thing in gross (*d*).

Incorporeal hereditaments are not, in a strict and proper sense, the subjects of *tenure*, like those of the corporeal kind (*e*); but they satisfy, in general, the legal description of *tenements*, and are expressly held to be within the meaning of that word as used in the statute *De donis*, so as to be capable of being *entailed* (*f*). And where an incorporeal hereditament is appendant or appurtenant, it will of course, in respect of the land to which it is annexed, be subject to all the rules of tenure.

The same *estates* may be had in incorporeal as in corporeal hereditaments, and in many respects they are upon the same footing with regard to *title*, or the manner in which estates are acquired or lost. More particularly we may notice, that though the former subjects of property are intangible in their nature, yet they are substantially in the same predicament with the latter, even in regard to some of those laws of title which are founded upon an actual *seisin* or occupation. Thus with respect to *descent*, the rule of *seisina facit stipitem* has the same application to things incorporeal as to corporeal (*g*); that is, it governs, since the Inheritance Act (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106), all descents which took place on a death prior to

(*c*) Co. Litt. 121 b, n.; Barlow v. Rhodes, 3 Tyr. 280; James v. Plant, 4 Ad. & El. 749; et vide sup. p. 486.

(*d*) Plowd. 381; Com. Dig. Append. and Appurt. (D.); 2 Saund. 32.

(*e*) Co. Cop. 97; Co. Litt. 20 a; Bac. Ab. Tenure (A.) It is observable, however, that under the feudal system, as it formerly prevailed on the continent, not only lands, but

“casual rents, such as the profits of a toll, the fare paid at ferries, the salaries of offices, and even pensions, were held as *fiefs*, and military service performed on account of them.”—Robertson’s Charles V. vol. i. n. (8).

(*f*) Vide sup. pp. 242, 558.

(*g*) Vide sup. p. 396.

the 1st of January, 1834 (*h*). For if a man who died before that day had what is *equivalent* to corporeal seisin in hereditaments that are incorporeal and in gross,—thus, if in the case of a rent he had obtained the actual receipt of it—such constructive seisin makes him the root of descent with respect to these hereditaments, though he was not himself the purchaser (*i*). But upon successions since that Act, the rule before laid down as to corporeal, obtains also to incorporeal hereditaments, that descent is in all cases to be traced from the purchaser (*h*). So hereditaments of the latter as well as of the former description fall within the doctrine of *special occupancy* (*l*). For though it seems that at common law there could be no title by *common occupancy* to things of which no corporeal or actual seisin could be had, yet the heir might take as *special occupant* (*m*); and incorporeal hereditaments are now expressly included in all the legislative provisions with respect to estates *pur autre vie*, which we had occasion to notice in a former part of the work (*n*).

But on the other hand, in some important particulars the law of title, in incorporeal things, differs from that which applies to things corporeal. For the former cannot in their nature pass by *feoffment*, this implying, as we

(*h*) No descent prior to that day was within the operation of the inheritance act; vide sup. p. 391, n. (*i*).

(*i*) Co. Litt. 15 b. It is not, however, every incorporeal hereditament which will admit of this constructive possession. Thus Lord Coke makes an express exemption of *Dignities*, in which he says a man cannot by any act “gain more actual possession (if it may be so termed) than “by law descended to him.” (Ratcliffe’s case, 3 Rep. 42 a.) It is also to be observed with regard to such

incorporeal hereditaments as are *not* in gross, but appendant or appurtenant (vide sup. p. 650), that they follow the descent or conveyance of the land to which they are annexed; Co. Litt. by Harg. 15 b, n. (1); Watk. Desc. 60, 61.

(*h*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, ss. 1, 2; vide sup. p. 391.

(*l*) Vide sup. p. 449.

(*m*) Bearpark v. Hutchinson, 7 Bing. 186; see 2 Bl. Com. 259.

(*n*) Bearpark v. Hutchinson, ubi sup.; vide sup. p. 448.

have seen, an actual livery (*o*). But they are capable in every instance of passing by *grant* (*p*); and therefore they have always been said (like remainders and reversions of hereditaments corporeal) to *lie in grant*, and not *in livery* (*q*). In this, however, we refer not only to a grant properly so called, but also to a surrender, if by deed (*r*), and to a conveyance operating under the Statute of Uses (*s*); for every existing incorporeal hereditament may be limited to a use, and such use will be executed (as in the case of a conveyance of land) by the statute (*t*). Nor is it by grant alone, that title may be made to an incorporeal hereditament. This indeed is the only universal method; but there are others applicable to particular cases. For, first, rents may be created by *reservation* in a lease or other conveyance as where a man seised in fee demises land to another for life or years, the latter yielding and paying for the same a certain sum of money (*u*). Again, there are certain incorporeal hereditaments which may be claimed by *custom*; as for all the inhabitants of a certain hamlet to have a right of way over a certain field for a particular purpose (*x*). This species of title, however, is subject to a very important restriction, viz. that no man can so claim a *profit* in the land of another (*y*): and, accordingly, a cus-

(*o*) Vide sup. p. 508.

(*p*) 2 Sand. Us. 33, 36, 37, where the only exceptions mentioned are the cases in which the policy of the law forbids *any* assignment at all, as in the case of an office of trust and confidence; (see *Welcome v. Upton*, 6 Mee. & W. 536). A *grant*, it will be recollected (vide sup. p. 510), implies a deed, i. e. an instrument under seal. Without deed, an incorporeal hereditament will not pass. (*Wood v. Leadbitter*, 13 Mee. & W. 838.)

(*q*) Formerly, on the other hand, corporeal hereditaments were said (*à converso*) to lie in livery and not

in grant. But this, as we have seen, is now altered by a modern statute; vide sup. p. 511.

(*r*) See Co. Litt. 338 a.

(*s*) Vide sup. p. 529.

(*t*) 2 Sand. Us. 33, 49, 59, 111; sup. p. 367.

(*u*) Bac. Ab. Rent, C.; Litt. s. 217; see *Doe v. Lock*, 2 Ad. & El. 705, 743; *Wickham v. Hawker*, 7 Mee. & W. 72.

(*x*) Coleridge's *Blackstone*, vol. ii. p. 36, n. (14).

(*y*) *Gateward's case*, 6 Co. Rep. 596; and see per Erle, C. J., *Constable v. Nicholson*, 14 C. B., N. S. 239.

tom for all the inhabitants of a certain hamlet to take from a private close, for the purpose of manure, sand drifted from the sea, was held to be bad in law (*a*). Besides these titles, there is also the claim by *prescription*, which applies to almost every kind of hereditament incorporeal (*b*); and as well to those which are appendant or appurtenant, as those in gross (*c*). And this last species of title involves so many points of nicety, as to demand a more particular explanation than we have bestowed on any of the former.

The subject of prescription indeed has been in some measure unavoidably anticipated, in so far at least that it has been stated to be a title by long usage. But we are now to examine its nature more closely, and, as a preliminary point, we would remark, that, though depending on usage, it is not to be confounded with custom. The distinction between custom—of which we had occasion to inquire at large in a preceding part of these Commentaries (*d*)—and prescription, is this, that custom is properly a *local* usage, and prescription a *personal* one, attaching to a man and his ancestors, or those whose estate he has (*e*). [As, for example, if there be a usage time out of mind in the parish of Dale, that all the inhabitants of that parish may dance on a certain close at all times for their recreation,—which is held to be a lawful usage—this is strictly a custom, for it is applied to the *place* in general, but not to any particular *persons* (*f*): but if the tenant who

(*a*) *Blewitt v. Tregonning*, 1 Har. & W. 431.

(*b*) “*Prescriptio est titulus ex usu et tempore, substantiam capiens ab auctoritate legis*.”—Co. Litt. 113 b. The title of prescription was well known to the Roman law by the name of *usucapio*. Ff. 41, 3, 3; see 2 Bl. Com. 264, where the subject of prescription is discussed at large.

(*c*) The title by prescription,

however (whether at common law or under the stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, to be presently noticed), applies to no other than incorporeal hereditaments. (*Wilkinson v. Proud*, 11 Mee. & W. 35.)

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 53.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 113 b; *Potter v. North*, 1 Vent. 386; 2 Bl. Com. 263.

(*f*) *Abbot v. Weekly*, 1 Lev. 176.

[is seised of the manor of Dale in fee alleges, that he and all those whose estate he hath in the said manor have used time out of mind to have common of pasture in such a close; this is properly called a prescription, for this is a usage annexed to the *person* of the owner of this estate.]

The subject of prescription has been newly regulated by the statute 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71; but its provisions are of a nature by no means to supersede the former state of the law in regard to this species of title; and prescription will be best understood by contemplating it in two distinct points of view—first, as it exists at common law; secondly, as it is modified by the statute in question.

First, with respect to prescription *at common law*, the following points appear principally to deserve attention:—1. This title is always founded on the actual usage of enjoying the thing in question; and without this, a mere claim, however often repeated or long continued, and whether its validity has been questioned or not, will not suffice to establish a prescriptive right (*g*). 2. The enjoyment on which a prescription is founded, must have been constant and peaceable; for generally, when it has been subject to interruption and dispute, it is of no avail. Yet where the right is shown to have once attached in consequence of an uniform and tranquil usage for a sufficiently long tract of time, a wrongful interruption of the enjoyment during a subsequent period of comparatively short duration (as for ten or twenty years) will not destroy the prescription (*h*). 3. As to the length of time sufficient to establish the right, the rule of the common law is, that there must have been a usage from *time immemorial*, or, as it is technically termed, *from time whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary*; which period (as before shown in our remarks upon *custom*)

(*g*) But a right more extensive than the actual user may, in some cases, be presumed. *Manifold v. Pennington*, 4 Barn. & Cress. 161; *De*

Rutzen v. Lloyd, 4 Ad. & El. 456; *Jones v. Richards*, 6 Ad. & El. 532.

(*h*) *Co. Litt.* 114 b; 2 *Inst.* 653; *Com. Dig.* Prescription, E.

refers to so remote an era as the beginning of the reign of Richard the first (*i*). And therefore if the usage can be shown to have commenced at any time since that period, the prescription (where it is claimed as at common law) is destroyed (*k*). But a commencement shown prior to the reign of Richard the first would constitute no objection; for all time prior to that era is out of the time of legal memory (*l*). Supposing no evidence to be given as to the time at which the usage commenced, but that it appears, either by the testimony of living witnesses, or by any other means of proof (*m*), that it has had continuance for a period of *twenty years* or more, this will in general amount, at common law, to a presumption that it is immemorial (*n*); so as to sustain the prescription, supposing no circumstances of a contrary tendency to appear (*o*); and even proof of a shorter continuance than twenty years will have the same effect, if corroborated by other attendant circumstances indicative of the existence of an antient right (*p*). But the presumption of immemorial right, that would otherwise arise from an enjoyment of twenty years, or any other period within legal memory, will be defeated by showing that such enjoyment took place by virtue of a grant or licence from the party interested in opposing it, or that it was without the knowledge of him or his agents, during the whole time that it was exercised (*q*). 4. Every prescription must be both certain

(*i*) Co. Litt. 115 a.

(*k*) See *Bryant v. Foot*, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. 161; S. C. in err., 3 Q. B. 497; *Mills v. Colchester*, ib. 2 C. P. 476; S. C. in err., 3 C. P. 575.

(*l*) 9 Rep. 27 b; Com. Dig. Prescription, Pract. lib. ii. c. 22; Stark. Ev. 1205.

(*m*) Stark. Ev. 1217, 1st edit.; Co. Litt. 115 a.

(*n*) This doctrine applies, it will

be observed, to a prescription at common law *only*. As to the case of a claim under the Prescription Act, vide post, p. 689.

(*o*) *Rex v. Joliffe*, 2 Barn. & Cress. 59; *Hill v. Smith*, 10 East, 476; *Daniel v. North*, 11 East, 372; *Chad v. Tilsed*, 2 Brod. & Bing. 403.

(*p*) Stark. Ev. 1217, 1st ed.

(*q*) *Bright v. Walker*, 4 Tyr. 509.

and reasonable; therefore a prescription to pay for tithes one penny or *thereabouts* for every acre of arable land, or to take as much clay as *required* for making bricks at a certain kiln out of another's field, is bad in law (*r*); and hence, also, a surplice fee claimed on marriage was held unsustainable on the ground that, according to the value of money at the supposed origin of the prescriptive right, it was *excessive in amount* (*s*). 5. All prescription at common law, must be laid either in a man and *those whose estate he hath* in certain lands (as in the example above given of a prescriptive common of pasture), which is called prescribing in a *que estate* (*t*), or it must be in a man and *his ancestors* (*u*). [And here this distinction is to be made—that if a man prescribes in a *que estate* nothing is claimable by this prescription, but such things as are incident, appendant, or appurtenant to lands; for it would be absurd to claim anything as the consequence or appendix of an estate, with which the thing claimed has no connection: but if he prescribes in himself and his ancestors, he may prescribe for anything whatever that lies in grant (*x*). And, formerly, a man might by the common law have prescribed for a right which had been enjoyed by his ancestors at any distance of time, though his or their enjoyment of it had been suspended for an indefinite series of years. But by the Statute of Limitations, 32 Hen. VIII. c. 2, it is enacted, that no person shall make any prescription by the seisin or possession of his ancestor, unless such seisin or possession hath been within threescore years next before such prescription

(*r*) Com. Dig. Prescription, E. 3; Clayton v. Corby, 5 Q. B. 415; Hilton v. Granville, *ibid.* 701.

(*s*) See Bryant v. Foot, Law Rep., 2 Q. B. 161; 3 Q. B. 497.

(*t*) See Richards v. Fry, 7 Ad. & El. 704; Padwick v. Knight, 22 L. J., Exch. 198.

(*u*) But a prescription may also

be in a body corporate, and their predecessors. "For as a natural body," says Lord Coke, "is said to have ancestors, so a body politic or corporate is said to have predecessors." And see Mellor v. Spate-man, 1 Saund. 342.

(*x*) Co. Litt. 121 a.

[made. 6. A prescription in a *que estate* must always be laid in him that is tenant of the fee. A tenant for life, for years, or at will, or a copyholder, cannot prescribe, by reason of the imbecility of their estates (*y*). For as prescription is usage beyond time of memory, it is absurd that they should pretend to prescribe for anything, whose estates commenced within the remembrance of man; and therefore the tenant for life, or for other estates short of the fee, must prescribe under cover of the tenant in fee simple. As if tenant for life of a manor would prescribe for a right of common, as appurtenant to the same, he must plead that John Stiles is seised in fee of the manor; and that he and all those whose estate he hath, had immemorially used to have this right of common appurtenant to the said manor; and that John Stiles demised the said manor, with its appurtenances, to him the said tenant for life. 7. A prescription cannot lie for a thing which cannot be raised by grant; for the law allows prescription only in supply of the loss of a grant, and therefore every prescription presupposes a grant to have existed; thus the lord of a manor cannot prescribe to raise a tax or toll upon strangers; for as such claim could never have been good by any grant, it shall not be good by prescription (*z*). 8. Another rule is, that what is to arise by matter of record, cannot be prescribed for: such as, for instance, the right to forfeitures—being among the franchises to which we before made brief allusion in the course of this chapter (*a*): for these forfeitures are found by the inquisition of a jury, and so made a matter of record: to which prescription, (which is a mere usage *in pais*, says Lord Coke,) cannot extend (*b*). But the franchises of treasure trove, waifs, estrays, and the like, may be claimed by prescription; for they arise from private contingencies, and not from any

(*y*) 4 Rep. 31, 32.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 114 a; Case of Ab-

(*z*) Potter v. North, 1 Vent. 387. bott of Strata Marcella, 9 Rep. 24 a.

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 662.

[matter of record (*c*). 9. Lastly, we may observe that a person having title to any thing by prescription, is not to be considered as being himself the purchaser, so as to make it descendible to his heirs general, according to the ordinary rule of inheritance (*d*); for prescription, inasmuch as it presupposes a grant, is in strictness rather to be considered as an evidence of a former acquisition, than as an acquisition *de novo*: but the rule on this subject is, that where a man prescribes for anything, (for example, a right of way,) in himself and his *ancestors*, it will descend only to the blood of that line of ancestors in whom he so prescribes: but if he prescribes for it in a *que estate*, it will follow the nature of that estate in which the prescription is laid, and be inheritable in the same manner, whether that were acquired by descent or purchase;—for every accessory followeth the nature of its principal.]

Next, as to prescription as regulated *by statute*, viz., by 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71; a subject which the explanations that have been given of the nature of the title by prescription, as it exists at common law, will enable us more easily to apprehend. This statute is described in its title, as an Act “For shortening the time of prescription “in certain cases,” and originated in a reasonable dissatisfaction with the rule, which required an enjoyment from “time immemorial” (in the legal sense of that term) as the indispensable foundation, in every case, of a prescriptive right. The effect of that rule (we have seen) was, that while, in general, an enjoyment for even *twenty* years sufficed to sustain a claim by prescription, because it constituted a presumption of immemorial antiquity, yet—if accident should supply the adverse party with the means of proving that, at any period subsequent to the commencement of the reign of Richard the first, the alleged right did not in fact exist—the claimant would be defeated, even

(*c*) Co. Litt. 114 b.

(*d*) Vide sup. p. 391.

though he could prove that the usage had lasted for centuries. To obviate the injustice and inconvenience resulting from this doctrine, the Act in question was passed; and its general plan is to dispense (in all the ordinary cases of prescription) with the necessity of making out an immemorial usage, either by presumption or otherwise; and to allow an enjoyment for a certain period, to constitute a direct and intrinsic right.

In pursuance of this view, it provides, with respect to rights of common “and all other profits or benefits to be “taken and enjoyed from or upon any land”—with the exception, however, of tithes, rents and services, which remain as at common law,—that where there shall have been an enjoyment of them by any person claiming right thereto (*e*), without interruption (*f*), for *thirty* years (*g*) next before the commencement of any suit upon the subject (*h*), the prescriptive claim shall no longer be defeated (as it would have been before the Act), by showing only that the enjoyment commenced at a period subsequent to the era of legal memory. There is a provision, however, that it may be defeated in any other way in which it was defeasible before the Act passed (*i*). And therefore a case of thirty years’ enjoyment would still be satisfactorily answered, by showing that it was without the knowledge of the adverse party, or that it was by his mere licence or permission; for either of these circumstances

(*e*) See *Tickle v. Brown*, 4 Ad. & El. 369; *Kinloch v. Nevile*, 6 Mee. & W. 795; *Magor v. Chadwick*, 11 Ad. & El. 584.

(*f*) See *Onley v. Gardiner*, 1 Horn & Hurl. 381; *Eaton v. Swansea Waterworks Company*, 20 L. J., Q. B. (N. S.) 482; *Carr v. Foster*, 3 Q. B. 581. No act or matter is to be deemed an interruption, unless submitted to and acquiesced in for the space of one year after notice.

(2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 4.)

(*g*) See *Richards v. Fry*, 7 Ad. & El. 698; *Wright v. Williams*, Tyr. & Gr. 375.

(*h*) See *Bailey v. Appleyard*, 8 Ad. & El. 161, 778; *Parker v. Mitchell*, 11 Ad. & El. 788; *Clayton v. Corby*, 2 Q. B. 824; 5 Q. B. 415; *Ward v. Robins*, 15 Mee. & W. 237.

(*i*) See *Mill, claimant, the Commissioners of the New Forest, objector*, 18 C. B. 60.

would, before the statute, have rebutted the presumptive right (*k*). It is also provided, that the time during which the adverse party shall have been an infant, idiot, *non compos mentis*, *feme covert*, or tenant for life, or during which any action or suit as to the claim shall have been pending and diligently prosecuted,—shall be excluded in the computation of this period of thirty years (*l*). But where there has been an enjoyment for as much as *sixty* years, the claim is to be absolute and indefeasible, except only by proof that such enjoyment took place under some deed, or written consent or agreement; while on the other hand, if the period of enjoyment shall have been less than thirty years, it is to be wholly unavailable, even to raise the slightest presumption of right. In addition to these regulations as to the time for a prescription, there are others as to the manner of making it, and among them the following,—that he who prescribes under this Act shall not be required in any case to claim as in right of the owner of the fee (*m*).

The statute makes similar provisions with respect to another class of incorporeal hereditaments, viz. any “way” or other easement (*n*), or any watercourse, or the use “of any water, to be enjoyed upon, over, or from any land or water” (*o*), “and the access or use of light to and for any dwelling-house, workshop, or other building” (*p*); but with this difference, that the periods constituting a prescriptive right in the case of ways or other

(*k*) See *Daniel v. North*, 11 East, 372; *Bright v. Walker*, 4 Tyr. 509; *Kinloch v. Neville*, 6 Mee. & W. 795.

(*l*) 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 7. See *Pye v. Mumford*, 11 Q. B. 666.

(*m*) 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 5.

(*n*) See *Battishill v. Reed*, 18 C. B. 696. These provisions do not apply to the right to the *passage of air*—as to a windmill: (*Webb v.*

Bird, 13 C. B., N. S. 841): nor to the use of a piece of ground as a race course, or otherwise for purposes of *mere pleasure*. (*Mounsey v. Ismay*, 3 H. & C. 486.)

(*o*) See *Beeston v. Weate*, 5 Ell. & Bl. 986; *Murgatroyd v. Robinson*, 7 Ell. & Bl. 391.

(*p*) As to a prescription for light, under this statute, see *Harbidge v. Warwick*, 3 Exch. 552.

easements, and waters, are twenty and forty years, in lieu of thirty and sixty respectively, and that an uninterrupted enjoyment of lights for twenty years, constitutes, in every case, an absolute and indefeasible right to them, any local usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding (*r*); unless indeed it shall appear that the enjoyment took place under some deed, or written consent or agreement. There is moreover a provision with respect to ways and waters, that when the land over which such rights as these are claimed has been held for life, or a term exceeding three years, such term shall be excluded from the computation of the forty years, in the event of the person who may be entitled in reversion resisting the claim within three years after the term determines.

Besides those which have been above noticed, there still remains another point of title appropriate to incorporeal as distinguished from corporeal hereditaments; viz. that the former are capable of *extinction*, in a manner peculiar to themselves. Thus, they may be extinguished by *release* (*s*); as when a person entitled to common, releases it to the owner of the soil over which it is claimed (*t*). And after disuse of them for twenty years, a release will in general be presumed (*u*). So they may be extinguished by *unity of seisin*; as where the person entitled to a way or common becomes seised in fee, by purchase or otherwise, of the land which is subject to the right. For the dominion of the soil itself, and of an incorporeal right relating to the same soil, cannot in general subsist together

(*r*) See *Truscott v. Merchant Tailors' Company*, 11 Exch. 855. As to interruption, within this section, see *Plasterers' Company v. Parish Clerks' Company*, 20 L. J. (Exch.) 362.

(*s*) Co. Litt. 280 a, 270 a; Litt. ss. 479, 480; see *Lovell v. Smith*, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 127.

(*t*) As to the extinguishment of

common by a release of it as to *part* of the land over which it is claimed, or by purchase of part, see *Benson v. Chester*, 8 T. R. 401.

(*u*) See *Moore v. Rawson*, 3 Barn. & Cress. 339; *Ward v. Ward*, 7 Exch. 838; *Carr v. Foster*, 3 Q. B. 581; *Cook v. Bath*, Law Rep., 6 Eq. Ca. 177.

in the same individual, because as soon as they are combined in his person, the latter right, being merely of a particular and subordinate kind, is absorbed and extinguished in the superior title of general ownership (*x*). To this, indeed, there is an exception in the case of franchises; which, as before remarked, are of a nature *collateral* to the inheritance itself, and are consequently not affected by unity of seisin (*y*). Even these, however, may be extinguished by a re-union with the Crown, from which they emanated, or by forfeiture for *misuser*, that is, such use of them as is contrary to the express or implied condition on which the royal grant may have proceeded; or by forfeiture for *non-user*, as if a vill was incorporated by the king, before the commencement of the period of legal memory, and that franchise has never been acted upon since (*z*). Lastly, we may remark as to some particular species of incorporeal hereditaments, viz. *lights* and *water-courses*, that, as they are acquired by mere occupancy, they are in like manner capable of being extinguished after their acquisition, by a simple act of abandonment; that is, by the mere discontinuance of the enjoyment, though for a period short of twenty years: provided, however, that the abandonment be absolute,—for if it take place under circumstances which imply the intention of future resumption within a reasonable time, the right in that case will not be lost (*a*).

(*x*) See 4 Rep. 38 a; Cro. Eliz. 570; 3 Taunt. 24; Whalley v. Tompson, 1 Bos. & Pul. 371; Warburton v. Parke, 2 H. & N. 64. As to the extinguishment of a *right of way* by unity of possession, see Winship v. Hudspeth, 10 Exch. 5.

(*y*) 4 Inst. 318. Vide sup. p. 669.

(*z*) 3 Cruise, Dig. 302. As to the re-grant of a franchise, see Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 385.

(*a*) See Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 692; Stokoë v. Singers, 8 Ell. & Bl. 31.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF RECENT PROVISIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF
PURCHASERS AND MORTGAGEES AGAINST INSECURE
TITLES.

THE provisions made by the legislature for the protection of purchasers and mortgagees against insecure titles, to which we formerly referred, demand some further consideration before this volume closes (*a*). They were established in the year 1862, and are contained in the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, intituled "An Act to facilitate the proof of title to and the conveyance of real estates," and in the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 67, intituled "An Act for obtaining a declaration of title;" which two statutes are to be taken in connexion with General Orders made and published by authority, since the Acts themselves passed (*b*). The recourse to these provisions (which is left entirely at the option of the landholder) has not hitherto been frequent, and the modes of proceeding which they sanction have been but scantily illustrated by judicial decisions;—a state of facts which makes it improper to descant at any length upon the new enactments; but the extracts which follow may be acceptable, as sufficing to illustrate the general plan under each of these Acts.

The 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, established an office, called the "Land Registry;" and provides (among other things) that the owner of the fee simple of an estate of freehold tenure may apply to the Registrar, to have the

(*a*) Vide sup. p. 613.

1st Oct. 1862, 6th July, 1864, and

(*b*) The dates of these Orders are 10th May, 1866.

title “registered as indefeasible” (*c*); but that no title shall be accepted for that purpose, unless, on examination, it shall appear to be such as a court of equity would hold to be a valid marketable title (*d*). If it appears to be of such nature, the applicant is then to furnish to the registrar an exact description of the lands (*e*), and a statement of the mortgages, charges and incumbrances affecting the same, or any part thereof (*f*); and the registrar will proceed to ascertain the accuracy of the description (*g*), and (if satisfied with the title) shall cause notice to be given by public advertisement of his intention to register the land with an indefeasible title, at the expiration of a period of not less than three months (*h*); a copy of which notice is to be served on all proper persons, including every adjoining occupier, and (where the case so requires) the person to whom such occupier pays rent, and the lord of the manor (*i*). The applicant also, and his solicitor or agent, and such other person or persons as the registrar shall require, shall make oath that all deeds and writings relating to the title, and all facts material to the title, and all incumbrances, have, to the fullest extent of their

(*c*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, ss. 2, 108. Application may also be made for “*registration without an indefeasible title*,” and for “*registration of leasehold estates*” (sects. 25, 26).

(*d*) Sect. 5. The duties imposed by this Act upon the equity judges, in respect of the registration of title, have been assigned to the *Master of the Rolls*. As to the practice on appeal from the registrar’s decision, see *In re Drew’s Estate*, Law Rep., 1 Ch. App. 126; 2 Eq. Ca. 206.

(*e*) The word “land” in this Act includes (unless the provisions require a different construction) messuages, tenements and heredi-

taments, corporeal and incorporeal. (Sect. 140.)

(*f*) Sect. 7. By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 78, s. 32, there is also to be kept in the land registry a register of all *mortgage debentures* granted by any company under the “Mortgage Debenture Act, 1865” (amended by 33 Vict. c. 20, the “Mortgage Debenture Act, 1870”); and unless a mortgage is properly entered therein, and the registrar’s endorsement obtained, no such mortgage debenture shall be a charge on the registered securities of the company.

(*g*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, s. 10.

(*h*) Sect. 11.

(*i*) Sect. 12.

respective knowledge and belief, been made known to the registrar (*k*). At the time and place in the notice mentioned, any person may attend and show cause, by affidavit or otherwise, against the registration (*l*); but if none be shown, or none shown that is sufficient, the registrar shall proceed to complete the registration, by entering in the "Record of title to land on the registry," an exact record of the existing estates, powers and interests in the land; and by also entering in the "Register of mortgages and incumbrances," an account of all the charges and incumbrances thereon (*m*). It is further enacted that, after the registration, every estate or interest arising or created in the land, or any part thereof, (except as in the Act is excepted,) shall be entered in the record of title, or register of incumbrances, to be so kept as those previously subsisting (*n*). An indefeasible title to the land being thus registered in pursuance of the proprietor's application;—the effect of it is stated as follows: that, "subject to any "exception, qualification or condition mentioned in such "record of title (*o*), and to any right or interest thereby "reserved, and to any registered charges or incumbrances, "and to such charges and interests as are in the Act declared *not* to be incumbrances (*p*), the persons originally, "and from time to time, named and described in such "record of title as aforesaid, shall, for the purposes of any "sale, mortgage or contract for valuable consideration, by "such persons respectively, be, and be deemed to be, as "from the date of registering such record by the registrar, or from such time as shall be fixed by him therein, "absolutely and indefeasibly possessed of and entitled to

(*k*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, s. 22.

(*l*) Sect. 13.

(*m*) Sect. 14.

(*n*) Sect. 32.

(*o*) See *In re Drew's Estate*, Law Rep., 2 Eq. Ca. 206.

(*p*) These are land tax, succession duty, tithe rent charges, rents

payable to the crown, public rights of way, liability to repair highways by reason of tenure, rights of way, watercourses, rights of water and other easements or servitudes, rights of common, manorial rights and franchises. (Sect. 27.)

“such estates, rights, powers and interests as shall be defined and expressed in such record, against all persons, and free from all rights, interests, claims and demands whatsoever, including any estate, claim or interest of her majesty, her heirs and successors” (*q*). In addition to which, it is also enacted, that every person having a sufficient estate or interest in registered land, may by will, deed or other instrument, create the same estate and interests, and enter into the same contracts and engagements with respect to such land, as he might do if the land were not registered; provided always, that no unregistered estate or interest, contract or engagement, for the registration whereof provision is made by that Act, shall prevail against the title of any subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration, duly registered under that Act (*r*). The Act also contemplates the further convenience to the parties of enabling them, if they think proper, and so far as they may find it practicable, to escape the length and intricacy now ordinarily incident to conveyances,—for it provides, as to all registered land, that it may be conveyed and charged, not only by the instruments applicable to unregistered land (*s*), but by what it terms a statutory disposition,—examples of which are set forth in a schedule subjoined to the Act.

To what we have here extracted from this statute, our object only leads us to add, that as regards the proprietors of land in Yorkshire and Middlesex, its plan is not attended with the inconvenience of subjecting them to two different systems of registration, as it is enacted that

(*q*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, s. 20. See *In re Richardson*, Law Rep., 12 Eq. Ca. 398.

(*r*) Sect. 74.

(*s*) It is not *universally* true that the methods of conveyance applicable to unregistered land are applicable also to registered land, for

there is this exception, that an *equitable mortgage* (vide sup. p. 305, n. (*i*)) cannot be created in registered land by a deposit of title deeds, though it may by the deposit of an instrument described in the Act as a land certificate.

the provisions for registries in those counties, of which we had before occasion to speak (*t*), shall cease to be applicable as soon as the same land has been put upon the register, under the statute now in question, and so long as it remains thereon (*u*).

The other Act mentioned above, viz., the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 67,—after reciting that it is expedient to enable persons having interests in land to obtain, in certain cases, a judicial declaration of their title so as to enable them to make an indefeasible title to persons claiming under them as purchasers for a valuable consideration (*v*),—directs (among other things) that every person entitled to apply for the registration of an indefeasible title under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, may apply to Chancery by petition, in a summary way, for a declaration of title (*x*), but that no such petition shall be admitted, as to lands of copyhold or customary tenure (*y*). The Act provides that the Court may require that the land registrar shall be served with notice of such petition, and that he shall thereupon be made a party to, and attend the proceedings (*z*). And further, that the Court, on the hearing of the petition, and on being satisfied that the petitioner has proved such a possession and stated such a title, as if established would entitle him to a declaration as prayed, shall make an order for investigation of the title in the same way as if he

(*t*) Vide sup. p. 613.

(*u*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, s. 104.

(*v*) The word "land" in this Act shall not, unless the provisions require a different construction, include any incorporeal hereditaments. (25 & 26 Vict. c. 67, s. 48.)

(*x*) Sect. 1. This application may also be made by "every person claiming to be entitled to land in possession for an estate in fee simple, either absolutely or sub-

ject to any incumbrances, estates, rights or interests, vested or contingent, or claiming to have a power of disposing of land for his own benefit for an estate in fee simple in possession, either absolutely or subject to any incumbrances, estates, rights or interests, vested or contingent." (Ibid.)

(*y*) Sect. 4.

(*z*) Sect. 5.

had obtained, as vendor, a decree for a specific performance of an agreement for sale of the land in question, for the estate claimed in his petition (*a*). And that after such an investigation, if the Court is satisfied that the petitioner has shown such a title as it would have compelled an unwilling purchaser to accept, it shall (on the conditions in the Act mentioned) make an order, that, on some day not less than three months afterwards, a declaration shall be made establishing the petitioner's title; unless, in the meantime, cause is shown to the contrary (*b*); but that no such order shall be made, until the petitioner and his solicitor, and any other person whom the Court may require, shall have made and filed an affidavit, that, to the best of their respective knowledge and belief, all instruments and papers relating to the title have been produced to the Court, or that the cause of their non-production has been fully and fairly explained, and that all facts material to the title have been fully and fairly disclosed to the Court; it being, however, also provided that such affidavit may be dispensed with or modified by the Court, according to circumstances (*c*). In order to secure the object of apprising all proper persons of the opportunity of showing cause against the making of the declaration, it is further enacted, that a copy of the order shall be served on such persons, and deposited in such place, as the Act describes, for inspection; and that notice of such deposit shall be also affixed in such place as it describes (*d*): and that after such deposit has been made, the petitioner shall cause advertisements to be inserted, three times at least, in such newspapers and on such days as the Court shall direct, stating the order, and also stating where any copy has been so deposited for inspection (*e*). And that, unless the last of such advertisements is made within four weeks next after the date of the

(*a*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 67, s. 6.

(*b*) Sect. 8. As to the practice of the courts herein, see *In re Roberts*, Law Rep., 10 Eq. Ca. 402.

(*c*) Sect. 10.

(*d*) See *schedules* subjoined to 25 & 26 Vict. c. 67.—Scheds. 4, 5.

(*e*) Sect. 7.

order, the time thereby fixed for showing cause against the same shall be enlarged as the Court shall direct (*f*). And further, that if no petition shall be presented against the proposed declaration of title within the time limited for that purpose, or if one has been presented, but the Court is of opinion that no sufficient ground has been shown for refusing to make the declaration, then the Court, upon being satisfied that all requisitions have been duly complied with, shall make a declaration that the petitioner has such title to the lands in question, as he sought to establish by his petition, or such title subject to any qualifications which it may deem necessary or proper to introduce (*g*). And further, that every declaration of title under the Act may, at the option of the person obtaining the same, be *registered* as an indefeasible title under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53 (*h*). A declaration of title to the land being thus obtained, in pursuance of the proprietor's petition, the effect of it is stated as follows:—"that such declaration of title, as soon as it shall have become final for the purpose of this Act, shall in favour of any person thereafter deriving title as a purchaser, for valuable consideration, of the land therein referred to, or of any part thereof, or of any estate, right or interest therein, from or under the person whose title has been so declared, be deemed and taken to have correctly declared the same: but, save as aforesaid, such declaration shall have no force or effect whatever as to the title of the land comprised therein" (*i*).

The whole law relative to the rights of property in things real, (exclusively of what relates to their violation,

(*f*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 67, sched. 8.

(*g*) Sect. 15.

(*h*) Sect. 21.

(*i*) Sect. 24. By sect. 29 the de-

claration of title shall not affect land tax, succession duty, tithe rent charge, rights of common, rents payable to the crown, public rights

and to the remedies in such case provided,) has now come, in due order, under discussion; and the second part of the present Book of these Commentaries—the part relating to Things Personal—will be entered upon in the next volume.

The subject which has thus employed our attention is of very extensive use and importance, but, it must be confessed, not very attractive at the first aspect. [To say the truth, the vast alterations which the doctrine of real property has undergone from the Conquest to the present time; the infinite determinations upon points that continually arise, and which have been heaped one upon another for so many centuries without any order or method; and the multiplicity of acts of parliament, which have amended or sometimes only altered, the common law,—these causes have made the study of this branch of our national jurisprudence a little perplexed and intricate. It hath been our endeavour principally to select such parts of it as were of the most general use, where the principles were the most simple, the reasons of them the most obvious, and the practice the least embarrassed. Yet it is not to be presumed that we have always been thoroughly intelligible to such readers, as were before strangers even to the very terms of art of which we have been obliged to make use, though whenever those have first occurred, we have generally attempted a short explication of their meaning. These are indeed the more numerous on account of the different languages which our law has, at different periods, been taught to speak; the difficulty arising from which will insensibly diminish by use and familiar acquaintance. And therefore we shall close this branch of our inquiries with the words of Sir Edward Coke,—“albeit the student

of way, liability to repair highways by reason of tenure, rights of way, watercourses, rights of water and other easements or servitudes, manorial rights and franchises, leases

or agreements for leases for any term not exceeding twenty-one years, where there is occupation under the same.

[“ shall not, at any one day, do what he can, reach to the
 “ full meaning of all that we have laid down, yet let him
 “ no way discourage himself, but proceed; for on some
 “ other day, in some other place,” (or perhaps upon a
 second perusal of the same,) “ his doubts will be probably
 “ removed” (*h*).]

(*h*) Proeme to 1 Inst.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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